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Abstract 
 
As  a  notable  academic,  Marxist  writer  and  one-time  political  activist,  an 
extensive critique of Rudolf Schlesinger’s writings is long overdue. Raised in 
the revolutionary atmosphere of early twentieth century Austria, Schlesinger 
soon became embroiled in central European communism, taking on full-time 
work for the German Communist Party in Berlin, Prague and Moscow. He left 
the Soviet Union during the purges, having been described as ‘alien to the 
party’, and made his way to the UK where he fostered a reputation as an 
informed and prolific scholar. 
 
This investigation is not intended to be a biography of Schlesinger, but rather 
an ‘intellectual biography’, an examination of his monographs, papers, drafts 
and  memoir  reflections.  This  allows  for  an  appreciation  of  his  academic 
contribution  and  an  understanding  of  his  unique  personal  motivation  and 
perspective.  Given  his  experiences,  as  well  as  the  cultural,  political  and 
ideological paradigm from which he emerged, this analysis provides insights 
into  Marxist  theory,  the  labour  movement,  the  Soviet  Union  and  German 
communism.  It  also  throws  light  upon  the  intellectual  climate  in  the  West 
during the cold war, providing a historiographical snapshot of academic Soviet 
studies, particularly in the UK. 
 
The thesis is divided into two sections, with each exploring a different aspect 
of Schlesinger’s writing. The first traces Schlesinger’s theoretical development 
and education, detailing and analysing the impact of Luxemburg, Lenin, Marx 
and Engels on his thought and writing. Schlesinger emerges as a Leninist, 
whose understanding of the dialectical nature of Marxism leads him to seek 
the  next  stage  in  its  development,  since  Lenin’s  revolutionary  successes 
forever altered the socio-economic landscape and thus fated his theories to 
obsolescence. An examination of Schlesinger’s attitude towards Stalin as a 
Marxist theorist illuminates his pragmatic stance regarding the Soviet leader. 
Whilst Stalin’s rule had a considerable human cost and a deleterious impact 
upon Marxist theory, to Schlesinger, his leadership was necessary to further   iii 
the existence of the Soviet state, the sole manifestation of the great social 
democratic experiment. 
 
The  second  section  focuses  on  Schlesinger’s  writings  concerning  Soviet 
historiography.  It  is  possible  to  discern  changes  in  tone,  emphasis  and 
argument  in  his  work  on  this  subject.  A  dichotomy  emerges  between 
Schlesinger’s  positive  portrayal  of  historiographical  developments  in  the 
Soviet  Union  in  papers  written  before  Stalin’s  death  and  his  retrospective 
condemnation of these events after 1953. This latter attitude chimes with his 
personal  memoir  reflections  of  life  as  an  intellectual  in  Stalin’s  Russia,  in 
which he described a highly controlled, academically stagnant society; yet it 
contrasts starkly with his earlier position. It is also possible to detect parallels 
between Schlesinger’s changing emphasis and the dynamics of official Soviet 
attitudes. An explanation is required if Schlesinger is not to be dismissed as 
inconsistent or polemical. 
 
It  is  argued  that  Schlesinger  can  be  accurately  described  as  a  ‘scholar 
advocate’,  both  in  terms  of  a  defender  of  the  Soviet  experiment  and  a 
proponent of Marxism and social democracy. This characterisation allows for 
an  understanding  of  Schlesinger’s  changing  stance  and  motivations  and 
explains  his  apparent  inconsistency.  Schlesinger  was  loyal  to  Marxism  in 
general, but not to the fluctuating dictates of the Russian party. He was not a 
polemicist or propagandist but instead sought to stay loyal to wider Marxist 
ideals and methodology. For Schlesinger, his pragmatism ensured that he did 
not judge events in Russia from the rose-tinted spectacles of utopianism; his 
attitude was not swayed by single events, however tragic, and he was aware 
both of the utility and the transient nature of Stalin’s rule. This helps to explain 
his positive attitude. 
 
In addition, Schlesinger was keen to defend Marxism and the Soviet Union 
against what he perceived as unfair criticism; he sought to counter myths and 
misunderstandings  propagated  by  disillusioned  supporters  and  opponents. 
Schlesinger  consciously  attempted  to  combat  what  he  saw,  and  many 
academics  have  recognised,  as  the  cold  war  bias  of  a  section of  Western   iv 
comment and scholarship. This may, perhaps, have led Schlesinger to paint 
too  optimistic  a  picture  of  the  Soviet  Union,  but  his  work  is  a  useful  and 
necessary  counterbalance  to  other  literature.  Schlesinger  was  no 
propagandist, and recognition of his unique and conscious motivation allows 
for a full appreciation of his rich and varied writings. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Rudolf Schlesinger: Background 
Rudolf Schlesinger was born on 4 February 1901 in Vienna. His father was 
from  an  old  Viennese  Jewish  family.  He  had  attended  university  and  was 
baptised in order to marry Schlesinger’s mother. His mother originated from a 
West German intellectual family, baptised two generations previously in order 
to  gain,  as  Schlesinger  expressed  it,  the  ‘entrance  ticket  to  European 
civilisation’.
1  The  family  were  relatively  prosperous,  intellectual  and 
aspirational, hence the baptisms. 
 
Schlesinger  claimed  that  his  ethnicity  limited  his  social  interaction  in  his 
childhood years. He found racial hatred to be endemic amongst intellectuals 
and the lower middle class within Austrian society and this naturally affected 
his  choice  of  friends.  He  became  aware  of  the  anti-Semitism  he  saw  as 
prevalent  in  Vienna  at  a  very  early  age;  one  of  his  first  nursemaids  was 
dismissed from the household when his mother heard that she had narrated 
an  anti-Semitic  children’s  story  to  Schlesinger  and  his  sister.
2  The  young 
Schlesinger noticed that racial discrimination and hatred were commonplace 
at his school too; some of his teachers were markedly bigoted and fights over 
race issues were common amongst pupils. He soon learnt that nationalists of 
this type had to be treated with fists, feet or whatever else was available;
3 
“heaven, hell or Siberia are the most appropriate places for people who rouse 
racial hatred”.
4 Yet Schlesinger described soon learning at university to regard 
the Zionist organisations as political opponents too.
5  
 
Schlesinger depicted his schooling as supportive but not stimulating. He often 
encountered  difficulties  with  discipline,  his  keenness  to  organise  student 
                                                 
1 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany? (Glasgow University Library, 1953-
1961, Unpublished) Memoirs Volume I, p1. 
2 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, (1944, Unpublished) Band I p. 
6. 
3 Ibid. p. 10. 
4 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 6. 
5 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, pp. 78-9.   2 
representation would lead him into trouble with the school authorities. Even at 
university, Schlesinger remained unsatisfied by the level and tone of learning 
provided  by  its  curriculum.  However,  walking  and  mountaineering  quickly 
became  a  means  of  escape  from  adult  control.  It  remained  an  important 
hobby  throughout  his  life,  offering  peace,  freedom  and  the  possibility  to 
overcome his physical shortcomings – he had suffered from TB early in life, 
leaving him with a shortened leg.
6 
 
According to his memoirs, certain events within Schlesinger’s formative years 
appear to have had a dramatic effect upon his development. He wrote: ‘Under 
the impact of World War One I became a socialist; under the impact of the 
revolution of 1918-1919 I decided to devote my life to service of the socialist 
cause.  Without  the  war,  I  would  have  become  a  somewhat  radical  liberal 
intellectual’.
7  This  description  of  his  path  to  socialism  was  mirrored  and 
expanded upon in an article on Rosa Luxemburg published in 1966. He wrote 
of the influence that Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, as leaders of the 
Marxist Left and the anti-war movement in Germany, had had upon him: ‘The 
present  author  is  not  the  only  one  whom  they,  and  the  Russian  October 
revolution,  helped  to  find  his  way  to  revolutionary  socialism.  (The  war,  in 
isolation, would have produced an indignant pacifism.)’.
8 After the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, Schlesinger began to read Marx and became a 
defeatist, supporting the fall of his own country in the belief this would further 
the revolutionary cause. This development led to a near permanent rupture in 
his  relationship  with  his  father,  an  army  officer.  The  brief  existence  of  the 
Hungarian  Soviet  Republic  also  had  a  deep  impact  upon  his  personal 
development. The joint efforts of Social Democrats and Communists to solve 
the  problems  of  political  power  were  inspirational  to  the  young  student, 
although  Schlesinger  was  still  aware  of  the  Republic’s  sins  of  omission: 
‘Surely they did not do what was necessary to root their power’.
9 
                                                 
6 Ibid. p. 18. 
7 Ibid. p. 23. Where the two versions of the memoirs are very similar, and unless otherwise 
stated, Schlesinger’s translation from German to English has been used. It is assumed that 
he knew best how he wished to express himself. 
8 Schlesinger, ‘Marxism Without an Organizing Party’, Soviet Studies, 18, 2, October 1966, 
pp225-251 at p. 225. 
9 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 42.   3 
The various tremors and aftershocks involved in the collapse of the Hapsburg 
Empire  also  affected  Schlesinger.
10  For  example,  a  demonstration  by  the 
unemployed workers on ‘bloody’ Maundy Thursday 1919 gave Schlesinger a 
picture  of  the  awful  conditions  in  which  the  Viennese  population  were 
struggling. He witnessed starving women risking their lives by rushing into the 
streets, between shots, to take flesh from dead police horses.
11 Schlesinger 
described  his  first  confrontation  with  political  opponents  as  occurring  at 
around  the  same  time.  In  one  incident  at  university,  which  contained  an 
overwhelming  fascist  front  of  both  students  and  staff,  Schlesinger’s 
Association (The Free Association of Socialist Students) invited Otto Bauer to 
speak.
12 Fascists stormed the meeting and, according to Schlesinger, he had 
to run to the nearby left-wing Rossauer barracks to get help. When leaving the 
university he was confronted by a fascist gang and was only able to escape 
by pretending his spectacle case was a revolver.
13 
 
Schlesinger  was  involved  in  a  number  of  organisations  of  the  labour 
movement during his youth in Austria. During the ‘revolution’ of November 
1918, ‘councils’ were formed throughout Austria. The more advanced of the 
youth movement emulated the pattern in schools and Schlesinger described 
doing  so  at  the  Schottengymnasium,  his  own  school.  He  was  immediately 
elected  to  the  Central  Committee  of  the  youth  council  and  became 
responsible  for  its  educational  activities.  He  was  re-elected  by  the  council 
                                                 
10  For  an  academic  treatment  of  this  same  period  in  Austrian  history  by  the  author  see 
Schlesinger,  Central  European  Democracy  and  Its  Background,  (London,  Routledge  and 
Kegan Paul ltd., 1953), pp. 132… For an alternative description, and one hotly disputed by 
Schlesinger, see R. Fischer, Stalin and German Communism, (Cambridge Mass., Harvard 
University  Press,  1948)  pp.  64…,  footnote  14.  Schlesinger  wrote:  ‘Ruth  Fischer  gives  her 
personal  account  of  the  incident,  which  seems  inexact’  (Schlesinger,  Central  European 
Democracy,  p.  143,  footnote  2).  He  disagreed  with  many  elements  of  Fischer’s  book, 
criticising her claim to have written ‘an objective history’ (Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: 
Whither Germany?, p. v.).  
11 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 30-32. 
12 Otto Bauer (1881-1938) was one of the founders of the school of Austro-Marxism and wrote 
on  matters  of  nationalism.  Bauer  joined  the  Social  Democratic  Party  in  1907  and  was  a 
member of the government for a short period following World War One. He was critical of a 
Bolshevik-style revolution and advocated the ‘slow revolution’. For more information see T. 
Bottomore and P Goode, Austro-Marxism (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978). 
13 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 78.   4 
even  when  his  school  failed  to  back  him,  after  an  anti-Semitic  smear 
campaign by a teacher.
14 
 
The  council  soon  brought  him  into  contact  with  the  Free  German  Youth 
Movement,  which  he  enthusiastically  joined.  In  his  memoirs,  Schlesinger 
explained that the Austrian version was much less romantic than the Reich 
one, involving a lot less dancing or national dress. For Schlesinger, its main 
activities  were  walking  and  political  discussions  and  he  noted  the  political 
evolution of diverse trends within the movement. For example, members of its 
right-wing were mainly gentile, lower-middle class males who formed Men’s 
Associations excluding women and Jews. The left-wing of the movement was 
primarily concerned with educational reform. They hoped that the ‘councils’ 
would  become  a  vehicle  for  student  participation  in  curriculum  setting  etc. 
Unfortunately, little was actually accomplished in this direction because many 
students simply wanted to use the ‘council’ to ensure easier exam papers.
15 
 
After an abortive attempt by Schlesinger to unite the Students’ Association 
(the ‘council’), the Communist Young Workers’ Association and the Socialist 
Young Workers’ Association (SYWA) into a loose federation, he joined the 
SYWA as a member of the Education Committee. According to Schlesinger, 
this kind of work made him very aware of his ‘emotional distance’ from the 
average worker.
16 This was a problem he believed was common to many of 
the  best  working-class  activists  and  Schlesinger  found  himself  unable  to 
rationalise the dilemma until five years later when he read Lenin’s ‘What is to 
be Done?’.
17  
 
At university, Schlesinger joined the Free Association of Socialist Students. 
He  described  it  as  a  predominantly  communist,  although  non-sectarian, 
organisation. Schlesinger wrote that communist students did little actual party 
work,  since  the  Austrian  Communist  Party  left  its  students  to  study  and 
                                                 
14 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 23. 
15 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 31. 
16 Ibid. p. 38. 
17 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 37-38, Lenin, Polnoe sobranie 
sochinenii , (Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe, Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1958) 6, pp. 1-
192.   5 
prepare  for  their  eventual  role  in  the  service  of  the  labour  movement.  He 
contrasted this attitude with that of the KPD where: ‘… the young intellectual’s 
usefulness  for  the  Communist  Youth  Association  was  measured  by  the 
number of evenings devoted to organisational life and street propaganda’.
18 
Schlesinger felt that this was to the detriment of the young party members’ 
studies. 
 
Schlesinger  joined  the  Austrian  Communist  Party  in  1921  but  was  always 
relatively  critical  of  its  policies  and  leaders.  He  felt  that  communist 
propaganda during the revolutionary period contained more enthusiasm than 
actual understanding of political realities. He cited Elfriede Friedländer’s (Ruth 
Fischer) speech in the Soviet Congress of June 1919 as an example of this. 
She closed her talk with a call to assume power saying: ‘Follow the way on 
[in]  which  Rosa  Luxemburg  has  preceded  us,  the  way  of  triumph  and  of 
death’.
19 Yet the Chairman of the Soldiers’ Council then outlined the technical 
conditions necessary for a successful struggle and demonstrated that many 
were wholly lacking: over one hundred machine guns, for example.  
 
Having gained his doctorate, Schlesinger moved to Berlin, in February 1923, 
to begin work for the Soviet economist Eugene Varga.
20 Now politically active, 
he joined the KPD immediately on arrival in Germany, eventually taking on full 
                                                 
18 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 69. 
19 Ibid. p. 38. There is an error in the page number ordering within this edition. The numbers 
read 37, 38, 39, 37, 38, 39, 40… This quote is taken from the second p. 38. Ruth Fischer 
(1895-1961) was born Elfride Eisler. She helped to found the Austrian Communist Party in 
November 1918 but moved to Berlin in 1919 and became active in the KPD. In 1924 the left, 
including Fischer and her then partner Arkadi Maslow, took over leadership of the KPD and 
she also entered parliament as a communist deputy. In 1925 the Comintern sent an open 
letter to the KPD criticising their leadership. They were expelled from the party the next year. 
Fischer  then  traveled  throughout  Europe  and  Asia,  briefly  living  in  the  US,  and  published 
books  on  the  history  of  communism  (B.  Lazitch  and  M.  M.  Drachkovitch,  Biographical 
Dictionary of the Comintern (Stanford, The Hoover Institute Press, 1986), p. 119). Schlesinger 
appears to have been mistaken about Fischer’s original name.  
20 Ibid. p. 96-97. Jenö (Eugen) Varga (1879-1964) was born in Hungary. He was commissar 
for finance and chairman of the supreme economic council during the brief Hungarian Soviet 
Republic. After its collapse, Varga fled to Austria and then to Russia where he joined the party 
and was active in Comintern. As an economist, Varga wrote a great deal on planning and 
economic problems. In 1927 he became head of the Institute of World Economy and Politics 
and was elected  to  the  Academy of  Science  in 1939.  Despite  occasionally falling foul of 
orthodoxy,  Varga  remained  a  key  figure  in  the  Soviet  Union  until  his  death  (Lazitch  and 
Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, pp. 492-493). For more information 
on Varga, see, T. Remington, ‘Varga and the Foundation of Soviet Planning’, Soviet Studies, 
34, 4, Oct. 1982, pp. 585-600.   6 
time  work  for  the  party  in  spring  1925.  On  22  May  of  the  same  year 
Schlesinger  married  Mila  Sellvig,  a  communist  party  worker,  in  a  secret 
ceremony at Werbellin Lake. They took part in an official, civil ceremony three 
years later at the insistence of a landlord.
21 They remained together for the 
rest of his life. 
 
Schlesinger remained a committed and active member of the KPD until his 
expulsion in 1937. He had many different roles and undertook various tasks 
for the party. He witnessed and participated in many of its key events: the 
aborted revolutionary  attempts  in 1923;
22  the  repercussions  of  Comintern’s 
‘Open Letter’ to the party; the development of the theory of ‘social fascism’ in 
1928/9 and the failure of the May Day demonstrations and strikes in 1929 are 
just a few examples. The fluctuations of the KPD party majority involved an 
ever-changing body of leaders and theoreticians and Schlesinger sometimes 
found himself in agreement with the party majority. In his memoirs, he wrote, 
‘… my support for Thälmann in 1928-30, and for Ulbricht in 1933-4 was free 
from any mental reservation’.
23 During such periods, Schlesinger was able to 
enjoy more responsible party positions and an increased influence. At other 
times,  he  found  himself  unable  to  agree  with  the  tactical  and  theoretical 
assumptions made by the majority. This would inevitably impact upon his role 
within the party and he would often have to resort to freelance journalism or 
the  role  of  an  isolated  theorist,  until  such  time  as  the  dominant  faction 
                                                 
21 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 188. 
22  Again,  a  more  scholarly  treatment  of  these  issues  by  Schlesinger  can  be  found  in 
Schlesinger,  Central  European  Democracy,  p.  212…  and  Fischer,  Stalin  and  German 
Communism, p. 291… 
23 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, (1944, Unpublished) Band II, p. 232. 
Ernst Thälmann (1886-1944) was a member of the USPD when it’s left-wing merged with the 
KPD  in  1920.  He  was  on  the  left  of  the  party  and  took  part  in  the  abortive  Hamburg 
insurrection during the German October of 1923. He became chairman of the KPD in 1925 
despite the explusion of his left-wing peers. Thälmann survived the ‘Wittorf affair’, in which he 
attempted to cover up the appropriation of party funds by a member of the CC, and remained 
a member of the Presidium of Comintern and on the CC of the KPD for the remainder of his 
life. He was arrested by the Nazis in 1933 and was executed in Buchenwald concentration 
camp  in  August  1944.  Walter  Ulbricht  (1893-1973)  became  a  member  of  the  KPD  on  its 
founding in 1918. He became a member of the CC in 1923 and remained so, except for the 
period of left-wing dominance in the mid-1920s. After a few months undertaking underground 
partywork, Ulbricht left Germany for Prague in October 1933. He took part in the Spanish Civil 
War before settling in Moscow in 1938, where he found work at Comintern. In 1945 Ulbricht 
returned to Berlin and became vice-chairman of the SED in April 1946 and eventually first 
Secretary and head of the East German State until his resignation in May 1971(Lazitch and 
Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, pp. 465-467 and pp. 486-487).    7 
changed its opinions or was replaced. In fact, Schlesinger was so at odds with 
the  party  line  in  early  1926  that  he  was  sent  to  Russia  to  work  for  the 
International Agrarian Institute; like many of his comrades Schlesinger spent 
time in Moscow in order to ‘sit out his uklon’- deviation from the party line of 
the majority.
24 Deviationists were sent to be schooled by the Russian party 
and  to  correct  their  theoretical  positions  or  await  a  time  when  their  own 
attitude  became  that  of  the  party  majority.  Schlesinger,  having  made  the 
necessary adjustments to his party line, returned to Germany in April 1927 
and resumed KPD work. 
 
In his unpublished memoirs, Schlesinger described many of the key events in 
KPD history in the 1920s and early 1930s. His description of the development 
of the theory of ‘social fascism’ is perhaps one of the most interesting, as it 
puts Schlesinger at the epicentre of the theoretical evolution of the party. With 
the increasing success of fascism in the late 1920s, the KPD sought a new 
theoretical  line  on  which  to  base  its  tactical  decisions.  The  key  theory  to 
emerge  from  this  debate  was  that  of  ‘social  fascism’;  whereby  the  main 
enemy  of  communism  and  the  labour  movement  was  Social  Democracy, 
rather than Nazism.
25 According to the theory, Social Democracy and its party 
had  increasingly  collaborated  with  the  bourgeois  government  to  create  an 
authoritarian  and  fascistic  state, all  propaganda  and  tactical  considerations 
should therefore be directed towards exposing its true nature.
26 This theory 
was  of  little  use  when  encouraging  resistance  to  fascism  and  led  to  a 
disastrous underestimation of Hitler’s appeal and support.  
 
 As Schlesinger explained: ‘I had been one of the first who had coined the 
term, and I immediately made my effort at elaborating the concept – not quite 
on those lines on which it soon became a popular slogan and greatly harmed 
                                                 
24 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 202. 
25 Fischer, Stalin and German Communism, p. 655-656. 
26 The use of ‘social fascist’ as a derogatory label has been traced as far back as November 
1922 in  the  Soviet newspaper Izvestiia. In early 1924 Zinoviev and  Stalin spoke  of social 
democracy transforming into ‘a wing of fascism’. However, the concept was not developed 
until the late 1920s (McDermott K, and Agnew J., The Comintern A History of International 
Communism from Lenin  to  Stalin (London,  MacMillan Press Ltd.) p. 98).  Schlesinger may 
have been unaware of its earlier origins and was referring to his part in the evolution of its 
later, more developed formulation.    8 
our struggle against fascism’.
27 Schlesinger participated in the debates that 
led to the theory’s elaboration but disagreed with its eventual development 
into a slogan that suggested all Social Democrats were, in fact, fascists. In 
early 1929, under his regular pseudonym of Rudolf Gerber, Schlesinger wrote 
an article upon the foundations of ‘social fascism’, published in Communist 
International.
28 According to his memoirs, he also wrote a report on the same 
subject to the Central Committee of the KPD in February 1929. He argued 
that the German state was becoming characteristic of a fascist state because 
of monopoly capitalism’s tendency to directly control the state machine. There 
was also a tendency amongst trade unions and political parties to become 
direct supporters of the state instead of representatives of distinct sectional 
interests. These groups were then, ‘… collaborating with the employers on a 
corporative  basis  and  handling  the  broad  masses  of  the  workers  with  a 
combination of terror and demagogic phraseology’.
29 There had also been a 
change in the character of the ‘workers aristocracy’. It no longer consisted of 
skilled workers, since their position had been undermined by mechanisation 
and  rationalisation.  There  was  now  a  new  privileged  group  consisting  of 
foremen, supervisors and those employed in the state machine or in municipal 
or cooperative enterprises. This group, once bribed with the promise of job 
security,  willingly  collaborated  with  the  state.  It  gained  control  of  the  trade 
unions and Social Democratic party organisations and proceeded to use them 
as instruments of repression against the revolutionary workers’ movement. In 
light of these new developments, the KPD’s struggle to gain the loyalty of the 
broad  mass  of  Social  Democratic  workers  should  not  aim  at  winning  over 
parts of the reformist machine; this pursuit was hopeless since that machine 
was now part of the problem. The KPD should instead explain to the Social 
Democrat  workers  that,  ‘…  their  party  as  such  had  become  a  tool  of  the 
fascisation of Germany and that, in the decisive hour, it would be found on the 
other side of the barricade’.
30 A struggle along these lines would be made 
easier by the fact that the new ‘workers aristocracy’ was much narrower and, 
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in  its  fight  against  communism,  was  now  opposing  even  the  traditions  of 
bourgeois democracy. 
 
 Schlesinger  explained  that  he  was  less  concerned  about  whether  Social 
Democratic  workers  would  be  prepared  to  give  up  their  party  tickets  than 
whether they would join the revolutionary struggle against the advice of their 
leaders. Schlesinger used the expression ‘left-wing social fascists’ in terms of 
insincere  Social  Democrat  leaders  but  was  very  much  against  its 
generalisation. However, despite his protests, the term ‘social fascism’ quickly 
became a popular slogan within the KPD and came to mean that all non-
communist parties were fascist. Later in his memoirs, he referred to the theory 
of ‘social fascism’ as ‘my unwanted child’.
31 Schlesinger offered a unique and 
insightful analysis of this important theoretical concept. His contemporary and 
retrospective descriptions provide useful information on what a middle-ranking 
party activist felt about party developments. It also helps to clarify the limits of 
Schlesinger’s influence upon the party; he was respected enough to submit a 
report to the central committee and have a paper published in Comintern’s 
central  international  organs,  yet  he  had  no real  impact on  the  definition  of 
‘social fascism’ adopted by the KPD. 
 
Schlesinger continued his varied KPD roles throughout the 1920s. He was to 
play a decisive part in the, ultimately unsuccessful, Mansfeld strike of June 
and July 1930, involving workers in the area’s copper mines and foundries as 
well  as  the  local  unemployed  populace.
32  Schlesinger  opted  to  stay  in 
Germany after Hitler’s rise to power, going underground on 30 June 1933 in 
order to continue illegal KPD work against the Nazis.
33 On 7 August 1933 he 
was arrested and taken to the notorious General Pape Street headquarters of 
the SA and then the equally infamous Columbia House.
34 After two weeks of 
torture  and  imprisonment,  Schlesinger’s  wife,  Mila,  was  able  to  secure  his 
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release and expulsion to Austria on account of his citizenship.
35 
 
Schlesinger and Mila then moved to Prague and settled into émigré life. He 
organised educational activities for other German exiles and worked closely 
with Joseph Lenz, an old friend and German correspondent of the Communist 
Press  Agency.
36  However,  after  becoming  involved  with  internal  KPD 
squabbles, Schlesinger was ordered to move to the Soviet Union by the KPD 
representatives in Russia. They wished to investigate him in person.
37 The 
investigation  produced  nothing  against  Schlesinger  and  in  early  1935  he 
began  work  as  the  editor  of  the  German  edition  of  the  Communist 
International in Moscow.
38 
 
Schlesinger was in the Soviet Union at the time of the first ‘purge’ trial and 
was himself subject to the process of investigation and expulsion. Despite this 
he remained a strong supporter of both the party and the Soviet Union. In his 
memoirs, he stated: ‘My expulsion from the party was the hardest experience 
of my life, incomparably harder than the two occasions where I had to face 
death in its least desirable forms, in General Pape street and later in England 
when I had to undergo a serious operation because of cancer’.
39 He explained 
that Mila was actually pleased he was in bed with flu when his party group 
suggested his expulsion, because she feared he might have had a breakdown 
if present. His whole life had been the party and to be without it had, until 
then, been inconceivable. Yet at the time, Schlesinger believed that there was 
indeed a general conspiracy against Stalin. There must, therefore, have been 
a wider belt of sympathisers. As Schlesinger later wrote in his memoirs, he, 
‘… granted the party the right, if it suspected someone to belong to that belt 
even  if  being  incapable  of  proving  it,  to  expel  him  so  as  to  avoid  future 
mischief, the assumption being that, if the suspicion should prove unfounded, 
the  party  would  make  amends  to  those  innocently  expelled’.
40  In  an 
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anonymous paper to the journal Pacific Affairs written the year after he left the 
Soviet Union, Schlesinger insisted on the reality of an anti-Stalin conspiracy 
that justified the ‘purges’. He wrote: ‘That serious trouble existed is proven by 
the mere fact of the trials, whatever one may think of their details, for the 
holding of the trials was so detrimental to the repute abroad of the Soviet 
Union that it can hardly be assumed that they were ‘trumped up’’.
41 According 
to  Schlesinger,  even  when  the  full  scale  of  the  ‘purges’  emerged  and  it 
became clear, ‘… at least the majority of charges levelled against the victims 
of  the  ‘great  purge’’  were  trumped  up’,  Schlesinger  remained  a  Soviet 
sympathiser  and  a  member  of  the  communist  party  in  the  wider  Marxist 
sense.
42    He  believed  that  subsequent  information  about  the  ‘purges’  had 
justified  the  behaviour  of  those,  like  Schlesinger,  who  would  not  let  their 
attitude  towards  the  Soviet  Union  be  determined  by  a  ‘tragic  episode’.  On 
reflection, his opinion was that: 
 
The ‘purge’ was a violent and to a large extent criminal way of 
carrying out the unavoidable change of generations, to replace 
those whose ways of thought had been nurtured by the need of 
overthrowing the old society by people grown up in the new one 
and knowing no other aims than its gradual strengthening and 
development.
43 
 
The purges were violent and criminal but seemingly essential or unavoidable. 
 
Schlesinger  described  the  atmosphere  within  the  party  as  becoming 
increasingly  tense  over  the  summer  of  1936,  with  Schlesinger  himself 
becoming concerned when learning of the arrest of people that he actually 
knew  –  mainly  Russians  working  within  the  German  party.
44  In  July  the 
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German  representative  at  Comintern  informed  Schlesinger  of  the  arrest  of 
Emel Lurye, a member of the KPD and a historian at Moscow University.
45 As 
party procedure dictated, he immediately told the representative frankly of his 
relationship  to  Emel.  It  was  of  a  purely  social  nature  having  had  factional 
disagreements  in  the  past.  However,  Schlesinger  was  surprised  at  Emel’s 
arrest. He assumed that historians at the University formed academic cliques 
–  this  would  explain  Emel’s  tendency  to  cut  short  phone  conversations  in 
Schlesinger’s  presence,  but  his  having  formed  a  clique  did  not  seem  a 
sufficient  explanation  for  his  arrest.  He  had  been  an  oppositionist  and, 
perhaps, had continued to be so after falsely submitting to the party majority. 
But  no  one  in  Schlesinger’s  circle  could have  regarded  him  as  a  potential 
terrorist.   
 
On the day before Schlesinger went on holiday to the Caucasus he learnt of 
the arrest of Fritz David.
46 David had been editor of the German edition of 
Communist International and, on promotion to the chief Editorial Board, he 
had secured his old job for Schlesinger. He also worked for Wilhelm Pieck, 
the chairman of the German Politburo, as something amounting to personal 
secretary.
47 Since the information about his arrest was told to Schlesinger in 
confidence,  he  did  not  feel  able  to  make  any  declaration  regarding  his 
relationship with David. He described being very shocked at the arrest: ‘David 
had never belonged to any opposition within the party (in his confession he 
stated that Trotsky himself was surprised at him embracing Trotskyism – how 
could I have expected it!)’.
48 Schlesinger explained that if he had had to locate 
David politically, both in that year in Moscow and during their diverse contacts 
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in Germany, he would have placed him slightly on the right of the broad range 
of  political  views  which  made  up  the  German  party  majority;  just  as 
Schlesinger tended to be near its left fringe. In fact, such was his surprise at 
David’s arrest that Schlesinger immediately feared he was an enemy agent. 
However, his frank ventilation of heterodox views within private discussions 
seemed  to  contradict  this  initial  suspicion.  His  arrest  was,  therefore,  a 
mystery. 
 
Whilst on holiday, Schlesinger was able to get details of the first ‘purge’ trial 
from  Moscow  newspapers.
49  He  described  his  amazement  on  reading  that 
Kirov  had  not  been  killed  by  an  individual  on  the  fanatical  fringe  of  the 
Zinoviev group, as he had previously assumed, but by a concerted group of 
Zinovievites, including Emel. Even stranger than the terrorism of the Zinoviev 
group  was the  revelation  that  David  was  an  individual  terrorist  working for 
Trotsky and preparing an attempt upon Stalin’s life.  At this time, Schlesinger 
believed  that  the  Soviet  Government  would  not  groundlessly arrest  a  well-
connected person such as David and that there would not have been a trial if 
no actual conspiracy existed. Schlesinger asserted that he never discovered 
what it was that David actually did to cause his arrest but still believed that a 
person so closely associated with the chairman of the KPD would not have 
been randomly made an example of for political purposes. 
 
Schlesinger noticed on his return from the Caucasus that the editorial office 
had developed a tense atmosphere. The former head of the department had 
been expelled from the party for his having advocated David’s appointment. 
Other investigations were in the process of being prepared and amongst them 
was one on Schlesinger. The issue of Communist International he had edited 
before going on holiday was subject to a special review to determine whether, 
as well as demonstrating a lack of vigilance as regards David, he had been 
consciously distorting the party line.
50 The Commission reported a number of 
stylistic mistakes but no political tendency.  
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 The real focus of the investigation was Schlesinger’s relationship to David 
and several issues were central to the argument. The first was Schlesinger’s 
political  past.  Everyone  knew  of  his  former  connection  to  Ruth  Fischer’s 
group, yet the ten years since he had publicly broken with them had been 
those  of  his  most  responsible  party  positions.  Besides,  according  to 
Schlesinger, there were few in the KPD who had not, at some time, been 
involved with a group that had since been condemned. The second issue was 
that David had proposed Schlesinger for his editorial job. Schlesinger wrote in 
his memoirs: ‘David was a counterrevolutionary; hence David had proposed 
me  for  counterrevolutionary  purposes,  namely  in  order  to  have  tolerable 
surroundings in which he would not be denounced’.
51 Schlesinger responded 
that David had other obvious reasons for proposing Schlesinger, his editorial 
experience and knowledge of Russian, for example. He also argued that in 
ventilating  his  private  views  and  tactical  ideas,  David  had  never  exceeded 
acceptable  deviations  from  the  party  line.  Yet  Schlesinger  was  deemed  to 
have been insufficiently vigilant in his dealings with the ‘traitor’ David and was 
thus declared ‘alien to the party’ and encouraged to leave the country. It was 
agreed that he could not have known of David’s terrorism but Schlesinger was 
guilty of ‘liberalism’, in the sense of a readiness to frankly air disagreements 
within the party, something no longer desirable or tolerated. Schlesinger was 
regarded as a helper of treason, however involuntarily. Thus, he wrote, ‘… an 
example had to be made with a person who certainly was not involved in the 
conspiracies  (otherwise  it  would  have  been  no  example  of  the  necessary 
suppression of ‘liberalism’ but another treason case)’.
52  
 
Being ‘alien to the party’ rather than ‘anti-party’, official party bodies offered 
him  advice  and  material  help  for  the  first  few  months  after  expulsion, 
something that he thought demonstrated a reasonable attitude within Russian 
party circles towards those expelled for lack of vigilance.
53 He determined to 
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return to Prague, from where he could, in his own words, ‘… refute, not a 
certain sociological concept of the party, but the assertion that Rudolf Gerber 
was morally capable of lending any support to the enemies of the USSR or of 
his party’.
54 He would counter the label of ‘alien to the party’ by remaining 
faithful to the Soviet Union whilst in the West. Yet on his return to Europe, 
Schlesinger  found  it  nearly  impossible  to  publish,  due  to  the  stigma  of 
expulsion.  Mila  also  suffered  from  Schlesinger’s  expulsion.  According  to 
Schlesinger, in Moscow no one had questioned her party membership, yet in 
Prague her repeated request for admission to normal party work was met with 
the  response  from  the  German  party  organisation  that,  ‘…  you  must 
understand, Rudolf’s case slightly stains you’.
55 
 
With the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia in early 1939, Schlesinger and Mila 
were  forced  to  flee  to  Poland.  They  escaped  on  foot  over  the  Carpathian 
Mountains and, from Poland, were able to secure a place on a refugee ship 
from Gydnia to Britain on 21 April.
56 In England they were provided with some 
money by a fund for refugee scholars and lived in an abandoned cottage in 
the Fens near Cambridge.
57 Schlesinger was eventually to secure work at the 
University of Glasgow in 1948 and, as well as being a lecturer and researcher, 
he became co-editor of the journal Soviet Studies and founder of the journal 
Co-existence.  He  also  spent  time  as  a  visiting  professor  at  Sir  George 
Williams University in Canada.
58 He retired in 1966 and died at his home in 
Argyllshire on 11 November 1969.  
 
 
Why study Rudolf Schlesinger? 
Rudolf Schlesinger remains a relatively unknown figure within the history of 
socialism, both as an active fighter within its ranks and as a theoretician and 
academic.  Nevertheless,  he  is  worthy  of  detailed  study  for  a  great  many 
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reasons, not least because of the sheer number and scale of movements and 
events  in  which  he  was  personally  involved.  Schlesinger  lived,  at  various 
times, in Austria, Germany, the Soviet Union, the Czechoslovak Republic and 
Great  Britain.  He  was  deeply  involved  in  political  developments  and 
participated in, or witnessed, significant events in many of these countries – 
the  collapse  of  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy  and  Hitler’s  invasion  of 
Czechoslovakia are just two examples. 
 
Schlesinger was well educated with a distinguished publishing career. He was 
a keen, intelligent observer who was able to successfully put his memories, 
thoughts  and  feelings  to  paper,  inevitably  enhancing  his  reputation  as  an 
academic,  the  locus  of  this  investigation.  Schlesinger  was  born  into  an 
intellectual  family  and  attended  the  Schottengymnasium,  Vienna’s  most 
renowned secondary school.
59 He then attended the University of Vienna from 
autumn 1919, initially to read medicine but deciding upon social sciences after 
his  first  year.
60  On  arrival  in  Berlin  in February  1923  he began  work  as  a 
professional economist in a research institute associated with Comintern (The 
Communist  International).
61  From  February  1926  to  April  1927  Schlesinger 
worked  in  Moscow  as  the  German  member  of  the  International  Agrarian 
Institute,  researching  agrarian  problems  in  Central  and  Western  Europe, 
especially  Germany.
62  From  1939  onwards  Schlesinger  continued  his 
scholarly activities in Britain, eventually to work as a lecturer and researcher 
at  the  University  of Glasgow.  He  published  academic and  theoretical  work 
throughout his life on a vast number of differing topics including Soviet foreign 
policies, Marxist philosophy and Soviet legal theory.
63  Schlesinger became 
an expert in many academic disciplines. He trained as an economist but was 
also a proficient and well respected sociologist, historian and political theorist. 
As his obituary in the academic journal Soviet Studies noted: “His wide variety 
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of  interests  and  encyclopaedic  knowledge  of  the  Soviet  Union  made  him 
invaluable  to  the  students  of  the  Institute  [Institute  of  Soviet  and  East 
European  Studies]  and  of  the  University  as  a  whole  and  especially  to  his 
colleagues”.
64 
 
Another pertinent factor making the study of Schlesinger in general, and his 
writings in particular, so valuable is the fact that he was a professional writer. 
Schlesinger not only wrote as part of his scholarly work but was also a prolific 
contributor to the communist press. In fact, many of his party posts within the 
KPD (German Communist Party) were as a freelance writer or editor of party 
organs. For example, in spring 1925 Schlesinger moved to Halle to work as 
an editor for Klassenkampf, a KPD provincial daily.
65 After a gap of a number 
of years Schlesinger became the organ’s chief editor in autumn 1928.
66 In 
1935-6 Schlesinger became editor of the German edition of The Communist 
International  and  worked  within  Comintern headquarters  in  Moscow.
67  This 
editorial and journalistic experience would have enabled Schlesinger to gain 
particularly good writing and observational skills. One can assume that these 
skills would be used to the full in his publications and thus suggests that a 
thorough critique of them is worthwhile. 
 
Rudolf  Schlesinger  performed  a  vast  number  of  roles  within  the  labour 
movement.  He  was  an  eyewitness  to  many  decisive  occurrences  and  his 
perception of such matters would be of undoubted benefit to historians. He 
was also an organiser within the labour movement, a Marxist theoretician, an 
editor, an underground activist and, at times, an isolated intellectual. These 
different roles allowed Schlesinger to view the European labour movement 
from many perspectives. His varying functions also gave him the opportunity 
to  associate  with  a  great  number  of  people  from  many  different  countries, 
backgrounds and political affiliations, something which would inevitably add to 
the depth of Schlesinger’s experiences and thus promote him as an object of 
historical investigation. In fact, Schlesinger came to know many key figures 
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within  the  labour  movement  and  the  history  of  the  twentieth  century.  For 
example, at various times he enjoyed a close association with Ruth Fischer 
and Arkadi Maslow.
68 At university he became friends with the sons of the co-
founder of the German Communist Party (KPD), Karl Liebknecht, and made 
the aquaintance of leading Austro-Marxist Otto Bauer. In Germany he worked 
under  the  reputable  economist  Eugen  Varga  and  maintained  working 
relationships with many key intellectuals within the socialist fold. During his 
first stay in Moscow, he came into contact with Stalin, since his wife, Allilueva, 
was Schlesinger’s librarian and personal secretary.
69 
 
Schlesinger was unique in several ways. This makes a study of his academic 
writings  worthwhile  and  overdue.  He  was  both  a  politically  active  and 
theoretical man, a combination Schlesinger no doubt adopted from Marx.
70 
Schlesinger was unquestionably an active worker within the Communist party 
machine, both in Germany and the Soviet Union: he spent the two months of 
the Mansfeld strike of 1930 racing around the district on a motorbike with his 
colleague  Willy  Dolgner  acting as  party  liaison  for  the  strikers  and  making 
public  speeches  of  encouragement.
71  He  also  played  an  active role  in  the 
Berlin  underground  after  the  KPD  was  outlawed  on  Hitler’s  accession  to 
power. For example, he produced information sheets for factory and district 
newspapers, from which local editors could pick out relevant material.
72 Yet 
alongside  this  active  party  work,  Schlesinger  was  also  a  theoretician  and 
academic,  researching  and  writing  numerous  publications,  as  mentioned 
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above.  There  are  other  examples  of  people  within  this  category.  Rosa 
Luxemburg and Lenin were a combination of the theoretical and the active. 
Yet both died at a relatively young age and thus did not have the opportunity 
to reflect upon events fully and write memoirs of their experiences. Perhaps 
Ruth  Fischer  and  Trotsky  are  also  examples,  but  their  later  writings  and 
recollections seem coloured by overt political agendas to a far greater extent 
than Schlesinger’s. 
 
Schlesinger also occupied a relatively unique historiographical position. He 
was  a  participant  and  eyewitness  to  many  important  events  in  the  labour 
movement and the history of socialism in the first half of the twentieth century, 
yet completed his analysis and recollection of these events in the West, much 
later. Living in the West, he was free from the ideological constraints placed 
upon Soviet scholars and memoirists. Yet he also appeared relatively free of 
the  bitterness  that  often  accompanied  the  writings  of  those  who  had 
emigrated or been expelled from communists parties and the Soviet Union. 
 
A study of Schlesinger is of value to students of history and political thought 
because of his reputation as an academic within the UK. He co-founded and 
edited  the  multi-disciplinary  journal  Soviet  Studies.  This  reputable 
publication helped to establish Soviet studies as an academic discipline in 
its own right. As the co-founder J. Miller pointed out, both editors wished for 
the  publication  to  be  accessible  to  all  scholars,  regardless  of  political 
complexion:  
 
Schlesinger and I were both communists, in very different ways, 
but it never occurred to us that Soviet Studies could be anything 
other  than  a  vehicle  for  the  purpose  of  publishing  any 
reasonably serious scholar, the more empirical the better, who 
cared to use it…. When the late Naum Jasny, who was at the 
opposite pole to Schlesinger amongst serious students of the   20 
USSR, found publication difficult in the United States we both 
encouraged him to the utmost to use Soviet Studies.
73 
 
Schlesinger’s  commitment  to  academic  integrity,  especially  as  regards  his 
editorial role, is demonstrated in private correspondence between Miller and 
the  then  Principal  of  Glasgow  University,  Sir  Hector  Hetherington.  In  1951 
Miller wrote of a, ‘…tenet, which he [Schlesinger] holds in practice as well as 
in  theory  and  as  firmly  as  anybody  ever  will,  namely  that  the  editors,  as 
trustees of their office, must maintain standards of scholarship’.
74 According to 
Miller, although often ‘blinkered’ by his ‘own intellectual idiom’, Schlesinger 
strove for ‘objectivity’.
75 His administration of the periodical provides evidence 
of an academic endeavouring to create an objective forum for the discussion 
of all questions related to the study of the Soviet Union. 
 
Whilst  at  Glasgow  University  Schlesinger  contributed  prolifically  to  the 
journal.
76 He also lectured on the subjects of Marxism, the Soviet Union, and 
its legal theory. One of his final acts within academia was to help establish 
and edit the journal Co-existence from 1963 until his death in 1969. As D. 
Nelson,  the  editor  of  its  successor  International  Politics  pointed  out,  this 
international journal,  
 
…provided  an  insistent  and  innovative  reminder  that  the 
problems  of  statecraft  and  governance  were  not  merely 
explained by ideological distinctions or the differences between 
developed  and  underdeveloped  world.  In  an  era  when  little 
constructive  dialogue  existed  across  East-West  ideological 
divides  or  North-South  developmental  chasms,  Co-existence 
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offered much of lasting significance while widening the audience 
of scholars from both sides of Cold War divides.
77 
 
Once again, Schlesinger demonstrated his commitment to the provision of a 
multi-disciplinary academic forum. Co-existence was intended to facilitate the 
free discussion of issues across political, cultural and developmental divides. 
As Schlesinger wrote in the first issue of the journal, ‘Marx, indeed foresaw 
that socialism will rescue mankind from barbarism in its struggle for survival. 
Yet this journal is not produced by socialists for socialists, but is intended to 
offer a broad forum for discussion’.
78 He made his political allegiance clear but 
sought to provide an open journal that conformed to the strictest scholarly 
integrity and countered prevailing cold war tendencies. 
 
Schlesinger was viewed by some peers as one of a small circle of intellectuals 
and academics with expertise on what was still a new subject. For example, in 
1947 Miller wrote in an initial proposal for Soviet Studies: ‘The outstanding 
five  or  six  authorities  on  the  USSR  in  Britain  (Dobb,  Baykov,  Sumner, 
Rothstein,  Schlesinger  and  E.  H.  Carr)  are  all  very  interested  in  the 
proposal’.
79  It  was  clear  to  Miller  that  Schlesinger  was  an  ‘outstanding 
authority’. In 1951 he wrote, ‘… Schlesinger, in his books and articles, is doing 
a lot of spadework in helping to lay the foundations for work on Russia as a 
scholarly  subject’.
80  At  this  time  his  academic  pre-eminence,  and  notoriety 
within  the  cold  war  context,  was  thought  to  be  as  great  as  other  notable 
scholars  of  his  generation,  such  as  I.  Deutscher  and  E.  H.  Carr.  In  fact 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, the academic and one-time US national security advisor, 
was reported to have said that alongside Carr and Deutscher, Schlesinger 
was one of the most dangerous scholars in the UK.
81 Schlesinger certainly 
contributed significantly to the establishment of Soviet studies as an academic 
discipline. 
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Methodological/Theoretical foundations of the thesis 
The first thing to make clear is that this thesis in not a biography of Rudolf 
Schlesinger. The approach taken assumes an immutable separation between 
the  object  of  study  and  the  study  itself.  Whilst  source  material  and 
publications exist which allow for a perception of Schlesinger the man, any 
representation of him could never be anything near to complete or accurate. 
The study is too far removed from the object. Therefore, one cannot hope to 
fully  comprehend  Schlesinger  as  a  ‘personality’  or  effectively  communicate 
that to others.  
 
As eminent historian A. J. P. Taylor has noted, psychologists and Freudians 
argue  that  the  most  important  thing  when  studying  an  individual  is  the 
subject’s unconscious mind: 
 
This is all very well when the psychologist or perhaps even the 
historian has personal contacts with a living man. Even the most 
uninstructed  of  us  can  form  some  sort  of  impression,  noting 
whether our subject is bad-tempered, vain or sympathetic…. But 
how do you interview a dead man? The answer is: you guess. 
The psychologist takes concepts that he has derived from living 
subjects and imposes them on dead ones. The results are far 
from satisfactory.
82 
 
There  will,  thus,  be  no  psychoanalytical  investigation  based  on  the  self-
conscious  utterances  of  memoirs  in  an  attempt  to  gauge  Schlesinger’s 
‘unconscious mind’.  
 
According to Taylor, the task of a biographer and that of a historian are very 
different things. The biographer,  
 
… claims to know what his subject was thinking as well as what 
his  subject  was  doing.  He  writes  confidently  of  his  subject’s 
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aims even when they were not revealed at that time. He often 
provides us with a vivid picture of the subject’s thoughts. As a 
result  each  biographer  presents  an  entirely  different  version, 
based more on conjecture than on evidence.
83 
 
In contrast, the historian must be constantly aware of what he/she does not, 
and perhaps cannot, know about their subject. Conjecture must be kept to a 
minimum  and  clearly  labelled  as  such,  and  there  can  be  little  reason  to 
suggest what was in the subject’s thoughts. 
 
This investigation also makes no attempt to provide a detailed narrative or 
description  of  Schlesinger’s  life.  This  is,  once  again,  due  to  scepticism 
regarding the scholarly efficacy of ‘biography’ and also because of a lack of 
source  material  to  substantiate  the  information  given  in  Schlesinger’s 
memoirs. Details of his non-scholarly activities and home life have only been 
added to considerations of his academic writings in order to provide a context 
for them, when appropriate. 
 
This is, instead, an ‘intellectual biography’, an investigation of Schlesinger’s 
intellectual  career  and  achievements.  It  consists  of  an  examination  of  his 
scholarly  writings,  a  critique  of  their  contents  and  an  enquiry  into  their 
academic value both for his peers and subsequent generations. This is done 
with particular reference to his writings on Marxism and the Soviet historical 
field,  in order  to  determine  his  peculiar  political,  intellectual  and  theoretical 
paradigm.   
 
However, this investigation is more than simply an ‘intellectual biography’. It 
uses Schlesinger’s work, and the investigation and critique of it, to refocus on 
the Soviet Union’s history. The thesis should throw new light on aspects of 
Soviet history and society, as well as illuminating the value of Schlesinger as 
an academic to peers and modern students. It will also provide an insight into 
the work of a Western Marxist intellectual during the cold war. This is due to 
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the  employment  of  an  overtly  anti-determinist,  anti-essentialist  and 
irreductionist approach. This investigation utilises an overdeterminist theory of 
Marxist derivation, developed by Resnich and Wolff, which states that every 
aspect of society is both cause and effect of all others.
84 According to the 
authors, ‘Overdeterminism’ is:  
 
  …  the  proposition  that  all  aspects  of  society  condition  and 
shape one another. Hence it is not possible to reduce society or 
history to the determinant effect of some one or a subset of its 
constituent aspects. What theory or explanation does – all it can 
do or has ever done – is to select and draw attention to some 
aspects and some relationships of whatever object it scrutinizes. 
That object’s overdetermined complexity and ceaseless change 
place  a  comprehensive  grasp  beyond  any  theory’s  reach.  All 
theories  and  explanations  remain  partial,  open  to  ceaseless 
addition,  contestation,  and  change.  This  is  because,  to  be 
intelligible,  they  can  focus  on  only  a  few  aspects.  They 
necessarily leave out most of the other aspects.
85 
 
This theory adds further ammunition to the assumption, asserted earlier, that 
it  is  impossible  to  fully  comprehend  Schlesinger  as  a  ‘personality’,  thus 
precluding  any  attempt  at  biography.  Any  understanding  of  him  must 
necessarily ‘remain partial’ and so a definite aspect of the man is focused 
upon: his academic writings and those on Marxism and the Soviet historical 
field in particular. Whilst this ‘overdeterminist’ approach may appear negative 
and  limiting,  it  does  offer  a  more  constructive  element.  No  explanation  or 
theory  of  events  can  be  fully  satisfactory,  since  they  are  not  reducible  to 
certain  essential  factors.  Therefore,  what  is  currently  known  about  Marxist 
theory,  Soviet  society  and  the  study  and research  of  history  in  the  Soviet 
Union is not finite or comprehensive. Anything an investigation and thorough 
reading of Schlesinger’s input in this field can add to that bank of knowledge 
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and theory, will, therefore, be illuminating. New aspects can be highlighted in 
this complex area, without questioning the validity or importance of what has 
been previously discovered.  
 
The majority of sources utilised in this investigation are published works by 
Schlesinger. These are employed as primary sources, critically assessed to 
determine theories and analyses which Schlesinger wished to have attributed 
publicly to him. They are read in conjunction with one another to allow for 
broad perceptions of Schlesinger’s theoretical and political assumptions, over 
time  and  across  disciplines.  They  consist  of  monographs,  journal  articles, 
papers, commentaries and book reviews. The vast majority were published in 
the  West,  after  Schlesinger’s  expulsion  from  the  party,  and  most  of  these 
were  written  in  the  UK.  Some  unpublished sources  have  also  been  used. 
Private letters, early drafts of published works and copies of lectures have 
been  used  where  appropriate.  This  is  mainly  when  the  subject  matter 
contained in an unpublished work mirrors that of a published one or if it will 
help  in  the  exposition  and  increased  understanding  of  the  nature  of 
Schlesinger’s  published  scholarly  work.  These  private  materials  were 
obtained from the Rudolf Schlesinger Papers housed at Glasgow University 
Library or from private collectors. 
 
Another  major  source  is  Schlesinger’s  unpublished  memoirs.  This  form  of 
self-representation  is  very  much  within  the  Western  male  tradition  of 
autobiography.  As  the  literary  critic  Leigh  Gilmore  has  pointed  out: 
‘Autobiography…  has  come  to  be  identified…  with  master  narratives  of 
conflict  resolution  and  development,  whose  hero  –  the  overrepresented 
Western white male – identifies his perspective with a God’s-eye view and, 
from  that  divine  height,  sums  up  his  life’.
86  Schlesinger’s  memoirs  fit  this 
definition well. They are an attempt by Schlesinger to describe and explain his 
life and work. There are several copies of the memoirs. Early versions were 
written in German and the later drafts in English. An early, complete, German 
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version and the most up to date English one have been used in the present 
study,  with  reference  given  to  the  German edition  where  possible.  Neither 
copy  has  been  published.  The  English  version  was  donated  to  Glasgow 
University Library on Rudolf Schlesinger’s death and a private collector kindly 
gave one of the existing German editions to the author, others are retained in 
the Schlesinger Papers in Glasgow University Library.
87  
 
It is unclear why the memoirs were not published in Britain but it is certain that 
they  were  written  with  the  intention  of  publication.  Throughout  the  text, 
Schlesinger referred to ‘my readers’, clearly suggesting that he was intending 
it to be read.
88 It is also apparent that he expected an international readership. 
In the preface to the English edition, Schlesinger stated that when writing the 
first draft in 1944, he had hoped that the memoirs would be published after his 
death for the benefit of a resurrected democratic and socialist Central Europe 
as much as the ‘Anglo-Saxon world’.
89 In view of the period covered and the 
depth of analysis in the memoirs, it also appears that Schlesinger anticipated 
an  audience  with  a  reasonably  wide  knowledge  of  the  European  labour 
movement  and  twentieth  century  history.  However,  he  did  occasionally 
provide  background  information  to  the  events  he  described,  for  those  less 
familiar with the material covered.
90 
 
Rudolf  Schlesinger  first  began  work  on  his  memoirs  whilst  in  England  in 
spring  1944,  the  catalyst  being  a  serious  illness.
91  In  summer  1951  he 
managed  to  retrieve  his  personal  archive  from  Germany  and  those  of  his 
papers  he  had  been  forced  to  leave  in  Prague.  He  was,  thus,  able  to 
supplement  his  first  draft  and  correct  any  erroneous  details  from  1953  to 
1957.  
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The memoirs cover the period from Rudolf Schlesinger’s birth on 4
 February 
1901  to  his  escape  from  Poland  to  Britain  on  18  April  1939.  Or,  as 
Schlesinger explained in the preface to his second draft, the memoirs are a 
record  of  the  failed  efforts  of  the  central  European  labour  movement, 
concentrating  on  the  ‘interwar  years’, up  to  the  point  where armed  conflict 
began between the fascists and the rest of the world, including the Soviet 
Union.
92  
 
In the preface to the memoirs, Schlesinger insisted, as a historian, that he 
was well aware of the pitfalls and bias involved in memoirs. He, thus, saw his 
own as adding no more than interesting and colourful detail to his academic 
work. He also argued that he made no claim to be able to transcend the social 
conflicts of his time and so would clearly state his political standpoint from the 
very beginning:  
 
For many years I have not only ceased to be a member of any 
particular party organisation, but even arrived at the conclusion 
that I, given my background and capacities, can serve the cause 
of  socialism  best  without  belonging  to  a  definite  party 
framework. But this does not prevent me from being partisan ‘in 
the great historical sense’, to speak with Marx.
93  
 
He argued that a clear statement of the author’s political standpoint would 
promote the memoirs’ use by the historian and, thus, presented himself as a 
non-partisan socialist from the offset. 
 
The memoirs are a useful source for a better understanding of Schlesinger 
and his background and they provide a wealth of material on many key events 
of  the  twentieth  century.  Whilst  it  is  clear  that  Schlesinger  consciously 
attempted to give as honest a portrayal of events as possible, admitting to 
errors and conceding mistakes, the memoirs are not without speculation and 
inevitable self-justification. They must be used with caution and an awareness 
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of all the caveats applicable to a source of this nature. In the words of A.J.P. 
Taylor: ‘I have a word of counsel for any historian who is puzzled as to how to 
assess  an  autobiography:  he  should  write  one  himself.  He  will  find  that 
however resolutely he tries to tell the truth the narrative gets out of control. 
Little successes are magnified and failures passed over unless of course they 
are blown up into monstrous grievances’.
94  
 
 
Schlesinger’s  Marxism:  His  writing  on  theory  as  a  key  to 
understanding his wider work 
Half of this thesis is devoted to an investigation of Schlesinger’s writing on 
Marxism.  As the theory that underpinned all of Schlesinger’s scholarly work a 
thorough appreciation of his understanding of Marxism is essential. It is only 
by  acknowledging  Schlesinger’s  theoretical  foundation  that  one  can  fully 
comprehend his other writing, something which Schlesinger would have fully 
admitted. 
 
Marxism  featured  in  all  of  Schlesinger’s  work,  in  method  if  not  in  subject 
matter.  Consequently,  there  is  a  wealth  of  source  material  for  this 
investigation. However, two works in particular are of relevance. Schlesinger’s 
Marx His Time and Ours published in 1950 was his main philosophical work. It 
traced the history of Marxism, from its development in the nineteenth century 
through its reception in Russia and the success of the Russian revolution to 
its  applicability  in  the  world  of  the  mid-twentieth  century.  The  second 
important source is a series of nine lectures on Marxism-Leninism Schlesinger 
delivered  at  Glasgow  University  in  1964-1965  and  1965-1966,  and  at  Sir 
George  Williams  University,  Canada  the  following  year.
95    The  series  was 
intended for postgraduate students of Soviet studies or advanced economics 
undergraduates.  The  lectures  were  written  in  full,  with  references  and 
footnotes,  and  traced  Marxism  from  its  roots  through  to  1960s  China. 
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Schlesinger developed the lectures into a book entitled Marxism-Leninism: An 
Outline.
96 However, this does not appear to have been published, presumably 
due to Schlesinger’s death. Alongside these main texts are a vast array of 
papers and reviews. 
 
Schlesinger  spent  his  entire  adult  life  in  the  cause  of  Marxism,  both  as  a 
political activist and academic theoretician. In his memoirs, he wrote that he 
had devoted most of his life to the critical development of Marxist theory.
97 To 
Schlesinger,  Marxism  was  both  a  political  ideology  and  a  philosophical 
methodology. It was the movement that would, in his words, lead to, ‘…the 
emancipation of mankind from misery and de-humanisation’.
98 He argued:  
 
The  rule  of  man  over  man,  and  the  fact  that  the  means  of 
production were controlled by a certain class different from the 
mass of society was nothing natural (and hence unchangeable) 
but  an  historical  phenomenon  which  had  a  beginning  and, 
hence, presumably, an end: this had to be brought about by the 
action of those who were not interested in its eternity.
99 
 
Schlesinger believed that Marxism explained this situation and inspired and 
guided the movement that would remedy it. Marxism and its thinkers showed 
social-democracy  how  to  organise  to  bring  about  revolution  and  how  to 
construct a new state following that success. However, Marxism was also a 
philosophical  methodology.  Its  historico-materialist  outlook  was  a  valid 
explanation  of  society  and  the  way  in  which  it  operated.  Marxism  was  a 
scientific method for scholarly pursuits, a way of understanding the world and 
investigating it.  This method remained valid as circumstances changed and 
developed;  Marxism  was  not  a  set  of  commandments  or  mere  political 
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instructions but a universal theory of permanent veracity. Schlesinger wrote 
that Marxism was, ‘…a theory of social development which, at the same time, 
claims to provide guidance for action transforming society’.
100 He argued that 
it was to be defined, ‘…not as a collection of dogmata but by its historically 
given origins and its continuing approach and method’.
101 
 
To Schlesinger, the essence of Marxism consisted of historical materialism 
and  dialectics.  Together,  these  concepts  produced  the  Marxist  method,  a 
scientific, verifiable methodology. Marxism was not a set of instructions or a 
political  creed,  but  was  primarily  this  method.  He  outlined  his  basic 
understanding of Marxist theory in the second of his series of lectures, by 
quoting Marx’s ’A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’: 
 
The  entity  of  production  relations  constitutes  the  economic 
structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal 
and political superstructure and to which correspond the definite 
forms  of  social  consciousness.  The  mode  of  production  of 
material  life  conditions  the  social,  political  and  intellectual  life 
processes in general. It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being 
that determines their consciousness.
102 
 
The  materialistic  conception  of  history  explained  the nature  of  society  and 
how  it  developed  from  one  form  to  another.  The  character  of  production 
determined the nature of society at any given stage; means of production and 
an individual’s relationship to that means dictated man’s relationship to nature 
and other people.  
 
Marxism was a historical method as much as a philosophical or economic 
one.
103 Historical materialism was concerned with the succession of different 
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social formations, as determined by production.  As Schlesinger expressed it 
in 1964: 
  
Marxism is…a certain conception of the objective conditions of 
human action and, in particular, of such actions as lead to the 
replacement of one form of social organization by another one. 
In  particular  it  asserts  the  basic  importance  of  the  industrial 
working class in the replacement of a capitalist by a socialist 
order of society.
104 
 
In  the  lectures  he  made  clear  how  this  transformation  from  one  social 
formation  to  another  took  place.  Once  more  quoting  Marx,  Schlesinger 
argued: 
 
At  a  certain  stage  of  development,  the  material  productive 
forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of 
production, or – this merely expressed the same thing in legal 
terms  –  with  the  property  relations  within  which  they  have 
operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive 
forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era 
of  social  revolution. The  changes  in  the  economic  foundation 
lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense 
superstructure.
105 
 
According to Schlesinger, historical materialism demonstrated that revolution 
was not a utopian hope but a necessary link in the inexorable development of 
mankind.  The  realisation  of  socialist  ideals,  although  impossible  in  earlier 
stages,  was  essential  in  later  periods,  when  contradictions  between 
productive forces and productive relations became apparent.
106 
 
The key constituent alongside historical materialism was dialectics. This was 
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derived from Hegel’s concept and Schlesinger described it in Marx His Time 
and Ours:  
 
As against the current assertion that only one argument can be 
correct  and  that  contradiction  in  itself  is  a  proof  of  logical 
mistake, Hegel showed that the thesis as well as the anti-thesis 
contain elements of truth, in that they reflect different stages in 
the development of human society and human thought.
107 
 
Contradiction was inherent in all things. This struggle between opposites led 
from  a  transformation  of  quantitative  change  to  one  of  qualitative  change. 
According to Schlesinger, this was a somewhat problematic concept when 
applied to Nature but it did explain the revolutionary progression of society.
108 
Antagonistic  forces  grew  within  society,  eventually  expressing  themselves 
through revolutionary change. The new formation developed within the old 
and change was an essential element of society. 
 
Schlesinger made clear the importance of dialectics to Marxism. He argued 
that the Hegelian inheritance was essential because it allowed Marxism to 
develop beyond its origin. It allowed Marxism to reject the finality of human 
thought or achievement. It, thus, became a developing, transforming theory 
capable of evolving with a changing society.
109  
 
This  dynamic  quality  is  what  made  Marxism  as  a  method  so  important  to 
Schlesinger.  If  Marxism  was  merely  a  set  of  instructions  or  a  philosophical 
theory then it would inevitably have been time-bound, able to be disproved by 
new information or inaccurate predictions. Since it was a method this was not 
the case. In a 1962 paper on Marxist theory Schlesinger argued that Marxism 
could  not  become  obsolete  because  of  the method,  which  he described  as, 
‘…the analysis of economic process as the interaction of social aggregates, 
and  the  associated  interpretation  of  history,  down  to  the  abolition  of  class 
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divisions, as a history of class struggles’.
110 He made clear the robust character 
of  such  an  understanding  of  Marxism  in  his  unpublished  The  Marxist 
Movement, writing: ‘The strength of Historical Materialism rests precisely upon 
its being a method, i.e. that every mistake in the application can be corrected 
by improved application of the method upon new subject matters’.
111   
 
There  were  a  number  of  features  of  Schlesinger’s  Marxism,  alongside  its 
significance as a scientific method. Firstly, Schlesinger emphasised Marxism’s 
transforming quality. This was, in part, because it was a method. It developed 
as science and society developed. Hence it was secure from obsolescence.  
In his unpublished book of lectures he argued:  
 
But  Marxism  is  not  a  specialist  economic  theory,  as  many 
people erroneously believe (hence they also believe that it can 
be refuted by the fact that the science of Economics, like any 
other, has made some progress during the century past since 
the publication of the first volume of ‘Capital’); it is a definite way 
of  understanding  and  synthesizing  the  achievements  of 
individual  social  sciences:  hence,  it  must  develop  with  the 
latter.
112 
 
Critics pointed to elements in the Marxist classics that were no longer true or 
had proven unfounded as if this disputed the relevance of Marxism as a whole. 
Schlesinger argued that this was erroneous. Of course elements would become 
redundant, predictions would fail to materialise, but Marxist theory would move 
on  as  events  did.  The  method  would  incorporate  these  developments.  As 
Schlesinger argued in 1963: ‘Communism regards itself as the expression of 
continuous contradictions of society which it should help to solve’.
113 Marxism 
and communism understood the world dialectically: antagonism; contradictory 
forces  and  an  ever-developing  society.  The  theory  to  emerge  from  this 
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understanding would inevitably be dynamic. 
 
A consequence of this aspect of Schlesinger’s Marxism was that his main area 
of concern was the relevance of theory for the present day. He had little interest 
in classical Marxism beyond what was necessary to understand its most recent 
manifestation.  The  ‘classics’  were  inherently  ephemeral.  Thus,  Schlesinger 
focussed upon what was still applicable to modern developments and ways in 
which Marxism had adapted and developed. 
 
A  final  characteristic  of  Schlesinger’s  Marxism  was  his  desire  to  counter 
errors  and  myths  in  general  understanding,  a  feature  of  all  Schlesinger’s 
scholarship.  It  can  be  discerned  in  his  assertion  of  Marxism’s  continued 
relevance, his insistence that critics who pointed to instances of redundancy 
in the classic texts failed to comprehend the nature of Marxism. He argued 
that many opponents of Marxism wrote from a distorted cold war perspective 
and that many within the Marxist camp presented a vulgar or utopian version 
that  was  equally  incorrect. For example, he  consistently  sought  to  expose 
vulgar  theorists  who  reduced  Marxism  to  the  level  of  basic  economic 
determinism. In 1964 he wrote: 
 
Thus the twentieth century vulgarizers of Marxism, including the 
‘economists’ not only misrepresented Marxist doctrine, but were 
indeed  several  decades  behind  the  course  of  history.  Their 
misrepresentation of Marx’ early political writings as some kind 
of ‘infantile disorder’ of Young Hegelian origin, and their neglect 
of Engels’ later writings stressing the non-economic factors on 
the shaping and interaction of history, belongs to the realm of 
political mythology.
114 
 
In his lecture series, Schlesinger insisted that Marxism was not a theory of 
simple ‘economic breakdown’ despite the efforts of Marx’s pupils to turn it in to 
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one.
115  
 
There are a number of reasons why a thorough investigation of Schlesinger’s 
writings  on  Marxism  is  necessary.  Firstly,  it  was  the  foundation  of  his 
scholarship. Marxism was the methodology underpinning his work; impacting 
upon everything: from the choice of subject, to method of investigation, to his 
paradigmatic assumptions. Without first exploring that theoretical foundation, 
it is not possible to fully appreciate his writings. The overdeterminist character 
of  this  thesis  makes  such  an  investigation  imperative.  Schlesinger’s 
theoretical  understanding  was  overdetermined  by,  and  in  its  turn 
overdetermined,  all  other  arenas  of  his  life –  his  other  scholarly  work  and 
political  activities  for  example.    In  addition,  an  explicit  recognition  of 
Schlesinger’s  political  standpoint,  something  he  was  keen  to  make  as 
transparent as possible, provides a further layer of understanding. It provides 
context  and  background,  as  well  as  a  deeper  understanding  of  his 
motivations. 
 
Secondly,  Schlesinger  was  a  respected,  erudite  and  prolific  scholar.  His 
theoretical development and writings on the subject of Marxism are worthy of 
detailed  examination  for  that  reason  alone.  They  represent  a  neglected 
resource, material that can provide information on one of the most significant 
political and philosophical doctrines of the last century. His work offers new 
perspectives  and  insights  on  Marxism  and,  in  particular,  the  great  Marxist 
theoreticians  such  as  Rosa  Luxemburg  and  Lenin.  Schlesinger’s 
interpretations were original and add to the existing body of literature but have 
not been investigated to any great extent. 
 
Finally, a focussed study of Schlesinger’s Marxism is valid because it provides 
an opportunity to understand and elucidate, as much as is possible, the work 
of  a  twentieth  century  thinker  and  political  activist.  Schlesinger  was  a 
representative of his generation – a Central European communist and scholar 
who  devoted  his  entire  life  to  his  political  cause.  He  was  an  active  party 
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member in Austria, Germany and Russia, but like many of his comrades, one 
who fell foul of the Soviet authorities and spent the latter part of his life in 
purely  academic  surroundings.  In  many  ways,  Schlesinger,  as  a  Marxist, 
epitomised his time. An investigation of his writings on the subject can, thus, 
illuminate many aspects of that time and generation.  
 
Schlesinger  had  remarkably  similar experiences  to  many  of his  more  well-
known  colleagues  and  contemporaries  and  they  shared  a  common 
understanding  of  their  ideology.  For  example,  Schlesinger  had  much  in 
common with fellow Austrian and party member Ruth Fischer. They emerged 
from  similar  backgrounds,  politically  and  educationally.  They  maintained 
contact  throughout  their  lives  and  worked  within  the  same  party  milieu.
116 
However, Schlesinger established his post-Soviet life in the UK rather than 
the  USA  and  retained  his  allegiance  to  the  Marxist  cause  and,  to  him,  its 
greatest hope and embodiment, the Soviet Union. In contrast, Fischer made 
her disillusionment and antipathy to Stalin’s Russia and the leading Soviet 
Party  clear  in  her  work.  Also,  whilst  she  was  a  more  senior  figure  in  the 
communist movement, Schlesinger was her more well-known superior in their 
latter  academic  careers.  An  investigation  of  Schlesinger’s  Marxism  and 
theoretical  understanding  can  provide  a  background  for  the  better 
appreciation of his contemporaries, such as Fischer, and the environment in 
which they developed and worked. 
 
Schlesinger’s writings on Marxism place him firmly within the European post-
Leninist Marxist intellectual era. He shared many of the concepts of peers 
Georg  Lukács  and  Karl  Korsch  and,  again,  emerged  from  the  same  party 
experiences.  Schlesinger used the same vocabulary and wrote from within 
the  Marxist  intellectual  paradigm  of  that  time.  However,  he  differed  in  his 
analysis from them and this is investigated in some detail within the thesis. 
Schlesinger  provided  original  commentary,  but  an  examination  of  his  work 
also  presents  an  opportunity  to  throw  light  on  a  man  of  his  time,  a 
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representative of European radical activism and thought. 
  
 
The  writing  of  history  in  the  Soviet  Union  as  a  window  on 
Schlesinger’s scholarly career  
The second focus of this investigation concerns Schlesinger’s work on the 
subject of historical writing and its theoretical framework in the USSR. The 
devotion of much of this thesis to the issue of Soviet historical output may 
seem unusual, since Schlesinger is not primarily known for his work in this 
field.  However,  it  will  be  shown  that  such  an  approach  is  significant  for  a 
greater  understanding  of  Schlesinger  as  an  academic,  commentator  and 
memoirist, as well as furthering knowledge on the nature of the Soviet state, 
both under Stalin and following his death. In fact, it is by far the most fruitful 
method of investigation available to any student of Rudolf Schlesinger. 
 
The production of historical writing had always been seen as a vital cog in the 
Communist party and state machinery in the Soviet Union. As J. Barber has 
argued, 
 
…history as a branch of knowledge was basic to Marxism in a way 
that  no  other  subject,  with  the  exception  of  political  economy, 
was… For Marx, the fundamental task of intellectual enquiry was 
understanding the process of social change, and to this the study of 
history held the key. Hence the central place occupied by historical 
analysis  in  his  writings  and  in  those  of  his  most  distinguished 
followers – and hence, conversely, given the political purpose of 
Marxist  theory  and  practice,  the  intrinsic  political  importance  of 
historical scholarship to Marxists.
117 
 
A  state,  which  was  purportedly  Marxist  in  essence,  would  regard  the 
researching,  writing  and  teaching  of  history  as  a  matter  of  great  political 
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significance. Such was the importance of historical analysis to the CPSU, it 
was deemed necessary to intervene directly in the historical sphere and to 
exert a degree of control over historical production. 
 
G. M. Enteen has pointed out how important the work of historians was to 
Soviet life in general: 
 
Party  officials  and  historians  themselves  demanded  that  the 
past  be  made  useful.  Industrialization,  heroic  leadership  in 
World  War  II,  enhanced  status  in  the  community  of  nations, 
even the passage of time – none of these could provide the vital 
links  of  identification and  loyalty between  the  regime and  the 
populace. Nor was their universal acceptance of roles delegated 
by virtue of images of the future…Thus even though there was 
so little Soviet history, so little experience marking the new path 
to  the  future,  the  burden  of  justification  fell  to  the  Marxist 
historians.
118 
 
A great deal of the party and, thus, the state’s legitimacy was based on its 
superior  understanding  of  historical  forces  and  relationships;  this  was  the 
Marxist cornerstone which assured the confidence of the populace. As Enteen 
argued,  ‘…  party  rule  rested  on  promises  about  the  future  that  claimed 
credibility by virtue of knowledge of the past’.
119 This ensured that party and 
state machinery would take more than a passing interest in the historical field.  
 
The very legitimacy and morality of the Communist regime rested upon the 
historical necessity, even inevitability, of the Revolution and the subsequent 
assumption of power by the Bolshevik party. It was, therefore, vital for that 
regime to insist that its people were educated in a manner which emphasised 
that legitimacy.  This task lay with the historians, and as such, the state was 
bound  to  exert  a  great  deal  of  influence,  if  not  control,  over  them.  The 
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significance of historical legitimacy increased with the continued survival of 
the  Communist  state.  The  absence  of  the  anticipated  European  revolution 
required  explanation,  with  reference  to  the  past  and  the  teachings  of  the 
founders of Marxism, as did the continued hardships of civil war followed by 
rapid industrialisation. The political ascendancy of Lenin and the subsequent 
crises in the search for a suitable heir, culminating in Stalin’s supremacy, laid 
yet  more  importance  on  the  concept  of  historical  legitimacy.  Individual 
authority could now be traced in a direct line from the founders of Marxism, 
through Lenin. One’s actions during and immediately after the Revolutions of 
1917 were the historical legacy on which one’s authority came to be based. 
Control over the portrayal of that legacy became paramount. 
 
The  Bolsheviks  demonstrated  the  significance  they  attached  to  historical 
writing  almost  immediately  after  the  October  Revolution.  As  historian  J.  D. 
White argued, ‘… from its very inception the Soviet regime established a firm 
control  over  how  the  history  of  the  Russian  revolution  was  written’.
120  In 
another work, he warned, ‘… the period [1917-1924] was not at all a relatively 
free one for historical scholarship. There was no time whatsoever in which 
important areas of history were not subject to political control’.
121 As early as 
spring 1918,  Trotsky  was  to  write  an authoritative  historical  account of  the 
revolution,  entitled  The  Russian  Revolution  to  Brest-Litovsk.
122  In  this 
presentation of events Trotsky was keen to demonstrate that the Bolsheviks 
had not simply seized power. They had enjoyed popular support and would 
have achieved a democratic victory; but were, ultimately, forced to act, since 
their  opponents  were  attempting  to  interfere  with  that  democratic  process. 
That  the  Bolsheviks  saw  an  urgent  need  for  a  formal  historical  account  of 
events is further evidenced in the fact that Trotsky wrote the short text whilst 
participating in the vital Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations.
123 As Trotsky wrote 
in My Life: 
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We  had  with  us  a  good  many  stenographers  who  had  once 
been on the staff of the State Duma, and so I began dictating to 
them,  from  memory,  a  historical  sketch  of  the  October 
revolution.  From  a  few  sessions  there  grew  a  book  intended 
primarily for foreign workers. The necessity of explaining what 
had happened was imperative; Lenin and I had discussed this 
necessity more than once, but no one had any time to spare.
124 
 
 The  Bolsheviks  immediate  concern  with  the  portrayal  of  events  of  the 
Revolution  could  also  be  seen  in  the  glowing  forward  Lenin  gave  to  the 
American journalist, John Reed’s Ten Days That Shook the World.
125 This text 
followed Trotsky’s account; asserting that the Bolsheviks reluctantly took up 
the reins of power only after such a course was demanded by the masses. 
 
By the time the Bolsheviks had begun to sense victory in the Civil War they 
were  able  to  take  a  more  positive  historical  approach  to  their  part  in  the 
October Revolution. The new interpretation was initially represented by Lenin 
himself,  in  ‘Left  Wing  Communism,  An  Infantile  Disorder’,  a  pamphlet 
distributed  to  delegates  at  the  Second  Congress  of  Comintern  in  July  and 
August 1920.
126 Lenin argued that the Bolshevik party, with its methods of 
organisation,  its  Marxist  principles  and  strict  discipline,  were  uniquely 
responsible for the success of the Revolution and their assumption of power. 
He continued: ‘Certainly, almost everyone now realises that the Bolsheviks 
could not have maintained themselves in power for two and a half months, let 
alone  two  and  a  half  years,  unless  the  strictest,  truly  iron  discipline  had 
prevailed in our Party’.
127 If others aspired to socialist revolutions in their own 
countries they would have to follow the model of Bolshevik experiences, as 
propounded by Lenin. He argued: ‘Now we already have very considerable 
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international experience which  most definitely shows that certain fundamental 
features of our revolution have a significance which is not local, not peculiarly 
national, not Russian only, but international’.
128 Once again a leading member 
of  the  Bolshevik  hierarchy  took  it  upon  themselves  to  expound  an 
interpretation of historical events. 
 
None of these works were undertaken by professional historians. Nor did the 
authors claim any accurate scholarly methodology. Yet, they were all intended 
as truthful accounts of a significant historical event. The speed at which they 
were produced suggests the importance that the Bolsheviks placed on the 
need for official interpretations. That these works had significant political and 
propagandist motivations enhances the thesis that the writing of history was of 
great importance to the Russian Communists. These examples only cover the 
period immediately concerning the Revolution and the Bolshevik party. They 
do not prove that the regime was concerned with the historical field in general. 
However,  they  do  show  an  apparent  fixation  by  the  party  and  new  Soviet 
power  with  historical  writing  and  the  presentation  of  history.  In  fact,  J.  D. 
White, referring to Lenin’s ‘Left-Wing Communism’, argued that since there 
were  no  historical  accounts  published  that supported  Lenin’s  account:  ‘For 
Lenin  the  next  logical  step  was  to  find  a  means  by  which  historical  works 
supporting  his  point  of  view  could  be  published,  or  at  least  prevent  the 
publication of works which contested it’.
129 This would certainly indicate how 
important a concern it was to the new regime. 
 
This is further evidenced in the establishment of a ‘Commission on the History 
of  the  Russian  Communist  party  and  the  October  Revolution’  (Istpart)  in 
August 1920, which was under the direct authority of the Central Committee. 
This institution was responsible for collecting, editing and publishing materials 
related to the party and the Revolution. It could demand the handing over of 
materials and had Soviet authority at its disposal to enforce this.
130 According 
to White: ‘Istpart was able to establish within the country a virtual monopoly on 
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materials  relating  to  the  history  of  the  Russian  revolution…  Istpart 
organizations  were  established  throughout  the  country  to  ensure  that  local 
histories of the revolution accorded with the interpretation approved by the 
centre’.
131 Istpart was merged with the Lenin Institute in 1928, by which time it 
had established a network of around 100 local branches. Although Barber has 
argued, ‘In academic circles… Istpart’s reputation was not very high’,
132 its 
success in publishing, by 1924, volumes of collected works by Lenin, Trotsky, 
Zinoviev and Kamenev, attests to its influence and commitment to presenting 
a Bolshevik interpretation of history.  
 
There  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  that  Lenin  intended  to  assert  the  kind  of 
control over the historical field which was to become commonplace by the late 
1920s under Stalin. However, whilst leader of the governing Bolshevik party, 
he certainly took an active interest in the production of historical writings and 
interpretations.  He  felt  that  some  party  control  over  historical  output  was 
desirable.  Even  Barber,  who  counterpoised  Lenin’s  non-interference  with 
Stalin’s activism in this field, argued that the basis of early Bolshevik policy 
towards  intellectuals displayed  some  elements  of  control.  The  two-pronged 
approach  included  the  belief  that  old,  ‘bourgeois’  intellectuals  would  be 
gradually won over to the socialist cause, as the successes of the new regime 
became  increasingly  apparent.  Yet  crucially,  the  second  element  was, 
according  to  Barber,  ‘…  the  policy  of  educating  the  new  generation  of 
intellectuals  in  the  spirit  of  Marxism,  thus  eventually  creating  a  truly  ‘red’ 
intelligentsia’.
133  Such  a  policy  suggests  the  desire  to  gain  considerable 
control over the actions and output of intellectuals, including historians. 
 
The degeneration of historical scholarship under Stalin is well documented.
134 
The state’s interference in the historical field increased enormously on Stalin’s 
assumption  of  power,  proving  once  again  the  importance  the  Communists 
attached to the subject of history. As White pointed out: 
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 More  and  more  areas  of  historical  study  acquired  a  political 
significance as they were used as ideological ammunition by the 
Soviet leadership or by one or other of the political groupings. 
This  situation  provided  the  opportunity  for  Stalin  to  exert  his 
influence over all historical writing between 1930 and 1934. The 
old division between subjects falling into the province of Istpart 
and the rest of historical study disappeared. From then on all 
areas of history became subject to Stalin’s control.
135 
 
One of the most significant events in this process was Stalin’s 1931 letter to 
the  editors  of  the  journal  Proletarskaia  revoliutsiia,  ‘Some  Questions 
Concerning  the  History  of  Bolshevism’.
136  In  it,  he  insisted  that  certain 
historical  matters  were  not  open  to  debate  or  discussion  since  they  were 
‘axioms of Bolshevism’; thus greatly curbing historians’ freedom of action. The 
culmination  of  an  all-powerful  Stalinist  monopoly  of  historical  interpretation 
was embodied in the orthodox historical textbook History of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course, published in 1938.
137 
 
The study and research of history had always been of great significance to the 
Soviet state. However, alongside his own brand of Marxism, the controlled 
historical interpretations expounded by Stalin’s historians constituted the twin 
pillars  of  the  Soviet  Union’s  theoretical  base.  Historical  and  Marxist  theory 
formed  the  essence  of  Stalinist  legitimacy.  Any  close  investigation  of 
Schlesinger’s analysis of these subjects, a previously undervalued and even 
ignored  analysis,  will  inevitably  shed  new  light  on  this  vital  aspect  of  the 
changing Soviet regime.   
 
As well as providing a new insight into these cornerstones of the CPSU and 
the Soviet Union, a close examination of Schlesinger’s writings on the study of 
history in the USSR is vital for a better understanding of Schlesinger as an 
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academic and writer. This is, not least, because the issue of historical study in 
the Soviet Union was obviously of such great interest to him. The importance 
he attached to it can be seen in the sheer volume of work he produced on the 
subject.  Over  the  course  of  his  academic  career  in  the  West,  Schlesinger 
wrote 17 articles and papers dealing specifically with the writing of history in 
the USSR. He made reference to it in many of his other papers and books. 
Schlesinger did not publish a book on the subject. However, the series of four 
articles  he  published  in  his  own  journal  Soviet  Studies,  so  quickly after  its 
inception, amount to a major monograph.
138 The importance he attributed to 
developments in the Soviet historical field was also discernable in the fact that 
Schlesinger’s first publication on his return to the West in 1938 concerned that 
very topic.
139 
 
It seems clear that from the mid 1930s onwards Schlesinger wished to be, 
amongst  other  things,  a  professional  historian.  Writing  in  his  unpublished 
memoirs  in  1944  Schlesinger  argued  that,  with  hindsight,  he  should  have 
taken the job offered to him at the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in 1935. He 
could then have prepared several serious historical works in order to gain a 
chair of modern German history at a Soviet university. Instead, he accepted a 
post at Comintern Headquarters.
140 His interest in the subject of history and 
his desire to become a published historian are also evidenced in the number 
of  historical  texts  he  produced  during  his  time  in  the  UK.  These  included 
Russia and her Western Neighbours published jointly in 1942 with George W. 
Keeton,  Professor  of  Law  and  Dean  of  the  Faculty  of  Law  of  University 
College, London. The work concerned, in the authors’ words, an attempt, ‘… 
to  interpret  the  policy  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  relation  to  her  Western 
neighbours from the time of the Revolution in 1917 down to the Nazi attack on 
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Russia in June 1941’.
141 Another early historical publication of Schlesinger’s 
concerned  the  evolution  of  federalism,  in  theory  and  practice.  Entitled, 
Federalism  in  Central  and  East  Europe,  the  monograph  was  published  in 
1945 and took a historical approach to the subject, tracing the changing forces 
of  centralisation  and  federalism  both  chronologically  and  geographically.
142 
The work included large sections on federalist theory, including Austro-Marxist 
conceptions and the emergence of a specifically Soviet federalism. However, 
it concentrated on the changing nature and success of federalism in Germany, 
from Nineteenth Century concepts of democracy, thorough Bismarck’s empire 
and  into  the  Nazi  era;  in  the  former  Austrian  territories,  from  the  seismic 
upheavals of 1848 through to the collapse of the Hapsburg monarchy; and in 
the USSR, from Tsarist to modern times. In 1950 Schlesinger again engaged 
with  the  historical  world  of  Central  Europe,  publishing  a  book  on  Central 
European Democracy and its Background.
143 In it, he concentrated upon the 
history  of  the  trade  union  movement  and  the  development  of  Social 
Democracy and working-class representation. 
 
Schlesinger  produced  two  documentary  readers  that  can  be  regarded  as 
historical  in  intent  and  character.  Both  were  published  by  the  International 
Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction founded by the sociologist Karl 
Mannheim.
144 The first, The Family in the USSR, was published in 1949.
145 
Although predominantly a sociological work, the book was chronological and 
source-based.  Its  introduction  traced  the  changing  debates  and  legal 
frameworks  from  pre-Soviet  times  to  post-war  USSR  policies  and 
experiences. Documents were fully annotated by Schlesinger and concerned 
Soviet attitudes towards the family, on such topics as marriage, divorce, co-
education and abortion.
146 The second work, The Nationalities Problem and 
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Soviet Administration, followed a similar pattern.
147 It seems clear, from this 
brief sample of Schlesinger’s historical writings, that he did consider himself to 
be a historian. This explains the interest Soviet historical output held for him 
and validates the detailed examination this thesis devotes to the subject of 
Schlesinger’s writing on Soviet historians and their work. 
 
Another reason for the concentration of this thesis upon Soviet historiography 
is because it is one of the only topics on which he wrote over time. His first 
paper on the topic was published in 1938, immediately after he left the Soviet 
Union.
148  One  of  Schlesinger’s  last  publications  was  also  on  the  topic  of 
developments  in  Soviet  historical  sciences  and  appeared  in  1967  in  the 
Annuaire  de  L’U.R.S.S.
149  Thus,  an  investigation  of  his  writings  on  this 
particular topic allows for an appreciation of his work over a long time period, 
nearly thirty years, from 1938 to 1967. Whilst Schlesinger may have written on 
a huge variety of subjects during this same time frame, he did not do so with 
the  same  degree  of  regularity.  The  theme  of  Soviet  historians  and  Soviet 
history was one to which he continually returned. The use of these papers, 
therefore, provides the degree of consistency necessary in any examination of 
one person’s writings.  
 
The  fact  that  Schlesinger  wrote  about  the topic  of  Soviet historical  studies 
over a long time period allows the reader to take a comparative approach. It 
becomes  possible  to  monitor  Schlesinger’s  analyses  and  comments  over 
time. This is one of the most academically rewarding aspects of this particular 
investigation,  because  one  is  able  to  perceive  the  modifications  and 
modulations  of  Schlesinger’s  approach  to,  and  assumptions  about,  the 
subject. One of the chief assertions of this thesis is that Schlesinger’s opinions 
and emphases regarding Soviet historical output did change over time. This 
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has  enormous  repercussions  for  any  consideration  of  Schlesinger  as  an 
academic, commentator and memoirist and inevitably affects any examination 
of  his  other  writings.  This  decisive  determination  would  have  remained 
undiscovered if not for the close examination of his historiographical writings 
over  time.  In  short,  no  other  study  would  have  highlighted  this  extremely 
significant factor for any appreciation of Schlesinger.  
 
Schlesinger did write on one other subject regularly over the course of his 
academic career in the West, the theme of Soviet legal theory and Soviet law 
in general. However, these publications often took the form of book reviews, 
which contained little, if any, analysis or discussion of the issues of Soviet law. 
Schlesinger  reviewed  books  containing  interpretations  of  Soviet  law  by 
Western  scholars,
150  as  well  as  translations  of  works  on  legal  theory  by 
Russian  and  Soviet  theoreticians
151  and  reviews  of  Soviet  books  on  the 
subject.
152 He also frequently published commentaries, small articles reporting 
on  contemporary  events  and  discussions  in  the  field  of  law  in  the  Soviet 
Union.  One  example  of  this  is  an  article  entitled  ‘Soviet  Theories  of 
International  Law’  published  in  Soviet  Studies  in  1953.
153  It  reported  on 
debates,  organised  by  the  Chair  of  International  Law  of  the  Academy  of 
Sciences, on the character of a recently published and sharply criticised book 
on  international  law.  Although  this  provided  Western  readers  with  new 
information on contemporary discussions of legal matters in the Soviet Union, 
it offered little in the way of insightful analysis. Schlesinger did not particularly 
engage  with  the  subject,  instead  merely  reporting  the  result  of  others’ 
engagement.
154  
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Schlesinger wrote several papers and one monograph on the theme of the 
Soviet  legal  system  and  these  do  represent  analytical  scholarship.  For 
example,  in  1951  he published  an  article  on  ‘Court  Cases  as a  Source  of 
Information on Soviet Society’.
155 The stated purpose of the paper was, ‘… to 
illustrate the way in which such materials [Supreme Court publication of cases 
and reports in legal periodicals] may be used and to indicate some specific 
problems arising in the interpretation of this type of evidence’.
156 Schlesinger 
drew readers’ attention to the many problems involved with the use of court 
cases  as  source  material  on  the  Soviet  Union,  such  as  censorship  and 
propaganda  issues  as  well  as  the  inevitably  unrepresentative,  even 
controversial, circumstances of those caught up in legal disputes. However, 
he was also keen to highlight what it was possible to learn from this material 
once all of the caveats had been considered. He argued that it was possible to 
discern what the highest courts wished to distinguish as important cases and 
decisions, as well as the ways in which lower ones were obviously failing to 
carry  out  their  functions  in  a  manner  satisfactory  to  their  superiors.  An 
examination  could,  thus,  help  to  determine  judicial  priorities,  especially 
following a change in the law. Other examples of his scholarship on matters of 
Soviet  law  include  two  papers  Schlesinger  published  in  1960  which 
documented the recent changes and debates surrounding social aspects of 
law.
157 The first dealt specifically with the incipient ‘transfer of ordinary judicial 
functions to social organizations’.
158 The second concerned issues of social 
regulation brought about by the re-codification of the labour law. 
 
It is clear that Schlesinger did not write as much about legal theory as he did 
on the subject of history in the Soviet Union. The subject of legal theory could 
not form the basis of this investigation because there is not the same wealth 
of  material.  Also,  much  of  it  requires  a  specialist  understanding  and 
vocabulary in order to properly engage with the material. This investigation is 
not,  nor  ever  intended  to  be,  a  specialist  legal  work  and  so  would  be 
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insufficiently equipped to fully critique Schlesinger’s writings on the subject.  
The  Soviet  legal  system  was  constantly  evolving  and  often  reflected  the 
abnormal  aspects  of  society  rather  than  its  norms.
159  This  also  makes  it 
unsuitable as the focus of a study since it cannot translate so easily to other 
areas on which Schlesinger wrote. In contrast, an investigation of his work on 
historical writing in the Soviet Union enhances understanding of his output on 
other topics such as Marxist theory and society.  
 
No source can be understood as a whole, isolated in time and space. This is 
especially true when a consciously over-determinist approach is taken, such 
as in this investigation. The detailed reading of Schlesinger’s work on history, 
therefore, provides the context in which to understand his writings as a whole. 
A thorough examination of his works on the historical sphere in the Soviet 
Union allows for a conception of Schlesinger’s understandings, motivations 
and  assumptions,  both  implicit  and  explicit;  it  reveals  the  political  and 
intellectual  paradigm  within  which  he  operated.  The  motives,  values  and 
assumptions  it  is  possible  to  perceive  in  his  work  on  historiography  would 
have been an inherent aspect of his other writings. However, they would have 
remained indiscernible without this investigation. Having revealed these, his 
other writings can be better understood and appreciated. It is only through a 
detailed,  thorough  examination  of  Schlesinger’s  writing  on  the  study  and 
researching of history in the Soviet Union that one is able to gain insight into 
his work as an academic. This method opens a window on to his scholarly 
career by revealing the peculiarities of his political and intellectual paradigm. 
 
 
The borders of the investigation: what the thesis is not 
As well as carefully outlining the remit of this investigation, it is also essential 
to clarify its boundaries; it is vital to identify what the thesis is not in order to 
fully comprehend what it is. As outlined in the methodology section, this thesis 
is  not  a  biography  of  Schlesinger  in  the  traditional  sense,  concentrating 
instead  on  his  role  as  an  academic  and  writer.  It  can  be  viewed  as  an 
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‘intellectual biography’, one based predominantly on his writings. In fact, the 
bulk  of  the  investigation  focuses  on  two  particular  sets  of  writing  for  the 
reasons outlined above. 
 
Nor is this a bibliography, elucidation or narration of Schlesinger’s collected 
works. He had a phenomenally wide variety of interests and wrote on a great 
many of them. He was also an expert in many academic disciplines: having 
trained as a social scientist; found employment as a professional economist 
and  published  as  a  sociologist,  political  theorist  and  historian.  It  would, 
therefore, be impractical to cover all of these writings and topics in the depth 
necessary for any meaningful understanding of Schlesinger’s work to emerge. 
Often his published writings appear as a running commentary on events he 
perceived as significant in the development of the Soviet Union, interspersed 
with monographs on a particular topic. 
 
 He is, perhaps, best known for his two documentary readers published by the 
International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction.
160 However, it is 
important to note that these were only written because of an invitation to do 
so. In the introduction to one, Schlesinger wrote: ‘In the spring of 1944 the late 
Professor  Karl  Mannheim  suggested  to  me  that  I  publish  in  this  Library  a 
number of volumes dealing with the changing attitudes prevailing in Soviet 
Russia towards specific aspects of social and political life’.
161 This suggests 
that the subject and nature of the works were not Schlesinger’s free choice. 
The two volumes do contain some analysis but mainly consist of translations 
of documents and so are somewhat unusual within Schlesinger’s publication 
portfolio.  
 
On the whole, his selection of subjects for examination or publication appears 
arbitrary  and  even  chaotic,  something  which  is  best  demonstrated  with 
reference  to a  brief  sample of  his  published  writings.  In  October  1949,  for 
example,  Schlesinger  published  a  ‘commentary’  on  the  Biology  discussion 
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that had been taking place in the Soviet Union.
162 He had never previously 
written about biological research, but now commentated on, in his words, ‘… 
the first occasion of Party intervention in the direction of scientific research 
and teaching outside the social sciences proper’; an event that represented a, 
‘…fundamental  change  even  in  comparison  with  the  philosophical 
discussions’.
163 The report concerned the dispute between so-called orthodox 
or  academic  geneticists  and  the  school  of  T.  D.  Lysenko.
164  The  official 
ascendancy of this latter school was confirmed by Lysenko on 7 August 1948 
in  a  speech  in  which  he  claimed  that  his  opening  statement  for  the  Lenin 
Academy  of  Agricultural  Sciences  of  the  USSR,  a  week  before,  had  been 
approved  by  the  Central  Committee.
165  It  was  further  evidenced  with  the 
publication of Yuri Zhdanov’s letter to Stalin, published in Pravda on the same 
day, in which he apologised for earlier criticism of Lysenko.
166 
 
The interpretation discernible in this paper on scientific research coalesced 
with  that  present  in  his  writings  on  historical  research  in  the  Soviet  Union 
published at the same time. Despite the obvious problems concerning state 
interference in academic study, Schlesinger appeared to provide a positive 
portrayal of events. For example, when discussing the disagreement between 
the followers of Lysenko and the ‘academic geneticists’ he wrote that there 
were frequent, ‘… complaints from both sides about alleged victimization’. He 
argued: ‘None of the facts mentioned seem to indicate anything worse than an 
atmosphere of embittered struggle between academic schools, each trying to 
use  its  position  in  order  to  give  appointments  and  promotion  to  its 
supporters’.
167  Schlesinger  insisted  that  Soviet  science  was  seen  as  an 
agency  of  Soviet  society  and,  thus,  party  principles  of  discipline  and 
submission to the majority line had been introduced to the field. However, he 
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continued, whilst this may have appeared strange to western scientists, ‘… 
the point in dispute between academic geneticists and Michurinists was not 
the legitimacy of applying Party philosophy to Science, but in the way it should 
be  applied’.
168  Schlesinger  portrayed  the  discussions  as  lacking  any  overt 
hostility  or  of  having  any  extreme  repercussions  for  the  losers.  In  other 
positive statements, Schlesinger appeared very optimistic about the likelihood 
of  progress  in  biological  and  agricultural  research  and  argued  that  official 
support  of  the  Lysenko  school  was  not  unconditional.
169  Whilst  generally 
conforming in interpretation to Schlesinger’s other writings of the time, this 
paper  on  the  biology  discussion  had  little  else  in  common  with  them.  The 
subject matter was an atypical choice, which helps to expose the occasionally 
random character of Schlesinger’s work. 
 
Another example of Schlesinger’s eclectic publication record is shown in his 
1954 paper on developments in Soviet agriculture.
170 Earlier in his research 
career  Schlesinger  had  concentrated  on  the  subject  of  agriculture  and  its 
development in a Marxist state.
171 He had touched upon it in earlier writings 
when in the UK, especially when discussing general Soviet developments.
172  
However, the attention he paid to the topic was intermittent, to say the least, in 
the latter stages of his scholarly career. This particular paper concentrated 
upon  recent  changes  in  Soviet  policies  regarding  kolkhoz  farms  and  the 
attempts  made,  since  August  1953,  to  increase  the  production  levels  of 
livestock and vegetables, which still languished at pre-World War One levels 
despite  recent  improvements  in  grain  output.
173  The  paper  contained  a 
detailed commentary and analysis of recent changes, using a combination of 
western  and  Soviet  sources.  The  tone  was  factual  in  the  main,  although 
Schlesinger  did  offer  some  opinion.  He  argued  that,  although  he  had 
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previously  anticipated,  ‘…  the  transformation  of  kolkhoznik  into  a  state 
employee’,  he  now  felt  that,  ‘…  with  the  private  plot  re-asserted  as  an 
important  element  in  the  kolkhoznik’s  economy,  the  state’s  control  of  the 
skilled labour force may become a main means of keeping the activities of the 
majority of the agricultural population within the framework of the plan’.
174 He 
now felt that, instead of creeping nationalisation of kolkhoz farms, more and 
more of the specialists and managers involved in agricultural production would 
become employees of the state and thus control would be exercised in this 
manner. 
 
Once  again,  this  publication  conformed  to  the  broader  interpretations 
discerned  in  Schlesinger’s  writings  on  the  historical  sphere  in  the  Soviet 
Union. Consistent with his other publications after Stalin’s death, Schlesinger 
made  an  overt  criticism  of  the  deceased  party  leader,  referring  to  ‘…  the 
stubbornness with which policies, once adopted, were pursued before Stalin’s 
death’.
175  He also wrote of Khrushchev’s depiction of the previous neglect in 
creating  incentives  for  agricultural  output  as  an  ‘error’;  illuminating  the 
incipient de-Stalinisation process. 
 
A  paper  published  in  Economics  of  Planning  in  1965  again  illustrates  the 
diverse nature of Schlesinger’s publication record, this time its subject being 
Soviet planning.
176 Schlesinger had written on planning several times and in a 
paper published the year before, he spoke of ‘… a major study on the Soviet 
decision to industrialize the country and to collectivize agriculture which I hope 
to  publish  in  the  near  future’.
177  However,  this  monograph  was  never  to 
materialise and so his articles on the subject of planning remained relatively 
isolated.  
 
The 1965 article began by asserting the importance of planning as a universal 
legacy of the October revolution: ‘As an historical phenomenon, though not in 
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all  its  theoretical  concepts,  planning  represents  part  of  the  impact  of  the 
Russian revolution on twentieth-century history’.
178 He then expounded a brief 
history  of  Soviet  planning,  arguing  that  first  efforts  originated  from 
technological, as  well  as political,  considerations.  As  the regime  stabilised, 
Lenin focused on electrification as a symbol of the power of planning before 
concentrating  the  efforts  of  Gosplan  on  the  solution  of  practical  problems. 
There then developed, in the mid twenties, a battle for the planning concept 
between ‘the “teleologists”, who conceived it as a conscious transformation of 
reality,  against  the  “geneticists”,  the  mere  forecasters  of  envisaged  market 
developments’,  before  collectivisation  proved  to  be  the  decisive  factor 
influencing planning.
179 
 
Again,  the  tone  and  emphasis  of  this  paper  was  consistent  with  his  other 
publications.  For  example,  Schlesinger  displayed  the  pragmatic  attitude 
towards  collectivisation  prevalent  in  all  of  his  work.  There  were  veiled 
references to the apparent necessity of collectivisation, despite the costs, and 
seeming  praise  for  Stalin’s  technical  abilities.
180  However,  consistent  with 
another common interpretation present in his writings of this time, especially 
those concerning the historical sphere, Schlesinger also condemned aspects 
of  ‘Stalinism’.  In  this  case  the  ‘anti-cosmopolitan’  rejection  of  anything 
perceived as western or bourgeois. He argued that developments in planning 
were possible, ‘… as soon as “de-Stalinisation” had marked the removal of 
ideological obstacles to the application of modern western methods’.
181 
 
The paper then sympathetically described the different, and evolving, species 
of  planning  present  in  Eastern  Europe,  in Yugoslavia  and  Czechoslovakia, 
and the USSR. Schlesinger argued that since 1961 the Soviet Union operated 
a tentative combination of planning and elements of market economics. He 
argued that two types of economies existed in the developed world at this 
time.  One  in  which  there  existed  ‘…  occasional  interference,  for  socially 
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approved purposes, with a market substantially conceived as self-regulating’, 
and another defined by ‘… the use of market institutions by a state-controlled 
economy applying “teleological” planning and using the public ownership of 
the “commanding heights” as a means to enforce the planners’ decisions’.
182 
Whilst there may well have been aspects of ‘convergence’ visible between 
these two systems, different types of planning would continue to characterise 
different social formations. 
 
This very brief description of a few of Schlesinger’s publications demonstrates 
the  breadth  of  subjects  on  which  he  wrote  throughout  the  course  of  his 
academic career. His choice seems haphazard, perhaps even arbitrary, and 
his publications were often a running commentary on contemporary events 
rather than researched and analytical scholarship. It is, therefore, clear why 
an in-depth investigation necessarily had to focus on one or two particular 
topics. Schlesinger’s writings on Marxism and the subject of historical work in 
the Soviet Union were chosen for the many reasons outlined above. 
 
 
Rudolf Schlesinger: The Scholar Advocate 
This  thesis  describes  Schlesinger  as  a  ‘scholar  advocate’  for  a  number  of 
reasons. The ‘scholar’ label requires little explanation – Schlesinger worked 
as an academic, theorist and writer for most of his life. He was an intellectual 
of some standing and would have described himself as a scholar. However, 
Schlesinger  also  used  his  scholarship  for  a  distinct,  Marxist  purpose:  to 
promote and clarify understanding of, and sympathy for, the Soviet Union and 
Marxism in general. He was, thus, an ‘advocate’ in both senses of the word. 
He  supported  and  wrote  in  favour  of  Marxism,  communism  and  its 
embodiment, however imperfect, in the shape of the Soviet Union. He was 
also  an  advocate  in  the  sense  of  pleading  for  or  defending  another.  He 
defended  the  Soviet  Union  against  its  detractors,  its  cold  war  critics  and 
disillusioned ex-supporters. He attempted to redress the balance against what 
                                                 
182 Ibid. p. 68.   56 
he viewed as the ‘cold war’ or reactionary character of Western scholarship. 
He  also  tried  to  correct  the  myths  and  misconceptions  surrounding  the 
subject. That is not to say that Schlesinger blindly or unthinkingly defended all 
actions  of  the  state,  all  Marxist  writers  and  variations.  He  was  not  a 
propagandist or even a member of the Communist party in the second half of 
his life. However, this thesis argues that he acted as a ‘scholar advocate’, in 
both the content and interpretation of his writings. 
 
Schlesinger’s pragmatism or utilitarianism enabled him to remain loyal to the 
idea of the Soviet experiment and Marxist methodology despite setbacks or 
the unsavoury actions of its leaders, notably Stalin. Schlesinger took a long-
term  perspective.  He  believed  that  his  attitude  should  not  be  swayed  by 
unfortunate  episodes,  such  as  the  purges,  or  the  hard  but  necessary 
decisions  of  a  party  attempting  to  retain  power  in  the  face  of  hostile 
encirclement. He was, thus, a scholar advocate when many had turned their 
back on the Soviet Union. To Schlesinger, these critics were utopian and he 
derided them for their naivety and wishful thinking. He gave a description of 
utopianism in Marx His Time and Ours, writing: ‘the utopian represents an 
intrusion of the element of will into the realm of knowledge. Thus it exceeds 
the limits of a rational explanation of the work which the observer can give 
within the conditions of his social surroundings’.
183 Utopians had unrealistic 
expectations and judged the Soviet Union from an unfair ideal. The scholar 
advocate, in contrast, was a realist. 
 
It  is  argued  here  that  a  noticeable  difference  exists  within  Schlesinger’s 
writings  over  time.  Those  written  before  Stalin’s  death,  in  the  period  from 
Schlesinger’s return to the West until 1953, were markedly distinct from those 
written  after  1953.  It  is  possible  to  determine  in  which  period  a  work  was 
written by noting the interpretation within it. In his earlier papers, Schlesinger 
was  generally  very  positive  about  the  Soviet  Union.  He  defended  Soviet 
developments, events and interpretations and, whilst never ignoring the more 
negative aspects, he tended to provide an optimistic conclusion or impression. 
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This attitude was in contrast to his personal memoir reflections on life in the 
Soviet  Union.  In  these,  Schlesinger  bemoaned  the  lack  of  intellectual 
opportunity and stifling academic climate and presented a negative picture of 
Soviet  life  under  Stalin.  Schlesinger’s  later  writings,  those  produced  after 
1953, and especially those after 1956 were characterised by his retrospective 
condemnation of events under Stalin, particularly in Soviet historiography.   
 
There are a number of possible explanations for this apparent dichotomy. But 
it is argued the most fruitful answer is that Schlesinger was acting as ‘scholar 
advocate’.  He  was  reacting  against  perceived  cold-war  hostility  within 
Western  scholarship  and  was  defending  the  Soviet  Union  against  utopian 
criticism. Thus, in the early years, Schlesinger attempted to provide a more 
positive  interpretation  of  events  in  Soviet  Russia  to  counterbalance  the 
profusion of overly negative appraisals. His pragmatism allowed him to find 
achievements and cause for optimism in the dark years of Stalin’s leadership. 
The deleterious consequences of Stalin’s rule did not blind Schlesinger to the 
successes of industrialisation for example. Later, after Stalin’s death, when 
the Soviet Union itself acknowledged the excesses and extra-legal methods of 
the  preceding  years,  Schlesinger  was  able  to  provide  a  more  distanced 
perspective and saw much cause for optimism for the future. He felt justified 
in not letting his attitude be dictated by the short-term distortions of one man’s 
rule. He now attempted to counter what he saw as the unfair concentration of 
Western scholarship and opinion on what was, in overall terms, a few short 
years in the history of Marxism and communism.  
 
The thesis begins with an investigation of Schlesinger’s Marxism. Following 
the chronology of his own theoretical education and development, it traces 
Schlesinger’s  writings  on  Luxemburg,  Lenin,  Marx  and  Engels  and,  finally, 
Stalin.  Schlesinger  appears  an  ardent  Leninist  but,  according  to  his 
understanding of Marxism, recognises that Lenin’s contribution and its very 
success,  now  makes  it  obsolete.  A  new  stage,  encompassing  new  socio-
economic  conditions  is  now  necessary.  In  accordance  with  the  timeline 
posited,  in  the  years  before  1953/6,  Schlesinger  appears  to  suggest  that 
Stalin’s contribution to Marxist theory may hold the key to this next dialectical   58 
stage.  However,  Stalin’s  theoretical  impact  is  dismissed  after  his  death. 
Schlesinger argues that it is necessary to remove the Stalinist distortions from 
Leninism  before  progressing  to  the  next  stage.  The  examination  of 
Schlesinger’s  writings  on  Stalin  provides  insights  into  his  pragmatism  and 
allows  for  a  greater  understanding  of  his  general  attitude.  Schlesinger’s 
writings on Marxism appear of their time: post-Leninist, post-war, European 
and have much in common with Lukács. However, they display a great deal of 
originality and provide the context for all his other scholarship. 
 
The thesis then turns to an examination of Schlesinger’s writings on Soviet 
historiography.  A  detailed  investigation  of  his  own  experiences  as  an 
academic  in  the  Soviet  Union  are  undertaken,  based  on  his  memoir 
reflections. These provide a context for his academic work and highlight the 
discrepancies  between  his  personal  opinion  of  the  Soviet  intellectual 
environment  and  the  seemingly  positive  description  of  it  he  provided  in 
published work. There then follows a detailed critique of his writings on the 
subject up to 1953 and from the death of Stalin onwards. The difference in 
nuance  and  interpretation  between  these  two  periods  is  highlighted  and 
possible explanations for the distinction are discussed.   59 
 
Part One: Schlesinger and Marxism 
 
The assumption that a person’s writings and activities cannot be viewed in 
isolation, but instead, are inherently interconnected with, and overdetermined 
by many aspects of the social, political and economic setting from which they 
emerge is a view that Schlesinger would no doubt concur with. It is also one 
that this enquiry supposes as self-evident. It is thus vital to investigate, as far 
as  possible,  the  political,  theoretical  or  philosophical  foundations  which 
comprise  the  basis  of  Schlesinger’s  scholarly  work;  remembering  that  with 
Schlesinger’s overtly Marxist understanding, the philosophical is the political. 
These  elements  form  the  layers  of  overdeterminancy  that  comprise  the 
background, influence and constituent components of his writings. A correct 
understanding of the theoretical underpinning of Schlesinger’s work, as well 
as  a  determination  of  its  consistency  or  otherwise,  over  time,  allows  for  a 
thorough critique of his work on the writing of history in the Soviet Union in the 
second half of the thesis.  
 
Part  One  of  the  thesis,  therefore,  attempts  to  discern  and  explain  the 
particular Marxist foundation of Schlesinger’s scholarship. It will examine his 
political  and  philosophical  education  and  influences,  as  elucidated  in  his 
unpublished  memoirs,  before  engaging  with  his  more  mature  theoretical 
evolution as certain concepts of his early years were rejected. Schlesinger 
began his active political life as a strong supporter of Rosa Luxemburg, so 
some time is spent examining his writings on this topic. However, with the 
embracing  of  Leninist  principles  of  organisation,  Schlesinger  became  an 
ardent  and  lifelong  adherent  of  Lenin’s  writings  and  theories.  A  thorough 
investigation of his writings on Lenin will, thus, be undertaken.  Schlesinger 
believed that his appreciation of Lenin finally allowed him to fully understand 
the work of the Marxist founders, Marx and Engels. Thus, his writings on this 
topic are explored and discussed. A comparison of Schlesinger’s attitude with 
those  of  his  contemporary  Georg  Lukács  will  also  be  attempted;  before,   60 
finally, turning to an examination of Schlesinger’s attitude towards Stalin as a 
political and philosophical theorist. Is this attitude consistent over time or does 
it  change  depending  on  the  orthodoxy  of  the  CPSU,  mirroring  his 
interpretation of the historical field and Soviet events in general? Does his 
analysis alter before and after Stalin’s death?  
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Chapter Two: Rosa Luxemburg 
 
In his memoirs, Schlesinger described his early philosophical influences as 
being of an academic nature. After an early affection for ‘misled patriotism’, 
demonstrated by his reading of Tolstoy, the works of Zola led him to a gradual 
non-Marxist type of socialism.
1 However, under the influence of the anti-war 
atmosphere, Schlesinger was soon to take a stronger approach to politics. He 
wrote,  ‘… if the recognition of the principle of revolution (as opposed to my 
initial absolute pacifism) can be seen as fundamental, I can date the essential 
turning point from Autumn 1917 and I have my late teacher, Karl Gruenberg, 
to thank for the decisive impression of my life’.
2 Schlesinger attended a series 
of his lectures on the ancestors of modern socialism whilst still at school and 
was  greatly  inspired.
3  Later  in  his  memoirs,  Schlesinger  wrote  that  Karl 
Grünberg provided him with excellent training in historical methods and the 
history of the labour movement at university. So much so that when, years 
later, Schlesinger was researching Central European Democracy he was still 
                                                 
1 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 24. For more information on 
Leo Tolstoy  (1828-1910) the Russian literary giant, pacifist and critic of state and church see 
W. Rowe, Leo Tolstoy, (Boston, Twayne Publishers, 1986). Emile Zola (1840-1902) was a 
French novelist and journalist who wrote about working class subjects in a similar manner to 
Charles Dickens in England a generation before. Apart from his literary legacy, not least the 
series  of  twenty  interlinked  novels  entitled  Les  Rougon-Macquart,  Zola  was  most  famous 
internationally  for  his  role  in  the  ‘Dreyfus  Affair’  of  the  1890s.  Zola  wrote  a  press  article 
headlined ‘J’Accuse’ to provoke French authorities to try him for libel in order to highlight the 
wrongful imprisonment of the Jewish military officer Dreyfus and its surrounding anti-Semitism 
(F. Hemmings, The Life and Times of Emile Zola, (London, Paul Elek, 1977). 
2 Ibid. p. 24. In the English edition, Schlesinger wrote, ‘So far as the war was concerned, an 
intelligent person might get inspiration from Tolstoy but, in the prevailing conditions, one could 
not be a Tolstoyan as regards the appropriate methods of bringing it to an end. War and 
economics, however, were not separated by a Chinese wall: if the replacement of my original 
Tolstoyanism by the acceptance of revolution is regarded as the essential turning point, I owe 
my later [late] teacher, Karl Gruenberg, the decisive impression of my life’ (Schlesinger, In a 
Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 20-21). 
3 Karl Grünberg (1861-1940) was born in to an Austrian Jewish family in Romania. He moved 
to Vienna aged twenty to study law and converted to Roman Catholicism in 1892 to take up a 
university career. By the end of 1899 he was appointed a temporary Professor of Political 
Economy at the University of Vienna; a position that was not made permanent until 1912. In 
1910  he  founded  the  journal  Archiv  für  die  Geschichte  des  Sozialismus  und  der 
Arbeiterbewegung and moved to Frankfurt in 1924 to become the first director of the Frankfurt 
Institute (see chapter 6, p. 210). He played a huge role in making the study of Marxism and 
the history of the labour movement possible within official institutions. This was demonstrated 
at an academic ceremony to open the institute; in his speech, Grünberg openly expressed his 
commitment  to  Marxism.  Grünberg  stoped  work  in  January  1928  following  a  stroke  but 
survived for a further twelve years (R. Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, (Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 1994) trans.  M. Robertson, pp. 21 – 34).   62 
able to use his doctoral thesis on Central European socialism and the trade 
union  movement  as  source  material.
4  The  admiration  and  respect  that 
Schlesinger  felt  for  Grünberg  continued  throughout  his  life.  In  one  of 
Schlesinger’s  last  writings,  in  1969,  he  spoke  of  Grünberg  as  one  of  the 
founders  of  the  study  of  socialism  and  described  him  as  ‘my  revered 
teacher’.
5 
 
Schlesinger argued that his theoretical training at university was not all that it 
could  have  been.  This  was  especially  true  of  his  appreciation  of  Marxist 
theory.
6  The  atmosphere  of  his  student  days  was  entirely  dominated  by 
western Marxist traditions, despite the presence of Russian Mensheviks, and 
communist Yugoslavs and Bulgarians in his Students’ Association. This was 
partly explained by the fact that, in those days, according to Schlesinger, ‘… 
the majority of the early writings of Marx and Engels, and practically all of the 
writings  of  Lenin’s,  were  inaccessible:  [Franz]  Mehring’s  writings  were 
regarded  as  the  last  word  in  the  philosophical  interpretation  of  Marxism’.
7 
Schlesinger  was  not to  fully  engage  with  the  works  of  Marx  and Leninism 
proper until later. 
 
Next to Marx, his other early philosophical influence was Rosa Luxemburg.
8 
Schlesinger had a personal connection to his mentor, since he was close to 
                                                 
4 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p.92. In the preface to the book, 
Schlesinger  referred  to  Prof.  Grünberg  as  the  person  to  suggest  this  doctoral  theme 
(Schlesinger, Central European Democracy, p. x). 
5 Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. II. 
6 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p.93. 
7 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 85. In the English edition, 
Schlesinger included the writings of Georgi Plekhanov alongside Mehring’s (Schlesinger, In a 
Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p.93). Franz Mehring (1846-1919) was born to a middle 
class family in Pomerania. As a journalist and writer, Merhing opposed Bismark and became 
a Lassallean socialist in the late 1870s but soon converted to Marxism and joined the Social 
Democratic Party. Mainly writing in Neue Zeit, Mehring attacked revisionists and remained a 
staunch internationalist throughout the war, alongside Luxemburg and Liebknecht, becoming 
a founder of the Spartacus League shortly before his death (F. Mehring, Karl Marx, The Story 
of his Life, (London, John Lane, 1936) especially translator’s preface by E. Fitzgerald, pp. vii - 
x).  
8  Schlesinger,  Erinnerungen:  Bis  zu  Hitlers  Machtübernahme,  p.  89.  In  his  memoirs, 
Schlesinger noted that he moved to Germany in February 1923 to work at a research institute 
under Eugene Varga as a sociologist specialising on agrarian problems (See above chapter 
1, p. 5). Although Schlesinger had enormous respect for Varga he did not seem to  have any 
great theoretical influence upon him (Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, 
pp. 102…).   63 
Karl  Liebknecht’s  sons  whilst  at  university.  In  1920  they  had  fled  Weimar 
Germany  and  continued  their  studies  in  Austria.  They  soon  joined 
Schlesinger’s circle of friends and he occasionally holidayed with them and 
their  stepmother,  Sonya.  She  received  many  letters  from  Luxemburg  and 
would read them aloud to the group. Schlesinger wrote in his memoirs:  
 
It  is  quite  possible  that  the  diverse  right-wing  factions  in  the 
German  C.P  [Communist  Party]…  appreciated  more  of 
Luxemburgism  proper,  i.e.  of  Rosa’s  limitations.  But  when  I 
moved amongst the people to whom a person who had been as 
good and devoted a Marxist as I ever hoped to be, had written 
such  letters,  who  knew  such  aspects  of  her  life  as  a  model 
revolutionary  would  hardly  remember,  I  became  conscious  of 
the whole broadness of her personality.
9 
 
This,  and  endless  discussions  with  the  younger  Liebknecht  boy,  gave 
Schlesinger a huge admiration for Luxemburg, something which is quite clear 
from his memoirs.  
 
Schlesinger  asserted  that,  at  this  time,  he  was  unaware  Luxemburg  had 
formulated many of her theories on spontaneity in polemic against Lenin; or 
that these theories were incompatible with the ideas of Leninism.
10 He thus, in 
his own words, ‘… did not even become conscious of the need to make some 
choice’ between Luxemburg and Lenin.
11 Schlesinger wrote in his memoirs 
that he knew the two theorists disagreed on certain matters, but ‘… everyone, 
in  those  days,  disagreed  with  everyone  on  some  issues’.
12  Instead, 
Schlesinger argued, his study of German Social Democracy filled him with 
respect for this great leader who, without resorting to theories of anarchism, 
opposed the narrow bureaucratism of the established labour movement and 
recognised  the  revolutionary  initiative  of  the  uneducated  and  unorganised 
                                                 
9 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 98. Schlesinger did not say so, 
but it is assumed that Liebknecht’s wife would reread old letters from Luxemburg, since the 
author was already dead at this point.  
10 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 95. 
11 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 98. 
12 Ibid. p. 99.   64 
masses.
13 He also appreciated the attention she paid to the problems of the 
colonies, writing: ‘Her Accumulation of Capital was important mainly in that it 
broadened that concept of the oppressed masses to include all the colonial 
peoples’.
14 Luxemburg’s economic treatise, first published in 1912, postulated 
that  only  economic  imperialism  could  account  for  continuous  capitalist 
accumulation, but the opportunities for this were finite as more and more of 
the  globe  was  used  up  in  this  manner.  Marxism  asserted  the  collapse  of 
capitalism due to the weight of its economic contradictions. Luxemburg sought 
the  cause  of  this  collapse  from  outside  the  individual  capitalist  economy, 
arguing that capitalism could continue to grow so long as there were primitive 
economies  to  be  drawn  into  spheres  of  influence.  Eventually  the  entire 
surface  of  the  earth  would  become  part  of  this  process  of  capitalist 
accumulation.  Capitalism  could  no  longer  grow  and  would,  therefore, 
collapse.
15 However, in these early days, Schlesinger was able to ignore the 
differences  Luxemburg’s  approach  to  the  colonial  question  had  to  that  of 
Lenin’s, which he also admired.  
 
Even after the KPD’s aborted revolutionary attempts of 1923, Schlesinger still 
adhered  to  Luxemburgist  principles.
16  He  reiterated  his  commitment  to  the 
Luxemburg tradition as late as 1924. In his memoirs he spoke of writing a 
pamphlet  in  February  of  that  year,  which  used  Luxemburg’s  theory  of 
capitalist  accumulation  as  its  foundation.
17  However,  the  KPD  was  now 
moving away from Luxemburg’s theories. As Schlesinger expressed it: ‘In the 
theoretical  field,  ‘Bolshevization  of  the  party’  was  now  proclaimed  as  the 
                                                 
13 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 89. 
14 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 99. R. Luxemburg, Gesammelte 
Werke, (Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1972), 5, pp. 5 – 411 and pp. 413-523. 
15 J. P. Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, (London, Oxford University Press, 1966), Volume I and II, p. 
530…  As J. Robinson, in  the introduction  to  the  English  translation  of  Luxemburg’s work, 
wrote, ‘Cloth from Lancashire pays for labour in America, which is used to produce wheat and 
cotton.  These  provide  wages  and  raw  materials  to  the  Lancashire  mills,  while  the  profits 
acquired both on the plantations and in the mills are invested in steel rails and rolling stock, 
which open up fresh territories, so that the whole process is continually expanding’. This could 
not continue indefinitely, hence capitalist collapse (Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, 
(London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), pp. 26-27). 
16 For  a description of  these  events by  Schlesinger see Central  European Democracy, p. 
212…. 
17  Schlesinger,  Erinnerungen:  Bis  zu  Hitlers  Machtübernahme,  p.  147.  He  also  made 
reference to a 1924 article based on these same principals in Schlesinger, ‘Marxism Without 
An Organizing Party’, p. 250, footnote 34.   65 
overcoming of the Luxemburgist tradition, which had proved bankrupt in the 
German events of 1923’.
18 According to Schlesinger’s memoirs, the slogan 
‘bolshevisation’  was  useful  to  the  KPD  because  it  exposed  the  difference 
between Lenin’s Bolshevik theory and the left-wing Menshevism of Trotsky 
and Rosa Luxemburg, something which, up to that point, few outside Russia 
fully appreciated.
19 Schlesinger did point out, however, that the term was later 
misused. It came to imply the mechanical transfer of a central leadership, as 
developed  over  years  of  revolutionary  struggle  in  a  giant  empire  with  a 
backward past, to parties in entirely different circumstances, such as those 
engaged in the fight against fascism.
20  
 
Schlesinger wrote of the horror he felt when the party first began attacking 
Luxemburg and her theories in 1924.
21 He wrote a long article in her defence, 
but it remained unpublished on the insistence of Karl Korsch, the then editor 
of  Die  Internationale  and  a  fanatical  anti-Luxemburgist  according  to 
Schlesinger.
22 The new Central Committee of the KPD set about publishing 
translations of Lenin’s works, including What is to be Done? and on reading 
these, Schlesinger’s support of Luxemburg waned considerably.
23 According 
to  his  memoirs,  Schlesinger  was  now  able  to  appreciate  the  irreconcilable 
antagonism between Lenin’s and Luxemburg’s approaches.
24 It was, perhaps, 
possible  to  integrate  some  elements  of  Luxemburg’s  theory  of  capitalist 
accumulation  into  a  theory  of  imperialism  based  upon  Leninist  principles. 
However,  for  Schlesinger,  ‘…  after  the  experiences of  1923  one  could  not 
remain  a  Communist  while  siding  with  her against  Lenin on  organisational 
problems’.
25 When it became clear to Schlesinger that he needed to make a 
choice between Luxemburg and Lenin he chose the latter with little hesitation.  
According  to  Schlesinger  this  alteration  in  his  theoretical  approach  was  to 
                                                 
18 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 175. The term ‘Bolshevisation’ 
was first officially proclaimed at the Fifth Comintern Congress in June-July 1924 and later 
modified in the Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI in March-April 1925 (McDermott K, and 
Agnew J., The Comintern  p. 45). 
19 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 149. 
20 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 177. 
21 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 151. 
22 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 180. 
23 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 6, pp. 1-192. 
24 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 152. 
25 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 180. Schlesinger’s underlining.   66 
dictate his attitude to internal problems in the KPD and also to decide ‘… upon 
the further course of my life’.
26 Such a theoretical transition cannot have been 
taken lightly. 
 
Schlesinger  argued  that  once  he  fully  understood  Luxemburg’s  complete 
system he had to oppose it; however, he believed it was still years before he 
had comprehended Marx’s scheme in full and came to the conclusion that 
Luxemburg’s  economics  were  untenable.
27  For  some time  he  attempted to 
interpret the differing theories of Lenin and Luxemburg as reflections of the 
needs of different stages of development in the western socialist movement. 
He wrote: 
 
The first of these stages involved the breaking of the sectional 
machinery built for the achievements of improvements within the 
given state, the second the construction of a new, socialist state 
and  society:  the  first  required  maximum  democracy  (….),  the 
second discipline especially on the part of the masses whose 
upheaval created the new order. Rosa Luxemburg regarded that 
discipline  as  too  high  a  price  for  the  formation  of  the  new 
order.
28 
 
In his later version of the memoirs, Schlesinger wrote that, in British exile, he 
had  come  to  think along remotely  similar  lines;  ‘…  in  some  places and  in 
some  stages  of  the  historical  transition  process  a  synthesis  between 
liberalism  and  socialism  will  be  found’.
29  However,  he  quickly  clarified  this 
uncharacteristic statement by adding the caveat that such a possibility could 
only exist under the impact of a revolutionary transition, ‘… in certain decisive 
countries, in crucial moments’.
30  Schlesinger ended this particular discussion 
of  his  conversion  from  ‘Luxemburgism’  by  once  again  reasserting  his 
‘Leninist’  credentials.  Referring  to  the  possibility  of  a  more  Luxemburgist 
                                                 
26 Ibid. p. 182. This sentence has been scored out on the copy of the memoirs used here, but 
remains perfectly legible nevertheless. 
27 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 152. 
28 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 181. 
29 Ibid. p. 181. 
30 Ibid. p. 182.   67 
transition or revolution he concluded, ‘No intellectual equipment superior to 
Leninism had been found for such points and moments of crisis’.
31 
 
Although  Rosa  Luxemburg  was  a  great  influence  upon  him,  Schlesinger 
argued  that,  as  a  member of  the  KPD,  he had  attempted  to help  free  the 
German labour movement from the limitations of her theories. With hindsight, 
he  argued  that  if  the  generation  preceding  his  had  been  capable  of 
successfully ‘bolshevising’ the labour party, the German revolution could have 
conquered  power  on  some  occasion  between  1918  and  1923.  Rosa 
Luxemburg could then have become Germany’s greatest leader, having under 
these circumstances been better protected. Her theories of 1905-1913 would 
thus  have  been  remembered  only  because  their  defeat  allowed  for 
revolutionary  victory  as  well  as  the  correction  of  many  limitations  of  the 
Russian movement.
32  
 
Schlesinger’s  attitude  towards  Luxemburg  altered  significantly  over  time.  It 
was clearly something over which he had thought, and suffered, a great deal. 
There  appeared  to  be  a  certain  amount  of  self-justification  involved  in  his 
memoir  writings  on  the  subject.  He  felt  it  necessary  to  explain  his  earlier 
admiration,  even  devotion,  to  her  person  and  theories,  as  well  as  his 
subsequent  rejection  of  them  in  favour  of  more  Leninist  conceptions. 
However, it is clear that he consciously and publicly retained a great deal of 
respect for her as a Marxist and revolutionary.  
 
All of Schlesinger’s exile writings on Luxemburg are consistent and support 
the views expressed in his memoirs. They show an admiration for her theories 
and activities but a fundamental dispute with her conclusions and methods. 
For  example,  in  Central  European  Democracy  Schlesinger  referred  to 
Luxemburg several times. When discussing her attitude towards the party and 
its role, he wrote: ‘She rejected the Bolshevist idea of a party which would 
support  the  sectional  interests  of  labour  while  continuously  representing 
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before it the tasks implied in a future revolutionary situation’.
33  According to 
Schlesinger, the Luxemburgist party could only assume a leading role on the 
assumption  of  an  imminent  socialist  revolutionary  situation.  The  party 
presumably stayed in the background when revolutionary circumstances were 
not  present  and  could  do  little  to  attempt  to  instigate  such  a  climate. 
Schlesinger  argued  that  Rosa  Luxemburg’s  theoretical  approach,  ‘…  was 
governed  by  the  combination  of  a  Menshevist  attitude  towards  Russian 
organizational  problems  with  a  strictly anti-bureaucratic  attitude to  those  of 
Germany’.
34 Such descriptions remain consistent with the post-1924 attitudes 
he wrote about in his memoirs. 
 
Schlesinger  once  again  emphasised  Luxemburg’s  devotion  to  ‘spontaneity’ 
and spontaneous mass action. However, he now criticised this commitment, 
arguing, ‘… she failed to see that even ‘spontaneity’ is not pure democracy, 
but is only action under ad hoc leadership’.
35 For Luxemburg, the direction of 
the political mass strike, a synonym of the revolutionary process, should be 
left to the ‘revolutionary period’, to spontaneous mass action. But Schlesinger 
questioned whether it was correct to expect the proper decisions to be taken 
by ‘… an ad hoc meeting of workers in a factory’.
36 This orthodox Leninist 
position differed markedly from the earlier unflinching admiration for her faith 
in the uneducated and unorganised masses he described in his memoirs. 
 
Yet Schlesinger did show some sympathy for Luxemburg’s ‘error’. He argued 
that, perhaps, she had not been aware of the gulf between the mythology of 
peoples’ ‘spontaneous’ actions in past revolutions and their actual behaviour 
in these situations. He also suggested, ‘… she was horrified by the prospect 
that a group of people who regarded themselves as competent to ‘organize a 
revolution’ on a national scale might also look upon themselves as competent 
to establish a revolutionary dictatorship’.
37 Her views on, and criticisms of, the 
Bolshevik  Party  and  its  behaviour  after  the  revolution  would  perhaps  have 
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encouraged her belief in mass action over that of an organised party.
38 In fact, 
it seems that Schlesinger retained some sympathy for this position, perhaps 
implying  that  it  was  not  unreasonable  for  the  time.  He  wrote  that  she  had 
reason to doubt that any organisation was preferable to the initiative of some 
ad  hoc  body;  ‘In  contrast,  any  centralized  body  shouldering  national 
responsibilities  might  be  handicapped  either  by  the  shortcomings  of 
information  available  when  the  movement  was  an  underground  one,  as  in 
Russia, or by its own bureaucratic conceptions of proper financial provisions, 
legal safeguards, etc., as in Germany’.
39 
 
Schlesinger published a long paper dedicated to discussions of Luxemburg 
and her political and theoretical legacy in Soviet Studies in 1966.
40 Ostensibly, 
the  article  formed  a  review  of  J.  P.  Nettl’s recently published  biography  of 
Rosa Luxemburg.
41 However, Schlesinger conceded: ‘The following lines are 
intended  as  a  treatment  of  a  great  figure  in  a  specific  stage  in  the 
development of the Marxist movement, reference to Mr. Nettl’s book being 
made  where  this  may  help  to  make  my  argument  clearer’.
42  In  the  paper 
Schlesinger clearly reiterated his profound respect for Luxemburg the ‘great 
figure’, as well as reinforcing the tremendous influence she had played in the 
development of his Marxist outlook and politics. He stated once again that it 
was  through  Luxemburg  that  he  found  ‘…  his  way  to  revolutionary 
socialism’.
43 
 
Schlesinger’s paper coincided with and expounded upon the views expressed 
in  his  memoirs  and  previous  writings.  He  began  by  declaring  that,  in  his 
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younger days, during the post-Great War revolutionary upheavals, he and his 
colleagues had been convinced of the orthodoxy of Luxemburg’s Marxism: 
‘Rosa Luxemburg had explained Marxism in a way which she regarded, and 
we  accepted,  as  the  orthodox  one’.
44  Schlesinger  argued  that  most  other 
Marxists’ rejection of her theory of accumulation had seemed irrelevant, as it 
explained to  his  generation  the  inevitability of  war  if  the  capitalist mode  of 
production remained. It was only when the revolutionary defeat in Germany 
was  compared  with  success  in  Russia  that  he  felt  the  need  to  critically 
reassess  ‘Luxemburgism’.  He  wrote:  ‘It  was  known  that  Rosa  had  had 
disagreements  with  Lenin  on  many  issues,  in  particular  the  organization 
problem, a wrong solution of which appeared to be the main cause of our 
defeats’.
45 His description of the timing and motive behind his disillusionment 
also conformed to that expressed in his memoirs. 
 
He went on to discuss whether Rosa Luxemburg’s theories and influence had 
played a part in the defeat of the revolution in Germany: ‘Had the theoretical 
foundations,  so  far  as  they  were  specifically  ‘Luxemburgist’,  been 
mistaken?’.
46 He answered this question in the positive, making reference to 
his 1953 Central European Democracy, in which he had argued that, had a 
Bolshevik-type party existed in Germany between January 1918 and October 
1923,  there  would  have  been  many  opportunities  to  seize  power.
47 
Schlesinger stated that thirteen years later he still believed the statement to 
be  true.  However,  he  added  that  now  he  felt  the  decisive  question  was 
whether the absence of such a party in the West was due to tactical errors or 
was simply an expression of the immaturity of the time for certain kinds of 
revolution.
48 He did not offer an answer. In general, he wrote, ‘… the need for 
communism  to  overcome  Rosa  Luxemburg’s  limitations  was  obvious,  and 
remains obvious, if only because she failed to notice the fact, emphasised by 
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Lenin  and  even  Hilferding,  that  capitalism  had  entered  a  new  stage, 
economically as well as politically’.
49  
 
Rudolf  Hilferding’s  study,  first published  in 1910,  concerned  the  increasing 
concentration  of  capital  in  large  corporations.  This  produced  a  growing 
number  of  cartels  and  trusts,  and  thus  enhanced  the  role  of  banks  and, 
ultimately,  finance  capital.  His  study  of  the  economic  and  political 
consequences of these developments led to his theory of economic crises 
and of imperialism, the economic policy of finance capital. Monopoly prices 
inevitably stifled domestic demand and created the need for state intervention 
to  ensure  protectionism  at  home.  At  the  same  time,  aid  increased  export 
demand for the cartels. Nationalist expansionist policies ensued, leading to an 
intensification of conflict between developed nations. Nationalism became not 
a question of national independence or cultural autonomy but the ideology of 
imperialism.  Crucially,  the  socialisation  of  the  economy  reinforced  by  the 
greater role of the state, meant that the socialist movement should not aim to 
smash  the  bourgeois  state  but  should  instead  take  it  over  and  expand  its 
role.
50  According  to  Schlesinger,  Luxemburg’s  failure  to  accommodate  the 
new stage of capitalist imperialism and monopoly rendered ‘Luxemburgism’ 
obsolete, even before it was able to enter the decisive stage of revolutionary 
upheavals in the first half of the twentieth century. This was in stark contrast 
to Lenin’s correct recognition and interpretation of developments.
51 
 
In terms of her long-term theoretical influence upon Germany, and the KPD in 
particular, Schlesinger believed it to be a negative one. He wrote: ‘She would 
always  have  been  ready  to  fertilize  with  her  blood  the  soil  for  a  truly 
revolutionary  party  of  the  German  proletariat.  In  the  moral  sense  she  has 
done so. But she was a theoretician, and her theoretical legacy proved to be a 
handicap for the development of the party’.
52 For him, the worst aspect of her 
legacy was that she left the party unable to correct its own mistakes, without 
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moving  towards  the  opposite  extreme.  The  KPD  thus  proved  incapable  of 
capitalising  on  ‘Germany’s  Kornilov’,  the  Kapp  Putsch  of  March  1920. 
Schlesinger insisted 
 
The  thesis  that  shortcomings  of  Rosa  Luxemburg’s  concepts 
formed  the  root,  not  of  any  particular  one  of  the  ‘deviations’ 
within our party, but of its incapacity to keep a balance and its 
ensuing  propensity  to  fall  from  ‘rightist’  mistakes  into  ‘leftist’ 
ones, and vice versa, has been maintained by me repeatedly.
53 
 
Schlesinger gave no explanation as to how Luxemburg had been responsible 
for this flaw. Perhaps her lack of organisation, her non-Leninist approach to 
party, was to blame. In any case, it was clear that Schlesinger now felt that 
his one time idol’s influence had hindered revolution in Germany. This was in 
marked  contrast  to  the  enormous  admiration  he  had  previously  described 
and, according to Schlesinger, was evidence of his increasing recognition of 
the correctness of Leninist principles. 
 
Once again echoing his earlier writings on the subject, Schlesinger noted that 
these failures of ‘Luxemburgism’ had necessitated, and indeed brought about, 
the  ‘Bolshevisation’  of  the  KPD.  He  noted  that  this  term,  and  the  policies 
surrounding  it,  came  to  be  misused  by  some.  In  particular,  Schlesinger 
mentioned  the  KPD  leadership  of  Ruth  Fischer  and  Maslow,  who  had,  ‘… 
played a temporary and provocative yet completely unprincipled part’ in the 
‘Bolshevisation’ process.
54  
 
Schlesinger insisted that a great deal of the anti-Luxemburgism that found 
expression in the early and mid twenties in Germany, were merely attempts 
by  party  members  to  demonstrate  their  loyal  pro-Stalinist  position.  It  was 
often, as Schlesinger expressed it, ‘… a mere hook on which to hang extreme 
caricatures  of  Stalinism,  which  would  not  have  been  defended  by  the 
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authentic  Stalin’.
55  However,  the  ‘authentic  Stalin’,  was  not  to  be  spared 
criticism either:  
 
Stalin  himself  is  co-responsible  because  of  his  extreme 
simplifications of the struggle against a conglomerate described 
as ‘Trotskyism’ and, what is more substantial, because of his 
silent,  and  nationalist,  assumption  that  the  development  of 
Russian  Bolshevism  was  the  development  of  revolutionary 
Marxism in the twentieth century.
56  
 
Such criticism of Stalin, and his nationalism in particular, came to characterise 
Schlesinger’s  later  writings  on  Soviet  Russia.  He  pointed  out  that  the  ‘de-
Stalinisation’  process  offered  a  unique  opportunity  to  reconsider  the  non-
Russian  tradition  of  Marxist  thought.  As  he  put  it,  ‘…  destalinization 
encourages  looking  back  to  those  forms  of  Marxism  which  preceded  the 
system described by Stalin as ‘Leninism’’.
57 Rosa Luxemburg’s legacy could 
now be put into perspective, away from the vagaries of Stalinist polemics and 
factional disputes. Significantly, Schlesinger inherently criticised Stalin and his 
influence on Marxist theory; a system ‘described’ as ‘Leninism’ suggests that 
this was not, in fact, the case. Stalin must, therefore, have corrupted it. 
 
In this 1966 paper, Schlesinger provided a description of the chronological 
evolution of ‘Luxemburgism’. He examined what was unique to her philosophy 
and  hypothesised  as  to  why  she  seemed  unable  to  come  to  terms  with 
Engels’ later writing and Lenin’s in general. He compared ‘Luxemburgism’ to 
what he saw as the three basic implications of Engels’ approach in the period 
following  Marx’s  death,  and,  in  particular,  in  his  1892  article,  Socialism  in 
Germany.
58 He concluded that Luxemburg was only fully aware of the first 
two.  Engels’  article  was originally  written  for  a  French  audience, to  inform 
them of the history of German Social Democracy. Engels argued that, given 
the developing social and economic situation in Germany, the Socialist Party 
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would continue to garner electoral support, to such an extent that eventually 
the  bourgeoisie  would  react,  provoking  a  revolutionary  situation.  However, 
Engels  argued  that  if  war  were  to  break  out,  most  likely  provoked  by  a 
belligerent Russia, then the triumph of socialism would either be immediate or 
pushed back tens of years. The German socialists would be forced to fight in 
order to defend the position they had managed to achieve. 
 
To  Schlesinger,  the  first  implication  of  Engels’  approach  was  the  need  to 
develop  class  consciousness  amongst  the  proletariat,  ‘…  the  social  class 
called to form the basis of the new social cohesion has to be organized and 
made conscious of its task’.
59 Secondly there followed the understanding that, 
in  Schlesinger’s  words,  ‘…  all  partial  reforms  must  be  seen  as  links  in  a 
prolonged  revolutionary  process’.
60  It  was  only  through  these  successful 
attempts  at  gaining  reforms,  as  well  as  temporary  setbacks,  that  the  new 
class would mature in experience and organisation, thus preparing it for the 
demands of its ultimate task. The third implication was the need to recognise 
and formulate plans for long periods without wars or depression. There could 
be  no reliance on  continual  immiseration  or  cyclical  economic disasters  to 
increase  consciousness  and  prepare  the  class  for  its  upcoming  role.  As 
Schlesinger  put  it:  ‘By  now  we  have  had  two  decades  without  major 
depressions, with an evident raising of the productive resources in both parts 
of the world, and the hope that the threat of world war may recede. What 
then?’.
61 
 
As  regards  the  first  of  Schlesinger’s  implications,  he  argued  that  Rosa 
Luxemburg  was  well  aware  of  the  need  to  develop  class  consciousness 
amongst  the  revolutionary  class.  He  wrote  that  this  required  the,  ‘… 
development of a proletarian ‘sub culture’ within West European civilisation’.
62  
Referring  to  Luxemburg’s  Mass  Strikes,  the  Party  and  Trade  Unions, 
Schlesinger  insisted  that  she  understood  the  pivotal  role  of  class 
consciousness  as  much  more  than  an  element  of  the  ‘cultural 
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superstructure’.
63 He wrote: ‘As distinct from the young Marx, yet in complete 
agreement with the mature Marx, who had appreciated trade union struggles 
as instrumental in the growing consciousness and demands of the masses, 
Rosa did not believe that mere misery creates class consciousness’.
64 In fact, 
‘… in her concept (and, a fortiori, in that of Engels) there was no contradiction 
between  improvement  in  the  condition  of  the  working  class  and  the 
preparation of that class for the eventual fulfilment of its historical task’.
65 This 
gave  Luxemburg’s  argument  a  degree  of  dynamism,  especially  when 
confronted  with  periods  of  relative  stability  and  even  prosperity.  Improved 
conditions, and such reforms as the working class was able to extract from 
capital,  nonetheless  prepared  them  for  the  coming  revolutionary  struggle; 
reform was a stepping stone towards revolution, not its alternative. 
 
The second problem for ‘classical’ or pre-revolutionary Social Democracy was 
that, if the socialist movement was to avoid a splitting of the working class into 
any number of potentially opposed interest groups, these reforms had to be 
understood  as  linking  elements  within  a  longer  revolutionary  process. 
According to Schlesinger, it was this concept that the Revisionists such as 
Eduard Bernstein attacked at the turn of the century.
66 Bernstein questioned 
the continual worsening of conditions for the working class and the need for a 
united movement transcending sectional aspirations. Luxemburg rose to the 
fore  as  a  Marxist  authority  in  German  circles  in  defence  of  this  second 
implication of Engels’ in her ‘Reform and Revolution’ first published in 1899.
67 
She  eloquently  defended  Marx’s  labour  theory  of  value  and  theory  of 
economic cycles, but did so with no particular originality. She also argued that 
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democracy could only emerge from the triumph of the working class and not 
from the Liberals. However, Schlesinger insisted that Luxemburg did display 
originality in her fight against Revisionism. He wrote: ‘The strength of Rosa’s 
reply lies in the demonstration that militarism, war and domestic reaction, far 
from  being  distortions  of  the  normal  course  of  capitalist  development,  are 
inherent  in  modern  capitalism’.
68  Although  there  was  no  guarantee  of  a 
continual  decline  in  working  class  conditions  as  a  catalyst  to revolutionary 
consciousness,  capitalist  crises,  wars  and  eventual  breakdown  were 
inevitable.  
 
In fact, Schlesinger argued that it was during this struggle that Luxemburg left 
‘…  the  well  traced  path’  of  Engels  and  began  to  develop  ‘the  specific 
‘Luxemburgist’ attitude’. According to Schlesinger, by:  
 
… arguing against all the current statements about the dangers 
of  assuming  power  before  the  objective  conditions  have 
matured,  Rosa  argues  that,  since  the  organization  of  the 
socialist  society  presupposes  the  assumption  of  power  by  a 
class  hitherto  removed  from  current  political  education  and 
experience,  where  all  the  objective  conditions  for  socialist 
reconstruction  are  available,  the  assumption  of  power  cannot 
come too early.
69 
 
The  working  class  would  mature  to  their  task  through  the  assumption  of 
power. It was the process of revolution and power that was important, not the 
determination  and  observation  of  necessary  prerequisites  to  that  seizure. 
There would be inevitable setbacks and failures, but the experience of these 
led to the maturation of the class.
70 According to Schlesinger, Luxemburg’s 
                                                 
68 Schlesinger, ‘Marx Without an Organizing Party’, p. 233. 
69 Ibid. p. 236. Author’s italics. 
70  In  ‘Reform  and  Revolution’  Luxemburg  wrote:    ‘…  it  will  be  impossible  to  avoid  the  
"premature" conquest of State power by the proletariat precisely because these "premature" 
attacks of the proletariat constitute a factor and indeed a very important factor, creating the 
political conditions of the final victory. In the course of the political crisis accompanying its 
seizure of power, in the course of the long and stubborn struggles, the proletariat will acquire 
the  degree  of  political  maturity  permitting  it  to  obtain  in  time  a  definitive  victory  of  the 
revolution.  Considered  from  this  viewpoint,  the  idea  of  a  "premature"  conquest  of  political   77 
attack  on  Revisionism  made  her  unpopular  with  the  party  machine.  Her 
emphasis  on  the  mass  strike  as  a  revolutionary  tool  from  1905  onwards 
separated her from the majority of the SPD. He wrote: ‘At first hidden, from 
1910 explicit, this differentiation turns, with the outbreak of war, into open and 
ruthless  struggle,  to  be  concluded  with  the  foundation  of  the  German 
Communist Party and the murder of Rosa’.
71 
 
Schlesinger  outlined  another  ‘unique’  aspect  of  ‘Luxemburgism’,  this  time 
concerning the role of the party in Social Democracy. Revolutionary parties 
were  to  provide  guidance  to  the  masses  but  could  not  determine  the 
revolution. They were instead to provide slogans to allow the working classes 
to maximise their potential: 
 
The socialist party of each country was the element of guidance, 
not more, since Rosa did not believe that revolutions could be 
organized in the sense of determining their start and practical 
course, which had to be left to the dynamics of the revolutionary 
period. Guidance in the revolutionary period meant giving the 
struggle such slogans and direction that at every moment the 
maximum  of  the  potential  as  well  as  the  actual  power  of  the 
working class is realized, that the decisiveness and sharpness 
of the tactics of Social Democracy never lag behind the actual 
forces but move ahead of them.
72 
                                                                                                                                           
power by the labouring class appears to be a polemic absurdity derived from a mechanical 
conception of the development of society, and positing for the victory of the class struggle a  
point fixed outside and independent of the class  struggle.’ (Luxemburg, Gesammelte Werke, 
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Luxemburg’s conception of a party differed markedly to Lenin’s. Schlesinger 
argued  that  her  theory  of  organisation  was,  in  fact,  a  ‘…  rejection  of 
organization’, and he strongly disagreed with this.
73 However, he insisted that 
Luxemburg recognised  there  were  two  different aspects  to a  party, having 
learned  this  from  Lenin.  The  party  had  to  fight  for  social  reform  whilst 
remaining  the  bearer  of  the  long-term  interest  of  the  working  class  in  its 
pursuit  of  a  socialist  society.
74  It  was  this  second  aim  of  the  party  which 
Bernstein had questioned. 
 
However  much  Luxemburg  had  learned  from  him,  she  was,  according  to 
Schlesinger, never able, ‘… fully to come to terms with Lenin at any stage of 
her development’.
75 It was this belief that led Schlesinger to reject the theories 
of Luxemburg in favour of Lenin’s. Her main failure in this respect was that 
she  lacked  a  conception  of  the  party  based  upon  the  experiences  of  all 
classes; unlike Lenin she did not take the peasantry into account. Schlesinger 
wrote,  
 
Rosa lacks one basic element of the Leninist analysis of party, 
namely  his  statement  in  What  is  to  be  Done?  that  the 
insufficiency  of  the  ‘trade  unionist  class-consciousness’  (both 
trade unionist and reformist parliamentary) derives not only from 
its  short  view  but  also  from  its  failure  to  be  based  upon  the 
experiences and relationships of all classes in society’.
76 
 
Schlesinger was, however, adamant that this difference in attitude to Lenin 
had nothing to do with any struggle of Luxemburg’s for ‘abstract democracy’, 
a cause retrospectively bestowed upon her by opponents of the Bolsheviks. 
                                                                                                                                           
Spartacus League is not a party that wants to rise to power over the mass of workers or 
through  them.  The  Spartacus  League  is  only  the  most  conscious,  purposeful  part  of  the 
proletariat, which points the entire broad mass of the working toward its historical tasks at 
every step, which represents in each particular stage of the revolution the ultimate socialist 
goal,  and  in  all  national  questions  the  interests  of  the  proletarian  world  revolution.’ 
(Luxemburg, Gesammelte Werke, 4, pp. 442-451 at p. 450). 
73 Ibid. p. 249. 
74 Ibid. p. 238. 
75 Ibid. p. 238. 
76 Ibid. p. 238. Author’s italics.   79 
 
Ultimately,  Luxemburg  was  inferior  to  Lenin  because  the  latter  based  his 
policies on an analysis of ‘actual’ conditions as opposed to prosaic theory. 
Luxemburg  proved  incapable  of  evolving  from  the  ‘classical’  model.  In 
Schlesinger’s words: 
 
Lenin’s specific attitude in the organization issue derived from 
his  concrete  analysis  of  the  national  and  agrarian  problems, 
which  forms  his  world  historical  merit  but  which  Rosa, 
enamoured  as  she  was  with  the  classical  ‘model’  of  ‘pure’ 
capitalism…, simply refused to appreciate.
77 
 
He went so far as to ponder whether Luxemburg had chosen to devote most 
of her energies to Germany because its socio-economic, political and cultural 
environment was closer to the ‘model’ than other countries. 
 
Schlesinger  now  returned  to  the  third  implication  he  discerned  in  Engels’ 
approach  of  1892:  what  should  a  Social  Democratic  party  do  in  a  period 
without wars or depression? Luxemburg had made two contributions towards 
tackling this problem. She made use of the term ‘imperialism’ in the widest 
sense of the word. This was, according to Schlesinger, ‘… certainly better 
than  over-specialization,  or  emphasis  on  the  mere  fact  of  monopoly;  both 
approaches  would  logically  lead  to  a  struggle  against  purely  individual 
aspects of existing society’.
 78  This would deprive socialism of its function as 
an alternative to capitalist society.  
 
Luxemburg’s  second  contribution  was  her  ‘theory  of  accumulation’.  As 
Schlesinger put it, this was the idea that the part of the surplus value which 
was to be used as investment could not be realised by sales to either of the 
main  capitalist  classes.  It  had  to  come,  instead,  from  those  pre-capitalist 
classes still remaining within capitalist centres and, more importantly, from 
colonial  countries.  This  process  would  lead  to  the  colonies  becoming 
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capitalist in character. Then, he wrote: ‘With the approaching conclusion of 
the process, and even earlier with a serious reduction of scope for expansion, 
the viability of capitalism, comes to an end and it will fall, presumably in a 
chain of major depressions with revolutionary consequences’.
79 Few Marxists 
agreed with Luxemburg’s analysis and her approach was in clear contrast to 
that of Hilferding and Lenin, based as they were upon monopoly capitalism.  
 
However, Schlesinger pointed out that it did have two positive aspects. Firstly, 
she questioned the stability of the value of money, a basic assumption of all 
Marxist  models.  Secondly,  she  at  least  approached  the  question  of 
underdeveloped countries. Although, according to Schlesinger, ‘… she did so 
with an erroneous concept and from the wrong end, so to speak, as potential 
yet insufficient markets for the industrialized countries rather than in relation 
to economic and political processes in the colonial countries themselves’.
80 
To conclude his thoughts on Luxemburg’s theory, Schlesinger argued that its 
impact  upon  the  KPD  could  only  ever  have  been  transitory.  This  was  not 
because of demands by the Russians for Leninist orthodoxy but because it 
was of no value in helping to understand the problems of real underdeveloped 
countries such as China. He once again criticised Rosa Luxemburg for the 
disparity between her theories and developing reality. 
 
That Schlesinger admired Luxemburg nonetheless was clear from his praise 
of her stance during the war: ‘She has proved herself not only a brave… but 
also a careful, … intelligent and consistent leader of the anti-war group’.
81 
Whether  Luxemburg,  who  attacked  those  who  had  betrayed  German 
socialism, or Lenin, who urged defeat of one’s own bourgeoisie, was the more 
correct  was  irrelevant,  a matter  of  nuance. Schlesinger  insisted:  ‘I  am  not 
willing to argue with my two great teachers on such points, after half a century 
has passed’.
82  
 
Schlesinger  appeared  to  provide  a  balanced  portrayal  of  Luxemburg’s 
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attitudes and influences. He argued against the use of her writings by various 
parties  and  individuals  who  attempted  to  expose  her  supposedly  inherent 
opposition to Bolshevik policies. In substance, four issues impacted upon her 
analysis  of  the  Russian  revolution.  Firstly,  Luxemburg’s  main  concern  was 
Germany and she was bound to view Soviet Russia concluding a separate 
peace with that country differently to the Bolsheviks. Secondly, he wrote, ‘… 
she had in general, as we have seen, a tendency to be pessimistic on the 
prospects of first revolutionary triumphs to be consolidated, and hence to put 
greater  demands  on  the  orthodoxy  of  the  practical  policies  which,  in  her 
opinion,  would  produce  lessons  for  the  future  rather  than  consolidated 
states.’
83  The  example  a  Russian  revolution  could  provide  was  more 
important than its securing any long term power. She also expected more 
‘proletarian democracy’ than the Bolsheviks could satisfy. Although, according 
to  Schlesinger,  she  was  to  eventually  pursue  the  same  policies  as  the 
Bolsheviks  in  Germany  but  without  the  backing  of  the  vast majority  of the 
industrial  workers  and  soldiers  which  the  Bolsheviks  enjoyed.  Finally, 
Luxemburg disapproved of the use of terror in the Russian revolution. Once 
again, Schlesinger felt that her opposition on this point was not intractable: 
‘This is the crux of the matter: the Russian revolution has ceased to be a 
dream,  it  has  become  hard  reality.  If  Rosa  had  survived  and  become 
responsible for a real revolution building a new order she, too, would have 
learned to do hard things’.
84 According to Schlesinger, although Luxemburg 
had her reservations about the Russian revolution, some of her reasons for 
this concerned her background and others were ones she simply would not 
have held if she were in the same position. Schlesinger’s paraphrasing of Leo 
Jogiches advice to Luxemburg was arguably a justification for Bolshevik terror 
practices  immediately  following  the  revolution.
85  It  was  also  based  on  a 
negative assumption: Rosa Luxemburg was not in a situation where such a 
moral conundrum was placed in front of her, so there is nothing to suggest 
that she would not have done as the Bolsheviks had. However, there is no 
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evidence to suggest that she would have either. Perhaps, Schlesinger was 
allowing his sympathies for the Bolsheviks and his oft-mentioned desire to 
counteract reactionary Western views colour his judgement in this respect. 
The  ‘scholar-advocate’s’  pragmatic  or  utilitarian  attitude  was  certainly 
apparent in his own attitude towards terror. 
 
In conclusion, Schlesinger argued that Lenin was by far the superior theorist 
and  political  figure;  Rosa  Luxemburg’s  failure  was  obvious  because  it 
contrasted so strongly with Lenin’s success.
86 For Schlesinger, Luxemburg’s 
main error was shared with most Marxism of the time: ‘Her weakness may be 
explained in terms of failure of Marxism, as developed in her days, to satisfy 
the  needs  of  a  fully  developed  Western  industrial  country’.
87  Luxemburg 
proved incapable of adapting theory to the developing needs of the modern 
proletariat. Whilst Lenin did not operate in conditions of a Western industrial 
country, he was able to promote a dynamic evolution of Marxism to suit the 
needs of Russia at that time. Schlesinger was obviously a great admirer of 
such  dynamism,  pragmatism  and,  perhaps even,  iconoclasm.  Ultimately,  it 
appears  that  Lenin  was  the  greater  materialist.  However,  Schlesinger  was 
anxious to put Luxemburg’s legacy in to context, arguing that she remained 
superior to both Trotsky and Bukharin. In fact, he argued, outside Italy, she 
was the greatest Western Marxist theoretician since Engels’ death. 
 
Schlesinger provided a reasonably balanced analysis of Rosa Luxemburg’s 
theories and political legacy. His interpretation also fitted in with his earlier 
writings  outlining  his  own  theoretical  evolution.  It  appears  his  onetime 
infatuation  coupled  with  a  subsequent,  but  not  wholesale,  rejection  of  her 
ideas led him to a realistic appraisal. Schlesinger dismissed common myths 
about ‘Luxemburgism’ as developed by her opponents and those who sought 
her authority and orthodoxy for their own cause. For example, he criticised 
suggestions that Luxemburg had represented notions of ‘abstract democracy’ 
in  opposition  to  the  undemocratic  methods  of  the  Bolsheviks.
88  He  also 
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insisted  that  it  was  a  myth  that  Luxemburg  glorified  mass  strikes  at  the 
expense of armed insurrection.
89 Finally, Schlesinger wrote that Luxemburg’s 
‘Accumulation  of  Capital’  could  not  be  used  to  validate  a  theory  of  the 
automatic  breakdown  of  capitalism.  In  fact,  Schlesinger  wrote,  Luxemburg 
rejected such notions, ‘… in favour of a conception of a series of conflicts and 
catastrophes, the solution of which by working-class action would demand a 
maximum of consciousness’.
90 Her theories were based on mass and direct 
action  by  the  proletariat.  This  ‘myth  breaking’  was  not  a  new  element  to 
Schlesinger’s writings. He had argued in 1950 that it was unjust to reproach 
Luxemburg with a desire to delay revolution due to her advocacy of automatic 
elements;  ‘…  long  before  capitalism  should  come  to  its  ‘natural’  end,  the 
horrors  and  destitution  involved  in  imperialist  wars  and  colonial  conquest 
would force revolution as the only alternative on peoples’.
91 This role was a 
familiar  one  to  Schlesinger  and many  of  his  writings  were  concerned  with 
unmasking both Western and Marxist distortions of theory and history. 
 
Arguably, Schlesinger blurred Luxemburg’s differences with and criticisms of 
the Bolsheviks and the October Revolution; an understandable sentiment for 
a man attempting to evaluate his two great sources of inspiration, Lenin and 
Luxemburg.  However,  he  consistently  argued  that  his  preference  was  for 
Lenin’s theories and he admitted that Luxemburg’s approach was inimical to 
them. For example, Schlesinger admitted Luxemburg could only envisage the 
breakdown of capitalism as a worldwide process. He wrote that she rejected 
the notion of a series of national revolutions, ‘… the essence of the modern 
Leninist concept.’
92 Leninism would always be the superior theory, not least 
because  it  was  formulated  in  regard  to  the  development  of  society  since 
Marx’s  time.  It  had  a  genuinely  materialist  base  and  its  pragmatism  had 
ensured its success. 
 
Like most of Schlesinger’s writings, the paper ‘Marx Without an Organizing 
Pary’ can be dated by the attitudes towards Soviet Russia contained within it. 
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It  was  written  after  Stalin’s  death  and  the  subsequent  ‘de-Stalinisation’ 
process in the Soviet Union, and contained overt criticisms of Stalin and the 
vulgarisation  and  authoritarianism  of  his  rule.  This  was  combined  with  an 
optimist outlook for the post-Stalin future in the USSR. Schlesinger argued 
that now there were opportunities to explore the non-Russian aspects to the 
Marxist tradition. 
 
J. P. Nettl’s description of Soviet and KPD treatment of Rosa Luxemburg after 
her death appears to broadly correspond to Schlesinger’s. For example, he 
clearly accepted the notion that Rosa Luxemburg’s body of writing constituted 
a system of ideas. According to Nettl, the notion of Luxemburg’s theories as, 
‘…  a  coherent  whole  with  universal  application’  was  first  propounded  by 
Georg Lukács in 1920-1921.
93 From then on ‘Luxemburgism’ existed as an 
‘ism’,  a  system  to  be  conflated  with  other  deviant  systems,  such  as 
Trotskyism,  and  contrasted  unfavourably  with  the  orthodox  system  of 
Leninism. Schlesinger undoubtedly viewed these theories in terms of differing 
systems, although he would never have reduced them to labels of abuse to 
be hung on whichever enemy was then current. He also clearly accepted the 
need for a choice between Lenin and Luxemburg, suggesting that the latter 
represented a lower stage of development and was surpassed, theoretically 
and politically, by Lenin. On the whole Schlesinger tended to agree with the 
post-World War Two official Soviet interpretation, which was now freed from 
the excesses of Stalinist control. Luxemburgism remained a system ridden 
with errors, partly due to historical circumstances but mainly because of the 
author’s  intellectual  failure.  However,  as  Nettl  wrote,  there  was  a  clear 
distinction between Luxemburg and Luxemburgism, ‘… the one as a shining 
example,  the  other  as  a  false  doctrine  related  to  but  not  justified  by  a 
particular  period  of  the  past;  in  any  case  worthy  of  critical  study’.
94 
Schlesinger was consistent in his admiration of Luxemburg but rejected what 
he regarded as her system. 
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Chapter Three: Lenin 
 
This  chapter  examines  Schlesinger’s  attitude  towards  Lenin  as  a  Marxist 
theoretician. Such an investigation provides an insight into Schlesinger both 
as a scholar of Marxism and as an adherent of that ideology. What did he 
understand  by  ‘Leninism’?  What  did  he  consider  Lenin’s  contribution  to 
Marxism  to  be?  Did  he  admire  his  work?  The  investigation  also  provides 
information on Lenin, his writings and theories. Schlesinger offers a little-read 
perspective, one which inevitably adds to the sum of work completed on the 
subject. It begins with an exploration of Schlesinger’s memoir reflections; an 
examination of how Schlesinger became acquainted with Leninism, as well as 
his initial impressions of its validity. The chapter then turns to an examination 
of Schlesinger’s published work on the topic. 
 
Following  from  Luxemburg,  the  next  stage  in  Schlesinger’s  theoretical 
development came about through his increased knowledge of Lenin and his 
writings.  This  led  to  a  thorough  transition  in  his  political  and  theoretical 
thinking,  from  his  acceptance  of  ‘Luxemburgism’  to  that  of  the  tenets  of 
‘Leninism’. This evolution is clearly described in Schlesinger’s memoirs and 
has been outlined in the previous chapter. In 1919 Schlesinger read Lenin’s 
‘State  and  Revolution’  but  felt  that  it  was  little  more  than  a  systematic 
presentation  of  Marxist  views.
1  Then,  presumably  around  the  time  of  its 
publication  in  1920,  Schlesinger  read  ‘’Left-wing’  Communism:  an  Infantile 
Disorder’.
2  This  was  a  tremendously  significant  event  for  Schlesinger;  he 
wrote,  ‘…  to  me,  like  many  other  western  Socialists,  this  was  the  first 
introduction  to  Bolshevik  theory  proper’.
3  However,  his  understanding  of 
Marxism, and Bolshevism in particular, was still far from comprehensive. He 
insisted:  ‘I  doubt  whether  we  grasped  even  all  of  the  essentials  of  its 
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contents…’.
4  Finally,  from  1923  onwards,  as  he  became  more  aware  of 
Lenin’s  work  and  the  failure  of  a  Luxemburg-inspired  KPD  became 
increasingly  apparent,  Schlesinger  came  to  recognise  the  superiority  of 
Lenin’s position over that of his previous mentor, Rosa Luxemburg. He wrote 
of the importance of reading Lenin’s What is to be Done?. The book was a 
catalyst to his dropping of Luxemburg’s economic and organisational theories 
and siding with Lenin.
5 
 
The only other notable mention of Lenin in the memoirs, separate from his 
realisation  of  Luxemburg’s  errors,  concerned  his  demand  that  parties 
affiliating to the Third Communist International, Comintern, should adhere to 
the ‘Twenty One Conditions’ it developed at its Second Congress in 1920.
6 
Whilst primarily a question of politics rather than Marxist theory, the issues of 
organisation,  agitation  and  attitudes  towards  other  groupings  are  matters 
necessarily  connected  to  political  theory.  According  to  Schlesinger,  the 
conditions of entry were formulated in response to centrist parties’ offers to 
negotiate the formation of a new International. Strict revolutionary criteria of 
entry  would,  therefore,  prevent  their  involvement.  To  Schlesinger,  the 
intention  behind  the  conditions  was  to  establish,  ‘…  some  standard  of 
sincerity in support of the Russian revolution’.
7 Presumably, this would be in 
opposition  to  the  mere  rhetoric  of  support  offered  by  certain  sections  of 
European Social Democracy. 
 
A majority of Social Democratic party leaders had argued against participating 
in the Comintern and, according to Schlesinger, their subsequent arguments 
showed  that  their  differences  with  ordinary  ‘social  patriotic’  reformists  had 
disappeared with the end of the war.
8 Men such as the influential German 
theoretician  Karl  Kautsky  had  already  moved  to  the  foreground  of  anti-
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Bolshevik propaganda.
9 It was, therefore, natural that the Bolsheviks would 
wish to remove opponents such as these from their International. Lenin was 
correct to insist upon some declaration of solidarity by participants as well as 
a commitment to fight any war of intervention. 
 
Unfortunately,  the  Bolsheviks  demanded  more  than  this.  According  to  the 
early version of Schlesinger’s memoirs, their insistence that the parties who 
sought to join the new organisation must absorb the experiences and policies 
of the successful Russian party was regrettable but understandable.
10 In his 
later draft Schlesinger was less conciliatory about what he regarded as the 
error of Lenin’s ‘Twenty One Conditions’. The conditions represented more 
than  simply  the  acceptance  of  the  value  of  Russian  experiences  and 
methods, something of undoubted use to parties such as those of Germany 
and Hungary, whose failure to apply these methods had greatly contributed to 
their recent revolutionary ‘tragedies’. Instead, according to Schlesinger, ‘… 
the  Bolshevik  principles  of  organisational  centralisation  and  of  complete 
ideological  homogeneity  were  proclaimed  as  standard,  the  acceptance  of 
which  formed  the  preliminary  condition  of  admission  to  Comintern’.
11  To 
Schlesinger  this  appeared  unnecessary  and  needlessly  alienating.  The 
conditions  were  ‘a  very  clumsy  formulation’,  especially  when  one 
remembered that European radical workers held such deep sympathies for 
Russia that the Soviet experiences would have been assimilated anyway.
12 
Schlesinger doubted that many non-Russians had read Lenin’s What is to be 
Done? and hence did not understand the organisational principles for which 
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they were voting anyway.
13  
 
When considering Lenin’s reasoning, Schlesinger argued: ‘It is just possible 
that  Lenin,  when  formulating  the  Twenty-One  Conditions,  envisaged  the 
possibility  of  a  prolonged  delay  of  socialist  revolutions  outside  Russia’. 
However, Schlesinger wrote that even if this were true, ‘… the Conditions did 
little  good  yet  a  lot  of  harm.’
14  In  Austria,  whilst  the  average  worker’s 
sympathy  for  the  Bolsheviks  did  not  decrease,  his/her  willingness  to  learn 
from Russian experience did. In Germany, the conditions did not affect the 
strength of the revolutionary movement but neither did they succeed as the 
cleansing  operation  they  were  intended  to  be.  Even  in  countries  such  as 
China  or  the  Balkans,  where  successful  parties  seized power,  they did  so 
because  of  the  application  of  Bolshevik  principles  in  countries  with  similar 
conditions to revolutionary Russia, not because of any ‘purges’ based on the 
conditions.
15 
 
If  Lenin  had  expected  prolonged  isolation,  he  would  have  been  better 
accepting  the  ‘centrists’  into  the  Comintern  as  they  were,  with  only  an 
insistence on their splitting from their right wings. According to Schlesinger, 
Lenin’s real opponents, those such as Kautsky and Hilferding, would have left 
the International anyway. Without the authoritarian tenets of the Twenty One 
Conditions, Russian efforts towards the reception of the Bolshevik experience 
internationally  would  have  assumed  the  character  of  an  honest  factional 
struggle.  Instead  it  took  on  the  ‘…  ridiculous  shape  of  Bolshevisation’,  as 
Schlesinger expressed it.
16 This was to the detriment of all involved. When 
the  split  within  the  International  did  come,  the  word  of  the  Comintern 
representative increasingly became final in internal disputes.
17 
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Although Schlesinger conceded that his understanding of the complexity of 
these  issues  was  limited  at  the  time,  he  felt  that  solidarity  with  the  great 
Soviet experiment was paramount. He wrote, ‘… when the [Austrian] social 
democratic party congress declared the 21 Conditions as incompatible with 
party membership, I joined the Communist Party as an individual’.
18 And so 
Schlesinger  pledged  his  allegiance  to  Lenin  and  the  Bolsheviks,  a 
commitment which remained for the rest of his life. 
 
There  is  little  else  concerning  Lenin,  as  a  politician  or  theoretician,  in  the 
memoirs. Schlesinger clearly admired Lenin, enough to abandon his youthful 
idol, and remained a supporter of his writings and ideas. However, since they 
were  not  contemporaries and  as  Lenin  died  soon  after  Schlesinger  began 
active  party  work,  there  was  little  else  he  could  say  on  the  topic  in  an 
autobiographical  work.  It  is  necessary  to  turn  to  his  academic  writings  to 
discover further insights into Schlesinger’s thoughts on Lenin and Leninism. 
 
Schlesinger wrote a number of articles and sections in books about Lenin. His 
admiration  and  praise  of  the  theoretician  is  one  of  the  major  elements  of 
consistency  throughout  his  writings.  According  to  Schlesinger’s  memoirs  it 
was only through a correct appreciation of Leninism that he came to properly 
understand  Marxism  as  a  system.  To  Schlesinger,  Marxism  and  Leninism 
were inseparable; the latter was a constituent part of, and developing stage in 
the former. Most of his writings about party, theory or Russia engaged with 
Leninism in some way, so there is an abundance of source material for an 
investigation of his attitude towards Lenin.  
 
Four themes emerge from an investigation of Schlesinger’s work on Lenin. 
Firstly,  his  undoubted  admiration  of  the  subject  matter.  That  Schlesinger 
believed  Lenin  to  be  an  outstanding  scholar,  theoretician,  organiser  and 
                                                                                                                                           
other occasion – destroyed hopeful revolutionary movements is nonsense, borne from the 
self-assertion of leaders who complain of miracles they would have wrought had [it] not been 
[for]  that  Moscow  devil’  (Schlesinger,  In  a  Time  of  Struggle:  Whither  Germany?,  p.  134). 
Schlesinger’s  attitude  was  in  stark  contrast  to  that  of  Ruth  Fischer,  his  peer  and  former 
colleague. She asserted that the machinations of Comintern, particularly at Stalin’s behest, 
doomed the KPD to failure. See Fischer, Stalin and German Communism. 
18 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 64.   90 
politician is clear from the most cursory glance at any of his writings dealing 
with Marxism and philosophy. It could be argued that this admiration went so 
far as to become a justification for all of Lenin’s writings, theories and actions. 
Perhaps  he  became blinded  to  any  faults  or  errors;  he  certainly  appeared 
willing to agree with Stalin’s lavish praise. Schlesinger seemed prepared to 
discuss  ways  in  which  Marx  and  Engels’  arguments  and  judgements  had 
been flawed or were no longer relevant, yet he appeared more reluctant when 
it came to Lenin.  
 
The  second  theme  is  Schlesinger’s  understanding  of  Leninism  as  an 
evolution  of  original  Marxism.  Marxism,  as  a  system  of  ideas,  a  scientific 
methodology and a revolutionary ideology has an unchanging philosophical 
materialist  core.  However,  beyond  this  base,  it  creatively  evolves  as 
circumstances  develop  –  thus  maintaining  its  materialist  and  dialectic 
essence. As a body of theory it is dynamic, capable of, and in fact requiring, 
change by successive generations. Leninism thus cannot be a ‘distortion’ of 
the original, true Marxism of the founders, a criticism often levelled at Lenin 
by  opponents.  It  instead  becomes  its  heir,  the  next  essential  evolutionary 
step;  one  that  will  ultimately  be  superseded  by  the  next  phase  in  the 
dialectical development of society. 
 
This  belief  of  Schlesinger’s  could  be  clearly  seen  with  his  transition  from 
‘Luxemburgism’ to ‘Leninism’ in the early to mid-1920s, and represents the 
crux  of  any  of  Schlesinger’s  writings  concerning  Lenin.  Lenin  was  able  to 
adapt his thinking and theories as socio-economic and political circumstances 
changed.  He  recognised  the  development  of  new  class  structures  and 
possible  alliances  between  these  classes  and  adapted  Marxist  ideas  and 
tactics  accordingly.  This,  ultimately,  allowed  the  Bolsheviks  to  affect  a 
revolutionary change. In contrast, Luxemburg did not perceive any changes, 
her  Marxism  remained  static  and  her  party  proved  incapable  of  leading  a 
revolution. 
 
Another  feature  of  Schlesinger’s  attitude  was  his  belief  that  Lenin’s  main 
contribution had been his theory of the party. Lenin had melded a synthesis of   91 
the  traditions  of  the  Russian  revolutionary  movement  with  a  dynamic 
approach  to  Marxist  theory.  His  application  of  these  principles  to  Russian 
conditions allowed him to organise a party capable of leading a revolution. 
Marxism  would  always  require  modifications  as  circumstances  developed. 
Lenin undertook the necessary modifications to ensure Marxism’s suitability 
for less well developed countries and its transformation in Russia allowed for 
its utility in China and elsewhere. Lenin’s success in this respect was proven 
by the existence of the Soviet state.  
 
The  fourth  notable  element  of  Schlesinger’s  writings  on  Lenin  was  a 
discernable feature of all of his work and was most clearly evidenced in that 
on Soviet historiography. Schlesinger’s interpretation or emphasis in writing 
about Lenin was noticeably similar to the official Soviet line at any particular 
time.  In  earlier  writings,  for  example,  Schlesinger  seemed  to  concur  with 
Stalinist  orthodoxy  in  asserting  the  greatness  of  Leninism  and  seeing 
developments  under  Stalin  as  a  natural  progression  from  it.  After  the 
denunciations  of  1956,  however,  he  appeared  to  believe  that  certain  of 
Stalin’s  ‘excesses’  had  to  be  purged  from  theory;  something  which  would 
bring  about  a  return  to  pure  Leninism.  After  this  return  to  a  more  sound 
theoretical base, further modifications could be made by later authorities such 
as Khrushchev. 
 
The key to Schlesinger’s understanding of Lenin was What is to be Done?, 
first published in 1902. The work was both a polemic against Economism and 
a call for a tightly knit, cohesive and disciplined party. Lenin argued that social 
democrats should not simply concern themselves with trade union struggles 
and the wider workers’ movement but should have a more clandestine and 
professional  organisation.  To  Lenin,  what  was  required  was,  ‘…  an  All-
Russian organisation of revolutionaries that stands undeviatingly on the basis 
of Marxism, that leads the entire political struggle and possesses a staff of 
professional  agitators’.
19  Whilst  spontaneity  and  a  loose  democratic 
organisation would condemn workers to the limited aims of trade unionism, 
                                                 
19 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 6, pp. 153-154.   92 
the  role  of  social  democracy  was  to  raise  their  consciousness.  Lenin 
described  the  type  of  party  necessary  to  fulfil  this  role,  and  Schlesinger 
believed this to be one of his main contributions to Marxist theory and the 
history  of  the  Russian  revolution.  He  seems  to  have  believed  that  Lenin 
prescribed  a  party  formula,  which  was  followed  by  the  Bolsheviks, 
successfully given the existence of the Soviet state. Schlesinger’s analysis is 
demonstrated by his attitude towards the ‘Twenty One Conditions’ of entry to 
Comintern. He argued that the conditions were erroneous and did little good, 
but that the assimilation of Bolshevik principles of organisation was essential 
for future revolutionary success. 
 
The  other  key  text  to  Schlesinger’s  analysis  of  Lenin  was  ‘’Left-wing 
Communism’: an Infantile Disorder’ written after the Russian revolution and 
first published in 1920. In it Lenin attempted to demonstrate that he and the 
Bolsheviks  had  created a  party  capable  of seizing  and  maintaining  power. 
Many elements of their experience were of international validity, thus foreign 
parties should centralise and assimilate that experience. They should follow 
the Bolsheviks since they had been the only party to succeed. Lenin argued, 
‘… certain fundamental features of our revolution have a significance that is 
not local, not peculiarly national, or Russian alone, but international’.
20  
 
In What is to be Done? Lenin set out how a party should organise, in ‘Left-
wing  Communism’  he  argued  that  the  Bolsheviks  had  achieved  power 
because of the nature of their organisation and urged foreign parties to follow 
this lead. However, many argue that the revolution in Russia did not simply 
occur  because  the  party  was  organised  in  the  way  in  which  Lenin  had 
originally  proposed  or  retrospectively  described.  In  fact,  even  Schlesinger 
admitted that Lenin’s initial plans for the state did not come to fruition and that 
Lenin was not responsible for the timing of revolutionary events.
21 As J.D. 
White has argued, Lenin insisted foreign parties adopt the principles which 
had apparently made them victorious. He continued: 
 
                                                 
20 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 41, p. 3. 
21 See below p. 120.   93 
Lenin  maintained  that  some  features  at  least  of  the  Russia 
revolution were applicable internationally. He was not inclined to 
consider  that  what  had  brought  the  Bolsheviks  to  power  in 
Russia was their promise of peace, bread and land to a people 
exhausted by war and hunger. Lenin was in effect imposing on 
foreign parties not the pattern of the Russian revolution, but of a 
mythical revolution that had not occurred anywhere.
22 
 
However,  instead  of  this  more  distanced  analysis,  Schlesinger  appears  to 
have concurred with Lenin’s evaluations, accepting his interpretation almost 
in its entirety. 
 
Marx His Time and Ours, published in 1950, was the first of Schlesinger’s 
works after his return to the West to engage in any great detail with Lenin. 
This was Schlesinger’s seminal philosophical work. It primarily concerned the 
development of Marxist theory up to the time of publication, in particular in the 
Soviet Union – in essence, Marxism’s applicability to the world of the 1950s. 
Schlesinger  wrote  in  the  preface:  ‘I  am  dealing  far  less  with  the  internal 
coherence  of  Marx’s  argument  in the  conditions  of  its  origin  than  with  the 
issue  of  how  far  questions  and  answers  conditioned  by  that  setting  are 
relevant  for  our,  very  different,  days’.
23  Schlesinger  attempted  to  trace 
changes  and  developments  in  Marxist  theory  from  its  roots  in  Marx  and 
Engels to its realisation, imperfect or otherwise, as embodied in the Soviet 
state. As Schlesinger put it: 
 
An investigation may concentrate upon the modifications of the 
Marxist  system  made  by  the  further  evolution  of  the  social 
formation investigated by Marx, including attempts at realisation 
of  his  system.  Such  an  approach  involves  inherent  criticism  of 
Marx’s original system but it takes the continuing relevance of the 
system for granted.
24  
                                                 
22 White, Lenin, The Practice and Theory of Revolution, (London, Palgrave, 2001) p. 161. 
23 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. x. 
24 Ibid. p. 1.   94 
 
It was this investigation he was proposing.  
 
Three key concepts emerged from his work. Firstly, a major aim seemed to 
be the clarification of what Marxism was, an attempt to demystify and dispel 
common misconceptions; although given the dry, lengthy and obtuse writing 
style employed this was unlikely to be too successful. Throughout the text, 
Schlesinger  made  clear  what  Marxism  was  not;  what  were  in  fact  the 
propositions of ‘vulgar’ variations. For example, Schlesinger went into some 
detail  to  explain  that  Marxism  was  not  utopianism:  ‘To  the  founders  of 
Marxism, Communism was not a condition to be established nor an ideal to 
which reality must adjust itself... This seems the strongest possible rejection 
of  utopianism  and  wishful  thinking’.
25  He  was  also  at  pains  to  separate 
Marxism  from  any  kind  of  pragmatic  philosophical  base.
26  Sometimes  this 
demystifying appeared to be an attempt to ‘rescue’ Marxism from the Western 
world’s erroneous understanding.
27 This is a somewhat negative motive, one 
that perhaps left the work open to criticism that it justified or apologised for 
more dubious aspects of Marxist theorising and characteristics of the Soviet 
state. 
 
Secondly,  a  major  feature  of  the  work  was  the  emphasis  on  Marxism  as 
science. It was a scientific theory that was verifiable, not as accurately as 
other  sciences  where  experiments  could  be  constructed  artificially  in 
controlled environments, but where results could be used to prove veracity 
nonetheless. To Schlesinger, Marxism’s materialist base implied the demand 
for  objective  truth,  the  very  essence  of  ‘science’.
28  Schlesinger  felt  the 
scientific nature of Marxism to be self-evident. For example, when discussing 
pragmatism  he  wrote:  ‘Pragmatism  is  thus  opposed  to  the  basic  tenet  of 
Marxism  and  of  Science  in  general  that  the  World  is  an  objective  reality 
                                                 
25 Ibid. p. 56. 
26 Ibid. pp. 58… and pp. 61…  
27 See for example Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 92 in which he points out that 
‘economic  determinism’  was  a  characteristic  of  vulgar  Marxism  as  opposed  to  Marxism 
proper. 
28 Ibid. p. 61.   95 
independently  of  human  ideas’.
29  It  is  clear  from  this  statement  that 
Schlesinger regarded Marxism as existing within Science, obeying the same 
rules and reasoning.  
 
The third important proposition of Marx His Time and Ours followed directly 
on from the second. Science required proof. Marxist theory had been proven 
to  be  fundamentally  correct  in  its  approach;  the  proof  lay  in  the  ‘objective 
reality’ of the October Revolution and the resulting Soviet state. Schlesinger 
was  at  pains  not  to  overstate  his  case;  the  state  was  not  some  idealised 
version of a Marxist model, it had problems. But for it to be otherwise would 
be  utopian.  The  dialectical  nature  of  social  development  was  expressed 
through  the  evolution  of  society,  parts  clashed,  experiments  failed,  but 
progress was achieved as a result. Schlesinger wrote: ‘That the system has a 
large degree of inherent truth is proved by the success of its application in 
Russia’.
30 Continuing: ‘The behaviour of those Socialists who are inclined ‘to 
write  off’  the  Russian  revolution  because  it  fails  to  comply  with  their  pet 
Utopia, which some of them prefer to describe as ‘Marxism’, is truly contrary 
to the Marxist point of view’.
31 This theme, of the Soviet state as proof of the 
correctness of Marxism, is one familiar in much of Schlesinger’s writing on the 
subject.
32 
 
Marx His Time and Ours adhered to the timeline proposed in this thesis. It 
was published in 1950 and can, therefore, be categorised into Schlesinger’s 
pre-1956  body  of  work.  The  unifying  characteristic  of  all  of  Schlesinger’s 
writings  in  this  period  is  their  broad  conformity  with  orthodox  Soviet 
interpretations.  So,  the  book  praised  Stalin and  his  contribution  to  Marxist 
theory,  presenting  him  as  the  natural  successor  to  Lenin  –  theory  was 
evolving from Marxism to Marxism-Leninism to Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. 
This perhaps explains why, when turning to Schlesinger’s engagement with 
Leninism in the work, there is not as much as one might expect. The book 
                                                 
29 Ibid. p. 58. 
30 Ibid. p. 4. 
31 Ibid. p. 4. 
32 See, for example, Schlesinger, ‘More Observations on Ideology’, Soviet Studies, 19, 1, July 
1967, pp. 89-99 at p. 89.   96 
dealt with Marxist theory’s roots in the writing of Marx and Engels, but then 
concentrated more on developments during the Stalin era. The importance of 
Lenin’s contribution was clear but there was little written specifically about it. 
Was this, perhaps, because Schlesinger was keen to demonstrate Stalin’s 
impact  on  theory?  Alternatively,  it  could  be  because  Schlesinger  was 
attempting to write about Marxism’s contemporary significance. According to 
his dialectical understanding of theory, as material circumstances developed, 
Leninism would lose its relevance. Further theoretical evolution was required 
in  order  for  Marxist  theory  to  remain  dynamic  and  applicable.  Lenin’s 
contribution  had  been  enormous  but  this  success  brought  about  changed 
conditions, and theory had to adapt to them. 
 
When Schlesinger did write about Lenin, there were, in general, two features 
to  his  comments.  Firstly,  Schlesinger  appeared,  almost  unquestioningly,  to 
adopt  Lenin’s  tenets.  For  example,  he  accepted  Lenin’s  criticisms  of  the 
philosophers Richard Avenarius and Ernst Mach in his polemic ‘Materialism 
and Empirio-Criticism’ seemingly at face value.
33 This was in spite of the fact 
that the work, published in 1909, was a violent and sarcastic attack on a great 
number of philosophers of whom Lenin knew relatively little. As the one-time 
Bolshevik  N.  Valentinov  wrote:  ‘It  is  the  rage  that  makes  Lenin’s  book  so 
unique: it would be difficult to find another Russian work which contains so 
much  crude  abuse  of  foreign  philosophers…  He  wanted  to  spit  on  his 
opponents’.
34  Lenin  argued  that  empirio-criticists,  as  positivists,  did  not 
believe that an object could exist independently of human consciousness. If a 
human  mind  could  not  relate  to  an  object  empirically,  experience  it  as 
sensations, then it did not exist. Lenin countered this position by stating that 
                                                 
33 Lenin, Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 18, pp. 7-384. Ernst Mach (1838-1916) was an 
Austrian  physicist  and  philosopher  who  believed  that  science  should  confine  itself  to 
descriptions  of  phenomena  which  could  be  perceived  by  the  senses  and  was  one  of  the 
founders of modern positivism. Richard Avenarius (1843-1916) was a professor of philosophy 
at Leipzig and  then  Zurich. He attempted  to discern a scientific philosophy based upon  a 
critique  of  experience.  The  two  scholars,  more  or  less  simultaneously,  but  independently, 
formulated the school of empirio-criticism. For more information see F Carstanjen, ‘Richard 
Avenarius and his General Theory of Knowledge, Empiriocriticism’, Mind, New Series, 6, 24, 
Oct. 1897, pp. 449-475 and L. Kolakowski, Postivist Philosophy, (Harmondsworth, Penguin 
Books Ltd., 1972), trans. N. Guterman, especially chapter 5. 
34  N.  Valentinov  (N.  V.  Volsky),  Encounters  with  Lenin  (London,  Oxford  University  Press, 
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the earth existed before man did, before any human mind was present to 
experience it. This fact was irrefutable. The only way the empiricists could 
resolve this problem was to ‘mentally project’ themselves in to the prehistoric 
past. However, he continued:  
 
If we ‘mentally project’ ourselves our existence will be imaginary 
– but the existence of the earth prior to man is real. Man could 
not in practice be an observer, for instance, of the earth in an 
incandescent  state,  and  to  ‘imagine’  his  being  present  at  the 
time is obscurantism, exactly as though I were to endeavour to 
prove the existence of hell by the argument that if I ‘mentally 
projected’ myself thither as an observer I could observe hell.
35 
 
However, this analysis was a crude portrayal of Machist thought. The Empirio-
Criticists were concerned with epistemological questions: how could one know 
that the earth existed prior to man. It was a matter of cognition not of the 
dismissal of objective reality or otherwise.
36 Whereas Lenin claimed positivism 
is the belief that if a human mind cannot engage empirically with an object 
then it does not exist, it is more accurately construed as the belief that if a 
human mind cannot relate to an object empirically, experience it sensationally, 
then it does not exist for that observer. In other words, what is is defined by 
what is observable or may be deduced from the observable. Scientists were 
able  to  build  a  picture  of  prehistoric  earth  by  way  of  fossils  and  other 
evidence,  allowing  for  empirical  cognition  and  logical  deduction.  However, 
Schlesinger  simply  wrote  of,  ‘…the  pertinent  question  in  Lenin’s  Empirio-
criticism, whether and how the World existed when Dinosaurian minds were 
                                                 
35 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 18, p. 74. 
36 As Valentinov argued with Lenin: ‘Actually, how do  you know that our planet was once 
incandescent, and that there was no life, human or otherwise, upon it? Was your knowledge 
of this provided by a mystical communication from some disembodied spirit, or is it the result 
of cognition, research on the part of a human subject, and derived from it? You are interested 
only in the fact that the earth was once incandescent: but the theory of cognition is concerned 
with  the way  in which such knowledge has been received,  through what contact between 
object and subject it was reached, how much of it is certain, and what in it must and can be 
considered truth from the epistemological point of view’ (Valentinov, Encounters with Lenin, 
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the only ones available to create it’.
37 As knowledgeable and experienced a 
student of philosophy as Schlesinger would surely know that this was a facile 
misrepresentation  of  the  empiricists  and  positivism.  Yet  Schlesinger 
unquestioningly  applied  Lenin’s  vulgar  argument  when  describing  these 
philosophical developments.  
 
The  second  feature  of  Marx  His  Time  and Ours  is  the  praise  Schlesinger 
bestowed  on  Lenin  and  his  theoretical  work.  He  did  offer  some  negative 
comments and pointed out where he believed Lenin to have been mistaken. 
But on the whole, Schlesinger offered a very positive portrayal. It was clear 
from Schlesinger’s memoir writings that he believed Lenin’s great impact had 
been  his  correct  assessment  of  material  conditions  and  the  resultant 
application of tactics to those conditions, but he reinforced this point in Marx 
His Time and Ours. He wrote:  
 
In some instances a correct statement of facts, made possible 
by Marxist theory and inconceivable from any other standpoint, 
has been the cause of the political success of the Marxist party. 
Lenin’s  correct  assessment  of  Russia,  in  contradiction  to  the 
Narodniki, that she was undergoing transformation to capitalism, 
and of the political consequences to be drawn from that fact, is 
a foremost example.
38 
 
This  statement  provides  evidence  of  the  kind  of  the  esteem  in  which 
Schlesinger  held  Lenin,  but  it  also  demonstrates  the  orthodoxy  of  his 
interpretations and uncritical acceptance of Lenin’s version of events. 
 
Schlesinger did not spend a great deal of the book focussed on aspects of 
Leninism,  but  a  brief  investigation  of  his  attitude  towards  Lenin’s  work  on 
imperialism  provides  a  general  insight.  Schlesinger  offered  a  brief  but 
orthodox exposition of the topic, concentrating in particular on Lenin’s main 
writing  on  the  subject,  ‘Imperialism,  the  Highest  Stage  of  Capitalism’,  first 
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38 Ibid. p. 66.   99 
published  in  mid-1917.
39  He  revealed  nothing  new  but  displayed  a 
characteristically  deep  knowledge  of  the  source  material.  Interestingly, 
although both Lenin and Luxemburg engaged with theories of imperialism, 
Schlesinger presented no comparative analysis of the work of his two great 
teachers. He made clear in his memoirs that on realising the difference in 
their approaches he initially attempted to accommodate elements from both – 
Luxemburg’s  theory  had  value  but  was  applicable  to  an  earlier  stage  of 
capitalist  development,  but  he  soon  realised  the  superiority  of  Lenin’s 
understanding. However, here there was to be no scholarly critique of both 
theories beyond the statement that Luxemburg had not recognised the new 
stage of capitalist development identified by Lenin’s work.
40 
 
Schlesinger described the influence on Lenin of J. Hobson’s explanation of 
imperialism as the export of capitals, and R. Hilferding’s analysis of monopoly 
capitalism.
41  Lenin  explicitly  pointed  to  the  two  texts  in  his  introduction  to 
‘Imperialism,  the  Highest  Stage  of  Capitalism’,  arguing  that  no  work  had 
advanced beyond these comprehensive descriptions of imperialism, until now 
of  course.
42  Lenin  adopted  Hilferding’s  idea  of  capitalism’s  transition  from 
competition to monopoly capitalism and the socialisation of production. This 
new stage of capitalism was finance capital and industry was now dominated 
by  banks  and  financial  oligarchies.  However,  these  developments  had  not 
brought an end to conflict. As the export of capital for increased profitability 
became  paramount,  nations  and  international  cartels  now  fought  over  the 
division  and  re-division  of  global  spheres  of  influence,  thus  creating 
                                                 
39 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 27, pp. 299-426.  
40 Schlesinger, ‘Marx Without an Organizing Party’, p. 228. 
41 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 316. The English economist A.J. Hobson was 
best known for his work Imperialism first published in 1902. According to A Brewer: ‘Hobson 
held  an  underconsumptionist  theory,  arguing  that  the  low  level  of  wages  and  the  high 
proportion  of  profits  saved  led  to  a  chronic  shortage  of  demand.  He  was  aware  that 
investment demand could fill  the gap between production capacity, on  the one  hand, and 
consumption  spending  on  the  other,  but  he  argued  that  there  would  not  be  sufficient 
investment opportunities at home to sustain demand’. The search for investment outlets to 
absorb these surplus savings was thus the economic driving force behind colonial expansion. 
Capitalism  could  be  preserved,  however,  by  raising  wages,  thus  increasing  consumer 
demand and lowering the volume of savings and the pressure to find new investment outlets 
(A. Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980) p. 
112). 
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international  power  struggles.
43  However,  finance  capital  was  a  moribund 
capitalism.
44 It had at its head a parasitic class which would impede technical 
innovation if necessary in order to preserve its own position. 
 
An  important  feature  of  Lenin’s  imperialism  was  its  uneven  advance; 
capitalism did not develop at a uniform pace.
45 Finance capital would invest 
wherever it found it profitable to do so, be this in a developed or undeveloped 
country.  An  implicit  corollary  was,  therefore,  that  the  spread  of  revolution 
would be uneven too. Revolution may begin in hitherto unexpected places 
rather than amongst the most advanced states. The huge profits enjoyed by 
finance capital allowed them to bribe the upper strata of the proletariat with 
high  pay.
46  This  produced  opportunism  and,  presumably,  explained  the 
behaviour of the majority of Social Democrats on the outbreak of war. 
 
In  ‘Imperialism,  the  Highest  Stage  of  Capitalism’,  Lenin  was  replying  to 
Kautsky’s concept of ‘Ultra-imperialism’, whereby capitalist monopolies would 
agree  worldwide  organisation  of  production  and  thus  bring  an  end  to 
international  conflict.  According  to  Schlesinger,  Lenin  answered  that  since 
capitalism  developed  in  an  uneven  manner,  any  agreement  would  be 
ephemeral.
47  Kautsky  was  also  mistaken  in  believing  that  imperialism  was 
driven by industrial capital rather than finance capital, hence his emphasis on 
the acquisition of agrarian territories.
48 
 
Lenin’s  theory  of  imperialism,  according  to  Schlesinger,  provided  a, 
‘…comprehensive picture of international relations differing from, but no less 
impressive than, the original Marxist – or pre-Marxist – scheme’.
49 It was of 
continuing relevance and offered an understanding of the world which was 
now  also  shared  by  Lenin’s  opponents.  This  attitude  amply  demonstrates 
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Schlesinger’s  appreciation  of  Lenin  and  ‘Leninism’.  However,  his 
wholehearted  endorsement  of  Lenin’s  imperialism  does  not  hold  up  to 
scrutiny. Whilst Lenin may well have been prescient in his recognition of the 
uneven development of capital, as well as finance capital’s ability to impede 
technological  progress  where  it  found  it  advantageous  to  do  so,  his  ideas 
concerning the importance of banks in a socialist assumption of power were 
proven  ill  founded  by  events  in  Russia.  Following  on  from  Hilferding  and 
Bukharin, Lenin believed that the concentration of power and capital in a few 
hands, those of the banks, was laying the foundations of a socialist system. 
As J. D. White has pointed out, Lenin had originally thought, ‘… the big banks 
were the state institutions which were needed to bring about socialism, and 
which  would  be  taken  over  as  they  stood  from  capitalism’.
50  An  important 
element of Lenin’s theory of imperialism was that this latest and final evolution 
of capitalism facilitated a relatively smooth transition to socialism. In fact, in 
‘Can  the  Bolsheviks  Retain  State  Power?’  written  in  October  1917,  Lenin 
wrote: ‘Without big banks socialism would be impossible’.
51 However, on the 
assumption of power, Lenin was soon to realise that he could not simply take 
over the reins of the financial institutions; the banking system was completely 
destroyed during the revolution.
52 Schlesinger was undoubtedly aware of this 
but concentrated instead on other elements of Lenin’s imperialism, such as 
international relations.  
 
Schlesinger further praised the theory of imperialism, writing, ‘Lenin’s concept 
of international relations is impressive as a general abstraction which serves 
to establish general trends’.
53 Lenin was not able to describe all of the details 
of  international  relations  as  they  emerged  after  the  revolution,  but  he  did 
provide  a  methodology  by  which  to  assess  them.  This,  once  again, 
demonstrated  Schlesinger’s  appreciation  of  Lenin  as  a  thinker  who 
recognised the need to evolve theory as conditions altered. Instead of a rigid 
definition of international relations, which would inevitably become obsolete 
as circumstances developed, he created ‘a general abstraction’ in order to 
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perceive ‘general trends’. 
 
That  Lenin  was  able  to  create  a  theoretical  model  or  methodology  that 
Marxists could use to analyse dynamic material conditions and then plan their 
actions  accordingly,  was  a  familiar  theme  in  Schlesinger’s  admiration.  His 
iconoclastic adaptation of the Marxist model in opposition to a rigorous and 
dogmatic  preservation  of the  founders’ pronouncements  was  what  set  him 
apart. For example, one of the basic principles of early Marxism regarding 
war  was  no  longer  applicable  during  Lenin’s  time.  The  use  of  war  by 
revolutionaries as an opportunity to appear as the most consistent defenders 
of the national interest and thus take power, was inappropriate when both 
warring  parties  were  viewed  as  equally  reactionary.
54  This  concept  was, 
therefore, of little relevance to the twentieth century. Thus Lenin introduced 
the notion of defeatism – changing theories and tactics as material conditions 
altered  over  time.  Schlesinger  pointed  out  that  defeatism  did  not  mean 
collaboration with a foreign government. He wrote, ‘… [this] would contradict 
the Leninist conception of internationalism because it would counteract the 
attempt  of  the  Socialists  on  the  other  side  to  defeat  their  imperialist 
government  and  would  give  an  efficient  propaganda  tool  to  the  latter.
55 
Defeatism  implied  the  defeat  of  one’s  own  leaders  and  bourgeoisie 
irrespective of its effect on others.
56  
 
However,  Lenin’s  conception  was  now  obsolete  due  to  its  successful 
application  in  one  country  –  Russia.  The  correct  Leninist  line  would  now 
advise support of the enemy by domestic revolutionaries if that foe was from 
the Socialist camp. However, not all communists had realised that theory and 
policies had to be altered. As Schlesinger pointed out, ‘… the tactics applied 
by most of the Western Communist parties during the first stage of World War 
II resulted in that failure which is bound to crown the application of sacred 
formulas to a situation which no longer fits the basic assumptions to which 
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they owe their origins’.
57 The ability to adapt theory to changed circumstances 
was one of the essences of Marxism-Leninism to Schlesinger. 
 
The second theme to demonstrate Schlesinger’s attitude towards Lenin in this 
work concerned revolution. To Schlesinger, Lenin’s theories on revolution and 
organisation  of  the  revolutionary  party  confirmed  his  pre-eminence  as  a 
Marxist  thinker.  According  to  Schlesinger,  there  were  three  basic  socialist 
attitudes  towards  revolution  and  transformation  of  the  state.  These  were 
revisionism, centrism and that of Lenin. The latter involved the replacement of 
existing  machinery  by  a  new  one  originating  from  within  the  revolutionary 
dynamic. This third conception implied a difference between the revolutionary 
mass movement and the organised sectional movements usually operating 
within a capitalist framework. According to Schlesinger, ‘… this consequence, 
though not alien to the minds of the founders, was not clearly drawn before 
the  Russian  revolution  of  1905  when  the  specific  character  of  the 
revolutionary mass-movements was emphasized by Lenin as well as by Rosa 
Luxemburg’.
58  Lenin  recognised  the  need  for  a  new  type  of  revolutionary 
movement or party, one which was differentiated from the sectional workers 
organisations accommodated within the capitalist state. 
 
In  the  Leninist  conception  of  revolution,  ‘revolutionary  situations’  occurred. 
However,  unlike  other  theorists,  Lenin  provided  a  much  more  concrete 
definition  of  what  they  were  and  how  to  determine  them.  As  Schlesinger 
wrote, these crises had not only ‘objective’ conditions but there also had to be 
‘subjective’  changes;  namely,  ‘…  that  the  revolutionary  class  should  be 
capable  of  revolutionary  actions  sufficient  to  overthrow  the  existing  regime 
which, even in a period of crisis, would not automatically collapse’.
59 Unless 
the working class was suitably organised and motivated, any revolutionary 
attempt  would  fail.  There  followed  from  this  the  need  to  organise  the 
revolution. There had to be a party capable of leading the revolutionary class 
to action at the appropriate time. Lenin’s understanding of these factors, as 
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well  as  his  realisation  of  the  function  of  the  party,  made  him  unique  and 
confirmed his superiority over Luxemburg. 
 
Lenin diverged from the centrists in recognising that when a ‘revolutionary 
situation’ transformed into an ‘acute revolutionary situation’, it was necessary 
for  the  working  class  to  take  offensive  action  and  create  a  new  state-
machinery.
60 The bourgeoisie would be unable to accept peaceful transition to 
socialism  and  so  civil  war  was  inevitable.  Leninism  insisted  that  this 
anticipated  conflict  should  be  solved  by  offensive  action.  Such  a  position 
obviously had a decisive influence on the kind of working class organisation 
necessary to accomplish that action; a tightly knit, disciplined body would be 
vital  in  such  circumstances.  According  to  Schlesinger,  Engels  would  have 
understood this but few of Lenin’s contemporaries did. 
 
Accurate  appreciation  of  the  characteristics  of  ‘revolutionary  situations’  as 
well  as  the  subjective  factors,  such  as  party  organisation  necessary  to 
transform the crisis into an actual revolution, allowed Lenin to discern tactical 
laws of general validity. Thus, wrote Schlesinger, ‘… a social phenomenon is 
no longer analysed as an objectively given fact, but the rules governing the 
behaviour of those who intend to bring that phenomenon to the culmination 
point are being established as laws [,] neglect of which is bound to result in 
defeat’.
61  Lenin  was  able  to  analyse  correctly  potential  revolutionary 
situations. He also provided laws for the organisation of the party and the 
transformation of the state. It was, in fact, ‘Leninism’ which brought about the 
success of the Marxist schema. As Schlesinger expressed it: ‘The realisation 
of the Leninist scheme in a fourth of the world had made clear that socialism 
is a practical proposition’.
62 
 
The essence of Schlesinger’s Leninism was its adaptation of Marxism to the 
circumstances of the time. That Lenin was able to do this successfully was 
proven by the emergence of the Soviet state. However, this very success led 
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to the obsolescence of many of his theories and tactics. It was necessary to 
develop new ones once the new material circumstances had been evaluated. 
Presumably  Stalin  had  undertaken  this.  However,  Western  Communist 
parties had proven unable to adapt dialectically; hence their failure.  
 
Similar  themes  emerged  from  Schlesinger’s  next  work  on  Lenin,  an 
encyclopaedia  article  written  for  Handwörterbuch  der  Sozialwissenschaften 
and  published  in  West  Germany  in  1959.
63  Once  again,  Schlesinger 
emphasised the transitional and progressive nature of Leninism – it was an 
evolution of original Marxist theory, adapted to changed circumstances, but 
one  that  itself  required  development  as  conditions  continued  to  alter 
dialectically. For an encyclopaedia piece the article was considerably detailed 
and  represented  a  broad  and  systematic  presentation  of  Leninism  with  a 
considerable and varied bibliography. It was also a very orthodox exposition, 
one generally in line with Soviet interpretations.  
 
This orthodoxy was demonstrated in Schlesinger’s emphasis of 1912 as a key 
date in Bolshevik and Russian history. Schlesinger wrote that at the Prague 
Conference of January of that year, Lenin formally constituted the Bolshevik 
faction  as  the  central  organisation  of  Russian  Social  Democracy.
64  Thus, 
1912 was the year the party which went on to lead the October Revolution 
and  ultimately  transform  Russia  into  a  modern  socialist  nation  was  truly 
separated from those who were incapable of this task. It was traditional in 
Soviet literature to point to 1912 as one of the significant periods in party 
history.
65 This is easily understood when it is remembered that 1912 is the 
year  in  which  Stalin  first  joined  the  Central Committee  and  became a  key 
figure  within  the  party.  Soviet  authorities  would  obviously  be  keen  to 
demonstrate  how  important  this  time  was  for  the  development  of  the 
revolution.  It  seems  that  Schlesinger’s  presentation  corresponded  to  this 
timeline, for whatever reason; although, he made no reference to Stalin at this 
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time.  
 
The article’s interpretations also coalesced with official Soviet orthodoxy in its 
emphasis  on  the  reasons  for  the  split  between  the  Mensheviks  and  the 
Bolsheviks at the London congress of 1903. Schlesinger wrote of the split in 
terms of organisation; was the party to be the vanguard of the revolutionary 
movement  or  a  gathering  point  for  all  with  socialist  sympathies.
66  The 
Bolsheviks  were  portrayed  as  the  only  truly  revolutionary  party  capable  of 
leading  the  masses,  through  their  organisational  discipline,  whilst  the 
Mensheviks,  including  G.  Plekhanov,  were  not.
67  This  interpretation  is 
commonplace and the description of the split as emanating from a dispute 
about  the  famous  ‘Article  One  of  the  Rules’  of  party  membership  was 
prevalent  both  in  Soviet  orthodoxy  and  in  the  West.
68  This  disagreement 
betrayed  much  deeper  divisions  regarding  organisation,  centralisation  and 
discipline  and  made  the  continuation  of  a  unified  body  untenable  and 
undesirable from the ever prescient Lenin’s point of view.  
 
There is certainly a great deal of truth in this presentation but it is a somewhat 
distorted and simplified version of events; something Schlesinger was likely to 
be aware of. The decisive issue of the congress concerned a more short-term 
question: how many members each group would have on the editorial board 
of Iskra, the party’s paper, and the Central Committee.
69 Although divergent 
opinions did exist within the Social Democratic party about who should be 
able  to  call  themselves  a  member  and  the  level  of  organisational  unity 
required, there was broad agreement on the need for such unity in order to 
bring about a transformation of society. As Schlesinger himself later wrote: 
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….  we  should  remember  that  in  those  issues  which  split  the 
Social  Democrats  and  Communists,  Mensheviks  as  well  as 
Bolsheviks  supported  the  position  now  associated  with 
communism (precisely for this reason the Bolsheviks eventually 
carried the large majority of the Russian labour movement). At 
the  Second  Party  Congress  Lenin  argued  that  a  proletarian 
dictatorship was necessary because the Russian working-class 
might  have  to  establish  a  minority  government….  Plekhanov 
followed  up  implications  of  Lenin’s  approach  when  he  stated 
that  every  democratic  principle,  including  universal  suffrage, 
should be subordinated to the needs of the revolution.
70 
 
Although the ‘trivial’ issue of composition of party bodies did bring to the fore 
disputes  about  what  constituted  a  party  member  and  what  a  supporter, 
interpretations  of  these  matters  are  often  made  to  appear  as  a  contest 
between  Bolsheviks  and  Mensheviks,  now  unmasked  as  ‘Economists’  or 
Revisionists. This was not the case. Schlesinger was fully aware of this and 
yet gave this simplified version in the encyclopaedia article. 
 
Schlesinger was also orthodox in his presentation by stressing the ripeness of 
Russia  for  a  revolution;  one  of  a  different  type  to  that  envisaged  by  the 
founders perhaps, but Lenin’s development of Marxist theory illuminated the 
way  in  which  revolution  could  be  carried  out  in  Russia  nevertheless.  This 
analysis legitimised the Soviet state and the Bolshevik assumption of power. 
Were it to be otherwise, the Bolsheviks would have been usurpers who used 
an  inappropriate  ideology  developed  for  industrial  countries  in  order  to 
achieve power for their own ends.  
 
His description of events in the article was often similar to Soviet sources. For 
example, Schlesinger wrote that during Lenin’s first exile in East Siberia, from 
1897  onwards,  ‘Economism’  gained  the  upper  hand  amongst  Social 
Democrats in St Petersburg and other cities. He described ‘Economism’ as a: 
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‘Russian  variant  of  west  European  revisionism’.
71  The  presentation  of  a 
coherent, powerful and totally erroneous theory of ‘Economism’ was common 
to all Soviet outlines of events, and was initially developed by Lenin, amongst 
others.
72 However, as J. D. White has pointed out, ‘Economism’ was not an 
actual doctrine or movement – no one would admit to being an ‘Economist’ 
and no one advocated the ideas attributed to them.
73 It was a label that Lenin 
would  pin  onto  opponents,  thus  equating  them  with  revisionism, 
‘Bernsteinism’, ‘Kautskyism’ and so on, in an attempt to discredit them.
74 
 
The encyclopaedia article began with a brief description of Lenin’s life and the 
leading role he played in Russian and Social Democratic events; ‘From the 
creation  of  ‘Iskra’  until  his  death  he  was  the  leader  of  the  Russian  left 
socialists’.
75  Schlesinger  explained  that  Lenin’s  theoretical  work  gave  the 
party its orientation and formulated its ‘Weltanschauung’. He then outlined the 
three  major  problems  confronted  by  Lenin,  describing  his  novel  and 
revolutionary solutions to them. These were the nature of Russian capitalist 
development, the necessary character of a socialist party and the question of 
socialist reconstruction in Russia.  
 
Schlesinger argued that Lenin identified capitalism in Russia with large-scale 
capitalist  industry.
76  Already  in  ‘The  Development  of  Capitalism’,  written 
between  1896  and  1899,  Lenin  recognised  that  the  rural  community  was 
splitting into socially differentiated categories – broadly characterised as the 
proletariat and capitalists.
77 As Schlesinger put it, in Russia, in contrast to 
many European countries; ‘… the urban bourgeoisie were only the tip of a 
kulak dominated pyramid’, ‘the proletariat were only the most proletarianised 
and conscious part of a much wider peasant or landless mass’.
78 Under these 
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circumstances there existed the possibility that revolution could come about 
not  simply  from  the  industrial  proletariat  but  from  the  development  of  the 
‘proletarianising’  process  on  the  whole of  society,  including  in  the  villages. 
This recognition, this development of the original Marxist suppositions was 
one of Lenin’s greatest achievements. 
 
Given the situation in Russia, a relatively backward country with developing 
revolutionary potential, Lenin went on to develop his conception of the tasks 
of  the  party,  most  notably  in  ‘Two  Tactics  of  Social-Democracy  in  the 
Democratic Revolution’ written in 1905.
79 From the classical Marxist position 
that a socialist revolution would occur in an industrially developed country, the 
majority  of  Mensheviks  thought  that  the  liberal  bourgeoisie  would  have  a 
leading role in the revolution. The Social Democrats would then become the 
opposition party within a bourgeois democratic political system. Trotsky and 
the left-wing Mensheviks thought that the proletariat should take the leading 
role in the forthcoming revolution in order to ruthlessly pursue their own class 
goals.  However,  in  the  absence  of  a  socialist  revolution  in  an  industrially 
developed country, they believed the Russian revolution to be destined for 
defeat due to the inevitable conflict between the victorious proletariat and the 
peasantry. In contrast, Lenin argued that a socialist party should not wait for 
the bourgeoisie to achieve democratic freedoms. It should instead try to seize 
power for itself in alliance with sections of the peasantry; thus establishing the 
‘democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry’.
80 
 
According to Schlesinger, Lenin’s ideas were further developed through the 
experience of the Great War and the quarrels regarding the correct socialist 
position to it. In contrast to socialist pacifists, Lenin’s analysis of monopoly 
capitalism led him to believe that war was inevitable due to the periodic re-
division  of  the  world  amongst  the  leading  capitalist  powers.
81  Peace  was 
unachievable whilst capitalism prevailed, thus revolutionary socialists should 
answer the world war with systematic preparation for the seizure of power. To 
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Schlesinger,  this  analysis  implied  Lenin’s  recognition  that  Marxism  had 
originated in different economic circumstances. Up to then, the only alteration 
to the teachings of the founders had been late Engels’ revision of his position 
on  the  war  question.  Now,  however,  Lenin  changed  the  traditional 
formulations  so  that  they  were  appropriate  to  the  changed  economic 
conditions. 
 
Schlesinger  touched  upon  the  philosophical  foundations  of  Leninism  when 
discussing the party as a revolutionary vanguard. According to Schlesinger, 
Lenin’s  ‘Materialism  and  Empirio-criticism’  disagreed  with  any  notion  that 
matter  was  not  a  physical  concept.  In  fact,  matter  was,  as  Schlesinger 
expressed  it,  ‘…a  philosophical  category  to  describe  objective  reality’.
82 
According  to  Lenin,  philosophical  materialism  was  the  recognition  that  an 
objective reality existed outside consciousness.
83 This objective reality could 
not be refuted by changes to any person’s physical conception of the world 
since it existed outside their subjective cognition. However, Lenin seemed to 
back away from such an ultra-materialist position later in his career, with the 
resurgence  of  the  revolutionary  tide  during  the  war.  He  began  to  make 
observations on the subjective element in dialectic interactions. According to 
Schlesinger, Lenin’s 1915 ‘Questions of Dialectics’ had the most far-reaching 
recognition of subjective factors.
84 He went further, arguing that Lenin had 
even  partly  acknowledged  the  legitimacy  of  philosophical  idealism.  This 
attitude does seem to contradict Schlesinger’s earlier brief engagement with 
Lenin’s materialism and his attack on empirio-criticism.
85 Then he had aped 
Lenin’s inaccurate criticism of positivism: how could a world before humans 
have  existed  if  there  was  no  one  there  to  experience  it.  However,  he 
recognised the changing nature of Lenin’s stance over time. 
  
As regards the necessary character of a socialist party, Schlesinger felt that 
most Russian socialists recognised the concept of a central organisation as 
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the ‘vanguard’ of the revolutionary movement. For Lenin this had developed 
through a combination of the Narodnik or Populist tradition and the practical 
necessity  of  the  underground  movement.  However,  Lenin’s  peculiar 
contribution was in his distinguishing between the movements concerned with 
the daily interests of the workers; the trade union or parliamentary sections of 
social democracy, and the revolutionary-socialist one. This latter movement 
required  non-proletarian  intellectuals  to  initially  organise  and  produce  the 
ideas.  However,  the  spontaneity  of  the  masses  remained  the  determining 
purpose of the organisational socialist vanguard. It was these organisational 
elements which, firstly in ‘The Urgent Tasks of Our Movement’ and then fully 
in What is to be Done?, created the foundations of the break between the 
Bolsheviks  and  the  Mensheviks.
86  These  ideological  divisions  soon 
intensified. According to Schlesinger, Lenin insisted upon the idea of, ‘… not 
just  an  organisationally  but  also  an  ideologically  united  organisation  as  a 
precondition  for  the  victory  of  the  proletariat  over  their  much  stronger 
enemies’.
87  
 
In  the  encyclopaedia  article  Schlesinger  described  Lenin  as  correct  and 
insightful  in  all  respects,  even  where  this  appeared  contradictory.  He 
mentioned that one of Lenin’s contributions to Marxist political theory was his 
recognition of the role of intellectuals as the initial source of ideas within the 
party: the proletariat could not become conscious of its tasks alone. However, 
immediately  afterwards  he  emphasised  the  significance  of  the  masses  to 
Lenin’s theory, in particular their spontaneity. This was as if to compensate for 
any dilution of the workers’ role. He was defending Lenin from criticism that 
he undermined the role of the proletariat in the proletarian revolution just as 
he  pointed  towards  the  hugely  important  role  the  non-proletarian  element 
were to play within the revolutionary organisation.  
 
In  much  the  same  way,  Schlesinger  appeared  to  be  fearful  that  he  had 
presented  Lenin  as  too  enamoured  with  ‘spontaneity’,  a  Luxemburgist 
deviation.  He  went  on  to  argue  that,  in  the  struggle  with  the  widespread 
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‘theory of spontaneity’, Lenin answered the question ‘should we organise the 
revolution’ with an emphatic ‘yes’.
88 Schlesinger went further insisting that, 
during  the  course  of  the  revolution,  Lenin  underlined  the  decisive  role  of 
armed revolt, an organised aspect of the movement which ‘spontaneity’ could 
surely  not  be  relied  upon  to  produce.  This  was  in  opposition  to  the  left-
socialists’ emphasis on the importance of ‘mass strikes’.  
 
The alteration in Lenin’s position only appears inconsistent when ‘Leninism’ is 
viewed as a monolithic coherent theory in which all works contributed to that 
body  in  a  uniform  manner.  Yet  Lenin  developed  his  ideas  throughout  his 
career; he altered his viewpoint and changed his emphases, even if he did 
not  explicitly  acknowledge  this  himself.  In  What  is  to  be  Done?  Lenin  did 
argue that consciousness needed to be brought to the proletariat from the 
outside.
89  However,  just  two  years  later  in  ‘One  Step Forward,  Two  Steps 
Back’, he stressed the potentially parasitic influence of intellectuals upon the 
working class and emphasised that they had a great deal to learn from the 
workers.
90 J. D. White noted the difference in emphasis: ‘In the earlier work 
Lenin had extolled the part played by the intelligentsia in bringing a socialist 
consciousness  to  the  proletariat;  in  the  later  one  he  maintained  that  the 
intelligentsia  had  lessons  in  organisation  and  discipline  to  learn  from  the 
workers.’
91 This may have been because he changed his mind or, perhaps, 
because of more short-term practical necessities. Equally, early in his career 
Lenin  reacted  with  great  ferocity  at  any  attempt  to  explore  idealism  or 
question the dialectic materialism he employed. Later, as Schlesinger noted 
above, he accepted that idealism did have some merit. The older Lenin thus 
seemingly mellowed in his attitude towards idealism. Schlesinger’s analysis of 
Leninism  only  appeared  contradictory  in  places  because  of  his  attempt  to 
present a systematic and entirely coherent account, one that glossed over 
changes in that system over time. 
 
Having  discussed  Lenin’s  attitude  towards  the  character  of  Russian 
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development  and  the  tasks  and  composition  of  a  revolutionary  party, 
Schlesinger  described  Lenin’s  views  regarding  socialist  construction  in 
Russia. However, he did not go in to any great detail; arguing that the big 
questions  concerning  socialist  construction  only  truly  ripened  after  Lenin’s 
death.
92 He first approached the subject within the context of Lenin’s ‘State 
and  Revolution’,  written  in  August  and  September  1917.  He  wrote:  ‘In  a 
systematic exposition of classical Marxist ‘theory of the state’, the necessity of 
destroying the existing state apparatus and replacing it with organs of working 
class power, emerging from mass initiative, is emphasised’.
93 Again, with an 
apparent desire to quash any potential criticism of Lenin, Schlesinger pointed 
out that despite any seeming concessions to anarchism this smashing might 
entail, there was a great emphasis on the role of the party as organisers of 
both the revolution and the new state. 
 
What was written thereafter on the topic can be seen as a robust defence of 
Lenin’s plans and policies. His initial ideas, developed in 1917 in his ‘April 
Theses’ or ‘The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution’ and ‘Can 
the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?’, concerned nationalisation of land and 
control of production.
94 Control of the banks and other ‘commanding heights’ 
would be sufficient for the immediate transformation of Russia into a planned 
economy.
95 Schlesinger conceded that this was not what occurred in practice. 
However,  he  insisted  that  the  much  more  far-reaching  nationalisation 
measures that were introduced in the first revolutionary period were not due 
to  any  theoretical  considerations  but,  ‘…in  part  because  of  the  flight  of 
capitalists  and  in  part  because  of  the  workers’  refusal  to  cooperate  with 
them’.
96 According to Schlesinger, it was not a miscalculation on Lenin’s part 
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but the circumstances of later events that meant that his earlier predictions 
did not come to fruition. That this remained a major flaw in Lenin’s plan was 
not discussed.  
 
Schlesinger briefly described Lenin’s writing concerning construction after the 
Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  before  turning  to  the  New  Economic  Policy  (NEP) 
instituted  in  1921.  According  to  Schlesinger,  the  temporary  revival  of  free 
trade at this time was necessary due to the backwardness of lower middle-
class  Russia.
97  This  justification  was  swiftly  followed  by  an  assertion  that 
Lenin continued to strive towards, and write about, the transition to socialism 
up until the end of his life. Schlesinger noted that in some of his last works, 
such  as  ‘On  Cooperation’  written  in  January  1923,  Lenin  asserted  the 
importance  of  developing  peasant  cooperatives  for  the  transition  to 
socialism.
98  His  point  was  that  Lenin  still  believed  Russia  had  begun  the 
journey towards socialism. 
 
Finally Schlesinger turned to an appreciation of Lenin: what recognition of his 
legacy existed in the modern world? He argued that in the atmosphere of the 
cold  war,  ‘stupid  libel’  had  been  written  about  Lenin,  presumably  by 
commentators from the West and political opponents.
99 The notion that the 
cold war blinkered many Western writers and created a hostile environment, 
which was anathema to a proper discussion of Soviet matters, was familiar to 
all of Schlesinger’s writing. The proposition that he spent much of his career 
consciously attempting to counteract this prevailing hostility and prejudice is a 
central tenet of this thesis. In contrast to those hostile to the Soviet Union, 
Lenin’s supporters had developed the cult of Leninism following his death. 
According to Schlesinger, Lenin was placed on a ‘pedestal of infallibility’.
100 
His theories and writings were applied to very different situations leading to 
unhistorical expositions of his works. 
 
To Schlesinger, this myth creation developed in two distinct directions, with 
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each trying to claim Leninist heritage in their own arguments. Firstly there 
were those who disagreed with the direction of Soviet policy since Lenin’s 
death. The left opposition, for example, constructed an image of Lenin as the 
‘pioneer of workers’ democracy’ in contrast to the current suppression of that 
democracy.
101 Oppositionists attempted to bolster their position by reference 
to Lenin. His successors had subverted Lenin’s intentions.  
 
The  other  myth  construction  was  undertaken  by  Soviet  authorities,  an 
orthodox position was created in official books, articles and speeches. Lenin’s 
approval and authority for current actions was sought and found in his body of 
work.  This  was  particularly  true  during  the  Stalinist  period,  in  which,  as 
Schlesinger wrote, Stalin ‘…. used every opportunity to find his own ideas 
within those of the ‘Master’’.
102 In the Stalinist presentation Leninism was a 
new phase of Marxism. Lenin’s name was added to that of Marx and Engels, 
as  one  of  the  founders  of  the  movement.  Whilst  Schlesinger  agreed  that 
Leninism was a new phase, he clearly disapproved of the use of Lenin as a 
litmus test of orthodoxy and Marxist correctness. Instead he appeared to be in 
agreement with the post-Stalin position of Soviet authorities. Stalinism had 
distorted Leninism, and it was necessary to remove these distortions so that 
further progress could be made. This analysis corresponds to the time-line 
the present thesis has posited. The encyclopaedia article was written after 
Stalin’s  death  and  in  contrast  to  his  earlier  work,  in  which  Schlesinger 
appeared to acquiesce with the Stalinist interpretation of Marxism-Leninism-
Stalinism, he was now more critical of the Stalinist influence upon theory.
103 It 
appears  that  it  was  necessary  to  remove  Stalinist  distortions,  to  return  to 
original Leninism, before further dialectical progress could be undertaken. 
 
In Schlesinger’s opinion, Lenin had melded a higher phase of Marxism: ‘Like 
all great thinkers, who helped form the history of their time, Lenin tied a series 
of threads together to create a new unity’.
104 In his case, those threads were 
Marxist  theory  and  the  traditions  of  the  Russian  revolutionary  movement. 
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From an analysis of monopoly capitalism, which others shared, he drew far-
reaching consequences for the reorientation of the socialist movement. Lenin 
washed away the difficulties of a socialist revolution in Russia and created a 
Marxist theory capable of seizing power. The realisation of Lenin’s new unity 
proved  to  be  a  model  for  many.  It  provided  the  basic  principles  of  the 
revolutions  in  China  and  in  other  backward  countries.
105    Schlesinger 
recognised  that  Lenin  had  altered  Marxism  beyond  the  founders’  initial 
assessment,  but  this  was  one  of  his  strengths.  According  to  Schlesinger, 
Lenin  had  positively  admitted  the  possibility  that  Russia  had  developed  a 
different revolutionary type to that of the classical Marxist schema; one ‘… 
devoted  to  improving  the  state  apparatus  and  systematically  overcoming 
cultural backwardness’.
106 He referred to Lenin’s statement in ‘Better Fewer, 
But Better’, written in March 1923, in which he stated that socialist victory was 
assured: 
 
In  the  last  analysis,  the  outcome  of  the  struggle  will  be 
determined by the fact that Russia, India, China etc., account for 
the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe. And 
during the last few years it is this majority that has been drawn 
into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity, so 
that in this respect there cannot be the slightest doubt what the 
final outcome of the world struggle will be. In this sense, the 
complete victory of socialism is fully and absolutely assured.
 107 
 
Whilst  some  would  consider  Lenin’s  development  of  the  original  Marxist 
scheme  as  heretical,  unprincipled  or  simply  wrong,  the  application  of 
revolutionary principles to an unsuitable, non-industrial climate, Schlesinger 
clearly applauded it. He maintained faith in what he saw as Lenin’s coherent 
and  holistic  theory  of  revolution  and  socialist  construction  and  believed  its 
victory was inevitable. 
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Schlesinger’s  analysis  was  clear.  He  praised  Lenin’s  contribution  in  the 
strongest  terms  and  defended  him  against  criticism  he  seems  to  have 
anticipated in readers. He also defended the Soviet Union, arguing that it was 
still  incomplete  but  progressing  towards  the  eventual  higher  form  of 
communist society.
108 He saw the Russian revolution and the Soviet state as 
a victory for Leninism in particular, a new and higher stage in Marxist theory. 
However, writing in 1958, ‘… a lifetime after his [Lenin’s] death, as his party 
emphasises his works in reaction to the extremes of his successor, there may 
be  a  need  for  some  of  the  main  elements,  although  not  the  philosophical 
foundations,  to  make  space  for  a  new  analysis’.
109  A  further  theoretical 
advance, a new phase, was necessary in Marxism, one taking into account 
the changing circumstances and one in which the Stalinist ‘extremes’ were 
first removed. 
 
Schlesinger once again touched upon his own views of Lenin when writing a 
book review for Soviet Studies in April 1959.
110 In it he praised Lenin and 
argued  that  it  was  his  development  of  the  theory  of  a  revolutionary  party 
which  was  of  most  importance:  ‘A  good  case  can  be  made  for  regarding 
Lenin’s political theory, and in particular his concept of the party, as his main 
contribution to Marxist theory’.
111 An understanding of the historical context of 
this  development  was  crucial  to  any  appreciation:  Lenin  combined  the 
Russian tradition of professional revolutionaries with Marxist theory. Similar to 
previous  work,  Schlesinger  emphasised  Lenin’s  recognition  of  the  need  to 
separate  the  workers’  economic  struggles  from  political  ones.  The  party 
should aim to raise these economic wants to the higher level of a political 
struggle  against  Tsarism.  However,  as  Schlesinger  wrote,  it  was  also 
necessary for the party to adapt to issues arising from: ‘(1) the predominance 
of the peasants in pre-revolutionary Russia, (2) the struggle against the War, 
(3)  the  transition  from  bourgeois-democratic  to  a  socialist  revolution  and, 
finally,  (4)  the  transition  from  the  conquest  of  power  to  economic 
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reconstruction’.
112 That Lenin was able to prepare and lead a party capable of 
these myriad tasks was taken for granted. Schlesinger again pointed out that 
Lenin played little part in the last task, that of socialist construction, due to his 
death.  
 
Key themes of Schlesinger’s writings on Lenin emerged from another review 
four years later.
113 Once again, as in the encyclopaedia article in particular, 
Schlesinger emphasised the tribute Lenin paid to, ‘… the Narodnik share in 
the ancestry of Bolshevism’.
114  It was Lenin’s amalgamation of the Russian 
revolutionary tradition with Marxist theory that paved the way for revolutionary 
success.  Schlesinger  also  emphasised  the  significance  of  What  is  to  be 
Done? as a defining text. As Schlesinger wrote, it was ‘the fundamental work 
of  Bolshevism’.
115  Another  crucial  feature  that  Schlesinger  consistently 
pointed  to  was  the  necessarily  dialectical  nature  of  Marxist  theory.  It 
developed  and  remained  an  active  and  relevant  methodology  because  it 
changed  over  time,  often  as  a  result  of  internal  struggles.  Its  historical 
materialist base also ensured theory remained interwoven with the ephemeral 
economic,  and  wider  socio-political,  circumstances.  Original  Marxism  was 
developed  with  West  European  countries  in  mind;  modifications  and 
developments were essential for it to be of any use to an underdeveloped 
state such as Russia. Schlesinger took this argument one step further. The 
dialectical alterations which took place, primarily at Lenin’s instigation, were 
now of relevance to other countries: ‘… Marxist theory, in that form in which it 
had developed in Western industrialised countries, could hardly have served 
as a pattern for countries such as China and Cuba unless it had undergone 
modifications implied in its application in a major underdeveloped country’.
116 
Presumably,  further  modifications  would  be  necessary  to  make  the  theory 
relevant to differing material conditions. However, Lenin’s input had ensured 
the continuing relevance of Marxist theory. 
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The  value  of  Lenin’s  fusion  of  the  traditions  of  the  Russian  revolutionary 
movement to Marxist theory were again underlined in a paper published in 
1965  entitled  ‘Lenin  as  a Member  of  the  International  Socialist  Bureau’.
117 
Schlesinger wrote, ‘… he [Lenin] turned the rather negative attitude of the 
early Russian Marxists towards the Populist inheritance into a demand for a 
synthesis of their organizational experience with the Marxist interpretation of 
the historical process’.
118 Schlesinger was careful to point out that this did not 
imply an uncritical acceptance of the Populist tradition; only that which was 
useful and applicable should be restored.
119 He also referred to the ‘decisive 
step’ Lenin took with his adaptation of Marxism to Russian conditions; Marxist 
theory thus became applicable to current material conditions. Demonstrating 
his commitment to the dialectical process, Schlesinger argued: ‘Still, he would 
not have claimed the outcome of the adaptations was the last word of the 
international  socialist  movement’.
120  Marxism-Leninism  was  not  the  final, 
absolute authority. Further changes would become necessary, not least as a 
result  of  the  correctness  and  success  of  that  theory.  The  call  for  further 
changes and a rejection of any exegesis of Lenin’s texts was a consistent 
theme of Schlesinger’s writings. 
 
The final substantial piece of work Schlesinger produced on the subject of 
Leninism  is  the  series  of  nine  lectures,  entitled  Marxism-Leninism.  The 
lectures  were  given  just  before  Schlesinger’s  retirement  and  constitute  his 
final assessment of the political theory or ideology he dedicated his adult life 
to. They can be seen as a final analysis; the culmination of a developing body 
of work on the subject of Marxism.  
 
The lectures were typical of Schlesinger’s style of expression. They clearly 
and unflinchingly displayed his commitment and belief in the subject matter – 
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the veracity of Marxism as an ideology, intellectual methodology and political 
movement.  The  content  was  thorough,  with  many  details  and  examples. 
However,  the  writing  style  and  language  was  complicated  and  obtuse  in 
places, with a structure that made comprehension problematic. Schlesinger 
would often change from one subject of discussion to another with no obvious 
break,  introduction  or  conclusion.  He  also  employed  a  great  number  of 
parentheses within sentences, often clouding his point in the process. 
 
Schlesinger displayed his usual utilitarian attitude towards events covered in 
the  lectures.  He  combined  condemnation  of  the  excesses  and  terroristic 
means  utilised  by  Stalin’s  regime  with  a  pragmatic  acceptance  of  the 
necessity  of  some  methods,  at  the  expense  of more  humanistic  concerns. 
Schlesinger  expressed  a  clear  admiration  of  Lenin’s  achievements  but 
insisted  that  the  changes  to  Marxist  theory  which  he  effected  were  of 
ephemeral  validity.  He  also  asserted  Lenin’s  fallibility,  a  reasonably  rare 
admission for Schlesinger. He twice pointed out that it was Stalin and Trotsky 
rather  than  Lenin  who  correctly  timed  the  October  insurrection  to  fit  with 
Soviet  legality.  In  the  seventh  lecture  he  wrote:  ‘…this  was  one  of  the 
occasions when the two worked together, and showed more practical insight 
than the master’.
121  And in the next he conceded: ‘Lenin admittedly proved 
occasionally wrong in tactical issues, the most important of which concerned 
the decisions, taken by the CC [Central Committee] against his volition, not to 
expel  but  simply  to  reprimand  the  opponents  of  the  October  insurrection 
[and], to carry out that insurrection according to a time-table preserving Soviet 
legality’.
122  Schlesinger  still  believed  that  Lenin  was  the  ‘master’  and  only 
‘occasionally wrong’ but these minor admissions were greater than usual. 
 
There  was  a  familiarity  to  the  orthodoxy  of  Schlesinger’s  analysis  in  the 
lectures. His position was similar to that of official Soviet sources on several 
issues, including the immediate pre-history of Bolshevism. He asserted: ‘From 
the struggle against Economism Russian Social Democracy in general, and 
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Leninism in particular were born’.
123 This overestimation of the coherence of 
‘Economism’  as  a  movement  has  already  been  discussed.  However, 
Schlesinger  went  further  in  the  lectures,  once  again  unquestioningly 
reiterating Lenin’s version of events. He referred to the Credo as a manifesto 
of  ‘Economism’  and  argued  that  the  group  wished  the  Russian  labour 
movement to be restricted to the defence of workers’ immediate economic 
interests  and  compared  themselves  to  Western  Revisionists.
124  Lenin  had 
referred to the Credo in such a way in 1899. He wrote:  
 
A  tendency  has  been  observed  among  Russian  Social-
Democrats recently to depart from the fundamental principles of 
Russian Social-Democracy that were proclaimed by its founders 
and  foremost  fighters…  The  Credo…  which  is  presumed  to 
express  the  fundamental  views  of  certain  (‘young’)  Russian 
Social-Democrats,  represents  an  attempt  at  a  systematic  and 
definite exposition of the ‘new views’.
125 
 
Schlesinger  also  portrayed  the  Credo  as  a  ‘systematic  and  definite 
exposition’. His agreement with orthodox Soviet and Leninist descriptions was 
also  apparent  in  the  lectures  when  he  described  the  ‘Empirio-criticists’  as 
‘supporters of semi-idealist re-interpretations of Marxist philosophy’ and ‘God 
constructors’.
126 
 
The majority of the lectures concerned aspects of Leninism and Lenin’s role 
in  the  development  of  the  Bolshevik  party  and  the  Soviet  Union.  They 
contained much that was familiar to earlier work. One of the main features of 
Schlesinger’s writings on the subject was that Lenin had uniquely synthesised 
the traditions of the Russian revolutionary movement with classical Marxist 
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theory; this blend had brought about the successful Bolshevik revolution and 
ensured  Marxism’s  continued  relevance  in  changing  socio-economic 
circumstances.  This  important  theme  was  evident  in  the  lectures.  As 
Schlesinger put it: 
 
Leninism represented the absorption of Marxism by the Russian 
revolutionary movement as well as the partial absorption of the 
organisational  traditions  and  moral  impetus  of  the  Russian 
revolutionaries movement: in the outside world without the first 
absorption the Russian revolutionary movement would not have 
resulted in the raising of a backward country to the position of 
one  of  the  leading,  and  in  some  aspects  the  most  advanced 
power of today; without the second one Marxism would have 
remained a Utopian dream, incapable of influencing the course 
of  history  when  those  who  had  been  backward  during  the 
European-dominated  period  of  modern  development  entered 
the great transformation process.
127 
 
Without Marxism, the Russian revolutionaries could not have brought about 
the  revolution  and  transformation  of  society  and  industry.  Without  the 
revolutionaries’ organisational heritage, Marxism would not have had the tools 
and structures to have any decisive impact on that society. 
 
In  the  lectures,  Schlesinger  conceded  that  Lenin’s  organisational  concepts 
may  have  altered  Marxism,  something  more  dogmatic  Marxists  would 
consider heresy. However, these alterations were a necessary and inherent 
part  of  Marxist  theory  and  were  what  made  it  applicable  to  changing 
conditions.  Lenin’s  organisational  concepts  may  have  led  Russia  further 
towards  a  socialist  revolution  than  accepted  Marxist  ideology  of  the  time 
allowed for an isolated Russia. However, according to Schlesinger, this was 
because Lenin, ‘… fully grasped the needs of his own country – and of other 
                                                 
127 Ibid. 9, p. 1.    123 
underdeveloped countries to follow’.
128 Lenin recognised that conditions had 
altered  from  Marx’s  day  and  developed  his  organisational  theories  to  take 
account  of  them.  He  perceived  the  rise  of  monopoly  capitalism  and 
imperialism and sought to change revolutionary theory to fit, something he did 
with great success. 
 
Familiar interpretations could also be seen in Schlesinger’s description of the 
birth of Comintern and Lenin’s Twenty One Conditions. In a similar vein to his 
memoirs, the lectures pointed out that few would argue with the Bolsheviks 
desire  to  purge  any  new  International  of  those  who  had  displayed  their 
consistent opposition to the agreed standards of social democracy. However, 
as  Schlesinger  wrote:  ‘The  really  controversial  problem  concerned  the 
definition  of  opportunism,  separation  from  which  as  well as  from  the  overt 
traitors was required’.
129 Lenin’s definition of opportunism was too broad and 
Comintern  was  saddled  with  unhelpful  and  unwieldy  conditions  of 
membership  as  a  result.
130  He  described  the conditions  as  one  of  Lenin’s 
major errors throughout his publishing career. Again, echoing his memoirs, 
Schlesinger went on to justify or explain the actions of those, such as himself, 
who agreed to accept the Conditions in order to join Comintern. He asserted, 
‘… already in the autumn of 1920 a consciousness of the central importance 
of  the  Russian  revolution  caused  many  left-wing  socialists  who  had  their 
objection against the extreme centralisation of the Twenty One Conditions for 
Admission to Comintern to vote for their acceptance’.
131 Solidarity with Soviet 
Russia took precedence over concerns about centralisation.  
 
Finally, the last key theme to also be present in Schlesinger’s lectures was 
the  importance  of  What  is  to  be  Done?  for  an understanding  of  Leninism. 
Schlesinger regarded it as one of the key texts of Marxism and wrote that 
there was not, ‘… the slightest reason to assume that at any time of his life he 
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throughout the period of investigation. In one of his first works on returning to the West, Spirit 
of Post-war Russia, Schlesinger wrote, ‘… it is extremely difficult even in retrospect to defend 
Lenin’s twenty-one conditions of 1920’ (Schlesinger, Spirit of Post-war Russia, p. 110.). 
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[Lenin] departed from the concepts of the functions of the revolutionary elite 
as  elaborated  in  What  is  to  be  Done  and  on  the  applicability  of  these 
principles  to  international  socialism  all  over  the  world’.
132  This  work  was 
fundamental  to  the  development  of  Lenin’s  theory  of  the  party,  although 
Schlesinger went on to point out that this theory was of only limited validity 
since conditions were dynamic. 
 
There  were  elements  which  were  new  in  the  lectures.  For  example, 
Schlesinger provided further analysis of Lenin’s attitude towards the state. He 
wrote  that  Lenin’s  aims  regarding  Russia  were  initially  limited,  continuing: 
‘Lenin did not believe that the realisation of his suggestions would turn Russia 
socialist’.
133    However,  Russia  could  begin  the  socialist  revolution  and 
improve conditions to facilitate the entrance of socialist allies in Europe and 
the  US.  The  immediate  aims  on  realisation  of  power  were  also  limited: 
nationalisation of the banks; worker representatives’ control of production and 
distribution; nationalisation of land alongside the preservation of large farms. 
Schlesinger  argued:  ‘It  was  on  this  platform  that  the  Bolshevik  party  … 
assumed  power’.
134  In  keeping  with  Schlesinger’s  admiration  of  the 
Bolsheviks and Lenin’s version of events, this statement implicitly assumed 
that  the  Bolshevik  seizure  of  power  was  consensual  and  that  it  was  their 
organisational tactics and correct application of policies which brought about 
this success. This suggestion is one that was made in many of Schlesinger’s 
writings on the history of the Russian revolution. 
 
Schlesinger went on to assert that Lenin envisaged the new state in a very 
fluid  manner:  ‘In  general,  Lenin  had  no  particular  respect  for  institutions, 
including  new  ones  created  by  the  revolutionary  movement  itself’.
135 
Institutions  would  rise  and  fall  as  they  were  needed.  According  to 
Schlesinger, Lenin was a ‘hard realist’ when it came to measures necessary 
to preserve the new state. Schlesinger pointed to Lenin’s report of 1918 in 
which he defended the need for unequal salaries and the use of bourgeois 
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specialists by arguing that state capitalism was essential for the salvation of 
the  Russian  revolution.
136  There  would  be  setbacks  upon  the  road  to 
socialism and unpopular measures may be needed, seemingly in contrast to 
long-held principles, but these would be worthwhile if the young revolutionary 
state  was  preserved  and  allowed  to  develop.  This  ‘hard  realism’  or 
pragmatism  is  a  characteristic  which  Schlesinger  shared.  He  continually 
defended the fledgling Soviet state against criticism that socialist principles 
were being betrayed. He took a pragmatic stance on issues such as NEP or 
party discipline, arguing that however unsavoury, such measures were often 
necessary for survival. He would, therefore, have approved of Lenin’s attitude 
and may even have been influenced by it. 
 
Schlesinger  spoke  of  a  systematisation  of  Lenin’s  theories  in the  lectures. 
This was also a new element to his analysis. He wrote that Lenin’s ‘Left-wing 
Communism’ and the Theses of the Second Congress of Comintern were: ‘… 
the  nearest  approach  to  a  systematisation  of  Lenin’s  political  theories  we 
have’.
137 Schlesinger had explained previously that the key to understanding 
Leninism was What is to be Done?. In it Lenin had explained the need for a 
professional  party  of  disciplined  and  centralised  revolutionaries  who  could 
raise  the  consciousness  of  the  proletariat  above  mere  economic  or  trade 
union struggles, to their historical role as a revolutionary class. Schlesinger 
had also made clear that these developments of Marxist theory had directly 
led  to  the  success  of  the  Bolsheviks  in  Russia  and  had  transformed  that 
Marxism into something applicable to later times and non-advanced states. 
However, Schlesinger now went further. He stated that Lenin’s later writings, 
namely ‘Left-wing Communism’ and his speeches at the Second Congress, 
were a continuation of that system.  
 
In these works Lenin was passing on his successful theory to other parties. 
He  was  outlining  how  the  Bolsheviks  achieved  their  revolution  and  urging 
other parties to take advantage of this experience. In ‘Left-wing Communism’ 
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Lenin wrote:  
 
But at the present moment of history the situation is precisely 
such that the Russian model reveals to all countries something, 
and something very essential, of their near and inevitable future. 
Advanced  workers  in  every  land  have  long understood  this… 
Herein lies the international ‘significance’ (in the narrow sense 
of  the  term)  of  Soviet  power,  and  of  the  fundamentals  of 
Bolshevik theory and tactics.
138 
 
Many features of the Russian revolution, and Bolshevik theory in particular, 
were  of  international  validity  and  should  thus  be  assimilated.  Schlesinger 
obviously  agreed  wholeheartedly  with  this  interpretation.  He  had  said  as 
much  from  a  personal  perspective  in  his  memoirs.  Schlesinger  accepted 
Lenin’s  interpretation  as  expressed  in  ‘Left-wing  Communism’,  as  a  true 
description of the way in which the Bolshevik party had operated during the 
revolution  and  on  gaining  power.  However  it  has  already  been  noted  that 
Lenin’s description did not directly correspond to the true nature of that party. 
 
Schlesinger  argued  that  alongside  Lenin’s  treatment  of  immediate  political 
issues in these works, he also tackled agrarian questions and problems of 
colonial  emancipation.  He  wrote:  ‘Most  important,  however,  for  the  further 
development  of  Marxism  is  his  systematic  treatment  of  the  agrarian  and 
colonial problems, i.e. those where Lenin had made his maximum contribution 
to the further development of the classical Marxist inheritance’.
139 Schlesinger 
had  not  previously  written  much  about  Lenin’s  attitude  towards  these 
problems and did not go into any great detail now, yet he clearly thought them 
significant.  
 
Schlesinger argued that Lenin’s theses on the agrarian problem submitted to 
the Congress were based upon the revolutionary experience of Russia. Once 
again he asserted the primacy of Lenin’s position due to successful Bolshevik 
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experiences in Russia. In backward countries it was necessary to divide up 
large  estates  in  order  to  win  the  sympathies  of  the  peasantry.  In  more 
advanced  countries  it  would  still  be  vital  to  provide  land  for  peasants  but 
some large estates could be preserved as state farms.
140  
 
Lenin also demanded a more modern approach to colonialism. According to 
Schlesinger  this  manifested  itself  in  calls  to  pursue  close  alliance  with  all 
emancipation movements so long as this association, ‘… does not prevent 
the struggle of the communist for independent organisation of the proletariat 
and  semi-proletariat’.
141  Communists  were  to  take  a  more  popular  front 
attitude to colonial emancipation where appropriate. Lenin insisted that the 
description of colonial movements should change from ‘bourgeois democratic’ 
to ‘national revolutionary’, because, often, colonial bourgeoisie now colluded 
with  the  bourgeoisie  of  the  oppressing  nation.
142  Schlesinger  noted  the 
change  of  emphasis  and  felt  it  concerned  the  possibility  of  avoiding  the 
capitalist stage of development.
143 This was something he believed was, ‘… 
alien as we know not to Marx but to the bulk of West European socialists who 
joined with what they supposed to be an orthodox-Marxist development’.
144 
Lenin and Marx both believed it was possible to avoid the capitalist stage; 
less  developed  countries  could  now  learn  from  Russia  and  move  directly 
towards  socialism.  This  both  legitimised  the  Bolshevik’s  seizure  of  power, 
Marx would have agreed with their actions, and emphasised Lenin’s role in 
adapting Marxist theory to modern conditions.  
 
Schlesinger  concluded  his  discussion  of  Lenin’s  political  system  by 
emphasising its open-ended character: ‘At the end of his life Lenin thus has 
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left  the  ends  of  his  system  open’.
145  He  argued  that  NEP  was  the  last 
contribution  Lenin  was  able  to  make to  Russian  development. This  was  a 
stage  in  which  many decisive  issues  were  yet  to  be  settled,  not  least  the 
enormous task of industrialisation. 
 
The final section of Schlesinger’s lectures to concentrate on Lenin concerned 
reflections  on  Leninism  immediately  after  his  death.  They  were  similar  to 
observations  he  had  previously  made  about  Soviet  and  cold  war 
characterisations of Lenin’s legacy and they demonstrate the historiographical 
and  dialectical  nature  of  Schlesinger’s  interest.  He  was  concerned  with 
Lenin’s significance during his lifetime and later, as his theories and policies 
bore fruit and shaped further developments. He was also concerned with the 
way in which leaders and groups manipulated Lenin’s legacy for their own 
interests. He singled out two strands within Soviet Russia immediately after 
Lenin’s death to demonstrate the different ways in which his impact could be 
understood.  During  the  struggle  for  Lenin’s  succession,  and  on  Stalin’s 
initiative,  the  party  encouraged  recruitment  from  the  working  bench.  As 
Schlesinger  noted:  ‘…for  their  indoctrination  systematic  textbooks  of 
‘Leninism’ were elaborated.’
146 Two of these textbooks in particular exposed 
the differing attitudes. According to Schlesinger:  
 
That written by Zinoviev was dominated by emphasis on the 
peasant  and  colonial  problems,  the  implication  being  that 
Leninism  was  an  adaptation  of  classical  Marxism  (which 
thus  was  to  be  retained  substantially  unaltered  for  the 
leading  industrial  countries)  for  the  particular  problems  of 
backward countries.
147 
 
By concentrating on what Lenin had had to change in order to remain relevant 
to traditionally inappropriate states, industrially backward, non-capitalist ones, 
Zinoviev was arguing that any adaptations Lenin had made were temporary 
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and of limited relevance. Marxism, in its traditional form, was still appropriate 
for the majority of industrial countries.  
 
Stalin, on the other hand, as early as 1921 and later in his work ‘Foundations 
of Leninism’ argued that Leninism was Marxism adapted to the later stages of 
capitalism, that of imperialism and proletarian revolution. Leninism was the 
latest  version  of  Marxism.
148  As  Schlesinger  explained,  ‘…  the  specific 
conditions  of  Russia,  plus  some  more  ‘underdeveloped’  countries  –  the 
accession of which, as we have seen Lenin envisaged at the end of his life – 
far from being atypical represented the problems of actual, as distinct from 
dreamed  of,  socialist  revolutions’.
149  Leninism  was  Marxism  for  present 
conditions. Schlesinger clearly agreed with this Stalinist interpretation. He did 
not  say  so  in  the  lectures  but  he  had  stated  many  times  that  he  believed 
Leninism to be the next evolutionary step in the dialectical and fluid political 
theory of Marxism. He also frequently emphasised the fact that Lenin had 
altered previous theory to take account of changed circumstances and had 
thus made it relevant to less advanced countries. 
 
The  lectures  provided  a  further  insight  into  Schlesinger’s  Leninism.  They 
substantiated the themes of his earlier writings as well as offering some new 
analysis. They are particularly important since they were written near the end 
of Schlesinger’s life, after his retirement from academia. They thus represent 
the culmination of his work.  
 
Schlesinger’s attitude to Lenin was largely consistent over time. There was a 
difference in emphasis between his writing whilst Stalin held power and that 
published  after  Stalin’s  death.  However,  this  timeline  is  more  difficult  to 
discern  with  works  on  Lenin  than  on  other  topics,  noticeably  Soviet 
historiography. This is because Schlesinger only published one work of note 
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in the West before 1956. Nevertheless, one distinct difference is apparent. In 
Schlesinger’s early work he appeared to concur with Stalin that theoretical 
developments  since  Lenin’s  death,  and  undertaken  by  Stalin  or  with  his 
approval, represented the natural progression of that theory. Whereas in later 
works,  notably  his  encyclopaedia  article,  Schlesinger  suggested  a  need  to 
purge theory of erroneous Stalinist distortions; a return to Leninist purity was 
required  before  further  advances  could  be  undertaken.  Once  again, 
coalescence with Stalinist interpretations was apparent whilst he lived. Yet 
condemnation of many developments effected by Stalin was characteristic in 
writings after his death.   
 
Schlesinger greatly admired Lenin’s theoretical work, the advances he made 
to  Marxism,  and  his  political  activities.  Schlesinger  committed  himself  to 
Lenin’s path in the early 1920s and remained on it for the rest of his life. He 
believed that Lenin’s theory of the party, his organisation of the Bolsheviks, 
led directly to the success of the Russian revolution and was a blueprint for 
parties  in  other  countries.  His  amalgamation  of  the  traditions  of  Russian 
revolutionaries with Marxism advanced that theory so that it was applicable to 
the changed conditions of the twentieth century. These alterations created a 
Marxism  which  differed  from  that  envisaged  by  the  founders,  but  these 
changes were natural; Marxism was supposed to remain bedded to dynamic 
material  conditions.  However,  Lenin’s  success  had  made  his  contribution 
obsolete. Further alterations were required as a result of changes to material 
conditions.  The  fact  of  the  Russian  revolution  had  irreversibly  altered  the 
socio-economic and political landscape.   131 
 
Chapter Four: Schlesinger’s Later Theoretical 
Development – Marx and Engels, Lukács, and 
Stalin 
 
This chapter will focus upon Schlesinger’s later theoretical development. As 
Schlesinger  became  familiar  with  Leninism  it  led  him  towards  a  greater 
understanding of the founders of Marxism: Marx and Engels. An investigation 
of his attitude towards them is vital for an overall perspective of his Marxism. 
A brief examination of the similarities between Schlesinger’s approach and 
that  of  the  outstanding  Hungarian  Marxist,  Georg  Lukács  will  then  be 
undertaken. Finally, the chapter will examine Schlesinger’s attitude towards 
Stalin  as  a  theoretician;  the  correct  appreciation  of  this  aspect  of 
Schlesinger’s thought is vital for the second part of the thesis. 
 
The  contents  of  this  chapter,  and  indeed  the  order  of  the  entire  Marxism 
section of the thesis may appear odd at first sight. It does not conform to the 
traditional  or  chronological  development  of  Marxist  thought  and,  perhaps, 
appears to treat Marx and Engels as an afterthought, combined as they are 
with later personalities. However, there is a valid reason for the presentation. 
It  instead  follows  Schlesinger’s  personal  theoretical  development,  his  own 
chronology: from Luxemburg to Lenin, through Marx and Engels and finally to 
Stalin. 
 
Schlesinger  was  not  particularly  interested  in  philosophy  until  later  in  his 
career, when a full-time academic. Although he stated that he devoted the 
substantial majority of his life to the critical development of Marxist theory, it 
seems clear that, for the most part, Schlesinger meant the active aspects of 
theory – characteristics of party, tactical strategies – Marxism in the widest 
sense of the word, the world-wide movement for social justice and freedom.
1 
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To Schlesinger, Marxism was a living, breathing methodology and source of 
inspiration rather than a dry, intellectual object of study. Hence his early focus 
on contemporary debates between Leninism and Luxemburgism. Even later in 
his career, historical debates were worthy of critical investigation only if they 
were of relevance to present concerns. This attitude was demonstrated in an 
article  Schlesinger  published  in  1964/5  concerning  Marx’s  Economic  and 
Philosophical Manuscripts.
2 Schlesinger made clear that he had no interest in, 
for example, ‘…. an academic dispute amongst a few German intellectuals, 
120  years  ago,  unless  the  outcome  is  relevant  in  its  intellectual  content’.
3 
Schlesinger would only be concerned with those aspects of Marx and Engels’ 
work that were of continued importance in present times. There were, thus, 
few writings devoted to Marx and Engels alone.  
 
Equally,  Schlesinger  expressed  no  interest  in  what  he  saw  as  purely 
philosophical debates, such as those involving Lukács, beyond their influence 
on contemporary understanding of Marxism and the movement. He had little 
time  for  those  who  concerned  themselves with  philosophical,  metaphysical 
enquiries  at  the  expense  of  actual  historical  circumstances.  In  1947 
Schlesinger  referred  to  the  eternal  debates  on  the  precise  functioning  of 
dialectics. He wrote:  
 
I  think  that  the  victories  of  the  Red  Army,  although,  in  my 
opinion, undoubtedly due to essential forces of Marxism, are in 
no way due to some mystic force of the negation, the negation 
of the negation, and so on. Therefore, the time spent by many 
people in Cambridge and Oxford on the commendable study of 
the  ‘mystery’  of the  successes  of  the  Red Army  should  have 
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been devoted to the study of the driving forces and the historical 
development of the Russian Revolution rather than to the study 
of some mystical formulas understood by very few of those who 
use them.
4 
 
This  ‘practical’,  pragmatic  attitude  was  a  common  theme  in  Schlesinger’s 
writings. 
 
Schlesinger made clear his dislike of purely scholastic tasks in his actions as 
well as his writings. On arrival in Moscow in 1935 Schlesinger was offered a 
post at the Marx-Engels Institute. He declined the opportunity on learning that 
foreign  staff  members  were  predominantly given  roles  involving  the  critical 
revision  of  Marx’s  manuscripts.
5  Such  work  was  of  no  interest  to  him. 
Schlesinger wished to be involved in more practical tasks, involving his own 
party if possible. This disdain for concentration on Marx’s writings remained 
with Schlesinger. The treatment of texts as received truths was anathema to 
Schlesinger’s  dialectical  and  historico-materialist  understanding.  Such  texts 
were inherently time bound and thus of limited value. There is not, therefore, 
many  of  Schlesinger’s  writings  which  undertake  textual  analysis  or  real 
engagement with Marx’s work. 
 
Schlesinger made clear that he had taken no special interest in the publication 
of  Marx’s  Economic  and  Philosophical  Manuscripts  until  they  became  the 
focal point of criticism of Marxism. He wrote:  
 
The Manuscripts were first published in full in 1932, on the very 
eve of Hitler’s access to power. At that time, we had other things 
to  bother about.  I  think  I represent  no particular  case  when  I 
honestly  confess  that,  notwithstanding  the  part  which  I  had 
played in the preceding years in the organisation of communist 
party education in Germany, I took notice of the very existence 
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of the Manuscripts only when, in the post-war period, they were 
broadly used by all kinds of critics of Marxism.
6 
 
This  quote  makes  clear  how  late  Schlesinger  became  aware  of  some  of 
Marx’s writings. He was conscious of Lenin and Luxemburg’s writings as part 
of his revolutionary work and life; they were read and debated within his party 
activities. However, the same was not true of the classics of Marx and Engels. 
Although he was certainly aware of the basic foundational texts, they did not 
hold the same immediate interest for him.  
 
Given  the  nature  of  Schlesinger’s  theoretical  education,  development  and 
scholarly  work,  one  gains  a  greater  understanding  of  his  attitude  by 
concentrating upon his writings on Leninism and Luxemburgism. There are 
more  of  them,  and  the  subject  matter  was  of  greater  importance  to 
Schlesinger, as the issues they dealt with were of contemporary significance 
to his generation. Leninism was still exerting a profound influence on a large 
part  of  the  world.  Although  Lenin’s  theories  should  now  have  been 
superseded,  this  had  been  far  from  satisfactorily  resolved  by  the  time 
Schlesinger was writing in the 1950s and 1960s.  
 
Schlesinger understood Marxism as evolving dialectically and Leninism was 
the natural progression from the theories of Marx and Engels. This evolution 
had resulted in much of Marx and Engels’ work becoming obsolete. There 
was,  thus,  little  to  be  gained  from  in-depth  investigations  of  that  work. 
Schlesinger became fully conversant with the works of Marx and Engels, an 
investigation  of  his  attitude  towards  them  is  vital  to  fully  comprehend  his 
‘Marxism’, but the main emphasis has inevitably to be on his other mentors.  
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Marx and Engels 
As noted above, the works of Marx and Engels are not of primary importance 
in an investigation of Schlesinger’s Marxism. Although most of Schlesinger’s 
writings which engage with theoretical concerns or the Soviet Union refer to 
Marx and Engels, he did not devote many papers or books to that subject 
alone. So, whilst the sections on Luxemburg and Lenin went in to a detailed 
analysis of Schlesinger’s developing works upon the subject, this section will 
provide  an  overview  of  the  key  themes  and  characteristics  of  his  attitude 
towards the founders of Marxism. 
 
Such an approach by no means attempts to diminish the influence Marx and 
Engels had upon Schlesinger. It merely suggests that he did not devote a 
great deal of scholarly attention to their individual writings. Schlesinger felt 
that Marx and Engels were men of towering intellect and genius. He dedicated 
his entire life to furthering their cause and his appreciation of their greatness 
ran throughout his work. In his memoir reflections he referred to Marx as, ‘…. 
the  greatest  thinker  whom  I  knew  (and  know  to  the  present  day)’.
7  He 
continually referred to Marx and Engels as the ‘masters’ and ‘founders’.
8 So it 
is  clear  that  Schlesinger  was  filled  with  admiration  and  respect  for  their 
contribution to social democracy. It is also clear that Schlesinger developed 
an enormous knowledge of their work and theories. His writings demonstrate 
a  deep  and  detailed  understanding  of  all  aspects  of  Marx’s  and  Engels’ 
writings. He was able to point out errors in quotation and emphasis in others’ 
analysis, even in official publications of their texts by the Marx-Engels Institute 
in Moscow.
9 
 
Whilst it is clear that Schlesinger held Marx to be ‘the greatest thinker’, it is 
necessary to define his attitude towards Engels. Did he believe Engels to be 
Marx’s  equal?  Were  they  joint  partners,  joint  ‘founders’  of  Marxism  or  did 
                                                 
7 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p.95. 
8 For example, in his memoirs he wrote of Marx as ‘the master’ (Schlesinger, In a Time of 
Struggle: Whither Germany?, p.96). 
9 Schlesinger, Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts in the Historical Perspective, 
p. 23. See also Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 34 in which he refers to the frequent 
misquotation and misunderstanding of Marx’s comments about religion as the ‘opium of the 
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Engels have a more junior role? Schlesinger did not give a precise answer in 
any of his writings. At no point did he set out the differing roles they played or 
write anything substantial about their relationship. His views on this subject 
must,  therefore,  be  sought  in  general  impressions.  Schlesinger  regularly 
spoke of the ‘founders’ and, more often that not, referred to both Marx and 
Engels  when  writing  about  Marxism.  In  an  encyclopaedia  article  defining 
‘communism’ he wrote: ‘Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels differentiated between 
the different ‘socialists’ currents’.
10 He went on to refer to Marx and Engels 
together  five  more  times  and  Marx  alone  four  times.  From  a  very  brief 
overview  of  this  article  –  a  broad,  general description  of  communism,  it  is 
clear  that  Schlesinger  routinely  referred  to  both  theoreticians.  Both  were 
obviously of importance in founding communist theory. 
 
Schlesinger  assigned  Engels  three  different  roles:  he  assisted  Marx  in 
developing initial Marxist assumptions; he was responsible for the propagation 
of  those  theories  after  Marx’  death  and,  to  some  extent,  he  continued  to 
advance elements of that theory in the post-Marx era. Schlesinger referred to 
the  first  role  in  his  unpublished  draft  on  the  Economic  and  Philosophical 
Manuscripts.  He  argued  that  the  bridge  between  a  philosophical  and 
economic Marxist analysis was first developed in 1844. The new economic 
outlook emerged on Engels’ instigation, as Marx himself would admit.
11 That 
Engels initially introduced Marx to the relevance of economics for his study of 
society and alienation is widely recognised.
12 Schlesinger did not spend much 
time discussing the issue, but acknowledged it nonetheless. 
 
Schlesinger  dealt  with  Engels’  second  role  in  one  of  his  last  works:  an 
unfinished  and  unpublished  manuscript  entitled  The  Marxist  Movement: 
Continuity  and  Diversity.  It  was  written  in  1969  and  presumably  remained 
incomplete  due  to  Schlesinger’s  death.  In  the  preface,  Schlesinger  wrote: 
‘This attempt to record the foundations of that struggle [Social Democracy] 
                                                 
10 Schlesinger, ‘Kommunismus’, Handwörterbuch  der Sozial-Wissenschaften, 54, 1965, pp. 
610-625 at p. 610. My italics.  
11 Schlesinger, Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts in the Historical Perspective, 
p. 12. 
12 See, for example, J. D. White, Karl Marx and the Intellectual Origins of Dialectical 
Materialism, (London, MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996) pp. 139…    137 
has been written by a man who joined it slightly more than half a century after 
its inception and who, as human fates go, has to lay down his pen about half 
a  century  later’,  suggesting  that  he  was  aware  his  death  was  imminent.
13 
Schlesinger  intended  the manuscript  to  become  a  published  book and  the 
idea for it emerged from discussions he had whilst visiting Montreal in 1968.
14 
Several colleagues insisted his generation’s knowledge and experience of the 
world  wide  Marxist  movement  should  not  be  allowed  to  die  with  it.  Thus, 
Schlesinger set out to write a general explanation of how and why Marxism 
continued to be, ‘…. one of the great intellectual and social movements of 
World  History’,  whilst  remaining  relevant  to  increasingly  diverse  groups  of 
people.
15  There  were  four  sections  to  the  manuscript  and  three  were 
complete. More were probably planned if the intention was to describe the 
movement  up  to  the  time  of  writing.  The  four  chapters  were  entitled: 
Introduction: the origins; The period of reception, 1864 – 1898; The period of 
crisis, 1898 – 1914, and The period of crisis II, 1914 – 1928. The manuscript 
represents  a  particularly  useful  insight  into  Schlesinger’s  thought.  It  was 
written  near  the  end  of  his  life  and  was  intended  as  a  broad,  scholarly 
examination of the Marxist movement. It can be seen as Schlesinger’s final 
analysis, one he spent a lifetime studying and developing. 
 
In  the  manuscript  Schlesinger  argued  that  Engels  furthered  both  the 
understanding  and  popularity  of  Marxist  theory.  According  to  Schlesinger, 
Engels’ Anti-Dühring, first published in 1877 and 1878, definitively converted 
continental Social Democracy to Marxism.
16 Later, he described Engels as a, 
‘….  generaliser  of  genius’.
17  Engels’  ability  to  generalise  and  explain  the 
concepts of Marxism were not the only, or most important, reason behind the 
conversion  of  thousands  of  activists  to  the  Marxist  cause,  but  it  certainly 
played its part.  
 
                                                 
13 Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. I. 
14 Ibid. p. 1. 
15 Ibid. p. II. 
16 Marx and Engels, Werke, 20, pp. 1-303. Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. 42. 
17 Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. 42.   138 
Finally,  Schlesinger  suggested  in  various  writings  that  Engels  advanced 
Marxist theory after Marx’s death. In his encyclopaedia article on Lenin, he 
argued that until Lenin’s work, the only alteration to classical Marxism came 
about as a result of Engels’ change in attitude to the war question late in life.
18 
That Schlesinger believed Engels to have continued developing Marxism is 
also  clear  from  his  treatment  of  Luxemburgism.  Schlesinger  believed  that 
Rosa Luxemburg’s theoretical deficiencies emerged from her failure to deal 
with  developments  in  theory  made  in  Engels’  later  writings  and  in  most  of 
Lenin’s.  He  pointed  to  Engels’  Socialism  in  Germany  in  particular  as  an 
example of work she did not adequately digest within her own.
19 So, Engels 
was  clearly  a  vital  theorist  in  the  initial  development  of  Marxism,  in  its 
dissemination and in its further evolution. Schlesinger seems to have viewed 
Marx and Engels as partners. He would often refer to the both, rather than 
simply write of Marx. If there had to be a senior partner in this relationship, 
however, to Schlesinger, this was clearly Marx. He alone was the ‘greatest’ 
thinker, the ‘master’. 
 
Turning to Schlesinger’s attitude to Marx, six major themes emerge. Firstly, 
Schlesinger’s  understanding  of  Marx  and  Marxism  derives  from  Lenin’s 
interpretation.  Secondly,  for  Schlesinger,  the  main  purpose  of  any 
investigation of Marx is to determine the relevance of his writings and theories 
for  modern  circumstances.  Following  from  this,  Schlesinger  believed  that, 
whilst  Marx  would  always  be  pre-eminent  as  the  founder  of  the  Marxist 
movement, the nature of that movement meant that the significance of the 
original leader was temporal. Marx was less important than the ‘ism’. Fourthly, 
the key to Schlesinger’s Marxism was dialectics and historical materialism; 
classical German philosophy was a vital ingredient. The fifth characteristic is 
Schlesinger’s emphasis on the active versus contemplative nature of Marx’s 
work. The final element to run through Schlesinger’s writings on the subject 
was his attempt to dispel myths about Marx and the theory he developed. This 
section will deal which each theme in turn.  
 
                                                 
18 Schlesinger, Lenin, W. J., p. 585. 
19 See chapter 2, p. 73.   139 
That Schlesinger’s understanding of Marx was Leninist in nature should be of 
no  surprise.  It  has already  been  shown  that  he  became  fully  conscious  of 
Marxist theory only as a result of his recognition and adoption of Leninism. He 
viewed  Leninism  as  the  necessary  development  of  Marxism  in  changed 
conditions and so would naturally be more concerned with it, over its now 
partially  obsolete  ancestor.  However,  he  clearly  judged  the  movement’s 
earlier  manifestation  from  the  perspective  of  this  later  vantage  point.  He 
seemed to view Marxism through the prism of Leninism. For example, in The 
Marxist  Movement,  Schlesinger  asserted  the  three  ingredients  of  Marxism: 
German classical philosophy, English political economy and the traditions of 
the French revolution, especially utopian socialism. Whilst this interpretation is 
commonplace,  what  demonstrates  Schlesinger’s  acceptance  of  Lenin’s 
version  of  Marxism  is  that  he  referred  to  him  in  order  to  validate  the 
proposition.
20  He  pointed  to  Lenin’s  1914  article  ‘Karl  Marx’  in  the  Granat 
encyclopaedia  as  an  authoritative  voice on the  sources  of  Marxism.
21  This 
interpretation of Marx’s heritage was clearly visible throughout Schlesinger’s 
work, in Marx His Time and Ours, for example.
22 
 
Lenin’s  influence  was  also  obvious  in  Schlesinger’s  attitude  towards 
materialism in Marxism. As noted earlier, Schlesinger emphasised different 
aspects  of  Lenin’s  materialism  in  different  writings,  although  he  gave  the 
impression  that  he  was  in  agreement  with whatever  attitude  he described. 
Sometimes, Schlesinger wrote of Lenin’s unstinting materialism in the face of 
idealistic challenges to the basis of Marxism, at others he referred to Lenin’s 
appreciation  of  aspects  of  the  idealist  approach.  He  noted  the  difference 
explicitly in one of his lectures on Marxism-Leninism: 
 
                                                 
20 Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. 6. Modern texts continue to emphasise these three 
key  constituents  of  Marxism.  See,  for  example,  P.  Worsley,  Marx  and  Marxism,  (London, 
Routledge, 2002) whose first two chapters concentrate upon German philosophy, the French 
revolution and socialism, and British political economy. 
21 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 26, pp. 43-93. 
22 See, for example, Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, pp. 38… in which reference is 
made to ‘German philosophic sources’ (p. 39), ‘Utopian critics of the [French] Revolution, St. 
Simon and Fourier’ (p. 40) and ‘Ricardian economists’ (p. 41).   140 
  It  is  not  surprising  that  Lenin  devoted  particular  attention  to 
emphasis  on  the  materialist,  anti-idealistic  aspects  of  Marxist 
philosophy in times when the voluntarist threat was particularly 
great,  i.e.  after  the  defeat  of  the  first  Russian  revolution  (the 
implications of which the party’s left-wing was not prepared to 
recognize  and  found  consolation  for  in  Mach’s 
‘empiriocriticism’),  and  after  the  introduction  of  the  New 
Economic Policy, when Lenin emphasized the need for a society 
of materialist friends of Hegelian dialectics. In between, … Lenin 
put  much  emphasis  on  the  positive  aspects  of  Hegelian 
dialectics and even of philosophical idealism.
23 
 
Schlesinger was aware of Lenin’s changing emphasis and the reasons for it. 
However, the important point is that Schlesinger coalesced completely with 
Lenin’s interpretation of Marxism and Marx’s philosophy. 
 
The second key theme in Schlesinger’s writings was his insistence that Marx 
was  only  to  be  investigated  in  order  to  determine  issues  of  contemporary 
validity.  Schlesinger  had  no  real  interest  in  locating  Marx’  or  Engels’  work 
within their historical context Thus, the study of classic texts, beyond the need 
for general education in Marxist method, was of use mainly to understand and 
explain why conditions had changed since the time of writing and hence to 
recognise what aspects of their theory now required alteration. Examination 
was  only  useful  if  it  had  a  practical  application.  This  was  demonstrated  in 
Schlesinger’s attitude to the publication of the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts.  Although  they  were  published  in  Germany  as  early  as  1932, 
Schlesinger did not bother to become familiar with them until they were cited 
by critics of Marxism, after 1945. Now there was a practical, present day need 
to examine them and so he did. Even then, his concern was how this work 
could be understood in relation to modern events. He wrote: 
 
                                                 
23 Schlesinger, Lectures, 1, p. 5.   141 
  For  those  who  accept  at  least  the  fundamental  principles  of 
Marxism, and even an objective approach to the history of social 
thought,  it  is  obvious  that  one  must  place  the  studies  of  the 
young Marx in a perspective which would be that of the middle 
of  the  twentieth  century,  and  not  that  of  the  1840s;  there  is 
everything to be gained by situating the object of interest in its 
true perspective.
24 
 
Schlesinger  explicitly  stated  his  concern  with  Marx’s  contemporary  validity 
and application in his major work on the subject, Marx His Time and Ours. In 
the preface he made clear that Marx’s work was not to be studied in regard to 
the conditions of its origin but only in terms of its continuing significance.
25 
This preoccupation with the application of Marxist theory to present concerns 
was demonstrated in his choice of subject matter in articles. He published two 
separate papers in 1962 dealing with Marxist theory, both of which did so in 
relation to the new programme of the CPSU, drawing historical theory and 
present events together.
26 He frequently perceived Marx’s work with a view to 
its  future  impact,  drawing  a  connection  between  his  statements  and  later 
events  in  Russia.  In  The  Marxist  Movement,  for  example,  Schlesinger 
connected  statements  by  Marx  to  those  of Russian  Social  Democracy  fifty 
years later.
27 
 
Following directly from this last theme, Schlesinger’s next concept was that, 
as  important  as  Marx  and  Engels  were  as  the  founders  of  Marxism,  the 
dynamic  nature  of  their  theory  meant  that  the  significance  of  the  original 
leaders  was  inherently  temporal.  The  theory  bestowed  by  the  masters 
required continual modification, it was time constrained. This meant Marx and 
Engels  could  be,  and  in  fact  were,  wrong  on  certain  issues  without  that 
affecting their influence or any judgement of them. Schlesinger often noted 
                                                 
24  Schlesinger,  ‘Les  ‘Manuscripts  économico-philosophiques’  de  Marx  replacés  dans  leur 
perspective historique’, p. 51. 
25 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. x. See chapter 3, p. 93. 
26  Schlesinger,  ‘Marxist  Theory  and  the  New  Program  of  the  Soviet  Communist  Party’, 
Schlesinger, ‘The CPSU Programme: The Conception of Communism’, Soviet Studies, 13, 4, 
April 1962, pp. 383-406.  
27 Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. 13.    142 
that Marx’s nationalities policies were incorrect and unhelpful. In The Marxist 
Movement, he wrote,  
 
…  the  erroneous  assumption  that  a  West  European  socialist 
revolution  was  near  and  that  the  forces  of  counterrevolution 
would combine against it on the lines of the late Holy Alliance, 
lead to undue emphasis on the national movements of countries 
such as Poland and Hungary which, in 1848 and later, opposed 
the traditional leading powers of the Holy Alliance yet, and Marx 
and Engels knew very well – were gentry lead [led].
28 
 
In Marx His Time and Ours, Schlesinger again referred to Marx and Engels’ 
failure to appreciate the national question.
29  
 
To  Schlesinger,  another  common  error  in Marx’s  reasoning  was  his  overly 
optimistic attitude towards the potential for bourgeois-democratic revolutions 
in his lifetime. In his lecture series Schlesinger frequently referred to Marx’s 
‘wishful thinking’ in this respect.
30 However, as he wrote elsewhere: ‘The fact 
that even great men make logical mistakes is not important for us’.
31 That 
Marx and Engels were wrong about certain issues, that their assumptions and 
predictions were proven fallible, did not take away from ‘Marxism’ at all. Since 
Marxism, rather than Marx, was the key, the latter’s failures were irrelevant. 
Marx  and  Engels  may  have  been  mistaken  on  certain  matters  but  they 
elaborated a framework in which to treat concrete political situations. They 
provided the Marxist methodology, and this, rather than the exegesis of some 
or other text, was the defining characteristic of Marxism. This method was the 
essence of Marxism.  
 
To  Schlesinger,  Marxist  methodology  comprised  of  dialectics and  historical 
materialism.  Schlesinger  asserted  the  primacy  of  historical  materialism  as 
method in Spirit of Post-War Russia. He wrote: 
                                                 
28 Ibid. p. 21. 
29 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 302.  
30 Schlesinger, Lectures, 4, p. 2 and p. 3, for example.  
31 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 97.    143 
 
But  although  method  is  not  knowledge,  good  methods  of 
approach are an essential condition for scientific success, The 
facts,  including  especially  the  development  of  the  Russian 
Revolution,  have  proved  dialectical  materialism  to  be  a  most 
fruitful  approach  to  social  science  as  well  as  to  its  practical 
application, politics.
32  
 
He also frequently referred to Marxism’s debt to dialectics and its Hegelian 
heritage. According to Schlesinger: 
 
  Marxism is, in substance, a synthetic approach to the diverse 
aspects of society. But there can be no doubt that of the three 
mentioned source elements the first, namely Hegelian dialectics, 
was  essential,  not  only  because  it  enabled  the  synthesis  but 
also  because  it  allowed  the  old  Marxists  to  go  beyond  their 
sources  and,  after  a  century,  still  allows  Marxism  to  proceed 
beyond its original tenets.
33 
 
The creation of this method was Marx’s true legacy. The dialectical approach 
facilitated, and in fact demanded, a continually critical perspective. It allowed 
Marxism to move beyond the sometimes erroneous and inevitably ephemeral 
nature of the original conceptions as elucidated by Marx and Engels.  
 
Although  Schlesinger  was  somewhat  inconsistent  on  this  point,  he  did,  in 
general,  emphasise  the  importance  of  the  Hegelian  tradition  to  Marx  and 
Marxism, particularly in regard to dialectics. In Marx His Time and Ours he 
argued that it was possible to derive Marxism, as it was to develop in Russia 
in the twentieth century, from indigenous sources and, thus, diminish the role 
of Hegel. However, he continued: 
 
                                                 
32 Schlesinger, Spirit of Post-War Russia, p. 173. 
33 Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. 6. The three sources Schlesinger referred to were 
German classical philosophy, English political economy and French socialist thought.   144 
  All this being duly recognised, we cannot get rid of the fact that 
Byelinsky and Herzen would have been impossible without the 
Hegelian background, and that Marx got from Hegel just what 
enabled  him  to  facilitate  the  progress  from  Chernishevsky  to 
Plekhanov and Lenin. Marx minus Hegel, or, to put it differently, 
Ricardo plus Robert Owen and Bakunin, could never have done 
the job.
34 
 
Marx’s debt to Hegel was unmistakeable.  
 
Another key to Schlesinger’s writings on Marx and Engels was his insistence 
that the active character of their work was crucial to their success. Marx was 
significant because he choose an active approach to his materialist outlook. 
Schlesinger wrote: 
 
  In the development process conceived as human practice, Marx 
already in his abstract-philosophical stage of his development 
sees  the  key  to  the  solution  of  the  ancient  dilemma  of  the 
relationships  between  the  objective-contemplative  and  the 
subjective-active  approach;  at  this  point  his  ways  finally  part 
from Feuerbach and from those of his contemplative, descriptive 
materialism.
35 
 
Marx chose the active path; mere contemplation, without a search for practical 
applications and solutions, was redundant.
36 The importance of this element 
of Marxist theory ran through Schlesinger’s work. He often made reference to 
Marx’s  assertion  that,  ‘The philosophers have  only  interpreted  the  world  in 
                                                 
34 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 44.  
35 Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. 12. 
36 Marx made this point explicitly in his ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ of 1845 when stating: ‘The 
question  whether  objective  truth  can  be  attributed  to  human  thinking  is  not  a  question  of 
theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the 
this-worldliness  of  his  thinking,  in  practice.  The  dispute  over  the  reality  or  non-reality  of 
thinking which isolates itself from practice is a purely scholastic question’ (Marx and Engels, 
Werke, 3, p. 5).   145 
various ways; the point is to change it’.
37 He believed that this made Marx’s 
work significant and he attempted such a practical approach in his own life. 
 
The final theme evident in Schlesinger’s writings on Marx and Engels is his 
apparent  desire  to  dispel  myths  and  misconceptions  surrounding  the 
theoreticians. Such a motive is also evident in his work on Lenin and Stalin 
and  appears  as  a  major  characteristic  of  all  of  Schlesinger’s  writings.  He 
believed that many critics of Marxist theory and the Soviet Union based their 
opinions  on  misconceptions  and  misunderstanding.  He  wished  to  correct 
these  errors  and  distortions.  The  ‘myth’  of  most  significance  to  this  thesis 
concerned  Marx’s  attitude  to  Russia.  Schlesinger  argued,  throughout  his 
writings,  that  Marx  had  not  conceived  of  a  historical  system  valid  for  all 
countries and times. He did not set out just one path along which all nations 
must proceed. Thus, Marx made clear that Russia could, potentially, take her 
own route to socialism, avoiding the pitfalls and horrors of the capitalist stage 
of development. In his paper ‘Marxist Theory and the New Program of the 
Soviet  Communist  Party’,  published  in  1962,  Schlesinger  wrote  that  many 
people,  particularly  in  the  West,  erroneously  believed  that  Marx  had 
envisaged only one way to socialism, that following the Western pattern. He 
continued: 
 
  On  the  contrary,  Marx  rejected  any  ‘general  historico-
philosophical theory the supreme virtue of which consists in its 
being supra-historical,’ and discussed the possibility of Russia’s 
avoiding  the  capitalist  stage  of  development,  with  the  village 
community  possibly  providing  a  bridge  for  passing  directly  to 
socialism  if  industrial  support  for  such  a  transition  was 
available.
38 
 
Schlesinger made similar arguments in many other papers on the subject.  
                                                 
37  See,  for  example,  Schlesinger,  Marx  His  Time  and  Ours,  p.  61.  The  quotation  is  from 
Marx’s ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ (Marx and Engels, Werke, 3, p. 7). Author’s italics. 
38 Schlesinger, ‘Marxist Theory and the New Program of the Soviet Communist Party’, p. 132, 
footnote 3. Schlesinger was referring to Marx’s letter of 1877 to the editors of Otechestvennye 
Zapiski (K. Marx and E. Engels, Selected Correspondence, (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 
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The  motive  of  myth-dispelling  was  particularly  clear  in  Schlesinger’s 
engagement with Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts.
39 He felt 
they were seized upon by critics of Marxism in order to pitch the young Marx 
against his mature work and, thus, discredit him. In 1965 he wrote, ‘During the 
last eight years or so Marx’s early writings have become fashionable. Part of 
the reason is that the ‘eggshells’ of their Hegelian origins and their differences 
in  approach  from  classical  Marxism  lend  themselves  readily  to  manifold 
abuses’.
40  As  shown  earlier,  Schlesinger  became  preoccupied  with  this 
particular  work  in  order  to  counter  these  abuses.  He  published  papers 
specifically dealing with it, and made reference to the distortions in many of 
his later writings.
41 Whilst many authors pointed to the Manuscripts to show a 
more idealist, non-economic perspective to some of Marx’s work, Schlesinger 
believed such an analysis to be entirely erroneous. The manuscripts were not 
published before 1932 and, according to Schlesinger, were never intended for 
publication,  ‘….  since  Marx  regarded  them  as  a  provisional  and  transitory 
effort in the elaboration of his theory’.
42 They certainly did not represent, as 
Schlesinger thought some suggested, ‘…. some kind of ‘infantile disorder’ of 
Young Hegelian origin’.
43 Marx’s early study of the concept of alienation was 
only of significance in that it developed an approach which was to become the 
materialist conception of history.
44 In fact, according to Schlesinger: 
 
  To  anyone  who  is  in  the  sense  of  conceiving  the  historical 
process  as  a  sequence  of  social  formations  the  growth  and 
potentialities of which depend on the economic conditions of the 
time,  the  Manuscripts  as  such  can be  no more  relevant  than 
they  eventually  became  to  their author,  who  appears  to  have 
                                                 
39  The  manuscripts  were  an  incomplete  attempt  to  synthesise  Marx’s  new  philosophical, 
historical and economic outlook. They remained unfinished and represent Marxism in an early 
stage of development. However, they do contain components of Marx’s critique of political 
economy (White, Marx and the Origins of Dialectical Materialism, pp. 145…).  
40 Schlesinger, ‘The Continuity of Marx’s Thought’, Science and Society, 29, 2, Spring 1965, 
pp. 217-224 at p. 217. 
41 Schlesinger, ‘The Continuity of Marx’s Thought’, Schlesinger, ‘Les ‘Manuscripts économico-
philosophiques’  de  Marx  replacés  dans  leur  perspective  historique’.  For  examples  of 
references  within  other  works  see,  Schlesinger,  The  Marxist  Movement,  p.  9-10  or 
Schlesinger, ‘The CPSU Programme: The Conception of Communism’, p. 384. 
42 Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. 9. 
43 Schlesinger, ‘The Dispute and the Socialist Tradition’, p. 178. 
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regarded them just as a link in his transition from idealistic to 
materialist dialectics, and from young Hegelian philosophy to an 
understanding of the basic importance of economic issues.
45 
 
The Manuscripts did not constitute a new insight into Marx’s thinking, they 
merely  helped  to  elucidate  his  theoretical  development  from  youth  to 
intellectual maturity. 
 
Two interlinked misconceptions Schlesinger spent some time attempting to 
dismiss concerned the very essence of Marxism. According to Schlesinger, 
critics argued that Marxism had been proven false because so many of its 
original tenets had been dropped or proven incorrect. A viable ideology would 
surely  have  remained  stable  and  correct  over  time.  To  this,  Schlesinger 
countered, ‘…. the Marxist concept of historical development, its Dialectics, 
serves  as  the  intellectual  tool  by  the  application  of  which  it  is  possible  to 
eliminate  and  to  replace  obsolescent  elements  of  the  original  ideology’.
46 
Marxism,  by  its  very  nature,  was  supposed  to  evolve  and  critically  reject 
elements that had become obsolete, more often than not, as a direct result of 
the theory’s impact. He argued that the movement would surely have become 
bankrupt if, over the course of one hundred years, no tangible results had 
been achieved. Some elements of the original theory would inevitably have 
been achieved whilst others were no longer appropriate.  
 
A further misconception followed from this: critics insisted that Marxism was 
no longer relevant since so many of its original aims had now become reality. 
However,  Schlesinger  argued:    ‘Marxism  was  intended  as  a  system  of 
concepts  subject  to  continous  [continuous]  change  –  and,  hence,  not 
obsoleting  as  a  system  when  individual  elements  of  that  system  have  to 
change; it also answers against the wide-spread misconception that with the 
realisation of a fair proportion of its original demands the Marxist movement 
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finds its natural end’.
47 Again, the error emerged because of a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the dialectical nature of Marxism; its aims and objectives 
would evolve as circumstances did. 
 
Another  myth  Schlesinger  was  eager  to  counter  was  the  reproach  that 
Marxism was fatalistic and deterministic, denying the role of human ideas in 
history. Schlesinger countered this argument throughout his writings. In The 
Marxist Movement he argued that, early in his career, Marx moved away from 
a contemplative, descriptive materialism. Schlesinger referred to Marx’s third 
Theses  on  Feuerbach  in  which  he  asserted,  just  as  men  are  products  of 
circumstance  and  education,  circumstances  are  changed  by  men,  and  the 
educators  have  to  be  educated.
48  According  to  Schlesinger:  ‘This  is  an 
advanced  yet  valid  formulation  of  the  argument  against  the  reproach  of 
fatalism frequently levelled against determinist philosophies’.
49 Marx explicitly 
acknowledged the human factor in social development. Schlesinger drew this 
same conclusion in Sprit of Post-War Russia, insisting: 
 
  Marx and Engels, unlike some of their popularizers particularly 
in Germany, never thought of denying the fact that ‘men make 
their history themselves’. Nor did they disregard the importance 
of historical personalities and of the ideas that move them. They 
considered it the task of sociology to explain how these ideas 
and these personalities could arise in a certain period.
50 
 
Again in Marx His Time and Ours, he wrote, ‘Marx’s ‘historicism’ is intended to 
mean  that  human  actions  are  conditioned  by  the  historical  circumstances 
under which men have to make decisions and does not deny the importance 
of those decisions as the factor immediately shaping human history’.
51 Later in 
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the  same  work,  he  argued:  ‘The  most  common  misapprehension  about 
Marxism is the assumption that it denies the power of ideas, as distinct from 
material forces, to influence the course of history’.
52 It is clear that Schlesinger 
was eager to defend Marx and Marxism against misconceptions and myths. It 
is a theme discernible in a great many of his writings concerning Marx. 
 
Lukács 
In  order  to  fully  engage  with  Schlesinger’s  understanding  of  Marx  and 
Marxism  it  is  necessary  to  turn  to  another  Marxist  theoretician  and 
contemporary  of  Schlesinger’s,  Georg  Lukács;  a  man  described  by  his 
biographers,  A.  Arato  and  P.  Breines  as,  ‘…the  greatest  philosopher  of 
Marxism since the death of Karl Marx and the most controversial communist 
intellectual  in  this  century’.
53  A  number  of  Schlesinger’s  attitudes  and 
interpretations appear reminiscent of those of the Hungarian scholar and a 
brief  investigation  of  what  influence,  if  any,  he  had  on  Schlesinger  should 
prove fruitful in furthering an understanding of his attitude towards Marxism. 
 
Georg Lukács was born in 1885 to a wealthy Hungarian family. He converted 
to communism in 1918 and served as Commissar for Culture and Education 
in the brief-lived Hungarian Soviet government of 1919. Fleeing the ensuing 
White Terror, Lukács lived first in Vienna, then Moscow, before returning to 
Hungary in 1945, where he became a member of parliament and Professor of 
Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Culture at the University of Budapest. He 
was an active figure in the uprising of 1956, action which led to his deportation 
to  Romania  for  a  year.  On  his  return,  Lukács  devoted  himself  to  scholarly 
activities. He died in 1971. 
 
As well as developing a Marxist theory of aesthetics, Lukács is best known for 
his  work  History  and  Class  Consciousness,  first  published  in  1923.
54  His 
critique of Marxist theory attempted to demonstrate the necessity of dialectical 
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historicism  and  argued  that  proletarian  revolution  was  a  question  of 
proletarian  class  consciousness.  The  work  met  with  immediate  and  sharp 
criticism from Comintern and Lukács soon recanted his theses, although its 
influence  on  later  Marxist  thinking,  especially  Western  Marxism,  remained 
significant.  The  German  communist  Karl  Korsch  had  reached  similar 
conclusions to Lukács in 1923.
55 Their thinking is eloquently summarised by 
Arato and Breins: 
 
Chief among them was the conviction that, in the final analysis, 
proletarian  revolution  hinged  upon  the  subjective  factor, 
proletarian  class  consciousness,  and  that  understanding  this 
factor  required  recognition  of  the  Hegelian  components  of 
Marx’s thought…. [They] further agreed that the outlook of the 
Second  International  and Marxist  thought  virtually  as  a  whole 
during  the  latter  part  of  the  nineteenth  century  had  been 
dominated  by  what  Korsch  called  ‘Hegel  amnesia’  and  what 
Lukács called a ‘vulgar Marxism’. By these terms they meant to 
characterize a standpoint in which dialectical and revolutionary 
understanding  was  displaced  by  a  narrowly  materialist  and 
positivist  approach  that  had  reduced  consciousness  to  an 
epiphenomenonal reflection of economic structures and laws.
56 
 
This vulgar materialism could never be revolutionary as it would not recognise 
and  thus  take  part  in  the  revolutionary  process  by  which  the  proletariat 
became the conscious and active ‘maker of history’.
57 Immediately, parallels 
with  Schlesinger’s  attitudes  are  apparent.  Schlesinger  was  continually 
defending Marxism against ‘vulgar Marxism’ and ‘vulgar materialism’; it was 
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more  than  simply  the  sum  of  economic  factors  or  a  lifeless,  crudely 
deterministic model devoid of human personality or will. He strongly believed 
in the importance of the subjective factor and revolutionary consciousness; for 
Schlesinger,  it  was  Lenin’s  recognition  of  subjective  elements,  as  well  as 
objective  conditions,  which  had  led  to  his  success.  Schlesinger  had  also 
emphasised the importance of the Hegelian tradition to Marx and Marxism. 
 
The  general  thrust  of  Lukács’  approach  concerned  the  active  quality  of 
Marxism. This was also a key theme of Schlesinger’s writings on Marx. Both 
authors emphasised ‘praxis’: what Arato and Breines have defined as a ‘…. 
philosophy of history with practical intent’.
58 Marx had revealed the necessity 
of action through a revolutionary materialist approach. Lukács began one of 
the major sections of History and Class Consciousness, ‘What is Orthodox 
Marxism?’, with a quote from Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach: ‘The philosophers 
have  only  interpreted  the  world  in  various  ways;  the  point,  however,  is  to 
change it’.
59 He made clear from the outset that his understanding of Marxism 
was  of  a  transformational  character,  a  philosophy  of  action.  Schlesinger 
would readily agree with this theme and often quoted from the same source in 
his own writing.
60 Although Schlesinger did not use the term ‘praxis’ he did 
make  clear  that  Marx’s  importance  was  in  his  recognition  of  the  human 
influence on historical development. 
 
Both Lukács and Schlesinger focussed upon the primacy of method in Marx’s 
work. Lukács wrote:  
 
Let us assume for the sake of argument that recent research 
had disproved once and for all every one of Marx’s individual 
theses. Even if this were to be proved, every serious ‘orthodox’ 
Marxist would still be able to accept all such modern findings 
without reservation and hence dismiss all of Marx’s theses in 
                                                 
58 Ibid. p. 112. 
59 Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p. 1. Marx and Engels, Werke, 3, p. 7. Author’s 
italics. 
60 For example in Marx His Time and Ours, Schlesinger argued: ‘Marx regarded an active 
approach to changing the world as a moral duty of progressive people in our time’, pointing to 
the Theses on Feuerbach as proof of this (Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 61).    152 
toto  –  without  having  to  renounce  his  orthodoxy  for  a  single 
moment.  Orthodox  Marxism,  therefore,  does  not  imply  the 
uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx’s investigations. It is 
not  the  ‘belief’  in  this  or  that  thesis,  nor  the  exegesis  of  a 
‘sacred’ book. On the contrary, orthodoxy refers exclusively to 
the  method.  It  is  the  scientific  conviction  that  dialectical 
materialism is the road to truth...
61 
 
He  stated  elsewhere,  ‘…  our  underlying  premise  here  is  the  belief  that  in 
Marx’s theory and method the true method by which to understand society 
and history has finally been discovered’.
62 Schlesinger agreed wholeheartedly 
with  these  sentiments.  He  continually  emphasised  the  importance  of  the 
Marxist method; dialectical materialism was the key to appreciating Marx’s 
contribution.  Conditions  would  alter,  the  statements  and  writings  of 
theoreticians  would  become  obsolete  as  a  result,  but  the  method  would 
remain  valid.  Once  again,  both  authors  seemed  to  regard  the  spirit  of 
Marxism along similar lines. 
 
Whilst  they  agreed  that  the  dialectical  method  was  the  key  to  Marxism’s 
vitality, they had a different understanding of what that meant. Schlesinger 
argued: ‘It is clearly established that the Marxist outlook is objectivistic and 
deterministic. It acknowledges the existence of a world independent of the 
human  mind’.
63  He  continued,  ‘….  the  other  essential  element  in  Marxist 
philosophy is the conception that the laws governing it are dialectical, i.e. non 
static, but dynamic’.
64 The dialectical method explained the laws of society, 
and  the  world  in  general.  To  Schlesinger,  it  was  an  objective  theory 
independent  of  man.  However,  Lukács  argued  that  the  dialectic  was 
contingent upon human consciousness and intention; it was not objective.
65  
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R. Hudelson has noted the similarities between Lukács’ and Lenin’s approach 
to Marxism as well as their major difference and this is along the same lines 
as Schlesinger’s attitude; with Schlesinger mirroring Lenin. Hudelson wrote, 
‘…. both Lenin and Lukács criticized the Marxism of the Second International 
for  its  mechanistic  and  undialectical  misconception  of  Marx’s  theory  of 
history’. Schlesinger also criticised such overly mechanistic misconceptions. 
Hudelson continued,  
 
However,  in  their  understanding  of  dialectics  and  the  proper 
method for social theory, Lenin and Lukács were in fundamental 
disagreement. Where Lenin accepted the dialectics of nature, 
Lukács  restricted  dialectics  to  processes  involving  conscious 
subjects.  Where  Lenin  held  a  unity  of  science  position  with 
respect  to  the  natural  and  social  sciences,  Lukács  held  that 
social  theory  required  a  method  distinct  from  the  method  of 
natural sciences’
66 
 
Schlesinger felt that dialectics of nature were somewhat problematic. In Marx 
His  Time  and  Ours  he  wrote  that  ‘….  problems  arise  once  the  Dialectical 
approach is applied outside the sphere from whose conditions it was derived, 
especially in the analysis of Nature’.
67 However, he did believe that Marxist 
dialectics  involved  the  search  for  a  ‘world-outlook’  of  scientific  validity,  so, 
unsurprisingly, he would certainly have sided with Lenin and against Lukács 
in the demarcation outlined by Hudelson.
68 
 
Yet there were more instances where the spirit of Lukács’ and Schlesinger’s 
analysis of Marx and Marxism coalesced. Both stressed the importance of 
Marxism for the present: Marx’s writings may have been time bound, but they 
remained significant for contemporary understanding and action because of 
the  method  he  had  developed.  This  chapter  has  already  addressed 
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Schlesinger’s preoccupation with current applications of Marxist theory. He 
was far more concerned with present conditions than past debates, not least 
because  of  his  belief  in  the  active,  transformational  obligation  of  Marxism. 
Lukács  expressed  a  similar  desire,  writing  of  the  need  to  adopt,  ‘….  a 
substantive position with regard to the urgent problems of the present; for 
according to this view of Marxist method its pre-eminent aim is knowledge of 
the present’.
69 Both adamantly urged the continual reinvigoration of Marxist 
theory and hotly denied that mistakes in past Marxist texts were indications of 
overall  errors,  since  they  were  of  necessarily  ephemeral  validity.  Similarly, 
Lukács  argued  that  the  Russian  revolution  was  evidence  of  Marxism’s 
veracity, a frequent theme in Schlesinger’s writings. Lukács insisted, ‘…. the 
experiences  of  the  years  of  revolution  have  provided  a  magnificent 
confirmation  of  all  the  essential  aspects  of  orthodox  (i.e.  Communist) 
Marxism’.
70 
 
A strong feature of Lukács’ work was his emphasis on the Hegelian aspects 
of Marxism; in fact, Schlesinger actually referred to him as a ‘neo-Hegelian’.
71 
Lukács insisted that Marx was indebted to Hegel, an attitude perhaps natural 
for a theoretician who stressed the importance of the dialectical method. He 
wrote:  ‘We  cannot  do  justice  to  the  concrete,  historical  dialectic  without 
considering in some detail the founder of this method, Hegel, and his relation 
to Marx’.
72  
 
As  noted  above,  Schlesinger’s  attitude  to  Marx’s  Hegelian  legacy  differed 
substantially over time. His shifting stance reflected the general chronological 
divide  in  Schlesinger’s  work.  In  one  of  his  earliest  works  on  returning  to 
Europe, Spirit of Post-War Russia, Schlesinger downplayed the significance 
of Hegel, and classical German philosophy in general. He wrote: ‘Marx and 
Engels as pupils of Hegel took over his own specially developed terminology 
which he called dialectics…. Marx and Engels, to use their own expression, 
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turned the teacher’s theory upside down. But they retained his terminology.’
73 
However, he continued, ‘…. I should, further, like to assure my readers that, 
in many years of thorough study, I have found nothing interesting in Marxist 
theories  that  could  not  be  explained  without  the  use  of  Hegelian 
terminology’.
74  Thus,  Hegelian  terminology  was  unnecessary  for  an 
understanding of Marxism.  
 
Elsewhere  in  the  work,  Schlesinger  argued  that  the  need  to  analyse  the 
background to Nazism had led to a critical re-examination of the ‘Prussian 
State  philosopher’  Hegel.  This  had  coincided  with  Russia’s  increasing 
recognition of the superiority of nineteenth century Russian progressives over 
their German counterparts. He continued: 
 
Consequently, these trends are bound to reduce the importance 
of Hegelian philosophies as a source of Marxism. It will become 
one  of  the  many  bourgeois  attempts  of  the  early  nineteenth 
century  to  establish  laws  of  historical  development  and  to 
understand  the  class  structure  of  modern  society.  It  may  be 
thought  as  no  more  important  than  the  works  of  the  French 
historians of the restoration or the Ricardian school of radical 
British economists.
75  
 
Schlesinger  supposed  that  if  Hegel  could be  placed  on  the  same  level  as 
other pre-Marxist theoreticians, the fact that Marx employed his terminology, 
‘…could be reduced to historical chance’.
76 Henceforth, the terminology could 
be dropped, especially since it impeded the dissemination of Marxism. 
 
However, in later or more scholarly works Schlesinger gave a quite different 
interpretation, asserting the importance of Marx’s Hegelian tradition. In one of 
his  last  manuscripts  Schlesinger  wrote  that  of  the  three  major  sources  of 
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Marxism,  ‘….  the  first,  namely  Hegelian  dialectics,  was  essential’.
77  As 
Schlesinger pointed out: ‘Marxism found its merits precisely in the overcoming 
of  the  limitations  of  its  source-material  by  recognising  their  historical 
conditioning’.
78  Yet  both  Marx  and  Engels  understood  the  importance  of 
Hegelian philosophy. This emphasis on the significance of Hegel seems in 
stark contrast to his earlier dismissal of it. Again, in Marx His Time and Ours, 
Schlesinger insisted Marx had received, ‘…. his basic methodological armour 
from Hegel’.
79  
 
Schlesinger consistently viewed the use of classical German terminology as 
an  impediment  to  popular  understanding;  he  referred  to  it  as,  ‘….  both 
recondite and mystical to the non-adept’ in Marx His Time and Ours.
80 He 
also spoke of the ‘burden’ of ‘Hegelian terminology’ in later works.
81 However, 
he  went  on  to  make  clear  that  Hegel’s  importance  could  not  be 
underestimated. In all later works he distinguished between the inaccessibility 
of  the  language  and  the  essential  nature  of  the  Hegelian  contribution  to 
Marxism.  This,  again,  differed  from  his  earlier  work,  in  which  he  did  not 
appear to differentiate between Hegelian terminology and Hegelian concepts. 
He appeared to argue both were obsolete. 
 
In Schlesinger’s earliest work his attitude was in contrast to that of Lukács, 
whereas he appeared in agreement with the significance of Marx’s Hegelian 
legacy in later writings. This alteration in emphasis is partly explained by the 
different nature of the publications. Schlesinger’s Spirit of Post-War Russia 
was  intended  for  a  popular  readership,  one  who  would  find  the  Hegelian 
discourse extremely challenging. In his efforts to demonstrate the viability and 
contemporary significance of Marx’s work, he may have deliberately under-
represented  Marx’s  debt  to  classical  German  philosophy.  However,  in  his 
more  scholarly  works,  such  as  Marx  His  Time  and  Ours,  Schlesinger  was 
outlining Marx’s development in a serious work intended for students of the 
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movement. He would inevitably include details of the Hegelian influence upon 
Marxism’s founders in such a monograph. Another reason for Schlesinger’s 
initial attitude forms the basis of the second part of the thesis. In earlier works 
Schlesinger  often  actively  demonstrated,  and  indeed  defended,  the  official 
attitudes of Stalin’s Soviet Union. This was particularly noticeable in The Spirit 
of  Post-War  Russia.
82  Later,  after  Stalin’s  death,  Schlesinger  was  more 
critical and condemnatory of developments that occurred under Stalin. From 
then on, he would often be in agreement with post-Stalin Soviet orthodoxy.  
 
L. Goldmann traced the changing attitudes towards the Hegelian tradition in 
Marxist theory. He wrote: ‘… between 1890 and 1923, with the exception of 
Rosa  Luxemburg  and  to  a  large  extent  Trotsky,  nearly  all  the  important 
theorists of Marxism took up a positivist position parallel to that of academic 
science’. This was shown in the dearth of attention paid to Hegelianism, and, 
‘….  even  Lenin,  in  his  Materialism  and  Empirio-criticism,  wrote  one of  the 
most  mechanistic  and  anti-dialectical  works  there  is’.
83  According  to 
Goldmann,  Lenin  discovered  Hegelian  philosophy  in  1914-1915  and 
subsequently moved to a more dialectical position. However: ‘The return to 
mechanism  and  Stalinist  positivism  was  to begin  round  about  1922,  but  it 
gathered force principally after Lenin’s death’.
84 Schlesinger appeared to be 
reflecting this Stalinist position regarding the Hegelian tradition in his early 
work.  He  also  reflected  and  flattered  Soviet  patriotism  in  downplaying  the 
German origins of Marxism. Later, however, he maintained a position closer 
to Lukács’ and this can be taken to be his final analysis, as it was represented 
consistently in his final works on the subject. 
 
Schlesinger shared much of the spirit of Lukács’ concerns. He may well have 
been  influenced  by  Lukács’  work.  But  there  was  also  a  great  deal  of 
divergence between the two writers. This was especially true of their differing 
attitude to dialectics and the nature of historical materialism. Both argued that 
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they were fundamental to Marxism, but disagreed about their exact character.  
They also demonstrated different perspectives on the Marxist tradition after 
Marx  and  Engels.  Lukács  wrote:  ‘Rosa  Luxemburg,  alone  among  Marx’s 
disciples, has made a real advance on his life’s work in both the content and 
method of his economic doctrines. She alone has found a way to apply them 
concretely to the present state of social development’.
85 Luxemburg was to be 
admired presumably, in part, because she had not fallen into the error of anti-
dialectical thinking common amongst her contemporaries. Whilst Schlesinger 
admired  Luxemburg’s  work  and  believed  that  she  had  advanced  Marxist 
thought, to consider the plight of colonies for example, he would not have 
offered  such  wholehearted  praise.  He  argued  that  she  had  encountered 
limited success since she had failed to properly use the historico-materialist 
method in evaluating new and changing conditions. She proved incapable of 
recognising  dialectical  developments.  Schlesinger  also  disagreed  with 
Lukács’ approach wherever it came into conflict with Leninism.  
 
Despite appearances suggesting Schlesinger was influenced by the work of 
Lukács, there is little in his writings that specifically touch upon the subject to 
suggest that this is the case. Schlesinger rarely mentioned Lukács in his work 
but what does exist is reasonably dismissive. Apart from one piece of writing, 
Lukács was only referred to in a few footnotes. In Marx His Time and Ours, 
Schlesinger  wrote  of  Lukács’  work  as  anathema  to,  ‘….  the  objectivist 
foundations of Marxism’.
86 He went into slightly more detail in his paper on 
Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts but, again, did not appear to 
agree  with  Lukács.  He  described  History  and  Class  Consciousness  as  a 
collection  of  essays  written  in  the  aftermath  of  the  defeated  Hungarian 
revolution  and  the  Comintern  disputes  of  the  early  1920s.  According  to 
Schlesinger, it concerned the question of whether communist parties should 
undertake offensive action because of the long term effect it had on workers’ 
class  consciousness:  Lukács,  ‘in  a  highly  refined  philosophical  form’, 
suggested  that  the  revolutionary  vanguard  could  make  the  leap  towards 
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freedom  by  the  act  of  rallying  and  taking  revolutionary  action.
87  However, 
Schlesinger was deeply sceptical of this notion. He wrote, ‘… even supposed 
for a moment that it could have lead to consciousness of the need to establish 
a socialist society, [it] would not necessarily have abolished the phenomenon 
of Alienation from the operation of such a society, which cannot live on mere 
enthusiasm’.
88  Schlesinger  did  not  believe  that  action  intended  to  produce 
proletarian consciousness was, alone, enough to produce the revolutionary 
transformation of society.  
 
The only piece of work focussing on Lukács remained unfinished. A collection 
of  essays  concerning  Lukács’  major  work  entitled  Aspects  of  History  and 
Class Consciousness was published in 1971 and contained an appendix by 
Schlesinger.
89 The papers were based on a series of open lectures held at 
Sussex  University  in  1969-70.  However,  as  a  footnote  to  Schlesinger’s 
contribution noted, he died a few days before he was to deliver his lecture 
and,  ‘Thus,  his  contribution  remained  somewhat  fragmentary’,  hence  its 
inclusion as an appendix rather than a full chapter.
90 It remains, nonetheless, 
his only substantial work available on the subject.  
 
Schlesinger’s paper was intended to investigate the historical context in which 
Lukács’  History  and  Class  Consciousness  was  written,  in  particular,  the 
debates  concerning  the  correctness  or  otherwise  of  ‘offensive  action’. 
Schlesinger referred to the ‘Bettelheim affair’ in the Austrian party in 1919 and 
the German ‘March action’ of 1921 as concrete examples of the events and 
ensuing debates that contributed to that context.
91 According to Schlesinger, 
Lukács was concerned with the problem of how to define the party’s function 
in  the  acute  stage  of  revolution.  He  agreed  with  Rosa  Luxemburg’s 
organisational  principles  and  belief  in  spontaneity  in  the  earlier  period.  As 
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Schlesinger  explained,  Lukács  thought,  ‘…  party  activity,  by  inherent 
necessity, would lead the masses to a higher level of activity, well beyond the 
immediate  aims’.
92  However,  Lukács  argued  that  Lenin’s  organisational 
concepts  were  correct  in  revolutionary  situations,  those  described  by 
Schlesinger  as,  ‘….  characterized  by  the  actuality  of  a  proletarian 
revolution’.
93  
 
Apart from a few short pages of outline, there was little actual analysis within 
the appendix. Schlesinger did not express opinions or provide any in-depth 
critique of Lukács’ work, perhaps because he did not fully complete the paper. 
However, there were a few insights into Schlesinger’s thinking on the subject, 
and what there is, fits with his other references. He emphasised the idealistic 
and subjective character of Lukács’ analysis, accusing him of ‘philosophical 
Leftism’.  He  argued:  ‘As  in  many  analogous  cases,  only  one  side  of  the 
complicated  dialectical  relationship  between  the  subjective  and  objective 
factors – that of action – is emphasized, while the other is neglected’.
94 He 
reiterated the point: ‘The idealistic character of the ‘theories of offensive’ and, 
even  more,  of  Lukács’  generalizations  related  to  them,  rested  in  the  very 
conception that it was possible – to speak with Thalheimer – ‘to force the 
Revolution’s  destiny’’.
95  Once  again,  Schlesinger  seemed  sceptical  of  this 
prospect.  However,  he  did  make  clear  that  Lukács’  views  could  not  be 
equated with Blanquism since such action was not intended to achieve state 
power but was to be part of the maturation process of the working class so 
that, ultimately, they could gain power. 
 
The comments about Lukács discernible in Schlesinger’s writings were of a 
similar nature to the orthodox criticism levelled at Lukács by Comintern and 
official  Soviet  Marxism-Leninism.  Accusations  of  overemphasis  on  the 
subjective elements and the conflation of political ultra-leftism with theoretical 
subjective idealism were common amongst critics and were developed from 
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themes Lenin and Trotsky had presented in 1920-1921.
96 They were also a 
noticeable element of Schlesinger’s analysis. However, Schlesinger did clarify 
his criticisms; Lukács was not purely concerned with action and he did not 
believe that the development of proletarian class-consciousness would bring 
about revolution in and of itself, but he did place too much emphasis on this 
element.  
 
It is, perhaps, unusual that Schlesinger did not engage more with the work of 
Lukács’ or his contemporaries such as Karl Korsch. They were members of 
the communist movement of which he was an active participant. Schlesinger 
was  in  the  Austrian  Communist  Party  when  Lukács  was  involved  in  the 
Hungarian  revolution  and  short-lived  Soviet  government.  He  was  an 
intellectual worker in Moscow when Lukács was employed at the Marx-Engels 
Institute. He was a member of the KPD at the same time as Korsch and he 
participated  in  the  discussions  about  Rosa  Luxemburg’s  legacy  and  the 
‘March action’ to which he referred in his Lukács paper. However, his lack of 
interest  is  more  explicable  when  it  is  remembered  that,  at  this  time, 
Schlesinger  was  not  particularly  interested  in  philosophical  or  scholarly 
pursuits.  Later, when he began to write about philosophical and theoretical 
matters  he  would  be  fully  aware,  not  only  of  the  unorthodoxy  of  their 
approach,  this  was  immediately  apparent  to  anyone  with  a  degree  of 
theoretical knowledge, but the further development and legacy of Lukács’ line 
of thought. Schlesinger would be aware that the intellectual heir of Lukács’ 
work  was  ‘Western  Marxism’,  a  current  in  conscious  opposition  to  Soviet 
orthodoxy. Schlesinger would inevitably disagree with this school and he may 
have retrospectively criticised the source of its inspiration as a result. 
 
Schlesinger did emphasise many of the elements of Lukács’ work in his own 
understanding of Marx and Marxism. He wished to reassert the philosophical 
base of historical materialism and dialectics. There was also a similar spirit to 
his Marxism, one concerned with action, or praxis, the primacy of method and 
Marx’s  continued  importance  in  the  present  day.    So,  perhaps  Lukács  did 
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have an impact upon Schlesinger’s understanding. Schlesinger did not make 
this claim himself, and he appeared to dismiss Lukács’ contribution when he 
did  refer  to  him.  Nevertheless,  Lukács  was  of  undeniable  influence  upon 
Marxist thinking. He affected the intellectual environment in which Schlesinger 
developed and worked and some of the similarities in attitude between the 
two are stark. 
 
Stalin  
The  final  section  of  this  chapter  examines  Schlesinger’s  attitude  towards 
Stalinism and Stalin as a Marxist theoretician. As well as reviewing his writing 
on the subject, it attempts to determine whether Schlesinger’s views changed 
over  time.  This  thesis  argues  that  Schlesinger’s  attitude  corresponded  to 
Soviet  orthodoxy  and  that  he  was  reasonably  positive  about  events  in  the 
Soviet Union before Stalin’s death but retrospectively condemned them. Did 
his  writings  on  this  subject  conform  to  the  argument  and  timeline?  An 
investigation of Schlesinger’s attitude towards Stalin also helps illuminate vital 
aspects of Schlesinger’s work and beliefs. Recognition of his pragmatism, in 
terms of his attitude towards Stalin’s ‘socialism in one country’, the purges 
and Stalin’s legacy, provides a wider insight into Schlesinger’s work. It may 
help explain the apparent inconsistency in his attitude. 
 
Whilst all scholars agree that Stalin was not a Marxist innovator or theoretical 
genius in the mould of Marx, Engels or Lenin, there is some debate regarding 
his  reputation  as  an  intellectual.  According  to  the  historian  R.  Conquest, 
Bukharin remarked to Kamenev in 1928 that Stalin was, ‘… eaten up with the 
vain desire to become a well-known theoretician. He feels that it is the only 
thing  he  lacks’.
97  It  seems  it  mattered  to  Stalin  that  he  was  viewed  as  a 
noteworthy theoretician. However, many believed that he continued to lack 
this quality throughout his career. For Conquest:  
 
Stalin had a good average grasp of Marxism, and though his 
adaptations of that flexible doctrine to suit his purposes were not 
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so  elaborate  or  so elastic  as  the  similar  interpretations of  his 
rivals and predecessors, they were adequate to his career. His 
lack of the true theoretician’s mind was noted by many, and he 
seems to have resented it.
98 
 
Although, Conquest also pointed out that Stalin’s theoretical clumsiness was 
often exaggerated by commentators.  
 
More recently, E. Van Ree has investigated Stalin’s contribution to Marxist 
philosophy.  He  argued,  ‘….the  writings  of  Stalin  that  can  count  as 
philosophical  at  all  are  few’,  continuing,  ‘Most  importantly,  the  dictator’s 
arguments were ramshackle and schematic’.
99 However, Van Ree did assert 
that Stalin had provided some original contributions to Marxist theory. Whilst 
Stalin’s ‘Anarchism or Socialism?’, had been criticised by many for its lack of 
originality as a mere summation of Marxism, Van Ree pointed out, at the time 
of  its  publication  in  1906  and  1907,  there  was  no  standard  Marxism. 
Therefore, any summarising of the theory had to display originality.
100 To Van 
Ree:  ‘Stalin’s  philosophy  was  a  compound  of  Plekhanovist  historical 
materialism and Bukharinist quasi-dialectics, but, the simplistic and schematic 
formulations not withstanding, with some original admixtures of his own’.
101 He 
argued  that  Stalin  had  contributed  distinctive  formulations  to  historical 
materialism, with his emphasis on the significance of ideas, and the existence 
of social phenomena, e.g. language, derived from the needs of the society 
rather than from the class structure of that society.
102 However, he insisted 
that  both  of  these  contributions  were  taken  from  Plekhanov.
103  Stalin’s 
concept  of  dialectics  also  contributed  to  theory,  but  once  again  Stalin 
occupied a position very close to another theoretician, this time Bukharin.
104  
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Typically,  Schlesinger’s  writings  on  the  topic  were  mixed.  Sometimes  he 
seemed to assert Stalin’s theoretical and academic credentials, at others he 
dismissed  them. This  was,  perhaps,  all  a matter  of  emphasis.  Schlesinger 
may  have  wished  to  counter  any  hostile  myth  that  Stalin  was  merely  a 
bureaucratic brute, but still believed his intellectual capacities to have been 
limited. In a footnote to one of his lectures on Marxism-Leninism, Schlesinger 
referred to, ‘…. the flourishing of the myth of his [Stalin’s] alleged failure to 
develop original theoretical work’.
105 So the familiar theme of myth dispelling 
was clearly important to Schlesinger in respect to this topic. He certainly did 
not admire his theoretical work as he did the other Marxist writers. Stalin was 
no  ‘master’;  Schlesinger  did  not  consider  Stalin  one  of  his  ‘teachers’. 
However,  according  to  Schlesinger,  Stalin  did  develop  original  theoretical 
work. 
 
In  one  of  Schlesinger’s  first  Western  writings  to  engage  with  Stalin  as  a 
theoretician he made clear that he believed this aspect of the Soviet leader’s 
personality  was  all  too  often  overlooked.  In  a  review  of  I.  Deutscher’s 
biography  of  Stalin,  which  was  published  in  Soviet  Studies  in  1950, 
Schlesinger was critical of the author for underestimating Stalin’s intellectual 
work.
106 He noted that the biography was superior to many sources in that it 
did  not  understand  Stalin  from  within,  ‘…  the  current  alternatives  of 
Superman, Devil or average shrewd bureaucrat driven into the foreground by 
forces he failed to master’.
107 However, according to Schlesinger, Deutscher 
failed to fully appreciate Lenin’s concept of the Bolshevik party. He was, thus, 
                                                                                                                                           
himself to the right, with Stalin against Trotsky. However, by 1928 Bukarin began to oppose 
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unable to understand that Stalin was selected by his party, rather than simply 
the master of it.
108  
 
In  the  review,  Schlesinger  emphasised  Stalin’s  significant  and  original 
contribution to Marxist theory: 
 
  Stalin has brought important elements into Marxist theory which 
were not there before (indeed, while the present tendency is to 
ascribe to him basic Marxist statements which he has, at the 
best, popularized, in earlier days the requirements of factional 
struggle  resulted  in  ascribing  quite  a  lot  of  his  original 
statements  to  Lenin).  Stalin’s  exposition  of  Leninism  to  the 
undergraduates  of  Sverdlov  University  was the  first  Bolshevik 
statement in which Leninism was assessed as a definite stage 
in the development of Marxist theory clearly distinguished from 
original Marxism, and was discussed in relation to the specific 
Russian background.
109 
 
Schlesinger also insisted Stalin’s ‘Dialectical and Historical Materialism’ was, 
‘... the continuation of a long line in its author’s thought as well as the first 
presentation of Marxist philosophy without Hegelian terminology and with full 
emphasis  on  the  parts  played  by  individuals  and  ideas  in  the  historical 
process’.
110 Stalin developed a new Marxist interpretation with his emphasis 
on the role of force in the transformation of society and on the continuity of 
national life. He was also original in dropping utopian elements in the concept 
of world revolution.
111 Schlesinger made clear that he believed Stalin to be an 
original Marxist scholar and theoretician. He also clearly agreed with some 
aspects of Stalin’s theory. Schlesinger consistently reproached those within 
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the  party,  as  well  as  its  critics,  who  judged  Soviet  Russia  from  a  utopian 
perspective. He would, therefore, have approved of Stalin’s practical approach 
to world revolution.  
 
In his next work to broach the subject of Stalin as intellectual, Marx His Time 
and Ours, Schlesinger was more circumspect but still suggested that Stalin 
had merit in this role. Again he pointed to ‘Dialectical and Historical Marxism’ 
as evidence of Stalin’s authority. He wrote: ‘Recently, Stalin gave a summary 
of the essential characteristics of Dialectics that has the great advantage of 
avoiding the pitfalls connected with specific Hegelian language’.
112 Later, he 
continued on the theme, arguing:  
 
Stalin’s  description  of  the  struggle  between  the  past  and  the 
future, that which is dying away and that which is developing, 
makes  impressive  reading  because  it  smacks  of  the  struggle 
carried on in the most varied fields of the social world of today, 
with  religious,  philosophical,  aesthetic  and even  mathematical 
disputes  hanging  upon  cleavages  caused  by  the  great  social 
and political issues.
113 
 
Schlesinger referred to the work as ‘impressive’ but did point out that it was 
impossible to apply dialectics to all spheres of nature. Thus, Soviet ideology’s 
recent attempt to portray dialectics as the ‘new world outlook’ together with its 
emphasis on the supposed partisan nature of philosophy was, according to 
Schlesinger, to be, ‘… interpreted as elements of social mythology rather than 
as contributions to Science’.
114 Yet, he again wrote positively about Stalin’s 
work when discussing ideology. He argued that Stalin was one of the first 
theoreticians to explicitly derive the correctness of historical materialism from 
methodological  advantage  rather  than  the  primacy  of  economics  over 
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ideas.
115  Schlesinger  continually  emphasised  the  importance  of  ideas  in 
Marxism so would inevitably approve of this development. 
 
In  1957  Schlesinger  published  an  encyclopaedia  article  on  Stalin  in 
Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften in which he offered his views on 
the  leader  as  a  theoretician.
116  Schlesinger  emphasised  the  practical, 
pragmatic nature of Stalin’s theoretical work. He argued, approvingly, that it 
could not be separated from his political activities, referring to Marx’s Theses 
on Feuerbach and its assertion that thinking isolated from practice was purely 
scholastic; or as Schlesinger expressed it, ‘…. when the immediate tasks of 
praxis are removed, study is rejected as fruitless and scholastic’.
117 According 
to Schlesinger, like Lenin’s work, every one of Stalin’s articles could easily be 
proven to have a direct connection to actual discussions within the party and, 
in his later writings, with the actual problems of the Soviet state.  
 
Schlesinger  described  Stalin’s  theoretical  work  in  a  reasonably  positive 
manner. He argued that Stalin’s ‘Anarchism or Socialism?’ was an attempt to 
explain  the  fundamentals  of  dialectic  materialism  by  relinquishing  Hegelian 
terminology and emphasising the importance of personality and human ideas. 
According to Schlesinger, this point of view had been neglected in the usual 
mechanistic exposition of Marxist philosophy.
118 In other writings, Schlesinger 
made clear that he agreed with such an approach and here too Schlesinger’s 
tone seemed to be one of approval.  
 
Later  in  the  article,  Schlesinger  described  the  difference  between  Zinoviev 
and  Stalin’s  view  of  Leninism.  He  argued  that  whilst  Zinoviev  interpreted 
Leninism as an adaptation of Marxism for the particular problems of backward 
countries,  Stalin  depicted  it  as,  not  only  a  presentation  of  revolutionary 
Marxism,  but  as  a  further  development  of  it,  as  socialism  in  the  epoch  of 
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imperialism  and  proletarian  revolution.
119  Schlesinger  had  made  similar 
observations in other work and his writings on Lenin make clear that he sided 
with Stalin in this debate.
120 Schlesinger made other positive comments about 
Stalin, the theoretician, in the encyclopaedia article, describing Stalin’s work 
on nationalities as ‘original’, for example.
121 However, he was not uncritical. 
Schlesinger pointed out that the concepts developed in many of Stalin’s later 
works  were  subsequently  criticised.
122  He  also  made  reference  to  Stalin’s 
negative  influence  on  intellectual  freedom.  Schlesinger  argued  that  in  the 
1930s Stalin devoted himself to the achievement of a definite conception of 
party  history.  He  aimed  to  create  a  standard  of  political  reliability  for  party 
members  and,  thus,  provided  an  ideological  motive  for  the  removal  of  all 
dissenters.
123 
 
Schlesinger  argued  that  any  assessment  of  Stalin’s  significance  in  the 
development of science and knowledge was muddied by his position in party 
struggles.
124 The partisanship of commentators polarised opinion. On the one 
hand there was the legacy propounded by his party machine; they claimed 
him  as  one  of  the  most  significant  Russian  statesman,  a  scientific  genius 
equal to, and perhaps surpassing, Marx and Lenin, whose reach extended to 
all  spheres  of  knowledge  in  which  the  party  was  interested.  On  the  other 
hand, the opposition described Stalin as a mere bureaucrat and questioned 
the authorship of his public works. According to Schlesinger, under Stalin, his 
theoretical abilities were widely lauded and, indeed, exaggerated. However, 
after  his  death,  the  reaction  against  his  dictatorial  methods  and  the 
overestimation  of  his  theoretical  achievements  led  to  the  opposite,  an 
underestimation  of  his  theoretical  significance.  Neither  gave  an  accurate 
picture. Schlesinger argued that Stalin was not a creative thinker in the ranks 
of  Lenin  or  Marx.  However,  he  did  free  Lenin’s  theory  of  some  internal 
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contradictions  and  his  simplification  process  made  Marxism  suitable  as  a 
basis  for  the  schooling  of  a  third  of  humanity.
125  The  article  was,  thus, 
reasonably positive in respect to Stalin’s reputation as a theoretician. 
 
In  Schlesinger’s  later  writings  he  tended  to  be  more  critical  of  Stalin’s 
intellectual  achievements  and  legacy.  For  example,  in  History  of  the 
Communist Party of the USSR Schlesinger referred to ‘intellectual Stalinism’ 
as  a  ‘deadweight’.
126  Elsewhere  in the monograph  he  wrote  of  the  ‘unified 
indoctrination’  aimed  at  by  Stalin’s  later  theoretical  work,  such  as  his 
presentation of dialectics in the Short Course.
127 Earlier he had described this 
exposition as impressive. Schlesinger still acknowledged that Stalin was an 
important populariser of Marxism. He wrote: 
 
  The presentation of Marxist dialectics … was the first popular 
treatment  of  the  subject  which  gave  the  essentials  without 
unnecessarily  burdening  it  with  Hegelian  terminology….  But 
whatever the historian may think about the correctness of the 
record, and the theoretician about the fullness with which some 
aspects of the Marxist theory have survived this popularization, 
it provided the sort of Marxism which finally reached the political 
cadres with the responsibility of leading one-third of mankind.
128 
 
Marxist  theory  under  Stalin  did  not  emerge  entirely  unscathed,  but  its 
popularisation  was  immensely  significant  to  the  future  course  of  the 
movement. 
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Schlesinger believed that Stalin deserved a reputation as a scholar. He felt 
the undermining of his intellectual achievements constituted an element of the 
partisan  struggle  in  which  Stalin  was  involved  and  also  represented  myth 
making  on  the  part  of  his  opponents.  Whilst  certainly  not  uncritical,  and 
recognising the negative impact Stalin had upon theory and intellectual life, he 
nevertheless  believed  that  he  contributed  to  theory.  Schlesinger  suggested 
throughout his works that Stalin was significant as a populariser of Marxism at 
the very least. This important function allowed one third of the globe to finally 
comprehend the theoretical foundation of the system under which they lived. 
 
In  early  works  such  as  the  popular  Sprit  of  Post-war  Russia,  or  the  more 
scholarly Marx His Time and Ours, Schlesinger emphasised the importance of 
Stalin as a great populariser of Marxism. Stalin may have simplified, but only 
to  increase  general  comprehension and  not  in  a  way  that  took  away  from 
theory.  As  was  shown  in  the  discussions  on  Lukács,  Schlesinger  almost 
entirely dismissed the importance of the Hegelian tradition to Marxism in Spirit 
of  Post-war  Russia.
129  According  to  Schlesinger,  the  decrease  in  Hegelian 
influence  under  Stalin  helped  otherwise  ‘perplexed  people’  understand  the 
fundamentals of Marxism.
130 In his review of I. Deutscher’s work, published in 
1950, he referred to Stalin’s significance in developing a, ‘Marxist philosophy 
without Hegelian terminology’.
131 He criticised Deutscher for labelling this a 
‘crude digest’, arguing: ‘But this is no reason to deny the importance of the 
theoretical  work  by  which  the  refined  product  of  the  liberal  Utopia  was 
transformed into practical guidance for action, even if that transformation was 
accompanied  by  popularization’.
132  Marxist  theory  was  supposed  to  inspire 
and transform the masses; Schlesinger would not have viewed popularisation 
in a necessarily negative way.  
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In comparison, his later writings and personal reflections concerning Stalin are 
more critical. For example, in his memoirs, when discussing Stalin’s impact 
upon theoretical research within the party, Schlesinger spoke of his having 
sterilised Marxism.
133 This deleterious effect was still being felt many years 
later.  However,  this  was  perhaps more  to  do  with  Stalin’s  attitude  towards 
theoretical and academic freedom than his personal theoretical contribution. 
Schlesinger  also  suggested  in  later  writings  that  Stalin’s  popularisation  of 
Marxism could be more correctly described as ‘vulgarisation’. Stalin’s Marxist 
literature simplified theory to an extent that took away its essential elements. 
In  his  memoirs,  Schlesinger  spoke  of  the  simplifications  and  vulgarisations 
inherent in the Short Course.
134 Whilst these simplifications may have been 
necessary  given  the  situation  in  backward  Russia,  it  undoubtedly  had  a 
negative impact upon Marxist theory. In History of the Communist Party of the 
USSR Schlesinger again referred to Stalin’s simplifications and argued that it 
was self-evident that they would have been, ‘…. subject to criticism after the 
end of his ‘cult’’.
135  
 
As  can  be  seen  from  this  brief  survey  of  Schlesinger’s  views  on  Stalin’s 
reputation, there was a discernable change in emphasis in his writings over 
time. Schlesinger’s earlier works were more positive about Stalin, whilst his 
later ones were more condemnatory. However, this was more a matter of tone 
than any real change in attitude. In this respect, his writings on Stalin differ to 
those on Soviet historiography or on Lenin. In the latter two the change in 
interpretation between his early work and that completed after Stalin’s death is 
marked  and  undeniable,  whereas  his  writings  on  Stalin  display  more 
consistency. Whilst his later works may have stressed the vulgarising quality 
of Stalin’s theoretical output this was described alongside, and even as part 
of, the popularisation process that he referred to, and admired, in all writings. 
He also consistently concurred with Stalin’s analysis of Leninism compared 
with others propagated at the same.  
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One theme to become evident when examining Schlesinger’s attitude towards 
Stalin  is  the  pragmatism  that  pervades  his  approach.  Recognition  of  this 
pragmatism is necessary for a proper understanding of Schlesinger’s attitude 
to all aspects of Marxism and the Soviet Union but it is particularly apparent in 
his  work  on  Stalinism  and  Stalin’s  theoretical  and  political  impact.  For 
Schlesinger, Stalin was a terror who had a detrimental impact on much of the 
Soviet  Union.  However,  at  the  same time, he  was  able  to bring about  the 
essential transfer of generations to continue the revolutionary tasks. As well 
as overcoming the problems of erroneous schools of thought of the previous 
Soviet  period,  Stalin’s  leadership,  in  thrusting  a  backward  country  through 
industrialisation and collectivisation in a few short years, was of paramount 
importance  in  guaranteeing  the  survival  of the  great  experiment.  Whatever 
Stalin’s  negative  aspects  and  whatever  the  negative  consequences  of  his 
leadership,  factors  which  Schlesinger  never  denied,  he  took  the  pragmatic 
stance that they were an unfortunate consequence of necessary processes. 
This  pragmatism  is  best  illustrated  with  reference  to  Schlesinger’s  attitude 
towards ‘socialism in one country’ and the purges.  
 
In the absence of the anticipated European revolutions, discussion in Russia 
inevitably  turned  to  the  fate  of an  isolated Soviet  state. The  topic  became 
increasingly  important  after  the  failure  of  the  revolutionary  movement  in 
Germany after 1923. The years from 1924 onwards saw much debate within 
the Soviet government on whether socialism in one country, and a backward 
one in particular, was possible. Could Soviet Russia survive in isolation and, 
even  if  it  could,  was  it  possible  to  build  or  complete  socialism  in  a  single 
country?
136  Some,  such  as  Trotsky,  argued  that  capitalist  restoration  was 
almost  inevitable  without  other  socialist  revolutions.  It  was  necessarily 
impossible  to  attempt  socialist  reconstruction  within  a  single  country.
137  In 
contrast, Stalin and Bukharin argued that a complete socialist society in an 
isolated nation was indeed viable. The discussion ended when Stalin’s theory 
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of ‘socialism in one country’ became the official party doctrine at the 14
th Party 
Congress in April 1925. The classic exposition of the theory was presented a 
year later in Stalin’s ‘Concerning the Questions of Leninism’. Stalin argued 
that ‘socialism in one country’ was, 
 
…  the  possibility  of  solving  the  contradictions  between  the 
proletariat and the peasantry by means of the internal forces of 
our country, the possibility of the proletariat seizing power and 
using  that  power  to  build  a  complete  socialist  society  in  our 
country, with the sympathy and the support of the proletarians of 
other countries, but without preliminary victory of the proletarian 
revolution in other countries.
138 
 
 Henceforth, the Communist party argued that the building of socialism was 
possible in Russia, whether she remained isolated or not. According to E. Van 
Ree:  ‘From  then  on  the  future  of  an  isolated  bolshevik  Russia  was 
summarised in two possibilities: either complete socialism or collapse under 
military intervention, and the first alternative was deemed highly probable’.
139  
 
Whether it was possible to achieve socialism in an isolated country or not, 
Schlesinger was certain that this had not taken place under Stalin. He wrote in 
the lectures, ‘…. when Stalin died the construction of socialism – in any sense 
acceptable to normal socialists as distinct, of course, from state ideology – 
was not yet completed [,] while Soviet Russia’s isolation had already ended 
eight years before’.
140 However, he agreed that this was what a Soviet country 
should aim for. Schlesinger felt ‘socialism in one country’ had been socially 
useful and politically expedient, displaying a pragmatic appraisal of developing 
Bolshevik theory.  
 
Schlesinger’s pragmatism was in contrast to, and perhaps in reaction against, 
the utopianism he saw in many communists and commentators. He believed 
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that  ‘socialism  in  one  country’  was  the  correct  theory  for  that  time,  in 
opposition to utopians who argued that it deviated from the classical Marxist 
perspective and insisted it was better that a capitalist restoration occurred until 
such time as the subjective conditions ripened for the final revolutionary wave. 
Schlesinger  did  not  believe  that  the  great  socialist  success  should  be 
abandoned  simply  because  it  deviated  from  the  Marxist  classics.  More 
importantly,  he  believed  that  his  great  mentor,  Lenin,  would  not  have 
abandoned Russia. Schlesinger made this clear in a paper published in 1965. 
He argued that it was unlikely Lenin had thought seriously about the possibility 
of  socialism  in  an  isolated  country.  However,  he  continued,  ‘….  surely  he 
would not have left, as Trotsky later suggested, the Russian revolution in the 
lurch when the west European part of the revolutionary perspective failed to 
realize’.
141 If Lenin could become convinced of the possibility of an isolated 
Soviet Russia’s survival, Schlesinger was likely to follow suit. 
 
Schlesinger frequently emphasised Lenin’s writings from immediately before 
his death. These works appeared to indicate Lenin’s recognition of Russia’s 
opportunity to build socialism. According to Van Ree: ‘In the last years of his 
life Lenin became even more optimistic on the perspectives of socialism in 
Russia’.
142 He pointed to Lenin’s article ‘On Cooperation’ as significant in this 
respect, writing: 
 
  In his 1923 article Lenin accomplished a shift in definition. He 
defined  co-operative  property  on  land owned  by  a  proletarian 
state as socialist, and as ‘completely socialist’ for that matter…. 
Now, once this system was defined as a fully socialist one, the 
creation of a ‘complete socialist society’ in backward Russia was 
at one stroke deemed possible.
143 
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Lenin would, thus, appear to have come close to the conclusion Stalin was to 
advocate.
144  In  fact,  Stalin  frequently  cited  this  article  in  order  to  confer 
Leninist legitimacy upon his theory.
145  
 
Schlesinger  stated  in  one  of  his  encyclopaedia  articles  that  Lenin’s 
conceptions of the party and the development of capital in Russia had created 
the  prerequisites  for  the  development  of  the  theory  of  ‘socialism  in  one 
country’.
146 He also described ‘On Cooperation’ as significant and pointed out 
that Lenin was concerned with the development of peasant cooperatives in 
order to build towards socialism.
147 
 
He made the same point in History of the Communist Party of the USSR, once 
again  asserting  Lenin’s  later  faith  in  the  prospects  for  Soviet  Russia.  He 
argued: 
 
  Lenin believed that the State industry could not only be restored 
after the devastations of the war and hold its own in competition 
with  private  enterprise,  but  also  eventually move  the  peasant 
economy  forward  on  socialist  lines  if  proper  relationships 
(smychka)  with  the  peasants  were  established.  In  his  last 
articles,  written  during  his  illness,  Lenin  elaborated  on  the 
theme:  with  political  power  in  the  hands  of  the  Soviets, 
agricultural  co-operation  might  provide  a  transition  to  socialist 
forms  of  production  accessible  to  the  peasants’ 
understanding.
148 
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Schlesinger also argued in his lecture series that Lenin, by the end of his life, 
had envisaged the need for the Russian revolution to survive in isolation.
149 
This focus on Lenin’s later writings and the assertion of an optimistic approach 
to  Russia’s  fate  and  the  prospects  for  socialist  development  suggests  that 
Schlesinger saw continuity between Lenin and Stalin. It appeared to validate 
the theory of ‘socialism in one country’ for Schlesinger and he seems to have 
been keen to demonstrate this. 
 
Schlesinger had sympathy with the theory and seems to have believed that it 
was correct for the time, but he disagreed with Stalin’s apparent confidence in 
the near certain victory of full socialist construction. Yet Schlesinger believed 
in the efficacy of ‘socialism in one country’. He understood its usefulness and 
purpose, not necessarily as a theory of intellectual and philosophical validity 
but as a motivating, positive message to a tired society facing an enormous 
task and potentially disillusioned by the absence of international support. It 
harnessed energy and focused workers on the tasks of industrialisation and 
construction that lay before them.  
 
This aspect of Schlesinger’s thought was clearly expressed in History of the 
Communist Party of the USSR. Schlesinger wrote: ‘Whatever its shortcomings 
(Stalin died before socialism was completed in his country and a second world 
power  establishing  socialism  was  in  existence),  it  was  useful  in  rejecting 
pessimism or adventurism caused by the temporary isolation of the Russian 
revolution’.
150  ‘Socialism  in  one  country’  inspired  party  members  and  gave 
them  a  purpose,  one  of  great  historical  and  revolutionary  significance. 
According to Schlesinger, ‘... Stalin inspired the new cadres by showing them 
that the worker’s everyday job was part of a great historical process’.
151 He 
went further, arguing that the theory facilitated the great leaps Soviet society 
was to make in the coming years. He insisted that Stalin’s concept, ‘… served 
as  the  intellectual  skeleton  for  the  earlier  stages  of  the  industrialisation 
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process’.
152 Similarly, in the lectures, Schlesinger emphasised the motivating 
intention behind the concept, and did so with approval. He wrote, ‘… it served 
the  purpose  of  maintaining  confidence  and  encouraging  maximum  efforts 
during  the  period  of  the  temporary  isolation  of  the  Russian  revolution’.
153 
Schlesinger’s main concern when assessing the theory was its efficacy, its 
utility.  If  ‘socialism  in  one  country’  served  to  encourage  and  motivate  the 
Soviet people then it did not particularly matter if the theory was correct or not. 
Such  a  pragmatic  stance  was  natural  for  a  Marxist  of  Schlesinger’s  type. 
Marxist  theory  was  supposed  to  promote  action  and  Schlesinger  judged 
theories and policies in this respect. 
 
This same pragmatism is visible in Schlesinger’s attitude towards the purges 
and  Stalin’s  leadership  in  general.  Throughout  his  writings,  Schlesinger 
pointed  to  the  barbarism  and  extra-judicial nature  of  the  purges.
154  But,  in 
general,  he  seems  to  have  viewed  them  as  a  necessary  evil.  Schlesinger 
certainly did not deny the nature or scale of the purges and his distaste was 
made clear in all of his works. He wrote of ‘Lenin’s genial idea’ becoming, ‘…. 
tainted with horror’ under Stalin.
155 In the lectures, he described the purges 
thus; 
 
  When,  collectivisation  being  in  essentials  secured,  the  XVII 
party  Congress  tried  to  call  a  halt,  to  open  the  way  to 
reconciliation  with  the  opposition,  which  now  recognised  that 
Stalin had been in essentials right, and to replace his individual 
by collective leadership, Stalin proceeded to terror of the most 
brutal  kind  and  destroyed  the  majority  of  the  Congress 
delegates, of the Central Committee elected by them, of the old 
party and of the army cadres by the infamous procedure known 
as the ‘great purge’’.
156  
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Schlesinger frequently spoke of the horror and brutality of the purges. In The 
History of the Communist Party he referred to, ‘…. the horrible things that had 
happened  under  Stalin’  and  later  to,  ‘….  the  horrible  things  done  by  the 
highest authority in the country.
157 He also spent some time discussing the 
background to the purge, its procedures, results and what Stalin’s motives 
might have been.
158  
 
Yet, Schlesinger emphasised in all of his writings that no matter how terrible 
the  purges  were,  Stalin  and  his  brutal  methods  were,  in  some  ways, 
necessary.  As  noted  in  the  introductory  chapter,  Schlesinger  gave  some 
indication of this attitude in his memoirs. He wrote: 
 
The ‘purge’ was a violent and to a large extent criminal way of 
carrying out the unavoidable change of generations, to replace 
those whose ways of thought had been nurtured by the need of 
overthrowing the old society by people grown up in the new one 
and knowing no other aims than its gradual strengthening and 
development.
159 
 
He indicated that the purges had a purpose; one necessary and unavoidable if 
the Soviet state was to survive. He made further reference to the necessity of 
Stalin and his methods in the lectures. Schlesinger argued that through ‘blood, 
horror and triumphs’, Stalin ‘... fulfilled his historical function’.
160 This was a 
deeply pragmatic viewpoint.  
 
According  to  Schlesinger,  the  purges  had  two  main  consequences,  both 
necessary for the survival of the Soviet Union. Firstly, they brought about the 
essential transfer of generations; new, younger workers and party members 
came  to  the  fore  in  Soviet  life  in  place  of  Old  Bolsheviks  who  had  been 
schooled in revolution but not in state preservation. Secondly, the purges also 
helped prepare the Soviet Union for the upcoming war. In 1950 Schlesinger 
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wrote: ‘The purges completed Stalin’s triumph over the oppositional factions 
and at the same time created the conditions for preserving national unity even 
in the most difficult moments of the coming crisis’.
161 Whilst it could be argued 
the  purges  decimated  the  experienced  army  command  and  left  the  nation 
weakened, Schlesinger felt that its unity was strengthened; the purges left it 
better able to survive the difficulties of war.
162 In fact, Schlesinger believed 
that the threat of war allowed for the purges to take place. He argued that 
there was no vocal opposition to events because everyone wished to remain 
loyal to a state under threat from foreign countries. Schlesinger wrote, ‘… the 
victims could not even attempt to resist since it was carried out (and, perhaps, 
in Stalin’s subjective mind justified) in the atmosphere of an approaching war 
against a foe still superior in material strength’.
163  
 
Although Schlesinger’s pragmatic attitude towards the purges ran through all 
of  his  writings,  a  close  reading  does  indicate  that  Schlesinger  believed 
different things at different times. In his earlier works, Schlesinger indicated 
that since it would not have been in the state’s interest to show the hostile 
world  its  problems  through  a  series  of  show  trials  if  the  accusations  were 
exaggerated or fictitious, they must have been, to a large extent, true.
164 In his 
review article of 1950 Schlesinger also referred to the existence of at least, 
‘…. some conspiracy’, although he did add that not all of the facts were yet 
known.
165 This is in stark contrast to his later works, written once the true 
nature of the purges was established. In his memoirs, Schlesinger made clear 
that his former beliefs were erroneous; the majority of the charges were, in 
fact, ‘trumped up’.
166 He also stated in The History of the Communist Party 
that the Soviet Union and the party suffered as a result of the purges, not 
simply in terms of human suffering, which could be taken for granted, but in 
terms  of  prestige,  confidence  and  the  quality  of  party  membership. 
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Schlesinger  wrote:  ‘The  result  was  the  party’s  loss,  not  just  of  the  hidden 
oppositionist  or  at  least  of  the  Belorussian  Old  Bolshevik…but  also  of  the 
average  worker’.
167  Further  in  the  same  chapter  he  made  a  similar  point: 
‘Even the supervisory – not to speak of the democratic – functions of the party 
machine, were undermined by the ‘purge’’.
168 However, his final judgement on 
the  purges  remained  pragmatic.  They  were  a  ‘tragic  episode’  and 
‘unavoidable’. Schlesinger felt he was correct not to let his attitude towards 
the Soviet Union be altered or determined by such an unfortunate event.
169 
 
Schlesinger  displayed  a  pragmatic  attitude  towards  Stalin  and  his  rule  in 
general.  No  matter  what  his  negative  characteristics  and  the  detrimental 
impact  he  had  upon  the  Soviet  Union,  his  policies  and  leadership  were 
essential for its survival and further development. Stalin’s methods may have 
been  brutal  but  he  solved  problems.
170  In  his  encyclopaedia  article, 
Schlesinger insisted that Stalin enabled Russia to overcome fifty to a hundred 
years of backwardness in just ten short years. This achievement was the main 
reason for his enormous authority and made his brutal crushing of resistance 
acceptable to the party and Soviet public.
171 Schlesinger repeatedly referred 
to Stalin’s achievements and the fact that he was able to do more than even 
he had set out to do. Writing about Stalin’s formulation of ‘socialism in one 
country’ in the early 1920s in The History of the Communist Party, Schlesinger 
argued: 
 
  The  conditions  for  Soviet  Russia’s  security  against  external 
threats  and  fulfilling  her  functions  as  a  centre  of  socialist 
reconstruction were formulated in very ambitious terms, which 
however are low compared with what has been achieved since: 
fifteen to twenty million industrial workers (in comparison with 
the  four  million  available  in  those  days),  electrification  of  the 
main industrial regions, cooperative organisation (without further 
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specification)  of  agriculture,  and  a  well-developed  metal 
industry.
172 
 
He  repeated  the  sentiment  in  the  lectures,  arguing  that  Stalin’s  plans  had 
been  ambitious  but  were  far  below  what  was  actually  attained  before  his 
death.
173  
 
Schlesinger’s pragmatism allowed him to take a long-term perspective when 
judging  Stalin  and  his  legacy.  Although  there  was  suffering  and  brutality, 
Stalin’s successes were vital to the continued development and survival of the 
Soviet Union; in this respect he was as significant as Lenin. He summarised 
their achievements in respect of the Soviet Union thus: 
 
  …  Lenin  by  tremendous  will-power,  had  introduced  the  NEP, 
and thereby saved the Russian revolution from breaking at the 
point where the Jacobin dictatorship had fallen in 1795…Stalin, 
by  a  combination  of  soberness  and  brutality,  had  given  that 
decision a content which has turned the isolated Soviet Union 
into one of the ‘big two’, and what otherwise would have been a 
gigantic Paris Commune in to the start of a new phase of human 
political and social organisation.
174 
 
The two leaders may have taken decisions and developed policies that veered 
away from accepted theory and ideology but this was due to the exigencies of 
circumstance.  To  Schlesinger,  Marxism  was  an  active  theory  intended  to 
transform  society,  its  dialectical  quality  insisted  that  it  change  as 
circumstances  did.  Compromises  and  unpleasant  but  necessary  decisions 
were simply part of that developing theory and methodology. Lenin and Stalin 
were doing what was necessary to maintain Marxism’s relevance and viability. 
To baulk at the more brutal consequences of Stalin’s rule or to turn away from 
the  Soviet  Union,  as  the  embodiment  of  socialist  hope,  was  utopian  and 
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therefore  erroneous.  In  one  of  his  final  writings,  Schlesinger  confirmed  his 
opinion of Stalin, arguing that he was, ‘…a man whose whole political life can 
be brought under the heading that he tried to bring Utopia into the realm of 
what he deemed realistic policies’.
175 
 
This  apparent  pragmatism  of  Schlesinger’s  helps  to  explain  the 
inconsistencies in his attitudes and writings over time. The preservation of the 
Soviet Union was more important than any short-term humanitarian concerns 
and Stalin was essential for that preservation. Schlesinger would inevitably 
defend  him  against  critics  if  he  believed  in  the  necessity  of  his  rule. 
Unpleasant decisions had to be made if the Soviet Union was to continue to 
develop and Schlesinger, ever practical, understood and even praised those 
decisions. Perhaps his earlier writings were positive about the Soviet Union 
for this reason. 
 
In addition, it is clear from Schlesinger’s work on Stalin that he was not fully 
aware of events during Stalin’s rule until after the leader’s death. This helps to 
explain the change in attitude noticeable in his later works. Schlesinger may 
have  been  shocked  to  hear  of  the  scale  of  Stalin’s  crimes  and  this  would 
affect his judgement. Stalin was now condemned and Schlesinger was more 
negative about his leadership. However, Schlesinger may also have simply 
altered his attitude pragmatically as circumstances developed. What was now 
necessary for the Soviet Union was a ‘de-Stalinisation’, the recognition of the 
excesses and brutality of the Stalin period and the ability to learn from them 
and continue forwards. Schlesinger now supported such action. 
 
Finally, before concluding this part of the thesis, it is necessary to turn briefly 
to Schlesinger’s attitude towards that other notable personality and Marxist 
theoretician in early Soviet rule, Trotsky. Schlesinger wrote a great deal on 
Lenin  and  Stalin  but  rarely  mentioned  Trotsky,  although  it  is  possible  to 
discern  his  attitude  from  his  occasional  references.  For  the  most  part, 
whenever Schlesinger did write about Trotsky it was in a negative light. This 
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was  especially  true  when  Schlesinger  compared  Trotsky’s  actions  and 
thoughts to Lenin’s. For example, when discussing the German and Russian 
peace  negotiations  of  1918  in  The  History  of  the  Communist  Party, 
Schlesinger argued that Lenin made full use of all propaganda opportunities 
available at Brest-Litovsk. He continued; ‘However, he never went as far as 
letting the Germans have an excuse for breaking the armistice, which is what 
actually happened as a result of Trotsky’s proclamation of ‘neither war nor 
peace’’.
176  Later  in  the  same  work  he  again  criticised  Trotsky,  this  time  in 
regard  to  international  developments  of  Autumn  1927:  ‘When  the  Chinese 
events were followed by the Arcos raid, the British Government’s breaking off 
of  diplomatic  relations  and  the  assassination  of  the  Soviet  ambassador  in 
Warsaw,  a  demonstration  of  national  and  communist  unity  was  clearly 
required. But Trotsky drew the opposite conclusion’.
177 Trotsky’s judgement 
was frequently flawed and Schlesinger clearly disapproved of his actions. 
 
Ultimately,  Schlesinger  would  always  disagree  with  Trotsky  and  side  with 
Lenin and later Stalin. The advocate and pragmatist would concur with those 
who strove for the continued survival of the Soviet Union, even if this was at 
the expense of lofty, classical principles. Trotsky, in his dogged commitment 
to  internationalism  and  his  willingness  to  sacrifice  all  of  the  gains  of  the 
Russian  revolution  proved  himself  to  be  a  utopian.  Schlesinger  would 
inevitably  compare  Trotsky’s  attitude  towards  an  isolated  Soviet  Russia 
unfavourably with Stalin’s ‘socialism in one country’.
178 In fact, in Marx His 
Time and Ours, Schlesinger went so far as to argue: ‘Trotskyism is the natural 
punishment for the utopian elements in Marxism’, making his views on the 
subject quite clear.
179 Schlesinger argued that utopianism was necessary in 
the initial stages of a revolution; however, 
 
  … this holds true only during the preparatory stage and up to 
the  culmination  of  a  revolutionary  wave;  from  that  moment 
onwards the utopia, because it transcends not only actual but 
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also possible reality, is bound to serve as a mere pious hope, as 
an  ideological  explanation  of  the  existing  society,  if  not  as  a 
weapon of counter-revolutionary attack upon the actual results 
of the social transformation because they have failed to come 
up  to  the  utopian  standard.  It  is  this  mechanism  that  stood 
behind all the disputes between Stalinists and Trotskyists.
180 
 
Trotsky was utopian and judged Soviet society from this perspective. In this 
respect he was counter-revolutionary.  
 
Schlesinger  also  criticised  Trotsky  for  his  part  in  the  development  of  a 
particular  brand  of  history,  a  Western,  ‘Trotskyist’  version  of  events  that 
distorted and even falsified. In this respect, he was similar to Stalin and the 
conscious development of his own version of events. Schlesinger argued that 
when investigating Stalin’s actions,  
 
… the historian is virtually restricted to two primary sources, the 
works  of  Stalin  himself  and  his  closest  circle  of  friends,  and 
those  of  his  main  antagonist,  Trotsky  …  Both  sources  are 
partisan, and there is no a priori reason to ascribe to either an 
interest in establishing a historical truth above and independent 
of political implications.
181 
 
Both were concerned with ensuring their historical legacy. In another work, 
Schlesinger  again  compared  the  attempts  of  both  Stalin  and  Trotsky  to 
monopolise history’s judgement. He argued, ‘…much of Stalin’s and Trotsky’s 
assertions about the horrible crimes committed by the other in the years 1917-
1919 belong to the realm of factional mythology’.
182 Schlesinger held Trotsky 
responsible for a number of misconceptions of Soviet history prevalent in the 
West. He wrote; ‘Like everything connected with Stalin’s career, Lenin’s article 
‘Better  Fewer  but  Better’  has  been  interpreted,  particularly  in  publications 
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influenced  by  Trotsky’s  writings,  as  part  of  a  struggle  allegedly  waged  by 
Lenin  against  Stalin’s  ascendancy’.
183  However,  he  was  equally  critical  of 
official  Soviet  attempts  to  expunge  Trotsky  from  the  historical  record.
184 
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Part Two: Schlesinger and Soviet 
Historiography 
 
It seems quite clear from the volume of work produced by Schlesinger that the 
subject of Soviet historiography held an intense interest for him. Part two of 
the  thesis  concentrates  upon  his  writings  on  this  topic.  Due  to  the 
overdeterminist assumptions of the investigation, such an approach throws 
light not just upon on Schlesinger’s attitude towards the subject in question 
but also his thoughts on fundamental aspects of the Soviet Union as well as 
that society itself.  
 
Schlesinger’s analyses closely corresponded to official Soviet interpretations. 
He provided a reasonably positive portrayal of Soviet historiography during 
Stalin’s time; a portrayal that was deeply at odds with his personal experience 
of intellectual life in Stalin’s Russia. However, he retrospectively condemned 
the  academic  atmosphere  following  Stalin’s  death.  He  appeared  to  wholly 
endorse, and in fact performed his own, de-Stalinisation.  
 
The first chapter of the section appraises Schlesinger’s own experience of life 
as  an  intellectual  in  the  Soviet  Union.  An  examination  of  his  unpublished 
memoirs provides a detailed insight into his activities as well as his opinions, 
both at the time and later when writing about them. The next chapter provides 
an  outline  of  Schlesinger’s  writing  on  Soviet  historiography  up  to  Stalin’s 
death in 1953. Finally, the attitudes and interpretations discerned in his earlier 
works  are  compared  to  those  in  his  later  papers  concerning  Soviet 
historiography, those written and published after Stalin’s death. 
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Chapter Five: Schlesinger’s personal 
experiences as an academic in Stalin’s Soviet 
Union 
 
Schlesinger visited the Soviet Union on three occasions, from 1926 to 1927, 
in the summer of 1931 and finally from early 1935 to the winter of 1936/7. His 
first  and  last  stays  in  Russia  were  for  extended  periods  during  which 
Schlesinger was employed in an academic or intellectual capacity. In 1926 
Schlesinger moved to Moscow in order to work as the German representative 
for  the  newly  established  International  Agrarian  Institute  on  the 
recommendation of Eugene Varga. Like many of his comrades Schlesinger 
was induced to move to Russia by the KPD in order to ‘sit out his uklon’, 
deviation from the part line of the majority.
1 Deviationists were sent to Russia 
to be schooled by the Bolsheviks and to correct their theoretical positions or 
await a time when their own position became that of the party majority. He 
returned to Germany in April 1927 having made the necessary adjustments to 
his theoretical line on agrarian matters. In 1935 Schlesinger again returned to 
the Soviet Union and found work as the editor of the German edition of the 
official  Comintern  publication  Communist  International.    He  remained 
employed by Comintern headquarters until his investigation and subsequent 
branding as ‘alien to the party’ in summer 1936. 
 
Schlesinger wrote extensively of his experience of working in Russia in his 
unfinished memoirs. He described in detail the nature of his work, the kind of 
atmosphere in which it was undertaken and his own feelings about the events 
that he witnessed or participated in. His memoirs, therefore, comprise a new 
and insightful source for the better understanding of the intellectual climate in 
Russia at those times. They also provide a much more personal context from 
which  Schlesinger’s  academic  writings  on  Soviet  historiography  can  be 
understood. As well as contextualising his work, they offer an opportunity to 
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compare  his  personal  reflections  and  experiences  as  an  intellectual  in  the 
Soviet  Union  with  his  later  academic  works  on  Soviet  intellectual  life  and 
progress. One can contrast the ‘objective’ approach of his later writings on 
Soviet  historiography  with  the  inherently  ‘subjective’  nature  of  his  personal 
autobiographical  reflections;  something  which  will  allow  for  a  deeper 
understanding and critique of both. 
 
Schlesinger was not involved in historical research in any capacity whilst in 
the Soviet Union. His memoir reflections do not, therefore, involve the same 
intellectual  climate  of  which  he  was  to  write  when  describing  Soviet 
historiography. However, Schlesinger was involved in academic or intellectual 
work in both of his extended visits to the Soviet Union and can, thus, offer 
broad  insights  into  the  general  intellectual  atmosphere  of  the  time.  His 
memoirs  offer  the  opportunity  to  compare  the  constraints  placed  upon 
intellectuals working for the Party and those nominally outside its sphere. In 
addition, Schlesinger provided information in his unfinished memoirs on the 
influence  of  the  Soviet  Union,  and  its  attitude  towards  research  and 
intellectual  activities,  upon  communist  parties  in  the  West,  the  KPD  in 
particular.  
 
Schlesinger could have been a historian in Stalin’s Russia. He was offered a 
post  at  the  Marx-Engels  Institute  on  arrival  in  Moscow  in  1935  on  the 
recommendation  of  the  KPD  Central  Committee.  Schlesinger  declined  the 
offer in favour of work at Comintern headquarters after being informed by the 
Institute  that  his  work  there  would  have  predominantly  involved  critical 
revisions  of  Marx’s  manuscripts,  something  Schlesinger  was  most 
unenthusiastic about. However, he later argued, 
 
… if gifted with the art of prophecy (as regards the ‘great purge’ 
as well as regards the future position of research workers)… I 
would have accepted the job, would have somehow fulfilled my 
obligations  to  Marx’s  manuscript,  and  divided  my  spare  time 
between some literary work for the German C.P and the writing 
of some serious historical book in Russian, to prepare for my   189 
desertion from the Marx-Engels Institute to a chair for modern 
German history at some Soviet university.
2 
 
This  statement  suggests  that  Schlesinger  believed,  with  hindsight,  that  the 
historian’s life was not quite so controlled as that of the party academic’s. He 
believed he could have maintained his KPD role and a research post if the 
Institute,  as  opposed  to  Comintern,  had  initially  employed  him.  His 
disillusionment with the limited intellectual work granted to him as a Comintern 
editor  and  his  subsequent  investigation  and  dismissal  would  not,  in  these 
circumstances, have occurred. In fact, later in his memoirs Schlesinger wrote 
that the historical field was ‘remote from the field of actual political struggle’.
3  
 
This attitude perhaps helps to decipher the apparent inconsistency between 
Schlesinger’s  personal  memoir  reflections  upon  the  stifling  intellectual 
environment  existing  within  Stalin’s  Soviet  Union  during  his  visits,  and  the 
arguably  positive  perception  of  research  within  the  historical  field  that  he 
wrote about immediately after his expulsion. If Schlesinger regarded the two 
working  environments  as  very  different  he  would  not  view  his  personal 
experience of one as providing a great deal of information about the other. 
Condemnation of one would not necessarily involve the censure of all work 
completed in the other. Yet one is able to perceive broad trends within the 
intellectual  world  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  Schlesinger’s  personal  writings.  If 
nothing else, his reflections help to create an understanding of the nature of 
the  society  in  which  the  Soviet  historians’  research  was  undertaken.
4  It  is 
argued here that Schlesinger’s memoir observations do throw significant light 
on the intellectual and cultural environment in which the historians whom he 
later  wrote  about  undertook  their  research.  This  creates  a  problematic 
contradiction  between  his  positive  comments  on  the  kind  of  work  these 
historians  were  able  to  successfully  complete  and  the  not  too  severe 
restraints on freedom placed upon them by the state and the party, and his 
own personal experience of curtailment of academic freedom and a speedy 
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realisation of the very limited opportunity for real intellectual activities.  
 
Whilst working for the International Agrarian Institute (IAI) Schlesinger gained 
his first experiences of Soviet life as an intellectual. The Institute was founded 
in 1926 in Moscow and was envisaged as the research centre for the Peasant 
International.  According  to  the  historian  of  Soviet  agricultural  research,  S. 
Gross Solomon: ‘The new Institute had a broad mandate: the study of social 
relations in agriculture throughout the world. In keeping with that mandate, the 
membership of the Institute included many specialists of foreign agriculture’.
5 
Although  the  IAI  was  officially  attached  to  the  Peasants’  International, 
Schlesinger described this institution as being more a fiction than a reality and 
his only relationship to it was restricted to participation in the meetings of its 
party nucleus.
6 Yet, Schlesinger insisted that the IAI was a ‘proper’ scientific 
institution  that  conducted  research  it  found necessary  and  useful.  Its  work 
often overlapped with that of the Communist Academy whose superiority was 
evident in ‘…purely theoretical issues and, also later in the practical problems 
of Russian collectivisation’.
7 Despite this theoretical superiority and the very 
different conditions within Russian and German agriculture, Schlesinger found 
discussions  between  the  two  institutions  to  be  convivial  and  academically 
fruitful.  
 
His memoirs praised the openness and comradeship pervading many of the 
scholarly  discussions  he  was  involved  in,  including  those  organised  by 
Comintern.  Schlesinger  was able  to  attend the  talks of  the  Commission  of 
Agrarian  Policies  in  the  VIII  Enlarged  Plenary  Meeting  of  the  ECCI  in 
December 1927. These talks centred on whether to support the establishment 
of peasant parties in capitalist countries.
8 Yet despite the open nature of these 
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talks, Schlesinger made clear that he, and many others, preferred to debate 
agrarian  problems  in  private  talks  connected  to  their  work  rather  than  in 
official party meetings, since most of their opinions differed somewhat from 
the  party  line.  Whilst  suggesting  that  differences  of  opinion  were  tolerated 
within  the  party  and  discussions  of  these  differences  did  take  place, 
Schlesinger’s  assertion  also  seems  to  indicate  a  reluctance  to  air  openly 
many  of  these  debates  and  perhaps  suggests  a  fear  of  reprisals.  In  fact, 
Schlesinger  explained  that  shortly  after  these  discussions,  party  orthodoxy 
was transformed into a, ‘…catechism published as a pamphlet’.
9 Everyone 
learned the appropriate answers in order to recite them if their party nucleus 
was ever investigated for unorthodoxy. This was done to facilitate the smooth 
playing  of  everyone’s  parts  in  the  ‘required  comedy’  since  hardly  anyone 
would have met the catechism’s demands if they were to answer sincerely.
10 
This episode suggests a requirement, by the party, of uniformity of opinion 
and  severe  limitation  of  genuine  discussion.  Schlesinger  did  point  out  that 
even those people who were in general agreement with the party majority, as 
regards the agrarian question, strongly disagreed with this kind of discipline, 
yet he gave no evidence of the numbers that felt this or how their disapproval 
was expressed. 
 
Schlesinger’s  own  work  at  this  time  focused  on  the  agrarian  problems  of 
Central and Western Europe, and in particular the agrarian problems within 
the German labour movement. He had his own sub-department within the IAI 
and his own librarian, Stalin’s wife Allilueva. Schlesinger noted positively in his 
memoirs, ‘… not withstanding all political differences, the impression was in 
favour not only of her but also of her husband and of the Russian party’s 
general  setting’.
11    The  main  body  of  the  work  Schlesinger  produced  in 
Moscow  became  a  book  entitled  The  Agrarian  Problem  in  German  Social 
Democracy. It was published in Russia two years after Schlesinger’s return to 
Germany.  Schlesinger  described  the  difficulties  he  faced  in  securing  the 
royalties  owed  to  him  from  the  IAI  after  his  book’s  publication.  He  had  to 
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involve his former Soviet trade union and allow them to sue the Institute on his 
behalf. This in no way altered his relationship to the IAI. As Schlesinger wrote, 
‘... lawsuits were regarded as a means of pressure necessary to get from the 
State Bank the foreign currency necessary to pay royalties to Germany’.
12 
 
There was, however, a more serious political dispute which arose during the 
process of publication. The IAI, whom Schlesinger described as being near to 
the Russian right wing, chose the KPD member August Thalheimer as one of 
the book’s critics.
13 According to Schlesinger, Thalheimer was ‘… the main 
theorist of Brandler’s group and hence one of my most outspoken factional 
opponent[s]’.
14 The other reviewer was Fritz Platten, Lenin’s friend from the 
Zimmerwald days, who wrote a favourable critique of the book.
15 When the 
Institute  published  the  book  they  did  so  together  with  a  preface  repeating 
many  of  Thalheimer’s  general  criticisms.  Schlesinger  understood  these 
criticisms  to  be  that  he  had  failed  to  side  unreservedly  with  ‘orthodox 
Marxism’. He felt that the IAI were being overly cautious in their treatment of 
his publication since Thalheimer had already been expelled from the KPD at 
this point, but unfortunately ‘… such incidents were unavoidable by-products 
of the prevailing confusion between scholarly and factional activities’.
16  This 
incident can serve as an example of the kind of difficulty that scholars and 
intellectuals  could  encounter  in the publication  of their  research;  orthodoxy 
was  of  paramount  importance.  Schlesinger  admitted  that  factionalism 
increasingly played a part in academic activities. However, whatever criticism, 
fair  or  unfair,  Schlesinger’s  book  was  subjected  to,  it  was  eventually 
published, suggesting that any atmosphere of intellectual repression was not 
at this point all pervasive.  
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The drafts of Schlesinger’s memoirs contain many general observations on 
the  nature  of  Soviet  society  during  his  first  visit  to  the  region.  As  a  keen 
sociologist  Schlesinger  consciously  endeavoured  to  establish  a  picture  of 
society, including the attitudes and educational levels of average workers. His 
party  links  with  the  German  Club  provided  him  access  to  the  KPD  group 
involved in studying factory relations. This ‘circle’ was attached to a Moscow 
textile factory and allowed for his participation in regular ‘triangle meetings’ in 
the  factory  between  the manager,  the  party  organiser  and  the  trade union 
organiser.
17  Schlesinger  believed  that  these  experiences,  amongst  others, 
enabled him to create a relatively sound understanding of Soviet society. He 
wrote:  ‘I  would  definitely  say  that,  in  those  days,  party  members,  even 
foreigners,  of  a  certain  experience  and  standing  got  an  honest  and  fairly 
complete picture of the problems and difficulties arising in Soviet life’.
18 It is 
clear that Schlesinger was assured of his reasonably accurate portrayal of the 
Soviet Union. However, this strong assertion should perhaps be questioned, 
especially  since  Schlesinger  admitted  that  he  could  not  say  whether  his 
experience  within  the  textile  factory  had  been  typical,  or  particularly 
representative of Soviet industrial life.
19  
 
Schlesinger  claimed  that  the  average  Russian  industrial  worker  was 
overwhelmingly  superior  to  the  average  Western  working  class  activist  in 
terms of intellectual development. Yet many in the Soviet Union remained at a 
very poor educational level. This fact determined some of the developments in 
the tone of Soviet literature in the previous years. As Schlesinger argued:  
 
It is ridiculous to put Stalin’s Short Course on the History of the 
CPSU (quite apart from its factual errors and distortions), and a 
whole lot of other publications which preceded and followed it, 
on a level with the classics of Marxist literature – but if one has 
seen  Russia  before  and  during  the  collectivisation,  one 
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understands  how  and  why  Marxism  was  simplified  –  and,  of 
course, vulgarised – to such an extent as was done.
20  
 
An atmosphere in which it was necessary, and perhaps a state priority, to 
‘vulgarise’  literature  could  indeed  appear  to  be  stifling  for  an  intellectual. 
Certain constraints were placed on publications and these would inevitably 
limit vocabulary and the sophistication of argument. However, whilst admitting 
the ‘distortions’ in much of the literature, Schlesinger’s pragmatic justification 
of the need to simplify helps to explain his initially more positive assessment 
of Soviet historiography once exiled from the Soviet Union. 
 
Schlesinger’s  memoir  observations  provide  evidence  of  the  influence  the 
intellectual  environment  in  the  Soviet  Union  had  on  western  communist 
parties.  In  late  1931  Schlesinger  and  Mila  became  very  active  within  an 
educational  circle  they  had  helped  to  establish  in  Berlin.  The  circle  was 
composed of teachers from the higher party schools: members of the KPD’s 
Education Department; people such as Schlesinger and Fritz David, whose 
party  work  was  mainly  editorial,  and  educationalists  such  as  Johannes 
Schmidt, head of the Berlin ‘Marxist Workers’ High School’.
21 The circle spent 
its time formulating party school programmes, airing theoretical debates within 
a  relatively  free  environment and  planning  for  the  publication  of  annotated 
Marxist  classics.  However,  Schlesinger  admitted  in  his  memoirs:  ‘An 
institution  such  as  our  circle  was  bound  to  become  a  victim  of  the 
authoritarian trends within the party’.
22 The Party Secretariat closed down the 
circle  immediately  after  the  publication  of  Stalin’s  famous  letter  to 
Proletarskaia  revoliutsiia  in  1931.
23  It  was  in  this  letter  that  Stalin  insisted 
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one of the accused, Fritz David was also known as Ilya-David Israilevich Kruglyansky and 
was born in 1897. He was a member of the KPD and the CPSU. At the 1936 trial he pleaded 
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certain matters were not open to historical debate but were, in fact, axiomatic. 
Schlesinger  pointed  out  that  the  circle  was  not  involved  in  the  immediate 
subject  of  the  letter.  Yet,  Schlesinger  observed,  ‘…  beyond  its  immediate 
subject Stalin’s letter was intended to prevent theoretical research from being 
carried  out  otherwise  than  under  the  immediate  control  of  the  political 
leadership  –  and  from  this  standpoint  our  circle  surely  left  much  to  be 
desired’.
24 Schlesinger recognised the great impact Stalin’s letter and attitude 
had  had  upon  his  own  opportunity  to  create  theoretical  work  and  debate 
contentious  issues.  It  placed  limitations  upon  the  kind  of  work  that  could 
henceforth be undertaken and upon the appropriate channels through which 
research could be conducted. Schlesinger argued that Stalin’s influence was 
felt strongly and immediately within the KPD. He noted: ‘Stalin…by his letter 
to  the  Editor  of  Proletskaya  Revolutsia  had  opened  his  ‘offensive  on  the 
theoretical  front’  against  hidden  Trotskyites.  The  party’s  internal  life  was 
already Russified to such an extent that no one was astonished about the 
example  being  followed  by  the  leader  of  the  German  party’.
25  Thälmann 
instantly  launched  his  own  ‘theoretical  offensive’  within  the  party,  curbing 
debate  and  closing  discussion  groups  such  as  Schlesinger’s  educational 
circle.  
 
Schlesinger’s portrayal of the ‘russification’ of the German party at this time as 
well as the subservience of Thälmann to his Soviet masters is substantiated 
by many other sources. As the wife of Eugene Leviné and later Ernst Meyer, 
two key figures within the party, Rosa Leviné-Meyer was in a good position 
from which to report on German affairs. Concerning his assumption of the 
KPD leadership in 1926 she wrote: ‘Thaelmann was much better suited to the 
role of puppet. In a private talk with Ernst, he said he would surround himself 
with a set of secretaries, including Ernst, to work for him. ‘The policy will come 
from Moscow anyhow’, he concluded wisely’.
26 Later in her memoirs, referring 
                                                 
24 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany, p. 440. 
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26 R. Leviné-Meyer, Inside German Communism, (Pluto Press, London, 1977) p. 93. Leviné-
Meyer’s second husband Ernst Meyer (1887-1930) was a member of the KPD politburo from 
1920 until January 1923. He was re-elected in 1927 but due to his anti-Thälmann position he 
was removed from all party functions in June 1929, shortly before his death from tuberculosis 
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to the KPD leaders of 1928, including Thälmann, she observed: ‘They soon 
learned to repeat Stalin’s orders with automatic precision’.
27 What the CPSU, 
Comintern and Stalin, in particular, declared, became the final word. 
 
Such statements confirm what Schlesinger had reported of the increasingly 
Soviet  controlled  and  intellectually  stifled  environment  within  the  party.  If 
Stalin’s initiative had had such an impact within the KPD, Schlesinger must 
have been well aware that its repercussions would have been felt even more 
fundamentally within the Soviet Union, thus having a dramatic influence upon 
Soviet historians and their freedom to research and publish. 
 
In 1935 Schlesinger became the editor of the German edition of Comintern’s 
official  publication  Communist  International.
28  Fritz  David  had  been  the 
German editor but on his promotion to the General Editorial Board he had 
secured his old position for Schlesinger. Although David’s motives for offering 
Schlesinger the job were later questioned on his arrest and trial for terrorism, 
it came as no surprise to Schlesinger that he should be offered the role. There 
were very few Germans in Moscow with both Russian language and editing 
skills.  In  fact,  when  political  opponents  tried  to  block  Schlesinger’s 
appointment, they could find no suitable replacement to suggest.
29  
 
According  to  Schlesinger,  the  importance  of  precise  formulations  within 
Communist International was so great that the Russians were bound to see 
themselves  as  superior  in  such  matters.  The  General  Editorial  Board, 
therefore,  comprised  of  an  all-Russian  membership,  with  the  exception  of 
David who was granted his privileged position due to his great experience in 
Russian matters. This editorial board directly edited the Russian version of 
                                                                                                                                           
also married to Eugen Leviné (1883-1919) a founding member of the KPD and participant in 
the short lived Bavarian Soviet Republic in 1919, for which part he was tried and condemned 
to death by the Weimar authorities (Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary of the 
Comintern, p. 260). 
27 Leviné-Meyer, Inside German Communism, p. 145. Another KPD memoirist, Oskar Hippe, 
wrote of the Stalinisation of the party, viewing the 10
th Party Congress of 1925 as the decisive 
turning point away from Leninism and towards Stalinism (O. Hippe, …And Red is the Colour 
of Our Flag (Index Books, London, 1991) trans. A Drummond, p. 92). 
28 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 137. 
29 Ibid. p. 138.   197 
Communist International and also undertook all of the political editing. The 
foreign edition editors would then select appropriate material for inclusion in 
their  country’s  version.  Their  choice,  however,  was  subject  to  the  General 
Editorial Board’s approval.
30 
 
Under  these  circumstances,  Schlesinger  very  quickly  became  disillusioned 
with his work at Comintern. As he conceded in his memoirs, there was little 
room for initiative or indeed much real thought on his part at all. He found that 
for weeks on end he might, ‘… have little more to do in my job than to read 
the German newspapers, to check the correctness of the translations from 
Russian’,
31  or  to  give  the  Board  information  on  some  factual  German 
questions.
32 Schlesinger had taken the post on the assumption that it would 
offer him the opportunity to learn about communist parties in other countries 
and,  most  importantly,  to  write  articles  for  the  German  underground  and 
thereby aid clarification of party disputes. On first taking the post at Comintern 
it was still theoretically possible for him to contribute an article to the Russian 
edition, yet as the publication increasingly became seen as the organ for the 
unequivocal exposition of Comintern and the Soviet Union’s official views this 
possibility was gradually reduced to nil.  
 
In  the  1920s  Schlesinger  had  written  many  articles  for  publication  in 
Comintern  periodicals.  In  his  memoirs,  he  argued  that  he  had  frequently 
contributed, ‘… on most important questions, without holding any party office 
more senior than that of the chief editor of a Provincial daily and of a member 
of the Provincial Party Secretariat’.
33 For example, in early 1929, Schlesinger 
wrote an article on the theoretical foundations of ‘social fascism’, published in 
Communist International.
34 In late 1930, Schlesinger was able to offer another 
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contribution  to  Communist  International  on  the  conditions  of  political  mass 
strikes.
35  Yet  he  discovered  that,  by  1935,  there  were  to  be  no  more 
opportunities for him to publish any named articles, despite having a more 
responsible  party  post  at  Comintern  headquarters.  National  party  leaders 
were now regarded as the main contributors. However, even the articles of 
major  leaders  of  foreign  parties  were  subject  to  a  great  deal  of  editing. 
According to Schlesinger, there was a tendency, ‘… to regard original work of 
authors  –  in  particular  prominent  ones  –  as  hooks  on  which  statements, 
regarded  as  necessary  from  Comintern’s  standpoint,  had  to  be  hanged’.
36 
This would inevitably create a somewhat stifled intellectual atmosphere and 
would certainly curb inter-party debate. 
 
One feature of Schlesinger’s work as editor was the attention required when 
checking  the  translation  of  Russian  articles  into  German.  Overlooking  a 
mistake that had potential political implications could cost one’s party ticket. 
No  mistake  was  regarded  as  accidental;  an  inattentive  editor  might  aid  an 
intentionally anti-party translator in distorting the party line.
37  
 
A lack of fulfilment in his Comintern work led Schlesinger to seek intellectual 
satisfaction  in  part-time  activities  for  the  German  party  and  in  other 
publications. Shortly after his arrival in Moscow, Schlesinger was asked by the 
party publishers to write a book on Nazism, ‘… a systematic critique of the 
social demagogy of the Nazis, for the benefit of the workers who had to fight it 
within  the  diverse  organisations  of  the  ‘Third  Empire’’.
38  Schlesinger  made 
clear in his memoirs that he was not suggesting that his effort was a, ‘…work 
of genius’.
39 However, it was the first systematic analysis of Nazi demagogy, 
                                                                                                                                           
be  used  in  terms  of  insincere  Social  Democratic  leaders  but  was  very  much  against  the 
generalisation  of  the  term.  See  also  Schlesinger,  Erinnerungen:  Bis  zu  Hitlers 
Machtübernahme, p. 271. 
35 ‘Putting all my emphasis on the distinction between the present economic strikes and the 
political strikes to come I found the former’s main importance in their preparing the way for the 
latter and in the shaping of those mass organs which would be needed in the following and 
more decisive, stages of the German revolution’. Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers 
Machtübernahme, p 318. 
36 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 153. 
37 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 153. 
38 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 156. 
39 Ibid. p. 156.   199 
and remained the only one to emerge from within the Marxist camp as far as 
he was aware. According to Schlesinger, had this treatment of the subject 
been published it would have been read four years in advance of the critiques 
of the non-Marxist opponents of Nazism, who inevitably failed to analyse the 
class character of Nazi ideology; such as the fact that Nazi racial theories 
were  expressions  of  class  subordination  within  Germany.  Schlesinger 
continued: ‘Yet while our theoretical standpoint allowed us to come out with 
an earlier and more thorough critique of Nazi theories than available to the 
bourgeois anti-Nazis, the publicist setting which was available for the defence 
of this standpoint defeated that theoretical advantage’.
40 The intellectual and 
publishing  atmosphere  was  such  that  a  work  of  tremendous  value  to  the 
German workers and the Marxist camp as a whole remained unpublished. 
 
Schlesinger had finished the manuscript by 1 May 1936 and received a report 
from the party publishers in mid-July. They were not wholly against publishing 
the work but did raise several issues. In October 1936 the manuscript was 
returned,  with  the  comment,  ‘…  you  will  understand  that  its  publication  is 
impossible in your present circumstances’.
41 The publishers were referring to 
the  fact  that,  by  now,  Schlesinger  was  under  investigation  by  the  party 
because of his connections with David. Schlesinger had already received the 
majority of his payment for the work and he willingly recognised that the party 
publishers had settled the matter on fair terms whilst they could still deal with 
him as a comrade. However, he had not yet been expelled from the party and 
the proceedings against him may have only resulted in a reprimand, yet the 
publishers already felt it necessary to sever their ties with him. Schlesinger 
argued,  even  if  he  had  been  subject  to  a  mere  reprimand,  the  prevailing 
atmosphere  would  have  made  it  very  difficult  for  the  publishers  to  issue a 
book of his. Schlesinger criticised the environment, ‘… in which the literary 
treatment  of  a  most  important  issue  depended  on  quite  extraneous 
circumstances’.
42 This series of events and Schlesinger’s reactions to them 
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certainly  suggest  a  stifled  and  intrusive  intellectual  environment;  one  that 
would  inevitably  have  impacted  upon  the  quality  and  academic  integrity  of 
Soviet historiography. Schlesinger witnessed and was himself subject to the 
state’s  increasing  control  over  intellectual  life  within  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
mere instigation of an investigation by the party precluded Schlesinger from 
publishing again.  
 
Schlesinger did, in fact, write a great deal in his memoirs about the negative 
atmosphere that existed for intellectuals and academics in the Soviet Union 
during  the  times  in  which  he  lived  there.  From  a  wider  perspective, 
Schlesinger understood his private discomfort as the by-product of a certain 
development within the party. This manifested itself in the disappearance of a 
particular kind of intellectual from the political stage: 
 
 Since  Rosa  Luxemburg’s,  and  earlier,  days  a  certain  type  of  party 
intellectual, to which I counted myself with pride, had written on the 
assumption  that  they  were  responsible  for  the  scholarly  qualities  of 
their  contributions  and  for  their  usefulness  as  incentives  to  fruitful 
argument: the party as a whole, in which the author played his part as 
one comrade amongst many, had to organise these discussions and 
then to draw the lessons from the exchange of opinions; there was 
nothing inherently wrong in remaining in a minority
43 
 
The  increasing  demand  for  ideological  homogeneity  and  the  limitations 
imposed upon criticism differed starkly with Schlesinger’s conceptions of how 
a Marxist party should operate. In his view, if an author took responsibility for 
the academic integrity of his/her work as well as its efficacy in engendering 
discussion, isolation upon a particular theoretical issue was not a matter for 
investigation or even of much party concern. In a similar way Schlesinger had 
argued, in another section of his unfinished memoirs, that it was the duty of 
                                                                                                                                           
written and Schlesinger wondered if the withdrawal had anything to do with him (Schlesinger, 
Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 156). 
43 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 154. In the first edition of the 
memoirs,  Schlesinger  makes  a  similar  statement  but  does  not  mention  Luxemburg 
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every Communist to follow unhesitatingly the orders of the Communist world 
party.  However,  it  was  also,  ‘...  every  Communist’s  obligation  to  make  his 
maximal contribution towards those decisions’, that is: ‘It is the obligation of 
ruthless expression of one’s own opinion and ruthless criticism of one’s own 
as well as of other comrades’ mistakes’.
44  
 
If one compares Schlesinger’s own descriptions of what he expected from a 
Marxist party and its state, with his observations on what actually occurred in 
the Soviet Union one can easily understand Schlesinger’s disillusionment with 
the kind of intellectual opportunities available to him. As mentioned earlier, 
Schlesinger may have separated his own experiences from those of people 
working within the historical field but he can hardly have denied that the party, 
and in particular Stalin’s, increasingly total opposition to dissent of any kind 
was inevitably to have huge repercussions on all sections of Soviet society. 
The party and state exercised significant control over all academic subjects 
and  the  study  of  history,  necessarily  of  great  importance  to  a  state  with 
Marxist-Leninist  aspirations,  would,  therefore,  be  particularly  heavily 
regulated. This was increasingly so after Stalin’s personal intervention in the 
historical  debate  in  1931.
45  It  is  difficult  to  accept  that  someone  with  the 
insight and intelligence of Schlesinger could fail to comprehend that his own 
experiences and difficulties regarding his intellectual and academic integrity 
whilst in the Soviet Union may well have been mirrored in some way within 
the historical field. 
 
Schlesinger  was  actually  acquainted  with  a  Russian  KPD  member,  Emel 
Lurye, who worked in the University of Moscow History Faculty during his final 
visit  to  the  Soviet  Union.
46  Schlesinger  had  first  known  Emel  through  their 
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KPD  work  and  they  became  friendly  during  Schlesinger’s  1926  visit  to 
Moscow, since they shared a mutual friendship with Ruth Fischer. Emel had 
sometimes taken Schlesinger along to Russian oppositionist meetings at this 
time.
47  In  early  July  1936  the  German  party  representative  in  Comintern 
informed Schlesinger of Emel’s arrest. Schlesinger immediately spoke frankly 
with the representative about his and Mila’s relationship to the arrested man. 
This had been purely social since they disagreed over internal KPD matters.
48 
However, he had later appeared sincere in his submission to the majority and, 
according to Schlesinger, ‘… had given us good reasons to regard himself as 
convinced of the basic correctness (though not, of course, of the details) of 
Stalin’s line’.
49 Schlesinger was, therefore, astonished at his arrest, admission 
to  charges  of  terrorism  and  conspiracy  to  murder  Stalin  and  eventual 
execution in the first ‘purge’ trial of 1936.
50  
 
This surprise at Emel’s arrest and trial may have led Schlesinger to doubt the 
charges  made  against  him.  If  this  were  the  case,  he  could  well  have 
developed a negative attitude towards the study of history in the Soviet Union. 
There would appear to be little freedom for intellectual expression if one could 
be  ‘purged’  at  any  time.  However,  Schlesinger  explained  that  when  first 
writing his memoirs in 1944 and The Spirit of Post-war Russia soon after, he 
was fully convinced of the existence of an actual conspiracy against Stalin.
51 
An anonymous paper to the journal Pacific Affairs written by Schlesinger the 
year after he left the Soviet Union substantiates this attitude.
52 Under these 
circumstances Schlesinger may well have believed that Emel was guilty of 
conspiracy  and  terrorism  and  would,  therefore,  regard  the  intellectual 
environment  as  being  hazardous  only  if  one  were  involved  in  anti-state 
activities. 
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However,  this  explanation  loses  a  little  of  its  credibility  when  other 
observations Schlesinger made about Emel’s fate elsewhere in his unfinished 
memoirs  are  taken  into  consideration.  Schlesinger  wrote  that,  after  Emel’s 
trial,  the  party  authorities  claimed  that  a  whole  group  of  terrorists  existed 
within the history faculty of Moscow University; it was, in fact, ‘…a seat of 
conspiracy’.
53 Historian R. Conquest confirmed this, writing: ‘Historians were 
particularly  vulnerable.  The  whole  school  of  Party  historians  which  had 
followed Pokrovsky were arrested. They were often labelled terrorists. In fact, 
it is quite extraordinary how many of the leading terrorist bands were headed 
by historians’.
54 Yet Schlesinger also wrote in his memoirs: ‘I must assume 
that nothing worse than an organised discussion group to oppose the party 
line  in  the  historical  field  was  in  existence’.
55  He  assumed that  the  history 
faculty had done nothing more than form an academic clique, an act which 
had resulted in their arrest and execution. If Schlesinger did believe that the 
historians  at  Moscow  University  were  executed  by  the  Soviet  Union  for 
establishing  a  group  to  oppose  a  certain  historical  interpretation,  an 
understanding of his attitude towards Soviet historiography immediately after 
his return to the West becomes problematic. 
 
After  describing  his  expulsion,  Schlesinger  reflected  upon  authoritarianism 
within a Marxist party, how a party should operate and how its relationship to 
theory  should  best  be  developed.  In  the  second  draft  of  his  memoirs 
Schlesinger  explained  that  the  argument  was,  ‘…  in  substance  developed 
already in the first version of these memoirs; I cannot however assert that in 
1944 I was as detached from my personal experiences as I am now’.
56 This 
statement suggests that in the earlier version of the memoirs and around the 
time  that  Schlesinger  was  writing  many  of  his  articles  on  Soviet 
historiography, he was still very personally affected by his expulsion from the 
party.  One  would  imagine  this  would  engender  feelings  of  anger  and 
frustration and yet these emotions do not correspond with the clinical, perhaps 
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even apologetic, tone in which he was to write about the Soviet Union in the 
1940s. Instead, it is likely Schlesinger was attempting to prove his continued 
loyalty to the Soviet regime after his expulsion. Again there would appear to 
be a paradox between how Schlesinger expressed his feelings about events, 
both at the time and with hindsight, and the way in which he was to write 
about them in his academic works. 
 
Schlesinger argued that a certain degree of intellectual freedom was vital for 
the  healthy  growth of  theory.  However,  this  still  did  not  exist  in  the  Soviet 
Union in any satisfactory way at the time of his memoir writing: 
 
Long after Stalin, his ‘purges’ and the assertion that any lack of 
uniformity in the communist camp presented a weapon for the 
bourgeoisie  has  gone,  his  concept  of  theory  as  an  outlook 
authoritatively fixed and developed by the party leadership (and 
necessarily by the party leadership, for otherwise it could not 
claim authority) continues to sterilise Marxism.
57 
 
He went on to question the efficacy of one of the main ‘achievements’ of the 
Stalin period, namely the concept of Marxism as a necessarily authoritarian 
symbol of party unity. Schlesinger argued that Marxism had been at its most 
effective when it was promoted not simply as a systematic presentation and 
propaganda of accepted tenets, but rather as a system or method of thought 
applied to discover ‘gaps’ in theory and elaborate ways in which to fill them, 
thereby moving that theory forward. Such action would continually alter theory 
in a dialectical progression. Theory would be advanced ‘… not necessarily by 
the correctness of the suggested solutions but by the result of the argument 
induced  by  them’.
58  The  very  act  of  debate  and  the  freedom  to  make 
theoretical errors gave Schlesinger’s Marxism its vitality. His approach was 
based on the assumption that Marxist principles would be the foundation of 
party  activities  and  that  majority  decisions  on  practical  issues  would  be 
obeyed but that, ‘…no statement on matters of theory, by whomever it was 
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issued,  could  claim  authoritarian  validity’.
59  Schlesinger  admitted  that  this 
assumption was rejected in the course of the purges. Stalin did indeed claim 
total ‘authoritarian validity’ for his theoretical statements, including those he 
made  on  the  historical  front.  How  was  it  possible  for  Schlesinger  not  to 
condemn the atmosphere in which historians were working in the 1930s and 
1940s when the conditions in which they had to research were those very 
ones he claimed were most dangerous and stifling for theoretical progress? 
 
Schlesinger’s  unpublished  memoir  writings  do  contain  several  positive 
comments  about  the  intellectual  environment  of  Stalin’s  Soviet  Union. 
Schlesinger  insisted  theoretical  advancements  were  made  under,  and 
perhaps because of, Stalin. He wrote: ‘I find it difficult for anyone except very 
narrow-minded  dogmatics  to  deny  that  the  overcoming  of  the  schematic 
economist  interpretation  of  the  Marxist  theory  of  history  implied  a  major 
progress in sociological analysis’.
60 Schlesinger argued that the repudiation of 
what  he  regarded  as  Pokrovskii’s  historical  theories  represented  a  great 
advance in the study of history in the Soviet Union, a thesis he had elaborated 
consistently in his academic writings upon the subject. However, there were 
negative aspects in the progress of historical writing. He did concede, ‘…there 
is room for argument about the correctness of some of the statements made 
since  1935  by  Soviet  historians  in  order  to  emphasise  the  importance  of 
national  struggles  for  independence  in  1612  and  1812’.
61  There  were  no 
grounds  for  Marxist  historians  to  combine  an  appreciation  of  the  national 
struggle with any positive assessment of the Russian regime of those times. 
Schlesinger recognised the increased politicisation of the historical arena and 
yet emphasised the few positive benefits of research under Stalin. 
 
Schlesinger compared advances in historiography with those he regarded as 
having occurred in the arts. He wrote of Sholokhov’s And Quiet Flows the 
Don:
62 
                                                 
59 Ibid. p. 239. 
60 Ibid. pp. 185-186. 
61 Ibid. p. 186. 
62 M. Sholokov, Quiet Flows the Done, Volumes 1 and 2 (Raduga, USSR, 1984) trans. R. 
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I  always  regarded  Sholokhov’s  achievement,  and  his  final 
success when the leftist trends in art were overcome and his 
was praised as one of the masterpieces of ‘socialist realism’… 
as  a  warning  against  the  tendency  to  regard  the  rise  of 
‘Stalinism’ in the intellectual fields as an unmitigated evil: it was, 
indeed,  the  agency  through  which  much  of  the  narrow-
mindedness  grown  during  the  first  revolutionary  period  was 
overcome.
63 
 
For  Schlesinger,  the  Stalinist  period  of  Soviet  history  overcame  earlier, 
erroneous  movements  and  trends.  He  argued  that  to  regard  the  Stalinist 
period as devoid of any intellectual achievement was naïve and short-sighted. 
Many problems and setbacks may have occurred within the academic fields 
but progress was made nonetheless. In the overcoming of certain intellectual 
and theoretical trends, the party and the intellectuals may have ‘swung’ too far 
in  the  other  direction  but  it  was  this  debate  and  continuous  dynamic  that 
constituted  progress.  It  was  clear  to  Schlesinger  that,  ‘…the  Russian 
revolutionaries had never proved able to correct an error without falling into 
the  opposite  one’,  but  theoretical  advancement  was  still  achieved.
64  Whilst 
other commentators, such as the sociologist Nicholas Timasheff, viewed the 
Stalinist  1930s  as a  time  of  ‘great retreat’  from  the revolutionary  values  in 
cultural and social policy developed after the revolution, Schlesinger saw the 
changes  in  a  positive  light.
65  S.  Fitzpatrick  described  the  ‘retreat’  as, 
                                                 
63 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 180-181 The book was later 
made into an opera, but Schlesinger felt that this was far more populist than the original work. 
Schlesinger  did  describe  the  book  and  opera  in  the  first  version  of  his  memoirs,  but 
concentrated more on its contemporary impact than this historical perspective (Erinnerungen: 
Illegalität und Emigration, p. 181-182). 
64 Ibid. p. 185. 
65 N. S. Timasheff, The Great Retreat The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia, 
(New York, Arno Press, 1972). The first edition of the work was published in the US in 1946. 
Timasheff  argued  that,  contrary  to  popular  opinion,  pre-revolutionary  Russia  was  not 
stagnant,  but  showed  signs  of  overcoming  her  backwardness  and  developing  towards  an 
industrialised democracy. The Bolshevik revolution was thus, ‘… a shock inflicted on a rapidly 
advancing society compelling it to depart from its historical ways’. The revolution was, ‘… a 
violent  disruption  of  continuity,  a  conflict  between  a  Utopian  idea  and  historical  tradition’, 
continued  by  way  of  an  organised  dictatorship,  (p.  71).  The  ‘Great  Retreat’  from  the 
‘Communist  Experiment’  from  1934  onwards  involved  the  restoration  of  certain  national 
traditions and some adjustment of society towards its original line of development; although   207 
‘…exemplified by the return to the classics in literature, the reevaluation of the 
Russian  national  heritage  and  history,  and  the  repudiation  of  progressive 
methods in education’.
66 Whilst Schlesinger conceded that many of these new 
emphases  went  too  far,  he  did  believe  they  were  a  necessary  step  in 
overcoming past mistakes made in the heady atmosphere of the 1920s. 
 
When  discussing  disillusionment  with  his  Comintern  work,  something  that 
Schlesinger regarded as symptomatic of the party’s more authoritarian stance 
on intellectual activities, he wrote that his feelings on this matter had altered 
over time. He explained that immediately after leaving the Soviet Union he 
had felt quite negative about the climate there. However, now, in the mid-
1950s, he felt much more optimistic about intellectual freedom: 
 
…. in the USSR there is now a fair freedom of argument even 
on  major  issues,  if  conducted  in  scholarly  journals  in  the 
economic, legal and even philosophical field; a person’s being 
‘wrong’ at some occasion does not preclude him from uttering 
his  opinion  at  some  following  one.  It  may be  hoped  that  this 
habit  will  eventually  expand  to  the  CPSU’s  clearly  political 
publications.
67 
 
If Schlesinger was becoming optimistic about the freedom of debate in the 
second half of the 1950s he could not have been so before then. One can 
logically deduce that Schlesinger believed the opportunity for debate, even 
within a scholarly context, to be minimal in the 1930s and 1940s. As he had 
pointed  out  earlier,  the  party  was  increasingly  claiming  a  monopoly  over 
theoretical  validity  at  this  time.  There  is,  therefore,  a  great  deal  of 
inconsistency  in  Schlesinger’s  memoir  writing  about  the  intellectual 
environment existing within the Soviet Union during his visits to the region. At 
                                                                                                                                           
this by no means implied a break with political dictatorship or the rejection of the materialist 
philosophy of Marxism.  Instead an amalgamation of  traditional and communist values had 
taken  place.  So:  ‘The  Russian  Orthodox  Church  is  once  more  a  recognized,  even  partly 
privileged  body;  this  is  in  accordance  with  historical  tradition.  But  the  State  teaches 
antireligion in schools; this is in accordance with Communist principles’, (p. 355). 
66 Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front, p. 197. 
67 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 154.   208 
some  points  he  seemed  to  suggest  that  the  atmosphere  was  stifling, 
especially as regards his own experiences, and at others he would claim that 
certain  freedoms  did  exist  and  that  numerous  intellectual  advances  were 
achieved during the period. 
 
Taking the memoirs as a whole, the impression that Schlesinger gives of the 
intellectual environment in which he found himself working when in the Soviet 
Union  was  a  stifled,  harsh  and  dissatisfying  one.  Schlesinger  clearly 
described this as regards his own personal circumstances. The opportunities 
for  initiative  and  creativity  were  massively  curbed  whilst  he  worked  for 
Comintern and there was a tremendous emphasis on precision and accuracy, 
producing a somewhat paranoid and creatively infertile atmosphere. As early 
as 1926 Schlesinger encountered the difficulties of publishing in the Soviet 
Union and the problems of factionalism taking precedence over intellectual 
integrity. In 1936 he again faced the now insurmountable political obstacles to 
publication. He was eventually expelled from the party and forced to leave the 
USSR because of his willingness to debate theoretical concerns openly and 
because of his lack of vigilance. In his memoirs Schlesinger wrote that he was 
chosen as a suitable candidate for expulsion because of his ‘liberalism’, ‘…not 
in  the  ordinary  sense,  of  course,  but  in  that  of  a  readiness  frankly  to  air 
disagreements  within  the  communist  party’.
68  It  is,  therefore,  plausible  to 
assume  that  he  would  regard  an  intellectual  environment  that  could  not 
tolerate his methodological beliefs as one that was itself intolerable for the 
undertaking of Marxist theoretical work.  
                                                 
68 Ibid. p. 222.     209 
 
Chapter Six: Schlesinger’s writings on history in 
Stalin’s Soviet Union 
Writings from 1938-1947 
This chapter describes and appraises those writings produced before Stalin’s 
death in 1953. The first part deals with his writings immediately after leaving 
the Soviet Union, and the second those articles he produced when settled as 
an  academic  in  Glasgow.  Taken  together  they  represent  a  coherent,  if 
developing,  expression  of  Schlesinger’s  views  on  historiography  in  Stalin’s 
Soviet Union. 
It  is  argued  here  that  throughout  his  writings  of  the  period,  Schlesinger 
attempted to portray the research of history in the Soviet Union in a positive 
light.  Whilst  never  ignoring  the  more  difficult  and  impeding  aspects  of  the 
intellectual  environment  in  which  historians  worked,  Schlesinger’s  overall 
analysis was almost predominantly one of praise, at least for progress made 
under difficult circumstances. He often defended historians’ work against what 
he seems to have perceived as unfair Western criticism, taking on the role of 
advocate for Soviet scholarship. Another distinctive feature of these writings 
was his reiteration of many of the arguments used in ongoing campaigns in 
the  Soviet  Union.  For  example,  in  many  of  the  papers  of  this  period  he 
reproduced various elements of the anti-Pokrovskii campaign; his criticisms of 
Bolshevik historian M. N. Pokrovskii and his so-called ‘school’ mirrored those 
made  by  representatives  of  the  state.  Schlesinger’s  interpretations  often 
coalesced with official Soviet orthodoxy. This may have been because he was 
in agreement with the emphases current at that time, but Schlesinger could 
also have been consciously interpreting Soviet events in a positive light. This 
contrasts  sharply  with  his  personal  experiences  of  life  as  a  scholar  in  the 
Soviet Union and with his later writing on the subject, in which he was far 
more  condemnatory  of  the  atmosphere  and  ensuing  scholarly  production 
under Stalin. 
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The first of Schlesinger’s articles to deal specifically with the subject of Soviet 
historiography  was  entitled  ‘Neue  sowjetrussische  Literatur  zur 
Sozialforschung’ (‘New Soviet Russian Literature on Social Research’) and 
was published in 1938. Schlesinger had been invited to submit this report by 
the Institut fur Sozialforschung based in Frankfurt, and the article was printed 
in their publication.
1 The work represented the main focus of Schlesinger’s 
research  and  income  whilst  in  Prague  in  1938.  It  concerned  general 
ideological developments in the Soviet Union and contained a section on ‘The 
provisional  results  of  the historical  discussion’.
2  In  his  unpublished  memoir 
reflections,  Schlesinger  explained  that  the  article  concerned  recent 
historiographical discussions, which he believed had led to the overcoming of 
the  Pokrovskiian  approach,  that  of  the  historian  M.  N.  Pokrovskii,  an 
achievement of some note in Schlesinger’s eyes.  
 
 Schlesinger wrote:  
 
My  general  intention  in  writing  these  reports  was  the 
demonstration of the actual progress made in the development 
of Marxist theory during the overcoming of the diverse schools 
which  had  held  a  monopoly  position  during  the  twenties  and 
early  thirties,  quite  independently  from  the  paraphernalia  with 
which this progress was surrounded in the atmosphere of the 
‘great purge’ and its immediate antecedents. Without knowing 
anything definitive about the amount of truth or otherwise which 
stood behind those paraphernalia I believed that it was possible 
to define the social and intellectual developments the road for 
which was opened by the Stalinist methods.
3 
 
This  statement  seems  to  entirely  substantiate  the  thesis  that  Schlesinger 
intentionally  and  consciously  conveyed  a  positive  description  of  Soviet 
                                                 
1 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 273. The Institut was later to be 
known as the ‘Frankfurt School’ and was instrumental in the development of critical theory. 
For  more  information  on  the  school  see  M.  Jay,  The  Dialectical  Imagination  (London, 
Heinemann Educational Books, 1973), esp. pp. 3-40. 
2 Schlesinger, ‘Neue sowjetrussische Literatur zur Sozialforschung’, p. 186. 
3 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 249.   211 
historiographical developments in his writings. His aim was to demonstrate 
the achievements made in intellectual fields, something perhaps denied by 
other commentators. This progress had come about because Stalinist Russia 
was  able  to  overcome  the  erroneous  theories  and  interpretations  that  had 
enjoyed  monopoly  status  in  the  earlier  period  of  Soviet  rule.  Schlesinger 
argued that, not knowing anything substantial about the ‘paraphernalia’ of the 
‘great purge’, he had believed it possible to observe ideological progress as a 
result of it. Ignorance of the scale, brutality and extra-judicial nature of much 
of  the  ‘purges’  had  apparently  allowed  Schlesinger  to  view  developments 
purely  in  terms  of  intellectual  progress.  His  use  of  the  past  tense  in  this 
sentence may well have been significant. Writing after Stalin’s death, and now 
knowing more about that ‘paraphernalia’ he perhaps no longer agreed with his 
earlier, deeply pragmatic, approach. However, he did not say so. 
 
The historiographical section of the article began with a short explanation of 
the  background  to  the  recent  historical  discussions.  On  16  May  1934  a 
Government  decree  on  the  defects  of  historical  teaching  in  primary  and 
middle schools was published.
4 This attack on the inadequacies and errors of 
current school textbooks was the starting point of the ensuing debate. The 
decree argued that historical teaching had simply provided abstract definitions 
of socio-economic formations, as opposed to a living description of the course 
of history. The Soviet authorities called for a new set of textbooks to facilitate 
the  teaching  of  history.  Unfortunately,  the  drafts  of  the  new  books  still 
appeared  to  suffer  from  errors  of,  what  Schlesinger  described  as,  the 
‘Pokrovskii school’. The Party leadership thus made clear in pronouncements 
of  8  and  9  August  1934  that  the  main  task  in  the  historical  field  was  the 
overcoming of this school.
5 Schlesinger explained that this was originally to be 
                                                 
4 For the text of the decree see M. Pundeff, History in the USSR, Selected Readings (San 
Francisco, Chandler Publishing Company, 1967), pp. 98-99. For more information on Soviet 
textbooks see D. L.  Brandenberger and A.  M. Dubrovsky, ‘The  People Need  a Tsar: The 
Emergence of National Bolshevism as Stalinist Ideology, 1931-1941’, Europe-Asia Studies, 
50,  5,  July  1998,  pp.  873-892.  For  another  Western  account  contemporaneous  to 
Schlesinger, see A. Mazour, Modern Russian Historiography, (Princeton, D.  Van Nostrand 
Co., Inc., 1958), pp. 196… 
5 For  the  text of  the decree see  Pundeff, History in the USSR,   pp. 100-105.The  original 
statements were only known to a small group of historians. They became known to Soviet 
society  at  large  after  their  publication  in  Pravda  on  January  27,  1936.  The  Pravda  article   212 
achieved by way of self-criticism and open discussion. However, new drafts 
reproduced many of the same errors and it became clear the ‘school’ was not 
prepared to undertake a revision voluntarily. According to Schlesinger, it thus 
became  necessary  to  publicly  bring  the  authority  of  the  State  and  Party 
leadership into the matter, and this was done on 26 January 1936 with the 
publication of the comments of Stalin, Kirov and Zhdanov.
6 A committee was 
to  be  established,  chaired  by  Zhdanov  and  consisting  of  historians  and 
politicians, which would publish a report on the drafting of new textbooks. 
 
In  September  1937  The  Soviet  of  Peoples’  Deputies,  on  the  advice  of  a 
published  report  by  this  committee,  authorised  the  publication  of  a  history 
textbook by A. V. Shestakov.
7 Schlesinger argued that this marked the end of 
the three-year debate on conceptions of history and its proper presentation. 
According to Schlesinger, this debate had arisen out of the practical need for 
recognised  and  authoritative  guidelines,  ‘….  on  the  question  of  history 
teaching  and  its  methods  in  general’.
8  Such  definitive  guidelines  were 
necessary because of recent political developments. Many new social strata 
had  entered  political  life  and  there  was  a  need  for  clarification  of  their 
relationship to the historical tradition. It was essential that the ‘vulgar Marxism’ 
of  these  groups  be  overcome  if  they  were  to  fulfil  their  roles  within  Soviet 
intellectual life. In other words, rising social mobility and the influx of peasants 
into  industrial  areas  required  an  increase  in  educational  standards. 
Schlesinger made no attempt to suggest other, perhaps more disingenuous, 
reasons  for  the  change  in  historical  emphasis  and  teaching  now  deemed 
                                                                                                                                           
began  with  an  explanatory  introduction  which  included  a  denunciation  of  the  works  of 
Pokrovskii; ‘the first public repudiation’. (Enteen, The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat, p. 190.) 
6 Schlesinger was presumably referring to the Pravda article mentioned above. 
7  A.  V.  Shestakov,  (ed.)  Istoriia  SSSR:  kratkii  kurs  (Moscow,  Uchebno-Pedagogicheskoe 
Uzdatel’stvo, 1938). According to Pundeff, in 1937 Professor A. V. Shestakov’s manuscript 
was awarded second prize in the competition and was issued as a textbook for USSR history 
in the third and fourth grades. The committee argued that it was unable to award a first prize. 
(Pundeff, History in the USSR, pp. 105-6.)  Enteen wrote: ‘Only in 1937 did the party judge 
one of the new textbooks prepared in the competition reasonably acceptable for its purposes’. 
(Enteen, The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat, p. 190.) Schlesinger was either unaware or omitted 
to mention that the Party only deemed the Shestakov textbook ‘acceptable’. The full text of 
the judging committee’s report can be found in K izucheniiu istorii, (Moscow, Partizdat, 1937), 
pp. 32-38. 
8 Schlesinger, ‘Neue sowjetrussische Literatur zur Sozialforschung’, p. 187.   213 
necessary.  He  appeared  to  be  in  complete  accord  with  the  state  on  the 
reasons for, and the necessity of, this change. 
 
Schlesinger argued that Stalin, Kirov and Zhdanovs’ theses had criticised the 
draft textbooks because they reflected the abstract nature and incorrectness 
of the Pokrovskii ‘school’.
9 He went on to detail exactly what the objections to 
Pokrovskii were. It seems clear from his narrative style that Schlesinger was 
again in complete agreement with the Party as to both the existence and the 
erroneous nature of the Pokrovskii ‘school’. For example, Schlesinger wrote 
that it was necessary for the party to publicly assert its authority in the matter 
of new textbooks since the ‘school’ had proven itself unwilling to ‘undertake a 
revision of its views’.
10 That the ‘school’ existed, a revision of its views was 
required and that this would not be accomplished voluntarily was stated as 
fact.  
 
At this point it is worth examining Schlesinger’s attitude towards Pokrovksii in 
more  detail  as  it  illuminates  how  closely  his  own  writings  mirrored  Soviet 
orthodoxy in the Stalin period. M. N. Pokrovskii (1868 – 1932) was the first 
Bolshevik historian of note and has been described as ‘the founder of Soviet 
historiography’  by  the  Western  commentator  A.  Mazour.
11  He  rose  to  pre-
eminence in the 1920s and trained a new generation of scholars to develop a 
specifically  Marxist  approach  to  history.
12  Pokrovskii  attempted  to  explain 
historical  developments  with  reference  to  what  he  saw  as  their  underlying 
economic  causes  and  introduced  the  concept  of  ‘merchant  capitalism’  to 
explain Russia’s development from feudalism to capitalism proper.
13 He held 
                                                 
9 Ibid. p. 188. 
10 Ibid. p. 187. 
11 A. Mazour, The Writing of History in the Soviet Union, (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 
1975) p. 14. 
12 For further information on Pokrovksii’s life, career and reputation see, Enteen, The Soviet 
Scholar-Bureaucrat,  Mazour,  Modern  Russian  Historiography,  pp.  186-202,  Mazour,  The 
Writing of History in the Soviet Union, pp. 7-23, J. D. White, ‘The Origins, Development and 
Demise of M. N. Pokrovskii’s Interpretation of Russian History’ in I. D. Thatcher (ed.) Late 
Imperial Russia, (Manchester,  Manchester University Press, 2005) pp. 167-188, H.  Asher, 
‘The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of M. N. Pokrovsky’, Russian Review, 31, 1, Jan. 1972, pp. 
49-63. 
13 See,  for example, M. N. Pokrovskii,  Brief History of Russia, Volume 1, (London,  Martin 
Lawrence Limited, 1933), trans. D. S. Mirsky, pp. 103-117.   214 
numerous party positions and was elected to the All-Russian and then All-
Union Congress of Soviets. He was also immensely active academically, at 
various times he edited journals, headed Istpart and chaired the State Council 
of  Scholars  as  well  as  continually  publishing  his  own  work.  However, 
Pokrovskii fell out of favour with the Soviet authorities from the mid-1930s. 
The  Party  and  the  historical  profession  in  general,  including  many  of  his 
former pupils and supporters, criticised the scholar and heaped condemnation 
on his work. As K. Mehnert wrote, ‘Pokrovsky died twice’; once in 1932 when 
he was given a State funeral with full military honours and once in 1934 when 
the  official  anti-Pokrovskii  campaign  began.
14  This  continued  until  his  slow 
rehabilitation from 1956 onwards. During this time, Pokrovksii was accused of 
anti-Leninism,  schematic  bourgeois  methodology,  vulgar  economic 
materialism and historical falsifications. 
 
Schlesinger referred to Pokrovskii and the ‘overcoming’ of his work in most of 
his  writings  concerned  with  Soviet  historiography.  He  appeared  to  be 
producing independent examinations of Pokrovskii’s approach to history but 
was,  in  fact,  aping  the  Soviet  line  as  decreed  by  Stalin.  In  many  ways 
Schlesinger  was  simply  retreading  ground  thoroughly  covered  by  Soviet 
historians and party orthodoxy. This may well have been because his opinion 
coalesced with that of the Soviet authorities; he consistently argued that the 
Stalin  era  advanced  the  study  of  history  because  it  overcame  Pokrovksii’s 
erroneous  theories;  and  he  was  not  alone  in  the  West  in  thinking  this.
15 
However, it also strengthens the thesis that Schlesinger consciously painted a 
positive  picture  of  developments  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  confirms  that  he 
frequently followed the orthodox line in matters of interpretation.  
 
The official anti-Pokrovskii campaign began with the publication in 1936 of the 
directive establishing a committee to organise the production of new history 
textbooks announced in 1934. Pokrovskii was an obstacle in Stalin’s path to 
                                                 
14 K. Mehnert, Stalin Versus Marx (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1952), pp. 11-12.  
15 For example D. F. White pointed out the negative effect Pokrovskii’s theories had on Soviet 
historical  scholarship  and  argued  that  the  fall  of  his  school  had  a  positive  impact  on  the 
profession  (D.  F.  White,  ‘Protiv  Istoriceskoi  Koncepcii  M.  N.  Pokrovskogo  (Against  M.  N. 
Pokrovksi’s Concept of History)’ Review, Slavonic and East European Review, 2, 1, March 
1943, pp 257-263 at pp. 262-263).   215 
the role of historical arbiter. Stalin may well have seen his chance to discredit 
his rival when the issue of new textbooks arose.
16 As J. D. White has argued, 
the campaign was launched in a subtle way; it involved the juxtaposing of a 
number  of  items  under  the  general  heading  of  ‘On  the  Historical  Front’. 
Pravda and Izvestiia published the directive in full as well as details of the 
subject groups tasked with the provision of the new texts, ‘None of this had 
anything  to  do  with  Pokrovskii.  However,  this  was  not  the  impression  the 
newspapers  conveyed’.
17  Alongside  the  details  concerning  the  schematic 
nature  of  school  history  texts  were  articles condemning  Pokrovksii  and  his 
errors.
18 These articles accused Pokrovskii of being schematic and ignoring 
true facts and events. According to J. D. White, the newspapers consciously 
created the impression that the directive on school textbooks had condemned 
Pokrovksii,  this  was  how  historians  referred  to  it  at  the  time.
19  The  myth 
conflating the textbook criticisms with Pokrovksii’s supposed schematic errors 
continued  thereafter,  including  in  Schlesinger’s  analysis.  Henceforth 
Pokrovksii  and  his  ‘school’  were  routinely  criticised  by  the  authorities,  his 
former  pupils  and  all  other  historians.  This  culminated  in  a  two-volume 
collection of essays, published in 1939-40, on the subject of Pokrovskii.
20 As 
G. M. Enteen, a biographer of Pokrovskii, has asserted, these volumes were, 
‘….  great  monuments  of  Stalinist  culture,  two  works  of  monumental 
distemper’.
21  
 
Schlesinger’s criticisms of Pokrovksii were remarkably similar to the official 
Soviet version, even using the same language. He referred to schematicism, 
                                                 
16 White, ‘M. N. Pokrovskii’s interpretation of Russian history’, p. 183. D. Brandenberger has 
argued  that  the  impetus  for  the  anti-Pokrovskii  campaign  involved  a  number  of  parties 
including Zhdanov and Bukharin. However, he does not dispute Stalin’s role in this, merely 
the notion of a monolithic totalitarian structure with Stalin at its centre making every decision. 
(D.  Brandenberger,  ‘Who  Killed  Pokrovskii?  (the  second  time):  The  Prelude  to  the 
Denunciation  of  the Father of  Soviet  Marxist Historiography, January 1936’,  Revolutionary 
Russia, 11, 1, June 1998, pp. 67-73). 
17 White, ‘M. N. Pokrovskii’s interpretation of Russian history’, p. 184. 
18  N.  Bukharin,  ‘Nuzhna  li  nam  marksistskaia  istoricheskaia  nauka?  (O  nekotorykh 
sushchestvenno vazhnykh, no nesostoiatel’nykh vzgliadakh M. N. Pokrovskogo)’, Istvestiia, 
27 January 1936 and K. Radek, ‘Znachenie istorii dlia revoliutsionnogo proletariata’, Pravda, 
27 January 1936. 
19 White, ‘M. N. Pokrovskii’s interpretation of Russian history’, p. 184. 
20 Protiv istoricheskoi kontseptsii M. N. Pokrovskogo; Protiv antimarksistskih kontseptsii M. N. 
Pokrovskogo (Moscow-Leningrad, Izatel’stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1939-40).  
21 Enteen, The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat, p. 190.   216 
vulgarity, projection of modern concepts into the past. A. Mazour outlined the 
Soviet  perspective  and  the  similarities  between  this  and  Schlesinger’s 
accusations are stark: 
 
  Pokrovskii was now charged with advocating a too subjective 
conception  of  Marxism  and  held  responsible  for  its  infiltration 
into  the  writings  of  others;  he  was  blamed  for  the  arbitrary 
attributions  of  modern  social  and  economic  ideas  to  bygone 
generations  utterly  ignorant  of  them;  ululations  were  raised 
against  his  doctrine  that  Communism  needed  no  objective 
science; he was ridiculed for forcing the course of history into a 
Procrustean  bed  of  materialism;  and  finally,  he  was  charged 
with the advocacy of a rigid conception of Imperial Russia now 
regarded as the worst historical blunder of them all.
22 
 
Schlesinger  apparently  agreed  with  the  vast  majority  of  official  criticisms. 
However,  he  was  certainly  not  alone  in  this.  Much  of  Soviet  and  Western 
writing  of  the  time  took  a  similar  approach  to  Pokrovskii.  Mazour  himself 
argued:  ‘The  entire  architectonic  system  of Pokrovsky  is  somewhat flimsily 
mechanistic’.
23 He went on to accuse Pokrovskii of writing history as a record 
of one inevitable continuum, ‘a lifeless mechanistic process’, ‘a purposeless 
play of economic factors’. This appeared to coincide with the orthodox Soviet 
interpretation as espoused in the criticism of school textbooks. 
 
The campaign against Pokrovskii was launched for a number of reasons and 
resulted in a one-sided and unfair portrayal of his writing. The biggest reason 
for the removal of his influence was because Pokrovskii’s theories were in 
contradiction to the ideology underpinning Stalin’s rule; they threatened his 
authority. For example, Pokrovksii’s analysis countered the supraclass theory 
of the state, the idea that state transcended class rather than developing out 
of the interests of the leading class. Enteen has suggested that this betrayed 
an  underlining  hostility  towards  the  state,  something  that  would  inevitably 
                                                 
22 Mazour, Modern Russian Historiography, pp. 200-201. 
23 Ibid. p. 192.   217 
conflict with a government advocating a policy of ‘socialism in one country’.
24 
Pokrovksii was also anti-individualist, refusing to celebrate or revere the acts 
of  key  individuals.  This  would  contradict  Stalin’s  cult  of  personality  and 
emphasis  on  the  power  of  transforming  personalities.
25  He  was  also  an 
internationalist  whose  ‘cosmopolitanism’  was  unacceptable  to  the  Soviet 
Union’s new emphasis on patriotism.
26 
 
Many of the errors the anti-Pokrovskii campaign imputed to the historian were 
distortions of his writing or complete falsifications. Schlesinger followed many 
of these myths seemingly to the letter. For example, as Enteen has pointed 
out: 
 
The extreme formulation of his [Pokrovskii’s] view – ‘history is 
politics retrojected into the past’ – is a statement attributed to 
Pokrovskii by virtually all his Soviet critics before the 1960s, and 
by  some  Western  critics,  They  suggest  that  it  imparts  the 
essence of his views on historical scholarship.
27 
 
Schlesinger frequently referred to the erroneous nature of this concept.
28 Yet 
the statement did not occur in any of Pokrovskii’s writings. In fact, according 
to  Enteen,  it  is  something  of  which  he  accused  non-Marxist  historians. 
Pokrovskii’s followers did use the phrase, but to seek to vulgarise his work 
with such an accusation is somewhat distorting. J. D. White has also argued 
that to accuse Pokrovskii of being schematic and dismissing concrete facts is 
totally unjust.
29 It is clear that the labelling of Pokrovksii as a vulgar or extreme 
economic  determinist  was  a  distortion,  and  again  was  something  that 
Schlesinger frequently did. As Enteen has explained: 
 
With  regard  to  the  relative  significance  of  substructual  and 
superstructural  elements  in  the  historical  process,  Pokrovskii 
                                                 
24 Enteen, The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat, p. 48. 
25 Asher, ‘The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of M. N. Pokrovsky’, pp. 52-53. 
26 Mazour, The Writing of History in the Soviet Union, p. 18. 
27 Enteen, The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat, p. 33. 
28 For example, see below p. 228 and p. 233. 
29 White, ‘M. N. Pokrovskii’s interpretation of Russian history’, p. 184.   218 
was  clearly  an  economic  determinist,  but  he  eschewed  and 
actually polemicized against the most extreme formulations of 
that position and sought to give some weight to superstructural 
elements.
30 
 
In  fact,  Enteen  argued  that  Pokrovskii  often  sought  to  combat  what  he 
regarded as the vulgarisation of economic determinism.
31  
 
Pokrovskii’s Soviet critics castigated him for crimes he did not commit and 
developed  and  propagated  a  myth  of  his  errors  that  continued  for  several 
decades.  Schlesinger  seems  to  have  been  party  to  this  misrepresentation 
despite his knowledge of the original Pokrovskiian sources. He followed the 
Soviet  interpretation  throughout  his  writings  of  this  time,  arguing  that  the 
overcoming  of  his  school  was  one  of  the  main  achievements  of  Stalinist 
historiography  and  giving  limited  credence  to  the  positive  effect  Pokrovksii 
had on the development of a Marxist study of history.  
 
In Schlesinger’s report the positive role Pokrovskii had played in the evolution 
of  historiography  was  partially  recognised.  Schlesinger  quoted  a  Pravda 
article of 21 January 1936 which stated that Pokrovskii had developed in the 
struggle  with  the  subjectivism  of  bourgeois  and  petty-bourgeois  historians, 
who saw in the Tsars and their actions the most important motive forces of 
history.
32  In  opposition,  Pokrovskii  had  postulated  the  theory  that  the 
development of economic relations was a fundamental factor in history. Whilst 
this represented an advance in the study of history, Pokrovskii’s work also 
had the negative effect of transforming dialectic materialism into ‘economic 
automatism’. His formulations were schematic and overly abstract, replacing 
the living history of the class struggle with dry social formations. The same 
Pravda article compared Pokrovskii’s treatment of Tsardom, merely a weapon 
of  merchant  capital,  to  Lenin’s,  which  supposedly  stressed  the  extremely 
elastic,  dialectic  character  of  Tsardom  and  its  slow  transformation  from  a 
                                                 
30 Enteen, The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat, p. 35. 
31 Ibid. pp. 33-34. 
32 Schlesinger, ‘Neue sowjetrussische Literatur zur Sozialforschung’, p. 189. It seems likely 
that Schlesinger was, in fact, referring to the article of 27 January 1936 mentioned above.   219 
monarchy of the nobility to one of capitalism; in order to expose the weakness 
and oversimplification of Pokrovskii’s analysis. 
 
Another  ‘flawed’  characteristic  of  Pokrovskii’s  work  was  that  of  his  ‘anti-
historicism’.
33 Schlesinger argued that Pokrovskii had forced complicated and 
contradictory historical processes into his pre-prepared sociological scheme, 
or  Procrustean  bed,  and  replaced  living  classes  with  abstract  sociological 
categories.  His  ‘anti-historicism’  also  manifested  itself  in  his  indifference  to 
concrete events and their chronological presentation; actual events were only 
referred to in order to illustrate his schema, to further elaborate his views on 
feudalism, religion, etc. These errors had been reproduced in the works of 
those from his ‘school’ and were visible in the draft textbooks. 
 
By far the most important element in the thought of the Pokrovskii ‘school’ 
was the concept of ‘merchant capital’; Schlesinger wrote that Pokrovskii had 
felt it to be the most significant component to any understanding of Russian 
history.
34 This too was criticised by the Soviet authorities. Schlesinger did not 
go into any great detail as to what this most important concept consisted of: 
Pokrovskii had asserted that capital had ruled Russia autocratically from Ivan 
the Terrible until the last Nicholas, ‘merchant capital’ had, in fact, created the 
Russian Empire and serfdom.  Schlesinger believed that its genesis lay in 
response  to  the  nineteenth  century  Slavophil  presentation  of  history  which 
attempted  to  dispute  the  existence  of  capitalism  in  Russia.  In  Pokrovskii’s 
attempt to prove this wrong he reflected the existence of capitalist features 
into the past. The theory had also originated from Pokrovskii’s polemic against 
the cult of personality inherent in bourgeois historiography. However, with his 
conception,  the  concrete  questions  central  to  historical  scholarship 
disappeared  since all  causes  were  presupposed.  Schlesinger  argued:  ‘The 
acting people were reduced to mere puppets of economic driving forces’; this 
would once again create a schematic, abstract presentation of history.
 35 
 
                                                 
33 Ibid. p. 190. 
34 Ibid. p. 190-191. 
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Schlesinger  argued  that  Pokrovskii’s  theory  of  ‘merchant  capitalism’ 
represented the projection of the modern day class struggle into the past, ‘… 
the present-day class struggle appears as the single reality and this leads to 
any past repression being conceived of as ‘capitalist’’.
36 Schlesinger insisted 
that the use of the concept of ‘merchant capitalism’ involved the application of 
modern  political  concepts,  such  as  Bolshevism  or  ‘democratic  peoples’ 
revolution’, to unsuitable periods of the past. The projection of modern political 
concerns backwards also led Pokrovskii to conclude that historians who were 
active  in  the  class  struggle  should  concentrate  entirely  on  specific  themes 
connected to matters of modern proletarian praxis. 
 
In  his  report  Schlesinger  also  took  issue  with  what  he  regarded  as 
Pokrovskii’s  incorrect  philosophical  viewpoint,  accusing  him  of  ‘idealistic 
relativism’.
37 He argued that Pokrovskii’s pragmatic epistemological approach 
led him to believe that every ideology, including Marxism, had the effect of a 
‘distorting  mirror’  through  which  reality  could  never  be  entirely  accurately 
reflected. Such an interpretation perhaps inevitably concluded that the goal of 
an ‘objective description of history’ was a bourgeois illusion. Pokrovskii had 
argued against the theory that laws of nature are objective and hence exist 
independently from consciousness. This justified the overtly political role that 
Pokrovskii granted the field of historical study.  Whilst the Soviet authorities of 
the 1930s accepted the connection between historical knowledge and politics, 
and the principle that history represented a weapon of the class struggle in a 
class society, it was argued that Pokrovskii was labelling Leninism as a form 
of  ‘class  based  subjectivism’  and  hence  placing  it  on  the  same  level  as 
reactionary  bourgeois  ideologies  such  as  positivism  or  subjective  idealism. 
This could not be tolerated and was also at odds with Schlesinger’s own belief 
in Marxism’s objective quality.
38 
 
Schlesinger’s  report  next  attempted  an  appreciation  of  the  Shestakov 
textbook  approved  for  publication  by  the  judging  committee.  Schlesinger 
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argued  that  whilst  it  would  be  ludicrous  to  expect  any  methodological 
definitions  in  a  schoolbook,  ‘…  it  is  worthy  of  note  what  a  popular  book, 
worked  out  by  the  Party  leadership,  has  to  say  on  the  significance  of 
history’.
39  He  provided  a  description  of  its  contents  as  well  as  a  positive 
impression  of  the  book’s  interpretation  on  various  matters.  Schlesinger 
emphasised  the  fact  that  the  book  began  with  a  brief  section  on  the 
emergence of the classes and states that comprised the history of the USSR. 
The textbook’s exposition was opened by a presentation of the oldest states 
in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, with small sections on the Scythens 
and Black Sea Greeks.
40 Schlesinger’s point was that from the outset it was 
not merely the Slavs who were represented as the central bearers of history. 
He conceded that, after this initial section, the Shestakov text was concerned 
almost exclusively with the Slavs, especially the Great Russians. However, 
Schlesinger  pointed  out  that  this  ethnic  chauvinism  had,  in  fact,  been  a 
criticism of the judging committee.
41   
 
Schlesinger provided an enthusiastic description of Shestakov’s textbook. He 
included many expressions of praise and noted the depth and detail to which 
it often went. Schlesinger wrote: ‘The emergence of the class divisions and of 
the  Slav  states  was  well  presented’;
42  ‘The  activities  of  the  ‘Tsar-reformer’ 
were  fully  described’
43  and  ‘The  struggle  for  freedom  of  the  oppressed 
peoples’ was appreciated in a purely positive and detailed manner’.
44 He also 
argued that the textbook presented a balanced approach, especially in regard 
to its treatment of Peter I; both the negative and positive aspects of Peter’s 
reign  were  described.  The  book  dealt  fully  with  the  oppression  of  the 
peasantry, the ensuing uprisings and the terror with which these revolts were 
subdued.    Schlesinger  quoted  from  the  book  in  order  to  substantiate  his 
argument:  
                                                 
39 Schlesinger, ‘Neue sowjetrussische Literatur zur Sozialforschung’, p. 194. 
40 Shestakov, Istoriia SSSRI, p. 8. 
41 Brandenberger and Dubrovksy have pointed out the extent to which Shestakov’s textbook 
was  redrafted  to  the  detriment  of  non-Russian  minorities  so  it  seems  that  this  ‘ethnic 
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Need a Tsar’, p. 879). 
42Schlesinger, ‘Neue sowjetrussische Literatur zur Sozialforschung’, p. 194. 
43 Ibid. p. 195. 
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Under  Peter  I  Russia  made  considerable  progress,  but 
remained  a  land  in  which  everyone  lived  under  the  yoke  of 
serfdom and Tsarist arbitrary use of power. The strength of the 
Russian  Empire  under  Peter  I  was  achieved  at  the  cost  of 
100,000 workers, and the cost of the plundering of the people. 
Peter I did a great deal for the creation and consolidation of the 
state of nobility and merchants.
45 
 
It seems that Schlesinger agreed with this analysis of the reign and legacy of 
Peter I. 
 
One criticism of Shestakov’s text was broached in the report. Schlesinger felt 
that it adequately described the harsh yoke of the Mongol conquerors and the 
eventual divorce of the Moscow Princes from them. However, he added, this 
was not achieved without a certain ‘prettification’, resulting in the past being 
described  in  purely  heroic  terms.
46  Yet,  in general,  Schlesinger provided  a 
positive description of the textbook and offered praise for many of its sections. 
He did not present any overall conclusions on its content or efficacy as an 
educational tool, but the lack of any real criticism did suggest that the book 
was suitable for its task. 
 
Schlesinger utilised a variety of contemporary Soviet sources for the report, 
such as official party statements, articles from newspapers such as Pravda 
and academic journals like Istorik Marksist, to illustrate current debates within 
the historical field, centring upon the issue of education and school textbooks. 
What  comment  he  did  make,  besides  his  general  narrative,  seemed  to 
correspond to the stance of the Soviet Union at the time. This can be seen in 
his support of the anti-Pokrovskii campaign and his praising of the Shestakov 
textbook. His analysis of the faults of the Pokrovskii ‘school’ represented his 
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see E. V. Anisimov, The Reforms of Peter the Great, (London, M. E. Sharpe, 1993) trans. J. 
T. Alexander. 
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general thinking on this matter and various elements of his interpretation were 
expanded on in his later writings on the subject. Schlesinger offered no overall 
conclusions or analysis, even though the paper was to provide a summary of 
recent  developments.  Without  this  final  summation  it  is  difficult  to  perceive 
Schlesinger’s opinion, yet what little he did offer in the way of analysis was 
predominantly  positive.  It  therefore  seems  reasonable  to  conclude  that 
Schlesinger intended to convey these latest developments in Soviet historical 
teaching as progressive. 
 
Schlesinger  again  addressed  the  topic  of  Russian  historiography  in  an 
unpublished discussion entitled The Problems of Commercial Capitalism in 
17
th  and  18
th  Century  Russia.
47  The  draft  was  not  a  final  version  and 
contained many  hand-written  corrections.  Perhaps  it cannot  truly represent 
Schlesinger’s  thinking  on  the  subject  since  his  ideas  required  a  certain 
clarification.  In  fact,  another,  probably  later  draft  of  the  article  was  turned 
down  for  publication  in  The  Economic  History  Review.
48  However,  it  does 
contain a great deal of relevant material and allows for an understanding of 
the development of Schlesinger’s opinion of historiography under Stalin. The 
article provides a bridge between his first work on leaving the Soviet Union 
and his later writing. Many of the themes touched upon in The Problems of 
Commercial  Capitalism  in  17
th  and  18
th  Century  Russia  were  further 
elaborated  in  The  Spirit  of  Post-war  Russia  published  in  1947.  In  the 
manuscript, Schlesinger traced the historical debate in Russia concerning the 
causes, character and success of the Petrine reforms, as well as discussing 
the  concept  of  ‘commercial  capitalism’  or  ‘merchant  capitalism’.
49  He 
                                                 
47 Schlesinger, The Problems of Commercial Capitalism in 17
th and 18
th Century Russia 
(Glasgow University Library, Rudolf Schlesinger Papers, MS Gen 1660 41 8, Unpublished, 
1941-1943). The manuscript can be roughly dated to between 1941 and 1943 when it is 
known that Schlesinger was living in Cambridge, the place of writing noted on the manuscript, 
but before the later draft was posted to journals (see footnote below). 
48 See letter to Schlesinger from the editor of the journal, M. M. Postan, (Schlesinger, The 
Problems of Commercial Capitalism, (Glasgow University Library, Rudolf Schlesinger Papers, 
MS Gen 1660 48 2, Unpublished, 1943). The date is taken from that attached letter from the 
editor of The Economic History Review dated 27 June 1943.) The editor wrote that it would 
require ‘drastic revision of both substance and form’ and criticised the paper for its lack of 
material.  The  earlier  draft  of  the  manuscript  is  used  here  because  it  is  complete,  in 
comparison  to  the  copy  of  the  draft  sent  to  the  journal  which  finishes  mid  sentence  and 
appears to have pages missing. 
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introduced  the  general  background  to  these  problems  and  evaluated  what 
‘capitalist’  elements,  if  any,  existed  in  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  century 
society. 
 
This work is somewhat unique because it offered Schlesinger’s own opinions 
upon historiographical problems. Schlesinger did not simply follow the debate 
but actually participated in it as a historian. Having no opportunity to engage 
with any of the primary material, he relied upon the secondary literature to 
examine the questions and formulate his own conclusions. This had several 
disadvantages, not least that Schlesinger was forced to rely upon those very 
sources, such as Pokrovskii, which he was casting doubt upon.
50 Since he 
had no new information and did not have access to the materials that other 
historians  had  based  their  judgements  on,  one  could  argue  that  he  would 
inevitably have very little that was new to offer. Yet the manuscript provides 
an insight into Schlesinger’s thoughts on the subject, even if no new historical 
ground is broken. 
 
Schlesinger argued that a capitalist interpretation of Russian history had long 
been  predominant,  if  erroneous:  ‘On  the  first  glance  it  seems  somewhat 
astonishing that in Russia the capitalist interpretation of early history has so 
much influenced historiography, already since the 18
th Century. For Russian 
history seems, prima facie, to suggest everything but a capitalist interpretation 
of feudalism’.
51 Russian development, at least in its successful forms, had not 
known municipal autonomy and had also never witnessed the breaking up of 
the manor, two classic characteristics of the evolution of feudal into capitalist 
society in Schlesinger’s view. Schlesinger argued that it would make more 
sense to describe Russia as the classic country of feudalism, one that had 
passed through four periods of crisis, developing new forms of feudalism in 
response to each until finally it was forced to make some compromise with 
capitalism in the 1860s.
 52  
                                                                                                                                           
that the two terms were synonymous in his thinking.  
50  For  example,  Schlesinger  cited  Pokrovskii  as  a  source  of  information  but  subsequently 
criticised him, Schlesinger, The Problems of Commercial Capitalism, p2. 
51 Schlesinger, The Problems of Commercial Capitalism, p. 3. 
52 The four periods were: ‘The introduction of Christianity and the so-called Olga reforms (in   225 
 
To Schlesinger, there were two reasons why students of history had tried to 
interpret Russia’s past from a capitalist perspective, despite the overwhelming 
evidence against it. The first was that, from the formation of the Kiev state 
until  the  1917  revolution,  the  Russian  aristocracy  had  been  involved  in 
commercial discourse with economically more developed countries. This was 
necessary  to  protect  themselves  from  becoming  instruments  of  ‘indirect’ 
colonial rule and it explained the strong impression that Westerners visiting 
Moscow  in  the  16
th  and  17
th  Ccntury  had  of  the  commercial  interests 
prevailing there. He wrote: ‘Once one is ready to suppose that a man mainly 
interested in money profits is, therefore, a capitalist, it is not difficult to support 
a  ‘commercial  capitalist’  interpretation  of  Russian  history  with  plenty  of 
documentary proof’.
53 However, Russia’s communication with capitalists was 
not proof of their own capitalism and could be explained by needs of self-
preservation.  This  need  to  prevent  colonisation  from  nearby  centralised 
Western  states,  such  as  the  Polish-Lithuanian  state  in  the  middle  of  the 
fifteenth century, resulted in a strong centralisation of government. Such a 
necessity saved the country from feudal dispersal and did lead to a strong 
development of the money economy. However, according to Schlesinger, if 
capitalism was understood as a system of production, 
 
 ….  it  is  problematic  whether  the  hastened  strengthening  of 
money economics did accelerate at all the growth of capitalism. 
Just the other way round it even might be concluded that the 
huge costs of centralisation and of the attempts, during the 16
th, 
17
th and 18
th Centuries to open for Russia an independent outlet 
to the West, retarded the evolution of the conditions for a truly 
capitalist development.
54 
 
                                                                                                                                           
the second half of the 10
th Century), the rise of the Northern princedoms (12
th/13
th century), 
the ‘Oprichina’ under Ivan IV and the following ‘Time of Troubles’, and the Petrine reforms 
with  the  following  reactions  up  to  1762’.  (Schlesinger,  The  Problems  of  Commercial 
Capitalism, p. 4.) 
53 Schlesinger, The Problems of Commercial Capitalism, p. 6. 
54 Ibid. pp. 6-7.   226 
Again,  what  at  first  might  appear  to  be  a  capitalist  advancement,  strong 
centralisation and active intervention in the economy, could be explained by 
other needs and developments within the state.  
 
Schlesinger  went  on  to  outline  the  broad  historiographical  trends  in  pre-
modern  Russian  history.  Liberal  historians  of  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth 
century sought the thread of Russian development in the increased binding of 
individuals and groups to the state.
55 They wrote reasonably favourably of the 
westernisation of Russia, but criticised the fact that, after the reign of Peter I, 
the  state  only  loosened  the  obligations  of  the  nobility.  In  contrast,  wrote 
Schlesinger, Pokrovskii’s main achievement had been his ability to criticise 
the Petrine reforms, ‘…. not from the point of view of an idealisation of the 
‘autocht[h]one’  feudal  Russia,  as  the  Slavophils  had  done…  but  under  the 
point of view whether Peter’s way was really the best and most effective way 
to  realise  capitalist  progress  and  to  render  Russia  a  country  up  to 
contemporary standards’.
56 He recognised the correctness of Peter’s aims but 
questioned his methods. Modern Soviet historiography, written in the 1930s 
and  1940s,  returned  to  the  rather  positive  attitude  of  the  Liberals,  whilst 
criticising the general feudal framework of Petrine and post-Petrine Russia. 
Schlesinger  argued  that  Russian  attitudes  to  the  country’s  past  and  future 
were determined by interpretations of the turning point in Russian history, ‘… 
the period when the great decision for the Western way of development had 
definitely  been  made’.
57  It  was  understandable  that  the  Bolsheviks,  having 
gained  political  power  under  the  aegis  of  a  Western  theory,  should  claim 
Peter’s inheritance. Schlesinger argued that there was a certain pragmatism 
to  the  Bolsheviks’  historical  interpretation,  one  that  he  understood  and 
perhaps even approved of. 
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For more information on the great master of nineteenth century historiography see, Mazour, 
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Schlesinger  next  tried  to  discern  if  any  ‘capitalist’  elements  could  be 
discovered in seventeenth and eighteenth century Russian society: ‘It is the 
question whether the dynamic tendency of such ‘capitals’ as existed during 
the  16
th  and  17
th  Centuries  was  to  create a  capitalist  society’.
58  Did  these 
earlier  elements  of  ‘capital’  lead  society  towards  capitalism?  Schlesinger 
argued that within a Marxist system of sociology one could not say ‘capital’ 
when referring to money accumulations that did not provide employment for 
industrial workers and showed no tendency towards such an employment as 
the normal method of yielding profits. Examples of money accumulation alone 
did  not  provide  evidence  of  a  transition  away  from  feudalism.  Instead, 
Schlesinger  introduced  his  own  criterion  for  assessing  the  nature  of  the 
Russian  state  at  this  time.  One  had  to  prove  a  causal  chain  between  the 
instances of ‘commercial capitalism’ and a capitalist tendency of development.  
 
According to Schlesinger the theory of ‘commercial capitalism’ did not stand 
up  to  serious  academic  scrutiny  and  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  century 
Russian society could not be characterised as developing towards capitalism. 
This was because only two of Schlesinger’s six criteria were present. There 
were  numerous  and  sizeable  ‘commercial  capitals’  and  the  ideologies  and 
foreign policies of the time did have a capitalist element.
59 However, the social 
and economic mechanisms to further develop these did not exist and what 
‘commercial  capitalisms’  were  present  were  not  gaining  control  over  the 
manufacture of small handicrafts.
60 Also, ‘commercial capitalism’ played no 
role in shaping large-scale industry and its representatives, the merchants, 
had very little, if any, political power.
61   
 
According to Schlesinger, Pokrovskii had insisted that all the pre-requisites for 
capitalism had existed at the end of the seventeenth century and would have 
come fully to fruition had it not been for the political framework of a state that 
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was  controlled  by  the  nobles.
62  However,  Schlesinger  disputed  this  claim 
arguing  that  at  least  two,  if  not  more,  of  Pokrovskii’s  preconditions  were 
absent. Schlesinger argued:  
 
There  were  no  sufficient  working-hands  apart  from  the  serfs, 
whose inclusion into industrial production was just to result in 
the ‘feudalisation’ of Russian industry. And, in consequence of 
the rule of serfdom, there was not a sufficient domestic market – 
apart from the enormous military needs of the state, and some 
luxury  consumption  of  the  rich,  certainly  not  just  the  most 
suitable field for developing a young industry
63 
 
Schlesinger argued that a capitalist interpretation of Russian history and the 
success of the ‘fallacious’ theory of ‘commercial capitalism’ had come about 
because the past had been judged by the needs and possibilities of another 
generation instead of its own. Present beliefs and social systems had been 
reflected backwards into the past creating a seriously mistaken impression of 
seventeenth and eighteenth century society. 
 
The Problems of Commercial Capitalism in 17
th and 18
th Century Russia is an 
interesting  manuscript  which  provides  some  information  on  Soviet 
historiography  but  perhaps,  more  importantly,  elaborates  Schlesinger’s 
personal  thinking  on  the  nature  of  pre-1917  Russian  society.  He  analysed 
various Russian schools of thought such as Pokrovskii’s and then offered a 
lucid explanation as to why he disagreed with these theories. His criticisms of 
Pokrovskii  were  of  an  academic  character,  perhaps  lending  them  more 
legitimacy  than  his  more  polemical  attacks.  Schlesinger  questioned  his 
concept  of  ‘commercial  capital’  and  found  it  wanting.  It  seems  clear  that 
Schlesinger was in agreement with and, in some ways, was reproducing the 
arguments of the Soviet anti-Pokrovskii campaign. He provided little evidence 
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to substantiate his claims regarding Russian development. He also failed to 
provide explanations of his terms. Schlesinger referred to concepts such as 
‘commercial capitalism’, ‘merchants’ and ‘ideologies’, terms with various and 
often value-laden meanings, but did not provide an exposition of the precise 
way in which he was using them. It is important to remember, however, that 
the manuscript was not a final draft.  
 
Schlesinger’s next writing on Soviet historiography was as part of a book, The 
Spirit of Post-war Russia. Whilst in exile in Prague in 1938 Schlesinger had 
written a large manuscript on recent developments in the Soviet Union. It was 
lost for some time between his London and New York publishers and, when 
Schlesinger did have it returned, he found it to be too outdated for publication. 
Most of the research he had undertaken was put to use in The Spirit of Post-
war  Russia  and  so  the  main  body  of  work  for  the  book  was  produced 
immediately  after  Schlesinger’s  expulsion from  the  USSR.
64  The  book  was 
based on observations that Schlesinger had made in the USSR before the 
Second World War. He argued, however, that he was, ‘…. quite justified in 
altering  the  detail  and  calling  it  a  book  on  the  spirit  of  post-war  Russia, 
because  I  believe  that  the  trends  observable  in  pre-war  Russia  have 
continued, and are continuing to dominate Soviet life’.
65 The correctness of 
this statement is open to debate. Certainly, in the historical sphere, post-war 
social  and  political  conditions  were  dramatically  different  to  earlier  ones; 
leading  inevitably  to  different  historical  interpretations.  Perhaps  the  most 
significant feature of post-war historiography was the ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ 
campaign; a movement introduced purportedly to purge Soviet society of the 
accommodation of the bourgeois world that had occurred during wartime.
66 
This obviously would have led to the manifestation of different trends before 
and after the war.  
 
Schlesinger asserted that his intention in writing the book was to study the 
Soviet social system: the internal development of a revolutionary state, from 
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the  point  of  view  of  the  needs  and  standards  of  the  state  under 
consideration.
67  He  believed  that  this  made  his  study  unique,  since  many 
other discussions simply applied the standards of one state in order to criticise 
another. This unique, academic and impartial strategy was, presumably, in 
contrast to many Western works, which merely criticised the Soviet system 
through the prism of inappropriate Western standards. Schlesinger observed 
various aspects of Soviet social life and attempted to discern general Soviet 
attitudes. He explored the Marxist ‘ideological superstructures’ constructed by 
the Soviet state, such as legislation and culture.  
 
The book had an entire chapter dealing with the historical field in the Soviet 
Union, ‘The Conception of History’.
68 In it, Schlesinger attempted to deduce 
the impact that recent developments in Soviet thought, namely the evolution 
of Soviet patriotism, had had upon approaches to the fundamental problems 
of  history.  He  began  by  explaining  that  Soviet  historical  studies  were 
necessarily  undertaken  within  a  Marxist  framework.  Marxism  stressed  the 
importance of the objective structure of society, the material conditions from 
which men produced their livelihoods. This Marxist conception was, according 
to Schlesinger, ‘…. in opposition to the traditional ‘explanation’ of historical 
development  by  the  enumeration  of  the  feats  of  ‘great  men’  and  by  the 
description  of  the  ideas  influencing  their  actions’.
69  Marxism  emphasised 
objective social constructions, the causal factors influencing man’s ideas and 
setting  limits  to  the  realisation  of  these  ideas.  As  in  his  Marxist  writings, 
Schlesinger  insisted  that  Marx  and  Engels  had  never  denied  that  men 
produce their own history or tried to reduce the significance of personalities 
and ideas. However, the task of Marxist sociology and historical research was 
to  explain  how  these  particular  personalities  and  ideas  had  arisen  at  that 
particular  time.  Any  historical  study  undertaken  in  the  Soviet  Union  would 
inevitably  begin  from  these  assumptions;  Marxism  was  the  theoretical 
paradigm from which all research was born. Schlesinger believed this to be 
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one of the most positive aspects of Soviet historiography, since he considered 
the use of Marxist methodology to be the basis of sound scholarship. 
 
It would, perhaps, be natural to expect great advances in sociological and 
historical research given that any work was produced from theoretically sound 
roots. However, according to Schlesinger, a distortion of Marxism had been 
introduced  to  Russia  prior  to  the  revolution  and  this  had  had  a  profound 
impact upon subsequent work. Schlesinger wrote: 
 
   ….  a  vulgar  travesty  of  Marxism  was  propagated  in 
Russia before and during the first years after 1917 under the 
title of ‘economic materialism’. Marxist theory was misused to 
imply  the  existence  of  some  automatism  by  which  economic 
conditions produce ‘history’ of their own accord, with the men 
and their ideas acting as mere marionettes.
70 
 
This theory of ‘economic materialism’ had various undesirable ramifications 
for  the  Bolsheviks.  Schlesinger  identified  two  major  disadvantages  to  the 
theory. Firstly it had a tendency to produce amongst revolutionaries a fatalistic 
attitude and willingness to seek out inevitable causes of defeat rather than 
solutions  to  avert  it:  ‘objective  conditions’  were  the  determining  factor  in 
society and if the ones necessary for revolution were not present there was 
nothing  one  could  do.  It  could  thus  be  a  pretext  for  avoiding  revolutionary 
action. Schlesinger believed that the theory had fulfilled such a function both 
in  German  and  Russian  right-wing  Socialism,  singling  out  Kautsky  as 
someone  who  strove  to  find  pretexts  for  avoiding  decisive  revolutionary 
action.  He  argued  that  ‘economic  materialism’  could  well  serve  as  the 
theoretical  basis  for  ‘right-wing  deviations’  on  the  eve  of  a  revolution. 
However,  it  could  also  become  a  pretext  for  ‘left-wing deviations’  after  the 
event;  the  society  that  had  emerged  from  the  revolution  had  done  so  in 
contradiction  to  Marxist  precepts  and  could  not,  therefore,  be  socialism. 
Further  radical  and  revolutionary  action  would  in  this  case  be  necessary. 
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According  to  Schlesinger:  ‘The  fact that  economic  materialism  lent  itself  to 
these heterodox interpretations, most of them in the Trotskyist sense, was a 
sufficient reason for the Stalinists to wage an energetic war ‘on the historical 
front’’.
71 Schlesinger rejected the ‘economic automatism’ and ‘vulgar Marxism’ 
he  attributed  to  Pokrovskii  and  his  school.  He  also  appeared  to  advocate 
Stalin’s actions. 
 
The second major problem the theory held for the Bolsheviks was that if one 
accepted that men and ideas were simply figureheads, what was the point in 
studying them?  Schlesinger argued that for fifteen years after the revolution 
Soviet  youth  were  only  taught  of  ‘empty  sociological  boxes’.  This  allowed 
children to gain a vivid impression of the general conditions of life in a certain 
period without having to worry about examinations based on ‘dry facts’. Yet 
the major disadvantage of this form of historical education was that it would 
very often result in total ignorance of the basic events of history. In provincial 
schools, even the positive aspect was likely to be distorted into caricatures, 
and so the children would learn nothing except meaningless phrases. This 
major  criticism  of  ‘economic  materialism’  was  familiar  throughout 
Schlesinger’s writings of this time. He accused Soviet education, based on 
what he perceived to be ‘Pokrovskiian’ concepts, of teaching only a vulgar 
and  overly  schematic  version  of  history.  This  judgement  appeared  to 
correspond directly to that of the Soviet authorities and their anti-Pokrovskii 
campaign. 
 
According  to  Schlesinger,  the  most  popular  ‘sociological  box’  used 
immediately  after  the  revolution,  under  the  auspices  of  ‘economic 
materialism’, was the theory of Russian ‘merchant capitalism’. This had been 
developed forty years previously and had proven to be especially dangerous 
to an understanding of Russian history. Schlesinger argued that the theory 
was,  ‘….  as  old  as  the  Marxist  fashion  among  Russian  intellectuals’  and 
pointed  to  Kautsky  as  the  originator  of  this  ‘‘economic’  vulgarisation’.
72  
Building upon his previous work, Schlesinger argued that if, at around 1900, 
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any states in Europe were feudal or semi-feudal it was surely Russia that best 
fitted the description. However, he continued: 
 
…. for good reasons…, the struggle against Tsarist Russia had 
to be fought under the leadership of a party, working class at 
least according to its own theory, and under the banner of the 
Marxist ideology which had been originally developed to satisfy 
the needs of the class struggle between industrial workers and 
capitalists.
73 
 
There was, therefore, a tendency amongst progressive historians to interpret 
the  feudal  past  in  light  of  present  circumstances,  and  to  seek  economic 
explanations  for  all  phenomena.  Added  to  these  errors  was  an  inability 
amongst  most  historians  to  fully  comprehend  the  Marxist  conception  of 
productive  relations.  This  produced  a  great  number  of  very  ‘primitive 
travesties of history’ in the years immediately before and after the October 
revolution.
74  
 
In Schlesinger’s earlier and later writings he accused Pokrovskii of utilising the 
false theory of ‘merchant capitalism’, but he made little reference to him in this 
work.  Schlesinger  did  write,  ‘….  the  tendency  arose  among  Russian 
progressive  historians  to  interpret  the  purely  feudal  past  in the  light  of  the 
present,  ‘to  reflect  the  proletarian  class  struggle  into  the  past’,  as  one 
extremist  representative  of  this  tendency  declared’.
75  It  seems  clear  that 
Schlesinger  believed  Pokrovskii  to  be  the  ‘extreme representative’;  he  had 
previously  argued  that  Pokrovskii  reflected  modern  circumstances 
backwards.
76 It is unclear why Schlesinger would choose not to name him 
directly at this point. Yet it seems certain that Schlesinger was once again 
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criticising  Pokrovskii  and  his  followers,  in  agreement  with  official  Soviet 
attitudes of the time. 
 
In order to substantiate the fallacious theory of ‘merchant capitalism’ it was 
necessary to find some characteristics of capitalism in ancient feudal Russia. 
As  elsewhere,  Russian  landlords  had  allied  with  merchants  since  the 
sixteenth century in order to facilitate development from feudal anarchy to an 
absolutist state. Schlesinger proposed that it was a relatively simple matter to 
overemphasise  this  point  in  order  to  assert  that  commercial  capital  had 
shaped  the  laws  of  serfdom  and  that  the  crown  was  merely  an  ornament 
covering the merchants’ rule. However, this interpretation of Russian history 
led to numerous logical difficulties. If Russia had already become capitalist, 
what had progressives been fighting for in the two hundred years preceding 
the 1917 revolution? Was it worthwhile to fight against overwhelming odds 
merely to change the existing type of capitalism into its more modern form of 
industrial  capitalism?  Schlesinger  also  emphasised  the  politically  expedient 
need  for  the  Soviet  state  to  reject  such  an  interpretation.  As  soon  as  the 
Bolsheviks  wished  to  stress  their  historical  links  to all  Russian  progressive 
thought, with the rise of Soviet patriotism under Stalin, the description of the 
former ruling pattern as ‘merchant capitalism’ had to be removed, along with 
other simplifications, since they described various aspects of Russian history 
as  non-progressive.  Such  vulgar  manifestations  of  capital  were  no  longer 
appropriate for a state wishing to shine a light on the historically progressive 
character of the Russian people. Schlesinger suggested that the state had its 
own  reasons  for  progressing  beyond  the  theory  of  ‘merchant  capitalism’; 
however, he agreed with the outcome. 
 
The other major weakness of the theory of ‘merchant capitalism’ was that, 
according to Schlesinger, aside from political motives, ‘…. what remained of 
Marxism as a sociological theory of history, if the standard of the present were 
simply  to  be  applied  to  the  past’?
77  It  distorted  Marxism  to  the  point  of 
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absurdity, and so the concept of ‘merchant capitalism’ was dropped in the late 
1920s.  Schlesinger  wrote  that  it  had,  ‘….  contradicted  the  fundamental 
Marxist thesis that various stages of social development are characterized by 
the  various  forms  in  which  men  produce  their  livelihood’.
78  According  to 
Schlesinger, in 1930-1 even Pokrovskii had to concede that the concept of 
‘merchant  capitalism’  was  meaningless  since  capitalism  was  a  system  of 
production and yet ‘merchant capitalism’ did not produce anything. 
 
As the distortions of this vulgar Marxism became ever more visible, Soviet 
historians made a concerted move away from those theories emanating from 
‘economic  materialism’.  Thus,  according  to  Schlesinger,  ‘….  the  past  was 
reinstated – in so far as this past had been progressive by the standards of its 
own times and had contributed to forming the present outlook of the Soviet 
fatherland’.
79 Historical interpretations were now freed from the constraints of 
an erroneous methodology. There was to be no more reflecting the present 
backwards  and  a  correction  of  previous  mechanistic  statements  ensued, 
although  emphases  were  often  determined by  propagandistic  requirements 
and some Soviet historians went too far in ‘correcting’ past mistakes. As well 
as  perceiving  these  changes  in  a progressive  manner,  Schlesinger  argued 
that some of the necessary changes in historical research and teaching were 
instigated by Stalin personally. He cited the drive against perceived ‘economic 
materialism’ in school textbooks, begun by the Party authorities in 1934, as an 
example. 
 
Schlesinger described the changes in Soviet historiography in a very positive 
light. He used the differing interpretations of Peter I over time as an example 
of  how  the  changes  made  in  historical  theory  under  Stalin  had  led  to 
improvements in its study and teaching. His analysis was very similar to The 
Problems of Commercial Capitalism in 17
th and 18
th Century Russia. In pre-
revolutionary Russia, historians had tended to treat Peter I in one of two ways. 
Either, as Westernisers, they celebrated him as a kind of liberal reformer or, 
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as Slavophils, they criticised him for the destruction of old-Russian mysticism 
and for killing many thousands for the sake of introducing modern technique 
and  economics.  The  first  generation  of  Soviet  historians,  i.e.  Pokrovskii’s 
school, attempted to criticise him from a more progressive perspective. They 
pointed to Peter’s failure to achieve his own aim of capitalist industrialisation 
and blamed him for the suffering of the masses, the fruit of which only the 
exploiters would be in a position to enjoy. However, Schlesinger continued, 
‘….  the  Pokrovskiian  historians  themselves,  in  their  polemics  against  the 
former official cult of Peter, relapsed into the Slavophil tendency of defending 
all  his  antagonists,  including  such  obvious  reactionaries  as  his  son  and 
grandson’.
80  Although  the  first  Soviet  historians  had  made  progress  in 
historical interpretation, more was clearly required. 
 
Schlesinger believed that the official Soviet textbook edited by Shestakov best 
illustrated the Soviet attitude at the time of his writing.
81 It acknowledged that 
Peter  had  done  much  to  shape  and  strengthen  the  state.  Now  Soviet 
historians expressed sympathy with him in his struggle against ecclesiastical 
and  other  reactionaries  and  against  the  peasant  uprisings  directed  at  the 
Petrine  state.    They  acknowledged  his  achievements  in  introducing  reform 
within  the  existing  system  and  his  recognition  of  the  need  to  eventually 
overthrow that system. Schlesinger concluded that, ‘… this result seems to be 
reasonable  from  the  historical  as  well  as  from  the  methodological  point  of 
view, it may be regarded as characteristic of the attitude of Stalinist Russia 
towards  the  Russian  past’.
82  Schlesinger  also  praised  Stalinist  Soviet 
historiography for returning to sound Marxist principles: ‘As to the theoretical 
interpretation  of  facts,  I  do  not  think  that  recent  developments  of  Soviet 
historiography are exposed to serious criticism from the Marxist point of view: 
at least in essentials it seems that the claims of the Soviet writers to have 
restored original Marxian concepts is justified’.
83 
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When writing about Soviet attitudes to Peter I, Schlesinger pointed out that 
any discussion inevitably had to confront questions of the price paid, in human 
costs, for speedy reconstruction, and the moral implications of a ‘revolution 
from above’ which would necessarily have little regard for freedom of criticism. 
There are obvious parallels between issues surrounding the rule of Peter and 
those of the Bolshevik state. Schlesinger wrote: ‘So when reading historical 
writings ‘on Peter’, one must sometimes ask whether it is really about Peter 
that  post-1917  Soviet  historians  were  writing’.
84  Schlesinger  believed  that 
personal ethics decided the stance individuals would take on these issues. It 
was unsurprising that both Lenin and Stalin had expressed the opinion that, 
without the work of Peter, they could not have undertaken theirs. However, he 
strongly  rejected  the  notion  that  this  had  led  modern  Soviet  historians  to 
uncritically lavish praise upon the Petrine reforms.  
 
This  section  of  the  chapter  is  particularly  interesting  because  it  displays 
Schlesinger’s  keen  awareness  of  the  political  nature  of  the  historical  and 
sociological work he was exploring. He believed this political dimension was 
characteristic  not  only  of  work  undertaken  within  the  Soviet  Union  but  of 
academic work in general. As a Marxist, attempting not simply to interpret the 
world  but  to  change  it,  Schlesinger  would  not  have  condemned  Soviet 
historiography for its political character; it was an inherent part of the research 
process, and one he explicitly recognised. All academic work had its political 
implications  and  assumptions  and  that  which  was  produced  in  the  Soviet 
Union was simply more self-conscious.  
 
Countering  any  potential  assertion  that  Soviet  historiography  was  overtly 
politicised  by  the  state,  or  simply  followed  the  needs  of  short-term 
propaganda,  Schlesinger  argued  that  there  was  little  doubt  that  at  certain 
times  certain  aspects  of  Russian  history  were  emphasised.  However,  he 
countered: 
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To emphasise, for needs of popular propaganda, certain topical 
aspects of national history is one thing, to ‘correct’ history for 
propagandist aims is another. I do not think that present Soviet 
writing of history deserves the latter reproach, at least in so far 
as  it  deals  with  issues  outside  the  field  of  factional  struggles 
within the Bolshevik party.
85 
 
Soviet historiography did no more than any other state would find necessary 
in order to mobilise its society against perceived dangers. Schlesinger argued 
that Marxism, the very cornerstone of Soviet historical and sociological theory, 
rejected  any  adaptation  of  historical  teaching  for  propagandist  aims  as 
belonging to a pragmatic philosophy. Soviet philosophy had strictly adhered to 
this policy; any manipulation of historical facts would be inadequate according 
to  those  standards.  Schlesinger  admitted  that  there  still  existed  certain 
inconsistencies between historical teaching and its ‘selection’ of facts, and the 
standards  established  by  Soviet  philosophy.  Further  advances  towards  the 
complete  rejection  of  pragmatism  were  thus  necessary;  he  wrote,  ‘….  the 
future of Marxism, as a scientific theory, in the USSR as well as in any country 
where it might conquer political power, implies the rejection of pragmatism…. 
and the exclusion of political expediency from arguments used in scientific 
discussion’.
86  However,  Soviet  historiography  could  not  be  condemned 
because it was not yet theoretically or methodologically perfect. 
 
In  order  to  counter  the  frequent  reproach  that  Marxist  and  subsequently 
Soviet  theory  neglected  the  historical  importance  of  human  thought, 
Schlesinger  used  quotations  from  a  state  textbook:  ‘New  social  ideas  and 
theories arise only after the development of the material life of society has set 
new  tasks  before  society.’    But  they  arise,  ‘…precisely  because  they  are 
necessary to society, because it is impossible to carry out the urgent tasks of 
development of the material life of society without their organising, mobilising, 
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and  transforming  action’.
87  He  was  attempting  to  demonstrate  the  state’s 
endorsement  of  the  view  that  social  ideas  and  theories  were  vital  to  the 
evolution  of  society.  Schlesinger  argued  that  it  was  unjust  of  detractors  to 
forget that the Soviet Union was fully occupied in changing the world. Any 
people or group that were bound to action could hardly deny the significance 
of the spiritual source of this action. Schlesinger may also have believed the 
overcoming of the theory of ‘economic materialism’ was proof that the Soviet 
Union  respected  the  historical  role  of  men  and  ideas;  it  replaced  a 
mechanistic world view with a much more vibrant, organic Marxist analysis. 
 
Schlesinger’s Spirit of Post-war Russia clearly and eloquently described much 
of  what  Schlesinger  appeared  to  believe  about  the  position  of  Soviet 
historiography at that time. He expressed a deep approval for its theoretical 
source of Marxism, before asserting that significant problems had developed 
within historical research and teaching immediately before and after the 1917 
revolution. Schlesinger’s understanding of the distorted theory of ‘economic 
materialism’ and its concept of ‘merchant capitalism’ were elucidated. Their 
eventual overcoming under Stalin was briefly described and it was clear that 
Schlesinger believed this to be a major achievement in the Soviet intellectual 
field.  He  also  attacked  several  common  reproaches  against  Soviet 
historiography  arguing  that  they  were  exaggerated  or  simply  untrue;  once 
more taking on the role of ‘scholar advocate’. On the whole, Schlesinger gave 
a very positive, one-dimensional, description of recent developments within 
the study of history in the Soviet Union. He approved of these developments 
arguing that state textbooks were good examples of the quality of scholarship 
and teaching available in the Soviet Union. It seems clear that the book was 
intended to be of a popular character; in his preface, Schlesinger argued that 
he  wished  to  describe  Soviet  ideology  in  ‘plain  language’  without  ‘special 
jargon’.
88  This  may  explain  the  rather  one-sided,  appreciative  tone 
Schlesinger gave to his analysis of Soviet historiography. However, it is also 
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good evidence to suggest the emphasis Schlesinger wished to convey to his 
readers.  Without  the  caveats  necessary  in  strictly  academic  writing, 
Schlesinger was able to wholeheartedly praise the historical field. 
 
Writings from 1950-1952 
The  most  significant  work  Schlesinger  completed  on  the  subject  of  Soviet 
historiography was a set of four articles published in 1950 and 1951 in the 
periodical Soviet Studies, the scholarly journal that he had co-founded and co-
edited.  The  fact  that  Schlesinger  wrote  these  major  articles  and  published 
them in his own journal so quickly after its inception proves the deep interest 
that  historiography  held  for  him.
89    Taking  the  four  articles  together,  the 
general impression Schlesinger gave of the Soviet historiography he outlined 
is positive. He described a great deal of active and critical debate amongst 
Soviet  historians  and  charted  many  theoretical  advances.  However,  at  the 
same time, he was often deeply critical of individual works of scholarship and 
certain trends within historiography. Quite how these two polar attitudes are 
somehow  to  be  married  together  is  indicative  of  the  general  paradox 
Schlesinger displayed in his attitude to the subject. He gave a very favourable 
overall analysis of the study of history in the Soviet Union under Stalin and, 
whilst  not  ignoring  the  flaws  apparent  in  its  study,  never  seemed  to 
incorporate them into his general analysis.  
 
The  articles  used  contemporary  Russian  historical  publications  to  decipher 
currents  and  trends  in  Soviet  historiography.  There  were  obviously  some 
limitations  to  this  approach,  since  Schlesinger’s  analysis  depended  on  the 
material that he was able to procure as an academic living in Britain. This 
would necessarily leave some gaps in his knowledge of the literature but this 
was  a  problem  for  all  students  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  West  and 
Schlesinger  could  at  least  add  his  own  personal  experiences  to  any 
investigation.  He  acknowledged  these  limitations,  proving  that  he  was 
certainly  conscious  of  them.  For  example,  he  was  not  able  to  follow  the 
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debate on Russian historiography, occurring in Soviet academic publications 
of the late 1940s, to its conclusion. Schlesinger admitted: ‘Unfortunately, we 
have  no  detailed  knowledge  of  the  persons  and  events;  therefore  the 
conditions of the next move are matters of speculation’.
90  
 
Schlesinger was very clear about the aims of the Soviet Studies articles. He 
wrote: ‘We are not here discussing Soviet history as specialists in that field; 
our interest is a sociological one, and we are dealing with the subject in so far 
as it reflects the life of Soviet society’.
91 Being a student of many academic 
disciplines,  history  and  sociology  included,  Schlesinger  perhaps  inevitably 
took  a  multi-disciplinary  approach  to  the  subject.  This  would  allow  for  a 
Marxist  perspective,  studying  one  aspect  of  society  in  recognition  of  the 
determinist relationship it had to other elements. Such an approach may also 
have  recognised  the  peculiarly  political  and  social  influence  the  study  of 
history often had, and nowhere more so than in an overtly Marxist state.  
 
He conducted his analysis of Soviet historiography by tracing the debates and 
changes in emphasis, as well as possible social, political or cultural reasons 
for these, in the academic journal Voprosy Istorii. Schlesinger justified his use 
of this particular journal by explaining that it predominantly concerned itself 
with questions of Marxist fundamentals; he wrote: ‘Although this journal is not 
the principle vehicle for original research, it is the central organ of the Soviet 
historical profession and the main vehicle for generalizing the application of 
Marxist  ideology  to  Soviet  historiography’.
92  A.  L.  Litvin  has  described  the 
periodical  as  being  ‘the  principle  historical  journal’  at  that  time.
93  It  does, 
therefore, appear to have been a good source for information on historical 
developments.  The  new  journal,  which  had  supplanted  Istorik  Marksist  by 
special order of the Party’s Central Committee, was to be serious, scholarly 
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and non-populist. According to Schlesinger, the editorial of the first issue of 
Volume 1945 promised to describe and influence the direction of historical 
research. It also announced the intention to offer a channel of communication 
with non-Soviet historians and to invite collaborative work with those foreign 
academics  who  shared  the  basic  approach of  Soviet  historiography.
94  This 
never  materialised.  However,  Schlesinger  insisted  its  reviews  of  foreign 
publications were, ‘…. fair and in many cases not unfriendly’.
95  
 
Despite the journal’s professed aspirations, just four years later the second 
issue  of  1949  announced  a  change  in  the  editorial  board  and  policy  of 
Voprosy Istorii.
96 This was as a result of criticism of the historical profession 
by  the  Central  Committee.  Schlesinger  argued  that  the  journal  had 
recognised, 
 
…. it has for some time past ceased to be a fighting organ of 
Marxist-Leninist historiography, that it has not confronted Soviet 
historians with their topical tasks, that it refrained from creative 
discussion of the most important problems of historiography and 
did  not  conduct  a  consistent  and  decisive  struggle  against 
expressions of bourgeois ideology in Soviet historiography.
97  
 
Schlesinger explained that the journal also admitted to having expressed a 
liberal  attitude  to  distortions  of  ideology  instead  of  unmasking  falsifiers  of 
history. Each issue had been a casual collection of articles that had failed to 
pose  theoretical  problems  or  elaborate  questions  of  social  thought  or  the 
history of Soviet society and the state. However, the new editorial board was 
committed to correcting these errors. Schlesinger used issues from the few 
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years  before  and  after  this  self-criticism  in  his  examination  of  Soviet 
historiography.  He  made  no  comment  on  it  or  the  change  in  editorial 
personnel  and  so  one  is  unable  to  ascertain  Schlesinger’s  opinion  on  the 
matter. This does appear to be a rather strange omission in his articles. He 
was basing his entire analysis on the contents of a periodical in the midst of 
major editorial changes as well as enduring harsh and public denigration. This 
would inevitably have affected the contents of the journal. Schlesinger could, 
perhaps,  have  made  some  distinction  between  articles  and  interpretations 
popular before and after this shift or described any alteration in tone as a 
result, but he did not. 
 
The series of articles began with an insistence that debate existed within the 
historical  field  in  the  Soviet  Union.  Marxism-Leninism  was  the  basis  of  all 
historical  research  but  this  in  no  way  impeded  debate  or  discussion. 
Schlesinger argued, ‘…. the general framework of interpretation is given to 
Soviet  historians,  but  the  Marxist-Leninist  theory  is  open  to  diverse 
interpretations.  Controversy  about  these  interpretations  is  one  aspect  of 
historiographical activities’.
98 Contrary to what many Western commentators 
thought,  a  strict  Marxist  methodology  did  not  limit  intellectual  freedom  or 
debate.  
 
Schlesinger gave a brief outline of the background to recent historiographical 
discussions,  giving  a  short  summary  of  pre-1917  liberal  historians  and 
outlining  the  work  of  Pokrovskii;  ‘….  the  most  prominent  figure  in  Soviet 
historiography during the first fifteen years after the October Revolution’.
99  He 
insisted  Pokrovskii’s  theory  of  ‘economic  materialism’  was  inherently  anti-
Marxist  since  an  attempt  to  interpret  history  in  solely  economic  terms 
contradicted  the  Marxist  conception  of  history  as  a  succession  of  different 
forms  of  social  life,  determined  by  the  nature  of  production  in  each. 
Schlesinger had written previously on what he perceived to be the problematic 
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nature of Pokrovskii’s theory but he now added another criticism of it. Namely 
that: 
 
Pokrovsky’s concept of Merchant Capitalism had very definite 
implications  for  the  interpretation  of  Russian  history.  This 
concept  confirmed  the  tendency  of  pre-Marxist  Russian 
historiographers,  such  as  Klyuchevsky,  to  emphasize  basic 
differences, distinguishing early Russian history, with its alleged 
absence of Feudalism, from the West.
100 
 
Such a theory denied the importance of the Slav peasants and the existence 
of autonomous development in mediaeval society parallel to the West. Such 
an  interpretation  was  now  at  odds  with  the  state  priority  of  emphasising 
independent, yet typical, Slavic development. Schlesinger argued that Soviet 
historians were conscious of the fact that their brand of Marxism demanded a 
certain universality of historical experience. The acceptance of separate yet 
analogous development to the West would, therefore, be necessary. Although 
Schlesinger did not say so, there was also perhaps an intentional appeal to 
national pride within the campaign against so-called Pokrovskiian concepts. 
Schlesinger’s assertion that Pokrovksii’s theory denied the parallel nature of 
Russia’s development was disingenuous since Pokrovskii consistently denied 
the particularity of the Russian experience. Schlesinger actually stated this in 
a later unpublished paper.
101 
 
Schlesinger  described  the  overcoming  of  Pokrovskii’s  school  within  Soviet 
historiography.  His  historical  concepts  were  attacked  in  the  early  1930s 
mainly due to the immediate needs of education. As Schlesinger had argued 
in  The  Spirit  of  Post-War  Russia  and  Zeitschrift  fur  Sozialforschung, 
Pokrovskii’s scheme had reduced the facts of national history to illustrations of 
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general trends and had created a tendency to merge the teaching of history 
with that of sociology.
102 The party thus sought to replace his analysis and 
theory  of  history.  According  to  Schlesinger:  ‘Pokrovsky’s  theories  were 
emphatically rejected as ‘empty sociological boxes’’.
103 Pokrovskii continued 
to  be  the  subject  of  criticism  as  late  as  1942  for  his,  ‘…anti-histori[ci]sm’; 
applying  structures  derived  from  present  conditions  to  entirely  different 
systems of the past and offering a negative perspective on national history.
104 
 
There  were  various  consequences  to  the  overcoming  of  ‘economic 
materialism’,  not  least  that  those  historians,  such  as  E.  V. Tarle,  who  had 
been  eclipsed  by  Pokrovskii,  could  now  come  to  the  fore.
105  A  younger 
generation of historians emerged and began to work on definite and distinct 
time  periods.  However,  Schlesinger  argued,  ‘….  the  defeat  of  Pokrovsky’s 
school caused also a lot of loose, unsystematic and propagandist talk of a 
traditional,  nationalist  character’.
106  Soviet  historians  reacted  against 
Pokrovskii’s erroneously negative approach to the nation by describing it in 
too positive a manner. This chauvinist tendency increased during World War 
Two  and  was,  perhaps,  inevitable  as  the  Soviet  Union  tried  to  unite  and 
motivate  its  people  against  a  foreign  foe.  Yet  Schlesinger  made  no  direct 
reference  to  possible  reasons  for  this  nationalist,  blinkered  approach  to 
history.  
 
According  to  Schlesinger,  the  1948  volume  of  Voprosy  Istorii  contained 
reactions to A. Zhdanov’s famous speech to a conference of philosophers on 
24
 June 1947. The speech formed part of a general restatement by the party 
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of  the  functions  of  intellectual  specialists  in  the  Soviet  Union.
107  The 
conference had been organised to lead criticism of G. G. Aleksandrov’s book 
on the history of philosophy. Stalin argued that the book overestimated the 
importance of Western, in particular German, philosophy and failed to note 
the decisive break Marx’s work had created in the evolution of philosophy. 
Criticism  was  thus  essential.
108  Zhdanov  took  the  lead  in  this  second 
conference, the first having been deemed too cautious in its condemnation. 
He insisted on the need for greater appreciation of Russian achievements and 
the rejection of ideological ties to the West.
109 According to Schlesinger, the 
speech  implied  a  shift  in  ideological  interpretations,  fitting  theory  to  the 
changed circumstances of post-war Soviet life.
110 However, he argued that 
Zhdanov’s speech did not have the enormous impact upon history that was 
noticeable in other academic subjects, ‘…. there was no special break in the 
historical field because, as we have just seen, the basic concepts of post-war 
ideology  were  elaborated  in  the  historical  field  rather  earlier  than 
elsewhere’.
111 
 
Schlesinger went on to describe the ensuing ideological campaign commonly 
referred to as ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’. In a paper in 1949 he had made clear 
the significance of this new focus in intellectual life. He referred to, ‘…. the 
general  importance  of  the  attacks  on  ‘cosmopolitanism’  as  the  general 
heading under which all the ideological discussions in the USSR have now 
been brought’.
112 In the Soviet Studies article, Schlesinger claimed that from 
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April onwards the 1949 volume of Voprosy Istorii had been dominated by the 
movement.
113  The  ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’  drive  was  concerned  with  many 
arenas of Soviet culture and had several themes. It seems generally to have 
been aimed at purging any perceived bourgeois or western elements from 
Soviet  intellectual  achievement  or  from  historical  interpretations.  The 
supposed past accommodation of the bourgeois world had developed during 
the war, due to an inevitable reduction in antagonism towards the U.S and 
other Western states, whilst fighting as allies.  Yet now, cosmopolitanism was 
synonymous  with  American  imperialism  and  was  the  antithesis  of  Soviet 
patriotism. There, thus, began a relentless campaign, directed at all strata of 
society and every sphere of Soviet intellectual life, aimed at the removal of 
any vestiges of tolerance towards western scientific or philosophical values.
114 
As K Shtepa wrote: 
 
Defined  in  the  painful  course  of  many  ‘discussions’  and 
‘criticisms’ in 1948 and 1949, cosmopolitanism came to mean 
the extolling or even the use of Western authorities – ‘fawning’ 
before  the  West  and,  conversely,  the  belittling  of  Russian 
historians and traditions. In accord with the dictates of foreign 
policy, the use of Western sources came to mean reliance on 
the tools of American imperialism.
115 
 
The  distinctly  anti-Semitic  character  of  the  campaign  has  been  widely 
recognised.  K  Tomoff,  for  example,  has  written:  ‘Anticosmopolitanism  has 
long  been  seen  as  thinly  veiled  anti-Semitism’.
116  There  was  more  to  the 
crusade  than  simple  anti-Semitism  but  few  denied  the  undertones  and 
                                                 
113 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 1, p. 303. For some examples of perceived 
‘cosmopolitanism’ in various academic fields as well as introductory notes by Schlesinger see 
Schlesinger, ‘Some Materials on the Recent Attacks Against Cosmopolitanism’. 
114 Erickson, ‘E. V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian under the Soviet Regime’, pp. 209-210. 
115 K. Shtepa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State, (New Brunswick, Rutgers University 
Press, 1962) p. 209. 
116 K. Tomoff, ‘Uzbek Music’s Separate Path: Interpreting ‘Anticosmopolitanism’ in Stalinist 
Central Asia, 1949 – 52’, The Russian Review, 63, April 2004, pp. 212 – 240 at p. 212.   248 
implications.
117 However, Schlesinger made no reference to this in his articles. 
This  does  seem  a  strange  omission,  particularly  from  someone  of  Jewish 
descent  who  had  experienced  anti-Semitism  in  his  childhood.  Schlesinger 
may have deliberately avoided mention of this sinister aspect of the campaign 
in  his  effort  to  emphasise  the  positive  aspects  of  Soviet  historiography. 
However,  this  is  merely  speculation.  Schlesinger  may  also  have  been 
unaware  of  these  implications;  although,  given  his  background,  this  is 
doubtful.
118 
 
Schlesinger  felt  the  campaign  was  a  reaction  to  the  rapprochement  of 
Marxism  to  its  bourgeois-democratic  ancestors,  and  in  particular  of  Soviet 
Marxism to all broadly progressive tendencies in the national past; both trends 
had flourished in the war years.  The campaign also reacted against attempts 
to diminish the differences between Soviet Marxism and the social forces in 
the  West  to  which  the  wartime  alliance  had  appealed.  According  to 
Schlesinger, in the historical field, the ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ drive manifested 
itself in, ‘…. a polemic against the minimizing of differences with the West’.
119 
Another  element  to  the  campaign  involved  a  critique  of  pre-Revolutionary 
historians. They were criticised in terms of their supposed embellishment of 
the Russian past. In order to enhance national prestige, Russian development 
had to be seen as independent of the West; although this did not go so far as 
to  suggest  that  Russia  evolved  upon  entirely  separate  lines.  In  addition, 
considerations  of  the  specific  achievements  of  the  Soviet  state  and  party 
made  it  necessary  to  rid  previous  times  of  embellishments;  making 
developments since all the greater.
120 
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Schlesinger  argued  that  ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’  was  of  a  more  severe 
character than previous ideological campaigns.
121 For example, it resulted in 
the  change  in  Voprosy  Istorrii’s  Editorial  Board.
122  However,  it  is  arguable 
whether the loss of position or reputation of several scholars on the Editorial 
Board  was  a  ‘more  severe’  punishment  than  that  which  had  occurred  in 
previous ideological campaigns. The campaign against bourgeois historians 
at the beginning of the first five year plan resulted in elderly academics such 
as  M.  K.  Lyubavsky  and  N.  P.  Likhachev  being  imprisoned  and  exiled. 
According J. Barber: ‘On one calculation, 130 historians were arrested during 
1930 and 1931’.
123  
 
The  ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’  campaign  had  a  major  impact  upon  Soviet 
historiography, affecting the selection, tone and content of articles in Voprosy 
Istorii.  The  drive  resurrected  theories  of  Russia’s  unique,  independent 
development whilst insisting that the Bolshevik takeover of power represented 
a decisive break with the past. There was to be no accommodation of the 
western world into analyses of Russian development. This new emphasis was 
to  be  followed  in  all  spheres  of  academic  research,  including  the  study  of 
Russian history. This party-instituted drive had enormous repercussions for 
Soviet historians and yet Schlesinger only described it in brief terms and failed 
to note the intentionally anti-Semitic implications of the new approach.  
 
In the paper, Schlesinger offered very little of his own opinion on the post-war 
historiographical developments he described. This appears to be a strange 
exclusion since in other writings on the subject Schlesinger was rarely reticent 
in offering his own judgements. There were implicit criticisms of the Soviet 
regime’s  historiographical  formulae  within  the  introductory  article;  several 
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footnotes seem to covertly disparage new trends or semi-official criticisms.
124 
However, the positioning of this criticism was bound to reduce its impact and, 
in general, the paper was very positive about developments.  
 
The second article began with a discussion of Soviet interpretations of ancient 
history, as reflected in the journal Voprosy Istorii. Non-Russian or Slav history 
appeared to have been primarily focused upon the Roman Empire. The decay 
of the ancient world had always been a major area of research in the West but 
now, Schlesinger asserted, ‘… the topicality of the issue is felt equally strongly 
by  Soviet  historians  and  publicists  who  are  rejecting  the  theories  of  their 
Western colleagues and beginning to formulate their own’.
125 He argued that 
Engels, in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, written in 
1884, produced the classic Marxist perspective on the subject.
126 Engels’ aim 
was to explain why the modern proletariat could overthrow capitalist society 
and replace it with a non-exploitative one, whilst oppressed classes of the 
past  only  succeeded  in  replacing  decaying societies  with other  exploitative 
forms. Schlesinger then referred to Stalin’s speech to a meeting of kolkhoz-
activists in February 1933, at the First All-Union Congress of Collective-Farm 
Shock Brigaders. According to Schlesinger, Stalin illustrated, 
 
….  the  superiority  of  the  modern  working  class  over  all  the 
earlier revolutionary classes by saying that the former could end 
exploitation for good, while the revolutions of the slaves which 
had overthrown slave-holding, and those of the serfs which had 
overthrown feudal society, had only been able to substitute one 
form of exploitation for another.
127 
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This  appears  to  have  been  very  near  to  the  tone  of  Engels’  statements, 
suggesting  a  continuation  of  Marxist  interpretation  into  the  Soviet  era. 
However, Schlesinger argued that more recently there had been a renewed 
tendency  to  reflect  backwards,  if  not  the  modern  class  struggle,  at  least 
contemporary  Bolshevik  concepts  about  the  social  dynamics  of  change. 
Whereas  Engels  was  satisfied  to  show  the  necessity  of  a  socio-economic 
interpretation of the fall of Rome, modern Soviet historians wished to stress 
the  decisive  role  of  popular  movements  in  the  transformation  of  social 
formations.  In  this  new  interpretation,  external  conquest  became  only  a 
secondary  phenomenon.  Schlesinger  asserted:  ‘It  is  obvious  that  this 
represents a methodological attempt to apply the Marxist theory concerning 
the  mechanisms  of  social  transformations  to  the  national  sections  of  the 
international process’.
128 He cited an article by M. Alpatov on the transition 
from the ancient to the mediaeval world as an example of it.
129 
 
Soviet interpretations of Roman history increasingly differed from those in the 
West at this time. Schlesinger cited A. Dopsch as an example of Western 
historiography.
130 He argued that Dopsch’s theory of the ‘barbarians’ merely 
‘taking over’ the Roman estate, assumed that the estate must have already 
contained manifestations of semi-feudal forms. Early mediaeval society must, 
therefore,  have  featured  a  well-developed  money  economy  in  which 
prosperous  farmers  were  producing  for  the  market  alongside  the  slave-
holding  manors.    Such  an  interpretation  differed  substantially  to  Soviet 
historiography. As Schlesinger explained: ‘This concept is sharply rejected by 
Soviet historians because it does not regard feudalism as a natural and serf-
holding economy and because it does not recognise the changes which took 
                                                                                                                                           
all of them were one-sided revolutions. One form of exploitation of the working people was 
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place in the ancient world as revolutionary’.
131 Dopsch’s scheme ran counter 
to the classic Marxist explanation of Western history and periodisation.  
 
Schlesinger argued that the articles in Voprosy Istorii concerned with ancient 
history represented a new, independent, stage in Soviet historiography. Soviet 
historians were developing their own theories on the Roman Empire and its 
fall  and  these  theories  diverged  greatly  from  those  in  the  West.  Soviet 
theories evolved from the classic Marxist interpretation and enjoyed the full 
support of Stalin. He pointed that Alpatov’s article contained statements to the 
effect that the slaves were incapable of defeating the Empire alone and thus 
required  class  allies.
132  Schlesinger  wrote:  ‘Such  statements  are  clearly 
ideological;  whether  they  can  be  helpful  to  Science,  as  earlier  ideological 
constructions  have  occasionally  been,  depends  upon  their  suitability  as 
incentives  to  specialist  research’.
133  The  fact  that  allies  were  required  to 
destroy the decaying empire may have been a reflection of the experiences of 
the Russian Revolution and the decisive role given to the peasantry, rather 
than  the  thoughtful  analysis  of  evidence.  It  was  to  be  seen  whether  this 
interpretation would prove fruitful for scholars. Schlesinger also pointed out 
that  Alpatov  was  keen  to  prove  the  continuity  of  Marxist  thought  on  the 
subject,  traceable  to  Marx  himself;  this  again  would  be  for  ideological 
purposes.
134  However, new advances in the historiography of this period had 
been made and Schlesinger described them in a positive light. 
 
Schlesinger  wrote  briefly  about  the  debates  on  the  nature  of  the  Petrine 
period to be found in Voprosy Istorii. The discussion was, in the main, on 
whether  Petrine  Russia  had  a  generally  feudal  character,  or  if  capitalist 
formations had already begun to take shape. According to Schlesinger, N. L. 
Rubinstein held the leadership of the dominant interpretation. He argued that 
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the Petrine period was of a primarily feudal character.
135 Schlesinger wrote 
that  he  assumed,  ‘….  a  transformation  from  a  predominantly  feudal  to  a 
predominantly capitalist pattern during the 1740s and 1750s’.
136 This matter 
seems to have been one of quite open debate. In fact, Schlesinger referred to 
one article which contributed to the discussion despite its apparently obvious 
unorthodoxy.
137  Schlesinger  argued  that  P.  Lyashchenko  enjoyed  official 
recognition for his interpretation of the nature of Petrine Russia in his book 
History of the National Economy of the Russia; ‘The Stalin prize awarded to 
Lyashchenko may be regarded as an approval at least of the principles of his 
approach’.
138 His interpretation was of a Petrine Russia featuring both feudal 
and  capitalist  characteristics.  Yet  a  year  later  Voprosy  Istorii  contained  a 
critical review of Lyashchenko’s book written by I. Bak. It argued that the era 
had remained predominantly feudal.
139 Again, the publication of this review 
would seem to suggest that a certain freedom of debate existed within the 
historical  field,  in  spite  of  the  heated  climate  of  the  prevailing  ‘anti-
cosmopolitanism’ campaign.  This open historiographical discussion appears 
to  strengthen  the  case  for  some  of  Schlesinger’s  most  positive  comments 
about the historical field in the Soviet Union, such as those made in The Spirit 
of  Post-war  Russia,  for  example.
140    Yet  one  year  later  the  contents  and 
editing  of  Voprosy  Istorii  were  heavily  criticised  and  the  majority  of  the 
editorial board were replaced. This may well have been due to the publishing 
of debates and heterodox articles such as those described above. 
 
Lyashchenko had described the Petrine regime as representing both feudal 
nobility  and  the  evolving  bourgeoisie.  According  to  the  historian,  the  era 
witnessed  a  strengthening  of  serfdom  at  the  same  time  as  an  increase  in 
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investment from large merchant capitalists and a great deal of development of 
the internal market. As Schlesinger wrote: ‘Thus the elements of capitalism 
grew  within  a  still  predominantly  feudal  society’.
141  Lyashchenko’s 
interpretation of the Petrine era differs markedly from writings of Schlesinger’s 
on  the  same  subject.  In  the  unpublished  The  Problems  of  Commercial 
Capitalism  in  17
th  and  18
th  Century  Russia,  Schlesinger  argued  that  there 
were no particularly significant developed capitalist features in seventeenth or 
eighteenth  century  Russia.
142  Again,  in  The  Spirit  of  Post-war  Russia,  he 
insisted:  ‘If,  about  1900,  there  were  any  feudal  of  semi-feudal  states  in 
Europe, it was certainly Tsarist Russia’.
143 Despite having written upon the 
subject, Schlesinger failed to offer his own opinion on the debate. He did not 
comment on the fact that this ‘semi-official interpretation’ was at odds with one 
he had himself written, or that Lyashchenko’s theory was very similar to that 
which Schlesinger had previously attributed to Pokrovskii in his repudiation of 
him.
144  
 
Schlesinger did write: ‘There can be little dispute amongst Marxist historians 
about  the  appearance  of  at  least  some  elements  of  capitalism  from  the 
sixteenth century onward’.
145 Whilst it is true that in his earlier writings he had 
not  argued  that  there  were  no  capitalist  elements  in  the  Petrine  era,  this 
statement does appear to change the tone of Schlesinger’s analysis regarding 
the extent of capitalist development from that in The Problems of Commercial 
Capitalism in 17
th and 18
th Century Russia. Perhaps Schlesinger had over-
emphasised the feudal nature of Petrine Russia in earlier work in order to 
discredit  Pokrovskii  and  the  theory  of  merchant  or  commercial  capitalism 
attributed to him. However, this would make those writings of Schlesinger’s 
somewhat  polemical.  His  interpretation  would  also  coincide  with  state 
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endorsed historiographical objectives of the time, as well as now endorsing 
changed contemporary ones. 
 
Schlesinger conjectured that the change in Soviet historiography on this issue 
had taken place because,  
 
….  with  the  increasing  ‘anti-cosmopolitan’  tendency  to 
emphasize  the  autochthonous  development  of  their  own 
country,  Soviet  historians  may  be  expected  to  devote  more 
attention  to  Russia’s  share  in  the  development  of  early 
capitalism than they did during the anti-Pokrovsky drive, when 
they  were  merely  interested  in  demonstrating  the  still  largely 
feudal  character  of  the  regime  overthrown  by  the  twentieth 
century revolutions.
146 
 
This  certainly  appears  to  be  a  convincing  explanation  for  the  alteration  of 
official  historiography.  However,  it  could  be  argued  that  Schlesinger’s  own 
interpretations followed the same pattern. Concurrent with the anti-Pokrovskii 
campaign in the USSR he was arguing for the, ‘largely feudal character’ of 
pre-revolutionary  Russia.  Yet  now,  contemporaneously  with  the  ‘anti-
cosmopolitan’ drive, he appeared to be, at least implicitly, accepting ‘Russia’s 
share in the development of early capitalism’.  
 
The  third  of  Schlesinger’s  series  of  articles  on  Soviet  historiography 
concentrated upon the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and began with a 
discussion of the revolutions of 1848 and their connection to the nationalities 
problem. 1948 represented the centenary of the Communist Manifesto and 
the  European  revolutions  and  was,  therefore,  a  great  catalyst  for  the 
publication of research on these subjects. The article went in to some detail 
regarding  Soviet  historical  work  on  Marx  and  Engels’  attitude  towards 
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nationalities.  However,  it  is  perhaps  most  interesting  because  it  led 
Schlesinger to comment upon the controversy surrounding the publication, by 
the  Marx-Engels-Lenin  Institute  in  1948,  of  correspondence  between  Marx 
and certain Russian political figures.
147 His comments shed light not only on 
Soviet attitudes to the topic, but also on Schlesinger’s.  
 
In  his  famous  letters  to  Vera  Zasulich  and  the  editor  of  Otechestvennye 
Zapiski, Marx appeared to question having created a theory that was ‘both 
universal  and  supra-historical’.
148    He  also  implied  that  Capital  might  have 
been written from a Western perspective only. The editors responsible for the 
printing of these letters were heavily criticised for not having emphasised the 
fact that, within this particular context, the classics had deviated from Marxist 
orthodoxy  as  established  by  Lenin.  Schlesinger  cited  a  review  by  A. 
Khan’kovsky inVoprosy Istorii as an example of this criticism.
149 Khan’kovsky 
had censured the editors for failing to include the appropriate references to 
writings of Lenin and Stalin alongside Marx’s letters.  
 
This seems to be proof of a trend within the historical field at this time towards 
a lessening of reliance on the Marxist classics. It would certainly be necessary 
if  Soviet  historians  were  to  prove  the  typical  character  of  Russian 
development,  something  they  were  at  pains  to  do  in  all  fields  of  historical 
research, but which was severely contradicted by the latest revelations about 
Marx’s  Russian  thinking.  Schlesinger  appeared  sceptical  of  the  approach 
Soviet historians had taken to the publication of Marx’s letters, writing: ‘In view 
of the great care taken by Marx in drafting the theoretical formulations in the 
letter  to  Vera  Zasulich,  the  current  method  of  explaining  ‘unorthodox’ 
statements made by Marx by his practical interest in encouraging the most 
active group amongst the Russian revolutionaries can hardly be defended’.
150 
Schlesinger  also  wrote  that  it  was  obvious,  ‘…  nobody  has  faced  the 
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possibility  that  Marx’s  temporary  doubts  about  the  succession  of  definite 
stages  of  social  development  typical  for  all  civilisations  may  have  been 
something more than an expression of opportunism in his dealings with the 
Russian factions’.
151 Schlesinger’s approach was consistent with the attitude 
he took in all other writings on this subject. Although he did not devote a great 
deal  of  attention  to  the  subject  of  Marx’s  attitude  towards  Russia  he 
consistently mentioned it when dealing with other work. Schlesinger always 
insisted that Marx had not posited the Western framework as the only path to 
socialism. Russia could potentially avoid the capitalist stage of development 
and transfer directly to socialism if the there was sufficient industrial support 
externally.
152 
 
It seems clear Schlesinger disapproved of ignoring, or undermining, Marx’s 
later  writings  about  Russia  simply  because  they  did  not  easily  fit  into  the 
orthodox successive stages theory of historical development.
153 He, therefore, 
made a significant criticism of Soviet historiography as reflected in the journal 
Voprosy Istorii. However, he did not devote a great deal of attention to the 
subject and much of his analysis was contained within a footnote, away from 
the  main  body  of  the  text.  This  would  inevitably  reduce  its  impact  upon 
readers.  It  is  important  to  note  that  a  party  institute  published  Marx’s 
correspondence despite the fact that their contents clearly differed from the 
orthodoxy  of  the  time.  This  would  seem  to  indicate  that  at  least  a  certain 
openness  of  discussion  was  tolerated,  even  encouraged,  on  such  a 
fundamental matter of Marxist principles.  
 
Schlesinger  expressed  concern  about  the  lack  of  publications  on  the 
immediate pre-history and history of the October revolution. There was more 
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work completed upon the first period of Soviet power. However, Schlesinger 
implied  that  much  of  it  had  an  overtly  political  role  to  play  in  reflecting 
contemporary attitudes backwards or proving the orthodox heritage of certain 
policies; ‘All these contributions emphasize those trends of the very earliest 
days of the Soviet republic which are predominant at the moment’.
154 What 
research was published in Voprosy Istorii at this time only illuminated small 
details of more complex questions or served to legitimise current policies and 
denigrate those people and ideas that were now out of favour. He argued that 
one paper, ‘…. describes the resistance against centralisation almost only in 
terms  of  the  treachery  of  the  factions  which  were  later  defeated’.
155  He 
suggested that the article was a polemical work with little intrinsically new to 
offer on the subject.  
 
Political  exigencies  impacted  upon  the  efficacy  and  quality  of  scholarship 
concerned with the Civil War period too. Historians were forced to explain the 
establishment of the Red Army without reference to Trotsky’s decisive role.
156 
Schlesinger argued that the requirements of state enforced historical axioms 
were,  in  these  cases,  anathema  to  the  rigours  of  sound  scholarship  and 
coherent presentation. 
 
The  last  section  of  Schlesinger’s  third  article  detailed  historical  work 
undertaken  on  the  themes  of  imperialism  and  the  German  revolution. 
Schlesinger  provided  a  condemnatory  evaluation  of  new  trends, 
interpretations  and  individual  works  by  Soviet  scholars  in  these  fields.  He 
reviewed  most  of  the  articles  within  the  context  of  the  ongoing  campaign 
against ‘objectivism’; ‘The struggle against ‘objectivism’ forms the main theme 
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of  all  the  present  Soviet  historiographical  discussions’.
157  This  latest 
ideological crusade on the historical front can best be understood alongside or 
as part of the ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ campaign. It was directed against those 
historians  who  were  regarded  as  uncritically  accepting  bourgeois  sources, 
both foreign and pre-Revolutionary Russian.
158  According to Schlesinger, the 
party  felt  that,  ‘….  under  the  influence  of  the  rapprochement  to  bourgeois 
liberal  and  progressive  thought  during  the  second  world  war’,  certain 
historians had blindly followed non-Communist sources and thus produced a 
liberal-western interpretation of events as opposed to the correct Communist 
critique.
159    This  criticism  assumed  that  utilising  bourgeois  sources  would 
necessarily  entail  the  assimilation  of  any  interpretation  or  emphasis  the 
foreign source may have had. However, Schlesinger argued that it was the 
task  of  historians  to  discuss  facts  rather  than  sociological  attitudes  to  the 
subject; sources could, therefore, be used as a means to gather facts only. He 
was  deeply  critical  of  the  campaign  against  perceived  ‘objectivism’  and 
insisted  that  any  omission  in  research  caused  by  a  one-dimensional 
theoretical approach would lead to a decline in scholarship. Schlesinger also 
suggested  that  the  campaign  would  have  a  negative  impact  upon  the 
perception of Soviet historical research abroad: ‘To the Western historian, the 
Soviet  drive  against  ‘objectivism’…  is  bound  to  appear  as  a  revival  of 
Pokrovsky’s demand for the reflection of topical politics into the past, if not as 
a demand for subjectivism in the worst sense of the word’.
160 This represented 
a damning indictment of current trends. 
 
The fact that all discussions, conclusions and interpretations of the German 
revolution had to be adjusted to match those of state orthodoxy as enshrined 
within the History of the CPSU(b) or Short Course, was another feature of 
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Soviet scholarship which Schlesinger criticised. The orthodox interpretation of 
events  in  Germany  in  1918/1919  found  the  revolution  to  have  been  a 
‘bourgeois’  one  and  it  seems  that  no  other  analysis  could  be  tolerated.
161 
Schlesinger  argued  that  this  particular  criticism  was  of  ‘a  dogmatic 
character’.
162  Once  again  dogmatism  in  matters  of  interpretation  was 
hindering scholarly progress, although it is important to note that Schlesinger 
did not make this conclusion himself. 
 
In  general,  Schlesinger  provided  a  negative  appraisal  of  Soviet  historical 
research concerning the period from 1848 up to the Second World War. He 
objected  to  the  vehement  campaign  against  ‘objectivism’,  a  current  which 
appeared to distort Soviet historical research. The campaign limited the use of 
sources and assumed that a historian always accepted the interpretation of 
that  source,  something  Schlesinger  felt  to  be  methodologically  erroneous. 
Progress  had  been  achieved  in  the  study  of  Marx  and  Engels’  attitudes 
towards the nationalities question. However, he castigated Soviet analysis of 
Marx’s writings upon the revolutionary potential of Russia in the nineteenth 
century. He argued that Marx’s contribution to the debate about Russia could 
not be ignored simply because it did not concur with official interpretations. 
Schlesinger bemoaned the lack of research produced on the history of the 
October  revolution  in  Russia  and  argued  that  the  majority  of  publications 
concerning the first Soviet period were of a tangibly propagandist or polemical 
character, focusing on issues relevant to the current needs of the state. He 
also  criticised  the  scarcity  and  quality  of  work  produced  on  the  rise  of 
imperialism and fascism in Europe. 
 
Schlesinger began his final article of the Soviet historiography series with a 
discussion of recent Soviet interpretations of post-1918 diplomatic history. He 
argued that the majority of work on the topic consisted of reviews of foreign 
documentary publications, many of which were viewed with hostility by the 
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Soviet writers. These reviews formed part of the ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ and 
‘objectivism’ campaigns. They involved a somewhat polemical rejection of all 
perceived bourgeois sources and interpretations and also attempted to infer, if 
not  simply  state,  that  an  anti-Soviet  bias  was  common  to  all  Western 
powers.
163 Reviewers were also keen to expose the ‘objectivist’ idealisation of 
bourgeois  foreign  policies,  believed  to  be  held  by  some  erring  Soviet 
historians. Schlesinger seemed to regard many of the reviews and articles 
unfavourably; reviews of documentary collections published about British and 
German inter-war foreign policies were evaluated with unnecessary hostility in 
the Soviet Union. He argued that they were attacked for supposed omissions 
in the collections rather than from the point of view of questioning authenticity. 
Often  the  documentary  collections  were  also  criticised  for  the  inclusion  of 
certain documents that the reviewers perceived to be in the interests of the 
publishing country. Schlesinger wrote: ‘The Soviet reviewers seem to take it 
for granted that the editors of British publications look only for political effects 
in Germany’.
164  
 
Only very recently had articles concerning US foreign policy in the pre-war 
and Second World War years began to emerge. Schlesinger argued that they 
involved a major re-assessment of the Roosevelt period and represented a 
serious shift in Soviet ideology. Once again this alteration of interpretation can 
be  understood  from  the  wider  context  of  other  post-1945  ideological 
developments, most importantly the ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ campaign. There 
was now a tendency amongst Soviet historians to extend their very negative 
analysis  of  post-war  USA  back  into  the  interwar  period.  According  to 
Schlesinger, this new orthodox analysis was very significant since, ‘… many 
of the recent Soviet attempts to avoid encirclement were based upon appeals 
to  the  Roosevelt  tradition  against  that  now  predominating  in  American 
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politics’.
165  Such  an  appeal  would  no  longer  be  possible.  This  perhaps 
heralded a more militant stance in international affairs; instead of appealing to 
the US’s more moderate past Soviet historians projected their current notion 
of its aggression backwards.
166 Schlesinger argued that a simple projection of 
current  notions  into  the  past  was  potentially  erroneous;  it  was  in  fact  a 
vulgarity of which he had accused Pokrovski. 
 
Schlesinger’s fourth article, completing his summary of Soviet historiography 
up to the post-war period, was in general very critical of the kind of research 
and reviews published in Voprosy Istorii. He argued that many of the reviews 
of foreign documentary publications were overtly polemical and often deeply 
unfair in their criticisms. He also pointed out that the exposition of events in 
China was occurring in the Soviet Union around a decade after the fact. He 
argued that, perhaps, this would persuade Soviet historians to view the state’s 
dominant  position,  as  regards  the  publication  of  research  work,  as  having 
certain  negative  consequences.
167  He  drew  attention  to  the  propagandist 
value of much of the work completed on the inter-war years and Allied policies 
before and during the Second World War. He did not, however, conclude that 
this was a major motivational factor in the evolution of interpretations.  
 
Schlesinger’s  major  articles  on  Soviet  historiography  offer  a  great  deal  of 
information  on  the  subject.  It  seems  clear  that  he  was  particularly 
knowledgeable and interested in this field and, therefore, had much of value 
to write. With limited access to information on the historical profession in the 
Soviet  Union,  a  critical  analysis  of  the  contents  of  an  important  scholarly 
journal allowed Schlesinger to gain an impression of the kind of work being 
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kapituliatsii Frantsii (mai-dekabr’ 1940 goda)’, Voprosy Istorii, 2, 1950, pp. 40-65. Schlesinger 
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published there. He summarised historiographical trends of the recent Soviet 
past,  elaborated  the  broad  shifts  in  interpretation  and  analysis  that  had 
occurred  since  the  Second  World  War  and  described  the  ideological 
campaigns which formed the wider context for these changes. However, the 
information  that  he  provided  on  this  latter  theme  was  limited.  He  wrote 
comparatively little on the course and impact of the major post-war ideological 
campaign  of  ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’,  despite  asserting  its  significance  and 
intensity.  It  was  left  to  the  reader  to  link  his  analysis  and  description  of 
individual works of scholarship to the broader ideological environment of the 
Soviet  Union.  Schlesinger  rarely  explained  any  relationship  between  the 
articles he described and the general historical front. 
 
In general, it seems that Schlesinger wished to convey a positive analysis of 
Soviet historiography in the articles. He began by insisting on the freedom of 
debate  which  existed  in  the  historical  field,  within  the  consensual  Marxist-
Leninist framework. He demonstrated the evolution of Soviet historiography, 
often  asserting  the  progress  achieved  by  successive  interpretations  in 
overcoming  the  limitations  of  their  predecessors.  Schlesinger  also  praised 
works of individual scholarship. It seems clear that he regarded work carried 
out on earlier historical periods as of a generally higher quality than Soviet 
research  on  more  modern  issues.  He  did  draw  attention  to  the  political 
efficacy  and  even  necessity  of  certain  historical  interpretations  but  did  not 
write any conclusions on how this may have affected freedom of discussion or 
scholarly credibility. He even pointed to individual cases of what appeared to 
be total censorship, wholly polemical purges and huge state interference in 
the practice of history in the Soviet Union; all without comment. At times the 
articles seemed entirely narrative, offering no real analysis or judgement upon 
the matters described.  
 
Schlesinger  was  condemnatory  of  individual  works  of  scholarship,  reviews 
and  interpretations.  Parts  three  and  four  contained  almost  entirely  critical 
observations of Soviet work. However, he did not seem to incorporate these   264 
critiques into what little overall, and almost entirely positive, summation he 
had. For example, in the first of the series of articles, Schlesinger argued that 
reviews  of  foreign  publications  were  conducted  with  fairness  and  often 
friendliness  in  Voprosy  Istorii.
168  However,  when  describing  actual  reviews, 
Schlesinger  clearly  gave  the  impression  that  foreign  works  were,  on  the 
whole,  viewed  with  much  hostility.  Schlesinger  had  not  incorporated  his 
descriptions of the actual character of the reviews into his general analysis. In 
fact,  in  this  instance,  his  general  and  specific  comments  were  in  direct 
contradiction to each other. Schlesinger’s criticisims of Soviet historiography 
were  often  introduced  only  in  the  footnotes  of  his  articles;  this  would 
necessarily lessen their impact on a reader.
169 
 
There was no general conclusion to the series of articles and there appears to 
have been a reluctance on Schlesinger’s part to make one. His stated aim 
was  sociological,  to  observe  how  the  study  of  history  reflected  the  life  of 
Soviet society. Yet Schlesinger did not fulfil this aim. His articles lacked any 
real  analysis  linking  historiographical  developments  to  events  in  other 
sections  of  society.  To  have  ended  the  series  of  articles  with  an  overall 
assessment or conclusion is the usual method of bringing a discussion to a 
close and Schlesinger did so in the vast majority of his other writings. There 
could  have  been  various  reasons  for  this  omission.  One  possibility  is  that 
Schlesinger  did  not  wish  to  make  the  necessarily  more  pessimistic 
characterisation of the study of history in the Soviet Union that followed from 
his many criticisms. Such a motive would support the thesis that Schlesinger 
wished to convey a good impression of Soviet historical work.  
 
Schlesinger’s  study  of  historiography  was  continued  in  a  publication 
appearing  just  a  few  years  after  his  major  series  of  articles.
170  ‘Recent 
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Discussions  on  the  Periodization  of  History’  was  published  in  the  journal 
Soviet Studies in 1952.
171  It was entirely concerned with developments within 
Soviet  historiography and, as  the  title  suggests,  focused  on the  continuing 
debate surrounding the correct periodisation of history.
172 It can be considered 
a  continuation  of  the  previous  set  of  articles  Schlesinger  produced  on  the 
topic.  It  had  the  same  tone  and  general  analysis  and  utilised  the  same 
sources:  Soviet  scholarly  journals  such  as  Voprosy  Istorii  and  Bolshevik. 
Similarly, this article appeared to defend the study and research of history 
within the Soviet Union from arguments that nothing of worth was produced. 
 
The article was one of Schlesinger’s most optimistic writings on the subject, 
alongside  The  Spirit  of  Post-War  Russia,  written  five  years  earlier. 
Schlesinger insisted that scholarly work of meritorious value was undertaken 
within the Soviet Union and also argued that major controversies on issues of 
Marxist fundamentals were frequent at the time of his writing. However, it is 
important to note that he did not deny there were problematic and harmful 
aspects to historical research, factors that inevitably impacted on the quality of 
scholarly output and teaching.  
 
Schlesinger  began  the  article  by  admitting  the  ‘politico-propagandist’ 
character  of  much  of  Soviet  historiographical  literature’.
173  Sometimes  re-
evaluations of historical events occurred according to the political needs of the 
state. Schlesinger wrote: ‘In such instances Soviet academic institutions work 
as  political  agency  pure  and  simple:  on  the  basis  only  of  some  inspired 
articles  in  Pravda  they  reject  theories  hitherto  accepted,  annul  academic 
degrees awarded years before, and so forth’. However, Schlesinger argued 
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that, in such cases, ‘…. the victims themselves are not the more scholarly 
writers (as Western critics of the USSR tend, after their fall, to depict them), 
but are themselves political propagandists who quite enjoyed the game as 
long as they were on the winning side.’
174 Schlesinger suggested there were 
two sides to the historical field in the Soviet Union, with only one of these, the 
less  ‘scholarly’,  being  involved  in  the  propagandist  type  of  research  and 
publication. The suggestion that some historians were playing a game and 
were actively involved in the developing state control of academia has been 
substantiated by modern scholars. A. Litvin has argued that some historians 
were active in their support of Stalin’s 1931 letter to Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia. 
He wrote: ‘The archives show that Stalin’s letter was discussed by historians 
before it appeared, and that members of the profession actually backed the 
new line; they were more than just its victims’.
175 S. Fitzpatrick has referred to 
the  advantages  the  cultural  intelligentsia  could  gain  from  their  position  in 
Stalin’s Russia, so there were certainly prizes for those who were successful 
in the game.
176 
 
Despite these overtly political activities, Schlesinger insisted real arguments 
took  place  within  Soviet  historiography.  Some  of  these  debates  involved 
matters of general principle, hugely significant to the ideology of a state with a 
Marxist  framework.  Schlesinger  went  further,  ‘….  there  are  plenty  of 
theoretical  discussions  amongst  Soviet  historians  and  there  are  very  few 
theoretical tenets which – in fact, though not in form – are uncontested’.
177 He 
used  as  an  example  Stalin’s  statement  during  the  linguistics  discussion  of 
May to July 1950 in which he asserted that there were spheres of mental 
activity, in this case language, which did not belong to the superstructure.
178 
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These  spheres  were  products  of  the  whole  of  society  not  the  rule  of  one 
class.
179 This statement was readily taken up by academics in a number of 
fields  and  provoked  widespread  debate  and  discussion  on  what  other 
elements of life might be products of the whole of society.  
 
Schlesinger argued that discussion and disagreement were necessary in a 
Marxist state in order to further science; it was only through debate that Soviet 
state tenets were elaborated. He wrote:  
 
In a society which has an organizational repository of orthodoxy, 
any individual dispute may come to an end by formal decision 
but, as intellectual life in a period of social change will never 
come to a standstill, no conclusion of any individual dispute can 
prevent, or is even intended to prevent, the re-opening of the 
basic argument in new forms. In fact, such arguments provide 
the actual source from which ‘authoritative’ statements are fed, 
to  provide  a  fertile  soil  for  new  argument  about  their 
interpretation.
180 
 
                                                                                                                                           
single  language  for  the  society,  common  to  all  members  of  that  society,  as  the  common 
language  of  the  whole  people.  Hence  the  functional  role  of  language,  as  a  means  of 
intercourse  between  people,  consists  not  in  serving  one  class  to  the  detriment  of  other 
classes,  but  in  equally  serving  the  entire  society,  all  the  classes  of  society.  This  in  fact 
explains why  a language  may equally serve both the old, moribund system and  the new, 
rising system; both the old base and the new base; both the exploiters and the exploited.’ 
(Stalin,  Marxism  and  Problems  of  Linguistics,  (Hawaii,  University  Press  of  the  Pacific 
Honolulu, 2003) pp. 5-6). For a contemporary account of the linguistics debate and Stalin’s 
statements upon it see J. Ellis and R.W. Davies, ‘The Crisis in Soviet Linguistics’, especially 
p241…. Schlesinger actually cited this article so it would seem to be a source of information 
he used. See also, K. Mehnert, Stalin Versus Marx, pp. 51… Mehnert saw this change in 
attitude  towards  language  as  part  of  the  wider  assertion  of  Russian  nationalism  and 
celebration of Russian tradition. 
179 In a later unpublished work Schlesinger outlined exactly what he understood by Stalin’s 
speech, ‘…he defined superstructures as institutions created by ruling classes for the purpose 
of the preservation of the existing social order: it followed that language, being created by the 
whole  of  society  and  serving  all  classes  of  society,  can  be  no  superstructure.  Nor  is  it  a 
means  of production, as it serves purposes  more broader  than  the production process. It 
follows that at least this social institution falls outside the traditional Marxist framework: it is 
created not by the peculiar classes of society, but by society as a whole’ (Schlesinger, Social 
Institutions, p. 212). 
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Disputes were the framework from which progressive theoretical consensuses 
were reached; in an ever-changing society, dialectical development of ideas 
and theories were inevitable and necessary. Schlesinger seemed to suggest 
that although the Party was the medium through which theoretical authority 
was  bestowed  it  was,  perhaps,  merely  a  channel  rather  than  the  absolute 
judge of that authority. The state could act as arbiter precisely because critical 
debate raged in the Soviet Union.  He cited a statement of Stalin’s in order to 
substantiate his claim of the necessity of debate, ‘…. no science can develop 
and succeed without struggle of opinions and freedom of criticism’.
181 That 
Stalin  would  argue  freedom  of  debate  was  essential  to  intellectual  and 
theoretical progress perhaps suggests that it existed. However, it does not 
necessarily prove that it was something he believed or that it was a state of 
affairs in existence. There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that Stalin 
wished  to  stifle  debate.  His  proclamation  that  certain  interpretations  of 
Bolshevik  theory  were  ‘axiomatic’  is,  perhaps,  only  the  most  infamous 
example.
182  Yet  Schlesinger  wished  to  prove  that  intellectual  disputes 
provided  the  ingredients  for  state  orthodoxy.  This  was  the  purpose  of  the 
entire article. He explicitly stated that his analysis of the periodisation debate 
was useful in order to illustrate that point.
183 Schlesinger’s desire to portray 
the study of history in the Soviet Union as one involving freedom of debate 
over fundamental principles seems clear. 
 
According  to  Schlesinger  the  discussion  on  periodisation  began  with  two 
articles in the journal Voprosy Istorii in 1949 and proceeded for more than a 
year without reaching any definite conclusions.
184 Over 30 discussion articles 
were  received  by  the  publication  in  response  to  the  initial  papers,  with  21 
being published. Debates on the subject also took place at various academic 
institutions. 
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Schlesinger began his discussion of the debate by, once again, suggesting 
reasons for Pokrovskii’s fall from pre-eminence within Soviet historiography. 
He argued that there were three main points that contributed to the overthrow 
of the ‘school’. Firstly, 
 
…. it interpreted both Russian and Western mediaeval history in 
terms  of  ‘merchant  capitalism’,  i.e.  a  social  formation  which 
does not differ fundamentally from the formation against which 
modern  socialist  revolutions  are  directed;  this  precluded  an 
interpretation of earlier Russian history as a succession of non-
capitalist periods.
185 
 
Schlesinger argued that such an analysis had now been definitely rejected in 
favour  of  an  interpretation  of  the  Russian  past  in  terms  of  feudalism. 
Secondly,  Pokrovskii  had  demanded  partisanship  in  historiography. 
Schlesinger did not object to this in principle. He wrote: ‘Interpretation of the 
past  in  terms of  modern  political  issues  is not  alien even  to  contemporary 
Soviet historiography’.
186 His problem with Pokrovskii’s particular partisanship 
was  that  an  interpretation  of  the  Russian  past  in  terms  of  ‘merchant 
capitalism’  led  to  attempts  to  find  manifestations  of  the  proletarian  class 
struggle throughout Russia’s history. He disputed the basis for Pokrovskii’s 
partisanship rather than the phenomenon itself.  Finally, Schlesinger rejected 
Pokrovskii’s so-called ‘a-historicism’, the utilising of a general description of 
socio-economic systems, as opposed to the evaluation of individual historical 
events, personalities and ideas. This last point remained unresolved and was, 
in  essence,  the  basis  of  the  periodisation  debate;  how  were  historians  to 
relate  individual events  to more  general  systems?  As  Schlesinger  wrote,  it 
was  ‘….  the  problem  of  defining,  in  the  specific  Marxist  terms,  the 
relationships  which  exist  between  the  individual  events  described  by  the 
historiography  and  the  general  laws  which  are  said  to  dominate  them’.
187 
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Pokrovksii was incorrect to focus exclusively on general laws, but there had, 
as yet, been no solution of how to fit the individual events and the general 
laws together. 
 
Three  interpretations  or  resolutions  to  this  methodological  problem  had 
emerged  from  the  ensuing  periodisation  discussion.  The  first  Schlesinger 
described  as  the  economic  interpretation;  ‘According  to  the  traditional 
concepts  of  nineteenth-century  Marxism  …  the  socio-economic  formations 
provide the framework in which the individual events proceed according to the 
specific laws governing each formation’.
188 The fall of the Pokrovskii ‘school’ 
meant that  the  framework  used  to  explain Russia’s  past  was  now to  be  a 
feudal one. Schlesinger was critical of this economic interpretation. However, 
despite his criticism, he pointed out that Soviet historians could not be found 
guilty  of  the  vulgar  economic  materialism  of  the  past:  ‘No  modern  Soviet 
author…. would attempt a periodization based upon economic events only’.
189 
Soviet historians now attempted to include all political events in their analysis. 
One is left to draw the conclusion that this surely represented an advance on 
Pokrovskii’s days. 
 
The  second approach  Schlesinger  labelled the  ‘political  interpretation’,  and 
involved the assertion of the primacy of politics over economics. He described 
some  instances  of  individual  political  approaches  but  argued  that  only  I. 
Smirnov  elaborated  this  viewpoint  with  any  consistency.
190  Smirnov 
suggested that a sound scheme of periodisation already existed in the basic 
documents of the anti-Pokrovskii struggle, such as Shestakov’s textbook and 
the  Short  Course.  According  to  Smirnov,  the  development  of  productive 
relations  was  the  cornerstone  of  Marxist  analysis,  but  this  evolution 
proceeded only very gradually and so it was necessary to base periodisation, 
the division of history into specific and successive stages, on definite events 
within this development. These important events were produced by political 
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history  and,  thus, historical  stages  could  best  be  divined  with  reference  to 
politics.  Schlesinger  pointed  out  that  Smirnov  had  a  marked  bias  towards 
those political groupings that proved successful within each historical stage: 
‘He recognizes as ‘real, and all-national’ class struggles only those which lead 
to a struggle of political power’.
191 Schlesinger made no comment as to the 
efficacy  of  this  approach  or  to  the  patriotic,  overly  positive  and  fatalistic 
interpretation such a method may provoke.  
 
When writing about Smirnov, Schlesinger described the nature of Shestakov’s 
state-approved  school  textbook.  This  exposed  his  attitude  towards  official 
Soviet historiography, something the book certainly represented for a period. 
He wrote: ‘It is patriotic, without being nationalist, and it is in sympathy with 
oppressed classes and peoples throughout the course of Russian history. It 
also supplies full and sympathetic information according to the standards of 
an elementary school textbook on the general conditions of life and of cultural 
developments’.
192 This could certainly be regarded as praise for the book and 
corresponds to his earlier judgement in Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung.
193 In a 
footnote to the discussion, Schlesinger drew his readers’ attention to certain 
constraints of Soviet scholarship. He argued that the textbook was much more 
sympathetic towards the victims of Tsarist expansion or those who suffered 
during the realisation of Peter I’s achievements than was possible in a modern 
Soviet publication.
194 This could again be regarded as praise for Shestakov’s 
book, as well as criticism for more modern works. Yet Schlesinger provided 
no unequivocal comment on the subject and, as noted, this information was 
only given within a footnote. 
 
According to Schlesinger’s paper the first two methods of periodisation only 
ever enjoyed limited success: ‘From the very start, the bulk of opinion rallied 
round  the  principle  of  periodization  according  to  the  development  of  class 
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struggles’.
195  N.  Druzhinin  had  originally  espoused  this  third  interpretation, 
arguing  that  class  struggles  were  the  key  to  understanding  economic 
developments,  as  well  as  changes  to  the  political  or  ideological 
superstructures. Periodisation according to class struggle did not necessarily 
follow a pattern of successful class actions or social movements, since this 
would differ little from a scheme based on significant political events. As most 
class struggles were defeated it would make little sense to align periodisation 
to  the  practical  outcomes  of  these  movements.  Druzhinin  argued  that  the 
class struggle always had historical significance and placed the beginnings of 
capitalism at the emerging social movements of the 1760s. 
 
Following  the  publication  of  the  discussion articles,  the  editors  of  Voprosy 
Istorii  noted  their  own  conclusions.  Schlesinger  described  their  stance  as 
‘eclectic’. It could also be seen as a compromise or synthesis of the three 
main interpretations.
196 Schlesinger argued that, even though the editors fully 
rejected  Smirnov’s  ‘political’  interpretation,  this  meant  little  more  than  their 
refusal  to  accept  any  one  general  or  universal  standard  of  periodisation. 
There  was  no  real  conclusion  to  the  debate,  but  equally,  no  definitive 
orthodoxy had henceforth to be adhered to. Discussions on the matter could 
and  should  continue.  Schlesinger  wrote:  ‘The  results  achieved  by  the 
discussion in Voprosy Istorii were recommended as a starting point for further 
argument, on the basis of further research, within the individual institutions’.
197 
Such  a  proposition  was  presumably  intended  to  promote  debate  and 
discussion. 
 
Schlesinger seemed keen to show the fruitfulness of the debate as well as the 
open manner in which new a consensus was to be achieved. He described 
the  evolution  of  consensual  historical  interpretations.  The  Voprosy  Istorii 
editors argued that, whilst the line taken during the anti-Pokrovskii struggle 
represented a major advancement within Soviet historiographical scholarship, 
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this consensus had now also been superseded.  Schlesinger wrote, ‘…. not a 
single  supporter  of  the  periodization  still  accepted  in  Soviet  textbooks  was 
found in the course of this last discussion’.
198 Later in the paper, Schlesinger 
declared, ‘…. the editors noted that the only point on which all the participants 
in the discussion were agreed was the rejection of 1800 (footnote 25: Which, 
until now, was the accepted dividing point in textbooks) as the year which 
marked  an  important  change  in  Russian  life’.
199  Whilst  there  was  no  real 
agreement  on  what  the  new  interpretation  should  be, there  was  a  general 
accord  that  previously  accepted  notions  were  no  longer  of  scholarly  or 
pedagogical value. Schlesinger gave the impression that there was friendly 
and  open  agreement  that  more  research  and  discussion  was  necessary 
before  the  subject  of  periodisation  could  be  satisfactorily  resolved.  This 
discussion  would,  therefore,  serve  as  an  example  of  critical  debate  on  a 
matter of fundamentals; an impression Schlesinger almost certainly intended 
to convey. 
 
Schlesinger concluded his paper in a somewhat restrained manner, insisting: 
‘No premature conclusions should be drawn from the comparative freedom, in 
which  a  discussion  about  rather  fundamental  issues  of  the  Marxist 
interpretation of history was carried on’.
200 The insinuation that the freedom 
enjoyed by historians during this particular discussion may only have been 
temporary seemed to contradict his earlier more positive statements. Use of 
the phrase ‘comparative freedom’ also indicated that the prevailing intellectual 
atmosphere was not one that non-Soviet historians would describe as free. 
Again,  such  a  statement  would  appear  to  oppose  earlier  ones  in  which 
Schlesinger stated that there were very few matters of principle which were 
not open to dispute.
201 He did draw attention to what he described as the 
‘achievements’  of  the  anti-Pokrovskiian  and  anti-‘cosmopolitanism’ 
campaigns, and reiterated the point that the orthodoxy to which all historians 
were  obliged  to  comply  was  established  through  the  process  of  debate. 
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However, in general, there did appear to be a significant anomaly between the 
apparent praise which Schlesinger expressed in the introduction to his paper 
and  the  somewhat  muted,  even  pessimistic,  conclusions  he  offered.  This 
could be seen as further proof that Schlesinger consciously wished to convey 
a more positive portrayal of Soviet historiography than his own empirical study 
of it warranted. One vital caveat to that thesis is the fact that, at no point, did 
Schlesinger  ever  deny  the  political  exigencies  and  orthodox  historical 
interpretations it was necessary for all scholars to conform to.  
 
There  are  several  themes  that  run  throughout  Schlesinger’s  writings  on 
historiography  up  to  Stalin’s  death.  Firstly,  he  gave  a  positive  portrayal  of 
events  in  the  historical  sphere.  He  insisted  on  the  freedom  of  debate  that 
existed, the quality of scholarship produced and the integrity of the historical 
profession  in  general.  He  also  consistently  argued  that  the  defeat  of  the 
Pokrovskii  school  in  this  era  was  an  enormously  progressive  step. 
Schlesinger  was  an  advocate  of  Soviet  historiography  in  this  period  –  he 
defended it against what he believed was unfair and excessive criticism and 
he seemed to want to inform the West of the valuable work that was being 
produced. Schlesinger’s views seemed to coalesce with the Soviet textbooks 
of  the  era,  something  that  was  especially  apparent  in  relation  to  attitudes 
towards  Pokrovskii.  However,  another  major  theme  was  Schlesinger’s 
negative  appraisal  of  individual  works  of  scholarship.  He  recognised  the 
censorship apparent in many, the erroneous impact of political expediency in 
others and pointed towards the political effects of party campaigns such as 
anti-objectivism or anti-cosmopolitanism. This created a tension between his 
individual critiques and his overall conclusions.  
 
Finally, it is necessary to note how at odds with other writers Schlesinger was 
in  his  praise  of  Soviet  historiography  at  this  time,  both  in  terms  of  his 
contemporaries and later scholars.  A. Mazour wrote of: 
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The stifling intellectual climate of this period, in which revising 
history  to  suit  political  needs  became  standard  practice… 
Everyone had to be a propagandist first and a historian second. 
A travesty of truth came to pass for history. To many historians 
research lost validity or importance, the main purpose being to 
prove a chosen conclusion even in the face of incontrovertible 
evidence.
202 
 
Writing much later, in 1989, R. Medvedev drew similar conclusions about the 
character of Soviet scholarship under Stalin. He wrote: 
 
There  was  no  room  for  free  discussion  and  the  contest  of 
various  opinions.  Instead,  dogmatism,  rote  learning 
(nachetnichestvo),  stagnation,  and  inertia  prevailed.  The  truth 
was not what corresponded to facts, to empirical research, but 
what Comrade Stalin had declared to be true…. Inconvenient 
facts were juggled, distorted, or simply ignored.
203 
 
Schlesinger’s  views  and  his  insistence  on  positive  aspects  of  Soviet 
historiography may be a welcome counterbalance to such total condemnation 
of a whole profession over a reasonably lengthy time period. Yet the contrast 
in emphasis remains stark and requires explanation. 
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Chapter Seven: Schlesinger’s Writings on 
History after Stalin’s Death 
 
Stalin’s  death  on  5
  March  1953  brought  about  seismic  changes  in  Soviet 
government and society. Nikita Khrushchev was eventually to seize the reigns 
of power after several years of collective leadership by Stalin’s lieutenants, 
and a gradual transformation of Soviet life ensued, with denunciations of the 
‘cult of personality’ Stalin had propagated.
1 The impact of these changes was 
felt in the historical field as keenly as elsewhere, especially after the Twentieth 
Party Congress of 1956. As historian J. Keep wrote: 
 
In Soviet historiography, as in other fields of Soviet intellectual 
life,  the  year  1956  was  something  of  a  turning-point.  The 
twentieth congress of the CPSU called upon Soviet historians, 
and particularly upon those concerned with the history of the 
party itself, to bring their studies ‘closer to life’, and to intensify 
their  efforts  to  promote  ‘the  building  of  communism’.  The 
campaign was intimately linked with what was euphemistically 
called  ‘overcoming  the  consequences  of  the  cult  of  the 
individual’’.
2 
 
There followed a period of examination and critical self-reflection by Soviet 
historians as they slowly moved away from Stalinist dogma. Stalin’s reputation 
was dealt one final blow in October 1961, at the Twenty-Second Congress, 
when  his  remains  were moved  from Lenin’s  tomb  to  the  Kremlin  wall.  His 
control  over  Soviet  intellectual  life  was  firmly  ended  and  there  followed 
                                                 
1  For  Schlesinger’s  description  of  the  events  following  Stalin’s  death  see  History  of  the 
Communist Party of the USSR, chapter VIII. 
2 J. Keep, ‘Introduction’ in J. Keep (ed.) Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror (George 
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another party appeal for historians to remove erroneous Stalinist distortions 
from their work.
3 
 
Alongside the dramatic changes to the official historical orthodoxy, there was 
a significant alteration in the tone of Schlesinger’s writing on the subject. After 
1953, and in particular after the congress in 1956, Schlesinger became far 
more  condemnatory  and  critical  of  Soviet  historiography  under  Stalin.  He 
expressed optimism for the future of the historical sciences but argued that 
much  of  the  previous  work  was  poor.  He  also  condemned  the  previous 
orthodoxy as distorting and politically motivated. Clearly this was a dramatic 
change from his early writing in which he emphasised the positive aspects of 
Soviet historiography. His attitude was now more in keeping with his personal 
memoir reflections of life as an intellectual in Stalin’s Russia. 
 
This  chapter  will  examine  Schlesinger’s  post-1953  writing  in  detail,  to 
determine in what ways and to what extent Schlesinger’s attitude changed. It 
will then turn to a discussion of possible reasons for this transformation: were 
the events of 1956 revelatory to Schlesinger, leading to a reassessment of his 
earlier  opinion;  was  he  now  switching  to  the  new  party orthodoxy;  had  he 
been  defending  the  Soviet  Union  against  the  perceived  ‘cold  war’  bias  of 
Western  commentators  but  now  felt  able  to  express  his  discomfort  with 
Stalin’s  leadership?  Whatever  his  motives,  recognition  of  this  change  in 
attitude must inevitably impact upon any judgement or critical assessment of 
Schlesinger as a scholar. It is argued that an assessment of Schlesinger as 
the ‘scholar advocate’ represents the most fruitful appreciation of his life and 
work in regard to Soviet historiography. 
 
Writings from 1953 
Schlesinger’s  attitude  to  Soviet  historiography  changed  following  Stalin’s 
death  and  the  ensuing  ‘de-Stalinisation’.  However,  there  is  one  piece  of 
writing that can be seen to span the two stages of his work. His unpublished 
                                                 
3 J. Keep, ‘Introduction’. For further information on post-Stalin Soviet historiography see N. 
Heer, Politics and History in the Soviet Union, (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971).   278 
Social Institutions seems to bridge the gap between the praise and defence of 
Soviet historical studies apparent in his early work and his later attitude of 
retrospective condemnation. The incomplete manuscript was a corrected draft 
that seems to have been intended for eventual publication. It was divided into 
two parts: the first entitled ‘The Family and Education’ contained chapters on 
the development of Soviet family policies, education and organised religion; 
the second, ‘The Arts and Science’, had chapters on the social sciences, the 
natural sciences and the artist and the party. The chapter on social sciences 
contained information on Soviet historiography.
4 
 
The manuscript appears to have been written between Stalin’s death in 1953 
and the beginning of official ‘de-Stalinisation’ in the Soviet Union as signalled 
by the Twentieth Party Congress. The latest reference in Social Institutions is 
to an article published on January 24, 1955.
5 However, it makes no mention 
of the Congress or its extensive preparations. These events were of critical 
importance to the further development of Soviet social sciences and it seems 
unlikely that Schlesinger would have omitted mention had he known of them 
at the time of writing. Therefore, it seems reasonable to date the manuscript 
sometime between January 1955 and early 1956. 
 
The transitional period between Stalin’s death and the Twentieth Congress is 
reflected  in  Schlesinger’s  manuscript.  He  was  presumably  unable  to 
determine the direction of future events in the Soviet Union and his analysis of 
the historical field is mixed and somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, he 
continued to be as positive about the value of historical work completed under 
Stalin and the freedom of debate available to scholars. Yet, at the same time, 
he was now undoubtedly more condemning of Soviet scholarship. 
 
When  discussing  Soviet  historiography,  Schlesinger  seemed  to  emphasise 
continuity between the Stalinist and post-Stalinist landscape. He argued that 
Stalin was consciously loosening his grip on academic freedom towards the 
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end  of  his  life.
6  Schlesinger  insisted  there  was  a  transition,  ‘…  from  the 
dogmatic  generalisations  of  The  Short  History  of  the  CPSU  and  of  the 
struggle against Pokrovksy’s school to more emphasis on the particularities of 
historical  processes’.
7  This  liberation  continued  after  Stalin’s  death,  when 
historians were invited to concentrate on the part played by the masses as the 
creators  of  cultural  and  revolutionary  transformation.
8  That  such 
developments were necessary does indicate an implicit acknowledgement by 
Schlesinger  of  the  existence  of  a  hostile  and  ‘dogmatic’  environment 
beforehand.  This  was  something  he  never  denied,  despite  his  positive 
portrayal of Soviet historiography. 
 
Schlesinger  argued  that  in  the  previous  decades  historians  enjoyed 
reasonable access to archives and produced positive work on subjects such 
as periodisation and economic relations in early Russia.
9 He also pointed to 
the degree of intellectual freedom that existed. Discussions of periodisation 
engaged differing definitions of the motive forces of history and questions of 
Russia’s distinctiveness. As Schlesinger noted: 
 
  In view of the whole of Russia’s intellectual development it is 
difficult  to  imagine  academic  issues  of  greater  weight  in  the 
Communist Party’s outlook: the fact that they could frankly be 
discussed  without  consequences  worse  than  a  very  mild 
criticism of the editor’s failure to take sides shows the extent to 
which  freedom  to  discuss  theoretical  issues  (as  distinct  from 
political issues circumscribed in historical terms) existed during 
the last years of Stalin’s life.
10 
 
This approach is consistent with Schlesinger’s attitude in his earlier writings. 
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Equally  familiar  is  Schlesinger’s  attack  on  Pokrovksii  and  his  school.  He 
pointed to Pokrovksii’s positivist errors: his confusing of dialectic materialism 
with ‘class subjectivism’; his erroneous conception of Marxism as an ideology 
like any other and thus, ‘… incapable of properly reflecting reality’.
11 He also 
argued that Pokrovskii’s theories hindered state education and suggested that 
the  defeat  of  his  school  was  a  major  achievement  of  the  Stalin  era.
12 
However, Schlesinger went further in his criticism than in his previous work. 
He  now  suggested  that  Pokrovksii  was  more  of  a  propagandist  than  an 
historian. He wrote,  
 
  … to the propagandist who search[e]s the past for quotations 
useful in commemoration speeches, the task of the present is 
the point of reference for the past. To him, history is ‘politics 
applied to the past’, and historiography aims at ‘reflecting the 
proletarian class-struggle into the past’. Pokrovksy applied this 
principle.
13 
 
As an example, Schlesinger argued that Pokrovskii adopted Lenin’s appeal for 
the defeat of one’s own bourgeoisie during World War One and applied it to 
inappropriate  periods  of  the  past,  thus  expressing  sympathy  with  the 
Napoleonic invasion of 1812. 
 
However,  there  was  a  noticeable  shift  in  Schlesinger’s  attitude  in  Social 
Institutions. Despite all of the positive features he emphasised, Schlesinger 
was  more  condemning  of  the  quality  of  work  and  highlighted  many  of  the 
problems encountered in its production. Schlesinger argued: 
 
There  is  an  enormous  amount  of  publications  on  the 
revolutionary  democrats  of  the  mid-nineteenth  century,  but 
already  in  the  study  of  this  period  the  party’s  demands  for 
confirmation  of  given  political  formulae  is  strongly  felt:  the 
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history of the Bolshevik party itself is either left alone by the real 
scholars or dealt with in popular books.
14 
 
In fact, Schlesinger continued: ‘With World War I and the October revolution, 
the sphere of possible detachment ends for Soviet historians’.
15 Whilst some 
work was of a very high quality, others, such as much of the writing on the 
Civil  War,  were  merely  vulgar  propagandist  devices.
16  Schlesinger 
differentiated quite clearly between serious research and propaganda; whilst 
the latter writer may unearth material of value to the historian, such a person 
did not write history.
17 Yet, despite this caveat, Schlesinger displayed a more 
hostile attitude towards Soviet historiography under Stalin than he had done 
previously. 
 
The  first  published  writing  of  Schlesinger’s  to  actively  engage  with  the 
intellectual  world  and  historiography  in  the Soviet  Union  after  the death of 
Stalin  on  5  March  1953  was  published  in  July  1956.  Schlesinger  wrote  a 
report for Soviet Studies on the Twentieth Party Congress, which ran from 14 
to 25 February 1956.
18 It was at this congress that Khrushchev delivered his 
so-called  ‘secret  speech’,  promoting  the  thesis  of  collectivity  of  leadership, 
whilst denouncing Stalin’s ‘cult of personality’.
19 From Schlesinger’s paper one 
is able to ascertain what he knew of events in the USSR at this time, as well 
as  his  initial  reaction  to  them.  The  report  described  the  pre-Congress 
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1956. It was intended as guidance for the party leadership of Communist Parties outside the 
Soviet Union. The text of the speech was released by the US Department of State in June of 
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discussions as well as the events of the actual Congress, its debates and 
decisions and their likely implications. Schlesinger’s article did not exclusively 
deal with the issue of historiography, a major aspect of the Congress, but it 
did provide a great deal of information and opinion on the matter. 
 
Schlesinger was certainly aware of the ‘secret speech’. He cited an article in 
The Times in March 1956 that seems likely to have been the source of his 
information.
20  The  newspaper  article  concerned  Walter  Ulbricht’s  report  to 
East Berlin party officials on his return from the Congress.
21 According to the 
newspaper, the First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party, described Stalin as 
‘a despot’ who had turned the State security services loose on his own party 
comrades and had made a, ‘…mockery of Soviet democracy’.
22 It went on to 
describe the content of Ulbricht’s speech in some detail. He had argued that 
East German Communists, like their Soviet counterparts, had to realise that 
Stalin’s  personality  cult  had  led  to  erroneous  foreign  policy  decisions.  His 
personal  despotism  had  damaged  Soviet  justice  and  produced  mistaken 
decisions on agricultural and economic matters. Whilst praising Stalin’s work 
concerning  the  construction  of  socialism  and  the  fight  against  Trotskyism, 
Ulbricht  argued  that  in  later  life  he  had,  ‘….  shown  a  growing  tendency 
towards personal tyranny’.
23 This had resulted in fewer and fewer meetings of 
the  Central  Committee and  even  the  Politburo;  inevitably  leading  to  wrong 
decisions being taken.  
 
The report continued:  
 
As a direct result of Stalin’s false premise that the class struggle 
was bound to grow more in intensity as Socialism was built up 
had been the persecution of leading Communists between 1936 
and 1938 (the great purges). Since the hostile classes had by 
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then been all but eliminated, where else could Stalin’s security 
police have turned?
24 
 
Stalin had given orders which infringed Soviet laws and had led to the arrest 
of innocent people. As regards the ‘myth’ of Stalin’s military genius, Ulbricht 
was reported as insisting its genesis was the work of Stalin himself, through 
passages in his biography and the Short Course. Contrary to the claim in his 
biography that the history book was written by Stalin and then revised by the 
Central Committee, it had in fact been the product of collective work on the 
part of the Committee. Stalin had then revised it to suit his personal taste.  
 
According to the report, Ulbricht argued, ‘…. it has become known that Stalin 
did  not  prepare  the  country  for  war  in  an  adequate  manner,  although  the 
impending aggression by Hitler’s Germany was plain to see’.
25 Three separate 
sources warning of the attack were ignored, as was a German deserter who 
crossed the Soviet line on the eve of the invasion. Finally it was reported that 
Ulbricht had informed the East Berlin party that Stalin had repeatedly refused 
the  ‘correct  advice’  of  military  advisors.  The  Times  article  corresponded 
closely with the available reports on the contents of Khrushchev’s speech at 
the Twentieth Party Congress. Reference was made to the errors and terrible 
conclusions inevitably resulting from Stalin’s ‘cult of personality’, his reputation 
as a military expert was repudiated and his part in violating Soviet justice and 
arresting many innocent party members was exposed. 
 
According to Schlesinger:  
 
Such reports about Khrushchev’s speech at the private session 
as are available indicate that under this heading were included 
problems such as Stalin’s thesis that the class struggle would 
be  intensified  after  the  expropriation  of  hostile  classes,  in 
reflection  of  the  capitalist  encirclement.  This  thesis  was  the 
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basis  on  which  he  let  loose  the  political  police  against 
oppositionists within the party.
26 
 
It seems clear that this information was taken directly from the article in the 
Times, as it mirrors so consistently information contained therein. However, 
Schlesinger made no reference to criticisms of Stalin’s leadership style and 
military capabilities. The validity of Khrushchev’s, and subsequently Ulbricht’s, 
speeches seems to have been taken for granted by Schlesinger in his July 
1956 article. At no point did he declare any doubts as to their authenticity or 
the correctness of their portrayal of Stalin’s rule. This seems to contradict his 
earlier stance on events within the Soviet Union, when he made very little 
comment on negative aspects of the Soviet regime. 
 
Schlesinger  argued  that  the  significance  of  the  ‘secret  speech’  and  of  the 
entire Congress was in its denouncing Stalinism as a method of leadership 
and  its  attempt  to  establish  a  new  orthodoxy.  He  wrote:  ‘Stalinism  was 
rejected not as a set of theoretical views, but as an authoritarian method of 
leading the party and the nation, opposed to the development of the work and 
responsibility of all the participants in socialist construction’.
27 The repudiation 
of the ‘cult of the individual’ was a necessary complement to the now sought 
after ideal of collectivity in leadership, the new method of rule which the Party 
authorities were attempting to found.  
 
There  were  three  main  reasons  why  the  Party  leaders  had  decided  the 
denunciation  was  necessary.  The  first  and,  according  to  Schlesinger,  ‘…. 
possibly the most powerful reason for making a clear break with the Stalinist 
framework  was  the  realization  that  party  theory  must  be  adapted  to  the 
changed international conditions’.
28 Such a statement suggests Schlesinger 
believed Stalinism was necessary under previous international conditions. If 
so, this would be one more instance of Schlesinger’s pragmatism: Stalin was 
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a necessary evil for the Soviet Union at a time of hostile encirclement when 
rapid social and industrial transformation was necessary.  
 
The second reason Schlesinger cited was the, ‘…. widespread demand for 
the  settlement  of  accounts  with  the  whole method  which made use  of  the 
nation’s need for protection against external enemies and their agents in order 
to suppress internal dissent, and even to get rid of anyone who happened to 
attract the displeasure of the political police’.
29 Simply put, this second reason 
for the change in attitudes heralded by the Twentieth Party Congress was due 
to the perceived need for security of law or primacy of Soviet justice. It was 
necessary to prevent a return to the extra-judicial terror of the Stalin period. 
 
The third motive force, and the one of most relevance to this study, was, as 
Schlesinger expressed it, the, ‘…. fight for a critical and realistic approach to 
the past and the present’.
30 A new attitude towards Russia and the Soviet 
state’s history was required. The main points of criticism of historical work 
mentioned  at  the  Congress  were  given  in  a  speech  by  A.  I.  Mikoyan.
31 
According to Schlesinger, these points had already been elaborated at the 
readers’ conference of the journal Voprosy Istorii earlier that same year.
32 He 
pointed  out  that  A.  Pankratova,  the  editor  of  Voprosy  Istorii  and  Central 
Committee member, in her summation at the conference on 28 January 1956, 
was  eager  to  explain  that  no  ‘revolution  in  historiography’  was  intended; 
instead merely an improvement in existing scholarly work. In fact, according to 
Schlesinger: ‘The rejection of the embellishments and nationalist distortions of 
the history of the Russian Revolution which had developed during the Stalin 
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Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan (1895-1978) joined the party in 1915 and enjoyed positions of 
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commissions.He became President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1964-965 (H. 
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period had been treated as an achievement of the new course as early as 
January 1955’.
33 This would seem to suggest that whilst the Congress and its 
‘de-Stalinising’ policy certainly impacted upon Soviet historiography, its effects 
were not leviathan; there was no ‘revolution’, as Schlesinger put it. Was this 
perhaps an attempt by Schlesinger to present a degree of continuity between 
the study of history before and after Stalin’s death? He may simply have been 
stating that the de-Stalinisation process in the historical sphere was begun 
before the Congress but few would deny that the Congress had an enormous 
impact upon the study of history. 
 
During  the  Twentieth  Party  Congress,  Pankratova  declared  the  Party’s 
opposition  to  attempts  at  embellishing  contemporary  events,  arguing  that 
many historians had proven themselves unable to deal with the shortcomings 
in their earlier work.
34 Mikoyan, in turn, demanded the writing of a history of 
the October Revolution and of the Soviet state, which would, as Schlesinger 
recorded it, ‘…. show without embellishment not only the surface but all of the 
manifold  aspects  of  the  life  of  our  Soviet  land’.
35  Schlesinger  argued  that 
Mikoyan had, ‘…. hit at the political root of the evil’ when he attacked the 
Short  Course,  a  book  which  Stalin  had  taken  responsibility  for.
36  Mikoyan 
argued: 
 
…. if our historians were to make a genuine and profound study 
of the facts and events in the history of our party in the Soviet 
period…..if they were to delve properly into the archives and 
historical  documents,  and  not  only  into  the  back  issues  of 
newspapers, they would be able to give a better explanation, 
from the position of Leninism, of many of the facts and events 
dealt with in the ‘Short Course’.
37 
                                                 
33 Schlesinger, ‘From the XIX to the XX Party Congress’, p. 9. 
34 The text of Pankratova’s speech is translated in Gruliaw, Current Soviet Policies II, pp. 146-
149. 
35 Schlesinger, ‘From the XIX to the XX Party Congress’, p. 15. In Gruliaw, Current Soviet 
Policies II, the statement is translated as follows ‘one that presents without embellishment not 
only the facade but the whole many-sided life of the Soviet fatherland’ (p. 88.). 
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This  statement  appeared  to  be  in  direct  contradiction  to  views  which 
Schlesinger  had  expressed  in  the  period  of  Stalin’s  rule.  Although  never 
having written about the Short Course specifically, Schlesinger had praised 
officially endorsed state textbooks in the Stalin era.
38 He had quoted from the 
Short Course in his Spirit of Post-war Russia. However, he did not name the 
text, referring to it instead as an ‘official document’. The quotation was used 
as proof against reproaches that Marxism neglected the importance of human 
thought.
39  So  it  was  certainly  meant  to  demonstrate  an  authoritative  and, 
presumably, correct text. 
 
As well as providing a coherent and reasonably detailed description of the 
events of the Twentieth Party Congress, Schlesinger seemed to argue in his 
article  that  the  changes  in  party  policy,  and  their  subsequent  impact  on 
historiography, were both justified and necessary.  He also criticised works of 
historical  scholarship  produced  in  the  period  before  Stalin’s  death  and 
supported the Party’s denunciation of the intellectual atmosphere which he 
had created. There does, therefore, seem to be a degree of inconsistency 
between Schlesinger’s contemporary and retrospective evaluation of historical 
works. 
 
Schlesinger published an article in Soviet Studies in October 1956 which dealt 
specifically with post-Stalinist Soviet historiography.
40 His earlier writings had 
broached the subject but now Schlesinger investigated, in some detail, the 
changes which took place in the sphere of historical scholarship as a result of 
the alteration of official party policies since Stalin’s death, in particular as a 
result  of  the  Twentieth  Party  Congress.  The  publication of  the paper  once 
again demonstrated the interest Soviet historiography held for Schlesinger. 
 
                                                 
38 See, for example, Schlesinger’s praise of the Shestakov textbook in Schlesinger, ‘Neue 
sowjetrussische Literatur zur Sozialforschung’, pp. 194-195.  
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40 Schlesinger, ‘Soviet Historians Before and After the XX Congress’, Soviet Studies, 8, 2, 
October. 1956, pp.157-172.   288 
The  Congress  proceedings  were  heavily  utilised  as  source  material.  In  a 
footnote, Schlesinger indicated that he had used the U.S. State Department’s 
translation of the proceedings, including Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’, for the 
purposes of the article.
41  He also used a great deal of material, including 
reports from the readers’ conference, editorials and individual articles, from 
the theoretical journal Voprosy Istorii. Schlesinger had made much use of the 
journal in his previous writings about Soviet historiography and had already 
convincingly argued that the publication was an effective window on to the 
activities  of  historians  in  the  Soviet  Union.  This  latest  paper  was,  thus, 
methodologically very similar to his earlier work on the subject, and allows for 
a great degree of comparison between them.  
 
In general, Schlesinger expressed an optimistic attitude towards the future of 
historical scholarship in the Soviet Union. He argued that historical output was 
already improving as a result of recent events. He described E. Burdzhalov’s 
article on Bolshevik tactics before Lenin’s return in 1917.
42 Schlesinger wrote, 
with praise: 
 
This article seems to be a serious effort to present the facts, 
based on well-known contemporary documents printed in the 
‘twenties which have been widely used by Western scholars. 
Burdzhalov  criticizes  himself  and  others  because  recent 
publications  on  the  period  misrepresented  events  in  Stalin’s 
favour – even to the extent of omitting Stalin’s own admission of 
error in 1924.
43 
 
Burdzhalov  argued  that,  prior  to  Lenin’s  April  theses  in  1917,  Stalin  and 
Kamenev  advocated  a  policy  of  conditional  support  for  the  provisional 
government in opposition to Lenin’s stance. Stalin decided to support Lenin 
after  the  April  conference  but  Kamenev  continued  his  opposition.  This 
portrayal  differed  substantially  from  the  previous  depiction  of  a  universally 
                                                 
41 Ibid. p. 170, footnote 14.  
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pp. 38-56. 
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consensual party under Lenin in the lead up to the Bolshevik revolution. It also 
suggested  fallibility  on  Stalin’s  part.  Schlesinger  argued  that  although 
Burdzhalov was admitting to distortions in previous presentations of events 
and was now in the process of correcting them, he did not attempt to analyse 
or explain why the truth had been distorted in the past. Thus, Schlesinger 
conceded  that  problems  and  errors  would  continue  for  a  time  in  Soviet 
historical work. 
 
Schlesinger  was  not  alone  in  expressing  optimism  about  the  future  of  the 
historical  profession  after  the  Twentieth  Congress.  There  were  plenty  of 
reasons to think this. N. Heer wrote: 
 
The  Twentieth  Party  Congress  was  a  landmark  for  both  the 
CPSU and its chroniclers. Many hopeful signals pointed to the 
invigoration, reorganization, and rededication of the party and 
its historians toward a more effective and rational fulfilment of 
their tasks in the Soviet system. Not only was the party to be 
revitalized and the substance of its history to be reworked at 
Khrushchev’s  direction,  but  at  the  behest  of  two  authoritative 
party figures there would be a drastic improvement in historians’ 
methodology and scholarship.
44 
 
Burdzhalov,  in  his  articles  and  editorials  in  Voprosy  Istorii,  was  one  of  a 
number of revisionists who began to explore the opportunities they thought 
were  now  open  to  the  historical  profession.  They  demanded  the  critical 
examination of sources and the publication of memoirs and other materials.
45 
They  were  sufficiently  emboldened  to  continue  their  demand  for  new 
standards of scholarship in the face of authoritative criticism of this revisionism 
in July 1956.
46 
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However,  by  June  1957,  Burdzhalov  had  been  removed  from  the  editorial 
board of Voprosy Istorii, a thorough shake up of the remaining personnel and 
organisation had taken place, and a hostile attack upon the ‘revisionists’, and 
Burdzhalov’s  contribution  in  particular,  formed  the  basis  of  the  journal’s 
editorial.
47 These measures were accompanied by official decrees from the 
Central  Committee  defining  the  boundaries  of  acceptable  discussion  and 
criticising  the  recent  actions  of  the  journal.
48  Those  historians  who  had 
attempted to open debate were officially silenced and the incipient broadening 
of scholarship was quashed as the state took a more conservative stance, 
perhaps as a result of events in Poland and Hungary.  
 
Schlesinger was obviously unaware of these later developments when writing 
his  article.  His  optimism  may  well  have  been  premature.  However,  most 
commentators agree that the post-1956 period represented a more open, free 
atmosphere for the historical profession. Whilst the first tentative steps of the 
revisionists may have strayed beyond the party’s tolerance, a new era was 
beginning. Schlesinger was not isolated in his positive attitude regarding the 
future of Soviet scholarship. H. Rogger, writing in 1965, argued: 
 
  Historians are no longer compelled (they are told) to write the 
history of the thirties as an unbroken parade of victories and 
triumphs; they can write about the non-Bolshevik opponents of 
Tsarism with greater fairness… The hero-worship of Stalin, Ivan 
IV and Peter I as nearly coequal gods of the national Pantheon, 
has ended. In short, there has been a refinement of method, a 
greater  subtlety  of  language  and  approach,  a  resumption  of 
contacts with foreign scholarship. Historians have been allowed, 
and even urged, to look differently at the past.
49 
 
Rogger  conceded  that  historians  still  faced  many  impediments  to  free 
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scholarship  and  pointed  out  that  the  sphere  of  their  activities  remained 
determined by the party. However, there had clearly been progress. 
 
An important feature of Schlesinger’s article is the criticism which he directed 
at  earlier  Soviet  historiography,  in  particular  that  of  the  late  Stalin  period. 
When referring to work published up to 1956 he pointed out, ‘…. the extent to 
which the selective approach to history had been entrenched, and to which its 
advocates took it for granted that its objective basis in the semi-literacy of a 
large part of the reading public still remained’.
50 His negative attitude towards 
earlier scholarship was also discernible in his evaluation of the changes which 
had occurred in this field. Schlesinger insisted: 
 
The main facts of party history are available once the taboos 
are lifted. Historians can now begin to rearrange them in the 
light of the experience acquired since NEP – the last period in 
which free argument about these things was possible among 
the rank and file of the party. This work has indeed presumably 
begun,  at  least  in  the  minds  of  those  who all  this  time  were 
confident  that  the  authoritarian  degeneration  of  Soviet 
intellectual  life  would  come  to  an  end  owing  to  the  laws  of 
motion of the socialist revolution.
51 
 
Schlesinger  was  arguing  that  since  the  NEP  period  an  ‘authoritarian 
degeneration’  had  occurred  in  the  intellectual  sphere;  ‘free  argument’  had 
been impossible until the recent reorganisation of academic work.  He may 
have been suggesting that only work concerning party history was conducted 
in  such  a  stifling,  intellectually  impotent  atmosphere.  In  his  writings  before 
Stalin’s death, Schlesinger had implied that work on later periods and on party 
history was generally of a lesser quality to other spheres of research. Yet he 
did  not  explicitly  indicate  this  caveat.  It  is,  therefore,  not  unreasonable  to 
assume this was how he evaluated the academic atmosphere for all historians 
in the recent Soviet past. This would correspond with the way he described 
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the environment under which he worked whilst in Soviet Russia. Perhaps this 
was  a  recent  conclusion,  based  on  the  potentially  revelatory  information 
provided  at  the  Congress,  especially  in  Khrushchev’s  ‘secret  speech’. 
However, it represents a dramatic shift in emphasis from Schlesinger’s earlier 
writings on Soviet historiography. In them Schlesinger conceded the hostile 
and problematic elements to the study of history in the Soviet Union, yet he 
offered a generally positive evaluation of the quality of work undertaken. 
 
According  to  Schlesinger,  the  revision  of  conventional  attitudes  was  made 
clear in the first edition of Voprosy Istorii of 1956, which appealed for a re-
examination of Pokrovskii.
52 Historians were asked to appreciate Pokrovskii’s 
merits in relation to the general level of historical science at that time, as well 
as to consider the shortcomings of his work. To Schlesinger:  
 
Compared with the intellectual climate prevailing quite recently, 
and  manifested  in  contributions  to  the  same  issue,  this 
indicated a basic change: the editors took up an attitude which 
was not entirely negative to the historian in opposition to whom 
Soviet  historical  studies  of  the  ‘thirties  and  ‘forties  had 
developed, and they found merits in a person denounced as an 
enemy after the 1937-8 purges.
53 
 
Schlesinger  argued  such  a  turn  of  events  could  signify  the  first  public 
rehabilitation  of  a  falsely  accused  old  Bolshevik  or  the  refutation  of  the 
convention  that  any  early  virtues  or  successes  of  those  who  went  on  to 
become ‘enemies’ should be ignored. Either way, Schlesinger was convinced 
that this, ‘explicit recognition’ of Pokrovskii’s achievements as a historian was 
a  significant  and  new  development.
54    Expressing  his  personal  opinion, 
Schlesinger argued,   
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….  there  can  be  no  Soviet  historian  who  wishes  to  return to 
Pokrovsky’s  ‘economic  materialism’  and  to  the  concept  of 
‘merchant capitalism’, but ever since 1950 there has been some 
recognition  of  Russia’s  especial  backwardness  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  of  the  part  played  by  the  urban  guilds  and  by 
wealthy peasants in the formation of capitalism.
55 
 
It  appears  Schlesinger  was  once  again  mirroring  the  official  views  of  the 
Soviet Union. He too now reluctantly accepted that Pokrovskii had merits as 
an historian. However, Schlesinger remained consistent with his earlier views 
about the weakness of what he perceived Pokrovskii’s system to be. He still 
criticised the models of ‘economic materialism’ and ‘merchant capitalism’ he 
attributed  to  Pokrovskii.  In  a  footnote  later  in  the  article,  Schlesinger  was 
again critical: ‘Every Soviet historian knows that one of the main, and most 
justified, criticisms levelled against Pokrovskii was based upon his demand 
that Marxist historiography should ‘reflect the proletarian class-struggle into 
the past’.
56 
 
The revision of the orthodox historical paradigm and the problems associated 
with it were also evidenced by Schlesinger in Soviet historians’ treatment of 
Stalin. Schlesinger felt that when dealing with recent history there arose a 
contradiction between what he described as ‘historical truth’ and the way in 
which  the  Central  Committee  was  administering  ‘re-education’:  ‘For  a  long 
time  Stalin  had  been  held  up  as  an  ideal  model;  he  is  now  treated  as  a 
‘negative hero’ whose negative features, however, can be disclosed only by 
stages, as the policies associated with his name are dispensed with’.
57 In a 
footnote, Schlesinger pointed out the inconsistencies between what the Soviet 
public were told about the recent past and the objective ‘historical truth’. He 
argued, ‘…. readers [of Voprosy Istorii] may be expected to be aware that 
what they are now being told is still not the whole truth but a transitional stage 
between the former embellishment and a future stage when the nation will be 
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regarded  as  ripe  to  face  all  the  facts’.
58  Such  a  statement  constituted  an 
explicit recognition of the falsity of past historical work as well as the merely 
partial truth of what was now being published. 
 
According to Schlesinger, the current official treatment of the question argued 
that Stalin’s historical function had been mixed.  Stalin had initially promoted 
the progress of Soviet society; however, with the evolution of his personality 
and working methods, he became divorced from the mass of the people. This 
created a division between his correctly formulated theory and his erroneous 
practice. In Schlesinger’s opinion,  
 
…. the Stalin thus depicted by his closest collaborators is not 
necessarily  identical  with  the  Stalin  of  the  objective  historian: 
this is rather a picture of the provincial or Central Committee 
secretary as he should not be at a time when Stalinist methods 
of leadership have become obsolete. Stalin is distorted, in his 
favour when criminal violations of accepted party standards are 
omitted, but greatly to his detriment when the negative side of 
characteristics which carried the USSR through grave crises are 
treated on the level of Ovechkina’s Borzov.
59 
 
The  correct  historical  interpretation  of  Stalin  had  still  to  be  reached  in  the 
Soviet  Union.  An  application  of  Marxist  principles  would  facilitate  this. 
According  to  Schlesinger,  ‘….  the  contradictions  in  Stalin’s  work  must  be 
explained by the contradictions inherent in the historical setting which shaped 
him’.
60 It seems clear that, whilst Schlesinger was optimistic about the future 
of historical scholarship in the Soviet Union, he nevertheless felt that, at this 
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stage, historians were impeded in their work by the prerequisites of political 
expediency, as judged by the Party. He argued that, although still imperfect, 
Soviet  historiography  was  making  great  progress.  Whereas  in  the 
historiography of the 1930s and 1940s Stalin had been portrayed as the great 
leader,  he  was  now  considered  to  have  had  a  mixed  legacy.  There  is 
obviously a contradiction between this evaluation of Soviet historical work and 
Schlesinger’s previous analysis.  
 
In this paper Schlesinger went into greater detail concerning the proceedings 
of the Voprosy Istorii readers’ conference, held in late January 1956.
61 The 
conference  lasted  for  three  days  and  was  attended  by  600  teachers  and 
research workers from Moscow. The main reports, given by Pankratova and 
the journal’s deputy editor Burdzhalov, fully anticipated the official objections 
to current historical scholarship proclaimed by Mikoyan at the Twentieth Party 
Congress.  Schlesinger  listed  a  number  of  criticisms  made  by  Burdzhalov. 
Party history had been falsified to better display the merits of a few leaders at 
the expense of other individuals and the rank and file as a whole. The inner 
party struggles of the 1920s had been presented as an unmasking of spies 
and wreckers, rather than as a political and ideological battle against anti-
Leninist elements. According to Schlesinger, Burdzhalov also argued that the 
Short Course was obsolete as a version of party history.
  62  Some dissent 
towards  the  editors’  criticism  was  to  be  heard  at  the  conference,  but 
Schlesinger  was  critical  of  these  oppositionists  and  insisted  that  any 
opposition  was  weak  and  came  almost  exclusively  from  the  institutional 
strongholds of the established tradition. He thus indicated his approval of the 
changes being sought in Soviet historiography. 
 
The paper described the contents of the edition of Voprosy Istorii which went 
to press a month after the Twentieth Party Congress. The editorial concerned 
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the lessons of the Congress for the historical profession and party history.
 63 
Stalin appeared to be principally blamed for the misrepresentation of party 
history and the Short Course was heavily criticised. The text’s pre-eminence 
as  the  touchstone  of  historical  truth had  prevented  the undertaking  of  any 
critical studies of party historiography, since any work written earlier had been 
seen as valueless. Yet now, Schlesinger wrote: 
 
The  Short  Course  is  recognized  as  having  some  merits  in 
systematizing and popularizing party history, and in ‘explaining 
some important issues of the history and theory of Bolshevism’. 
But  the  treatment  of  the  post-1917  period  in  particular  is 
denounced  as  being permeated by  the’  idealist  standpoint of 
the cult of the individual’.
64 
 
According to Schlesinger, the Short Course was criticised for neglecting the 
role  played  by  Lenin  and  the  masses,  to  the  benefit  of  Stalin.  It  also 
underestimated, or even ignored, the difficulties the party had faced. The book 
was dogmatic and ahistorical, reflecting political attitudes of Stalin’s days to 
the past. Its presentation of the party’s position on the eve of Lenin’s return to 
Russia  was  incorrect  and  Stalin’s  role  in  the  October  revolution  had  been 
overemphasized in party history. This was in direct comparison to treatment of 
the Petrograd military revolutionary committee and its role in organizing the 
insurrection,  which  was  hardly  mentioned.  Schlesinger  made  no  comment 
above a simple description of these criticisms. This can, perhaps, be taken to 
indicate his agreement with them. He did write of the ‘current falsification of 
history’  as  a  statement  of  fact  and  criticised  those  who  opposed  the  new 
editorial line so this would seem to be the case.
65 
 
According to Schlesinger the editorial also criticised the state of the material 
with  which  historians  had  to  work.
66  Verbatim  reports  of  conferences  and 
congresses were now a bibliographical rarity and important documents were 
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still withheld from research workers. The issue also appealed for a critical re-
examination of all books on party history, so that the kind of mistakes and 
falsifications being discussed could be eliminated. The study of Soviet history 
and the revolutionary movement could then be placed on to a truly Marxist-
Leninist foundation. Schlesinger speculated as to whether this appeal could 
be successful, arguing: ‘There is an obvious political interest in establishing 
the truth, for if all the assertions about the party’s past successes were true, it 
would be impossible to discuss present difficulties frankly without encouraging 
unfavourable  comparisons  with  the  past’.
67  He  argued  that  a  great deal  of 
material  was  now  being  republished  and  this  would  aid  historians  in  their 
analysis, but felt that historiography remained in a transitional stage. Whilst 
undoubtedly  progressing  away  from  the  falsification  of  history  which 
categorised  the  period  of  Stalin’s  rule,  historians  were  nevertheless 
constricted  by  political  orthodoxy  and  expediency,  especially  in  regard  to 
whom  they  could  and  could  not  name.  Schlesinger  felt  that  Burdzhalov’s 
already mentioned article on Bolshevik party organisations after the February 
revolution, which named everyone involved in party activities, including those 
who  were  later  to  become  ‘enemies  of  the  people’,  was  a  significant  and 
positive step.  
 
Schlesinger  argued,  although  progress  was  being  made  in  the  fields  of 
modern and party history, the situation was much more complicated when it 
came to the study of earlier periods of Russian history. He wrote that it was 
necessary  to  correct  the,  ‘….  misinterpretation  of  past  stages  of  Russian 
history which followed from the far-going identification, in the historical writing 
of the late Stalin period, of the present Russian national self-assertion with the 
past’.
68 Present concerns and priorities had once again been reflected into 
older, inappropriate periods. Disputes in this sphere centred upon the method 
of historical interpretation and research required to bridge gaps in knowledge, 
since omission of well-known facts did not generally occur. 
 
Schlesinger described the changing investigations concerning Shamil and the 
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Caucasian uprising of the mid nineteenth century to illustrate the dynamics of 
pre-modern historiography.
69 He felt that the defeat of the Pokrovskii school 
still  represented  an  achievement  in  this  arena,  thus  retaining  a  degree  of 
consistency with his earlier writings, but felt that the post-war period had led 
to, ‘…. harmful excrescences on that approach’.
70 Shestakov’s 1937 textbook 
was  the  first  to  systematise  the  post-Pokrovskiian  interpretation  that 
Schlesinger admired.
71 The textbook assumed that Shamil’s movement was 
progressive in character, as with all earlier Russian revolutionary traditions. 
Schlesinger  argued  that  it  was  only  in  the  late  Stalin  period  that  this 
interpretation was superseded by the official characterisation of the movement 
as a comparatively narrow group of local feudal lords and ‘bandits’. He felt 
Soviet  historians  should  have  known  that  this  was  merely  a  repetition  of 
Pokrovskii’s mistaken reflection of the present struggle into the past; the need 
for a strengthened Russian state was being reflected backwards. Thus, wrote 
Schlesinger: 
 
Without the assumption, at least tacitly, that tsarist Russia was 
the  nucleus  of  the  USSR,  this  new  interpretation  was 
senseless. In any case, it involved a series of falsifications. The 
supporters of the new interpretation falsified the statements of 
Marx  and  the  Russian  progressives  (who  critically  welcomed 
Shamil’s struggle against tsarism) and they distorted the reports 
of tsarist officials and generals.
72 
 
In  the  late  Stalin  period,  a  commonplace  historical  truth  was  repressed 
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1859 he led the resistance movement against Russian annexation. As L. Tillett wrote: ‘Up to 
1950 most Soviet historians considered him to be the greatest of several leaders of ‘national-
liberation’ movements against Tsarist colonialism… After World War II this concept of Shamil 
came  into  conflict  with  party-inspired  doctrines  of  Soviet  patriotism  and  Great  Russian 
leadership. As a result an opposing version of the ‘national liberation’ movements and their 
leaders was introduced into Soviet historiography, Shamil, who had been the most lionized of 
these  leaders,  was  now  the  most  condemned’  (L.  Tillett,  ‘Shamil  and  Muridism  in  Recent 
Soviet Historiography’, American Slavic and East European Review, 20, 2, April 1961, pp. 
253-269 at p. 253). 
70 Schlesinger, ‘Soviet Historians Before and After the XX Congress’, p. 168. Soviet orthodoxy 
of the Stalin era also held Pokrovskii responsible for the former positive portrayal of Shamil (L. 
Tillett, ‘Shamil and Muridism in Recent Soviet Historiography’, p. 258). 
71 Shestakov, Istoriia SSSR, p. 90. 
72 Schlesinger, ‘Soviet Historians Before and After the XX Congress’, p. 168.   299 
because it was politically harmful and Schlesinger argued that historians were 
willing  to  provide  the  necessary  interpretations.  This  is  a  hugely  damning 
evaluation of the state’s control of the historical sphere. Schlesinger, however, 
added the caveat that there were only a ‘few’ historians willing to write such 
falsifications and ‘none of the outstanding ones’.
73  He asserted that, since 
Stalin’s death, debate on this issue was now moving in a progressive direction 
and some historians were beginning to argue against the previous nationalist 
interpretation.  Whilst  the  post-Stalin  era  did  witness  a  more  open  attitude 
towards  research  on  Shamil,  there  was  a  party  reaction  against  the  more 
forceful  revisionists.
74  Once  again,  Schlesinger  may  have  been  overly 
optimistic about the prospects for free academic publication and debate. He 
ended the article on an entirely positive note: ‘This removal of taboos and 
standing judgments from the past is clearing the way for historians who are 
seeking  new  lines  of  approach’.
75  This  included  an  implicit  criticism  of  the 
norms of historical method in Stalin’s times.  
 
Schlesinger  provided  a  great  deal  of  information  upon  the  effects  of  the 
Twentieth Party Congress on the historical profession. He offered a review of 
likely shifts in the historiographical paradigm, as well as reporting what was 
written in the Soviet historical press immediately after. However, the paper 
does not correspond to the general interpretation of events Schlesinger had 
constructed  in  his  earlier  writings.  The  inconsistency  between  his  positive 
evaluation  of  historiographical  work  in  the  USSR  under  Stalin  and  his 
retrospective  condemnation  of  it  following  his  death  are  clear.  When  not 
explicitly criticising historical work of the Stalin period, Schlesinger was writing 
so enthusiastically and with such obvious agreement with the official changes 
heralded by the Congress that a negative appraisal of the previous orthodoxy 
can be assumed.  It is important to note that Schlesinger’s writings of the 
Stalin  period  were  not  without  negative  remarks  and  criticisms  of  Soviet 
historical work; the contrast between them and his post-Stalin writings should 
not, therefore, be exaggerated.  This paper also makes clear that there were 
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elements  of  continuity  in  Schlesinger’s  writings.  He  continued  to  denigrate 
what he perceived as Pokrovskii’s historiographical ‘school’; however, akin to 
the  official  Soviet  interpretation,  he  now  offered  a  much  more  conciliatory 
appraisal of his individual achievements.  In general, Schlesinger’s attitude 
towards Soviet historiography did appear to change at around the time of the 
Twentieth  Congress.  It  could,  perhaps,  be argued  that  he  was  once  again 
mirroring the official views of Soviet orthodoxy, adapting his interpretation just 
as it changed within the Soviet Union. 
 
Soviet  historiography  was  again  the  subject  of  Schlesinger’s  published 
writings in April 1958 with a short report on a conference in the USSR dealing 
with  the  methodology  of  source  critiquing.
76    A  conference  for  research 
workers had been held by the Moscow State Institute for Historical Archive 
Work  (MGIAI)  in  1957  and  Schlesinger  reported  on  as  much  of  the 
proceedings  as  he  was  able  to  glean  from  Soviet  journals.  According  to 
Schlesinger,  many  Soviet  historians  felt  that  discussions  on  critical  source 
evaluation  had  been  totally  neglected  in  the  Soviet  Union  and,  thus,  pre-
revolutionary  concepts  were  often  simply  reproduced.  In  recent  years, 
however, there had been a revival of interest in the subject, involving a search 
for  a  Marxist  perspective.  The  partiinost  attitude  towards  sources  was  still 
correct, so there was to be no return to ‘objectivism’, but all methods of textual 
criticism developed by traditional historiography were to be utilised.
77 
 
According  to  Schlesinger,  editors  had  displayed  an  uncritical  approach  to 
documents  and  in  some  cases  the  selection  of  documents  for  inclusion  in 
published collections had been carried out in an obviously arbitrary fashion. It 
was  felt  by  many  that  even  Lenin’s  works  required  investigation  into  the 
circumstances of their provenance and any emphasis the author may have 
had, due to time-conditioned necessity. Offering his own opinion, Schlesinger 
argued: ‘It is obvious that the very assumption of this function by the historian 
implies a rejection of the propagandist’s claim to use the ‘quotations bag’ in 
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order  to  back  by  Lenin’s  authority  every  statement  regarded  as  correct  in 
present circumstances’.
78 Schlesinger indicated that the majority of historians 
approved of the changes introduced into historiography since the Twentieth 
Congress.  He  pointed  out  that  there  was  no  reference  in  the  conference 
report to Stalin, ‘…. whose letter to the Editor of Proletarskaya Revolutsia in 
1931 signified the triumph of those applications of the concept of partiinost to 
the study of the past, the overcoming of which – though not, of course, of the 
concept as a definition of their general approach – at present occupies the 
minds of Soviet historians’.
79 Schlesinger made very little reference to Stalin’s 
letter in his earlier writings, in spite of his acknowledgement of its decisive 
impact  on  Stalinist  historiography.  Yet  he  was  now  clearly  emphasising  its 
influence on the researching and writing of history. He argued that the main 
concern of Soviet historians was how to overcome its insidious influence.  
 
The  paper  was  little  more  than  a  report  upon  a  conference  report.  It  did, 
however, show that Schlesinger remained concerned with the topic of Soviet 
historiography,  as  well  as  giving  some  indication  as  to  the  concerns  and 
priorities of Soviet historians. Schlesinger used Soviet terms such ‘partiinost’ 
without offering a definition of them. One cannot, therefore, know what exactly 
Schlesinger  understood  by  it,  and  little  of  his  own  opinion  was  provided. 
However, the paper is written with a tone of approval and the fact that he 
chose to write about the conference, perhaps suggests he regarded it as a 
significant event. The paper also provides additional evidence to support the 
thesis that Schlesinger’s writings on historiography underwent a dramatic shift 
in emphasis, coinciding with ‘de-Stalinisation’ in the USSR.  
 
In January 1960 Schlesinger published a brief report in Soviet Studies on the 
debates  concerning  a  new  history  curriculum  in  the  Soviet  Union.
80  The 
reorganisation  of  Soviet  primary  and  secondary  education,  which  occurred 
after discussions of autumn 1958, had resulted in the need for a new history 
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syllabus.
81 Before the proposed reform, history courses were administered on 
a  ‘linear’  basis.  Lower  grades  were  taught  the  earliest  stages  of  history, 
gradually moving to the modern era as they progressed through the years. As 
Schlesinger pointed out, however, those who did not intend to complete the 
full  term of  secondary  education  left  school  with  no  knowledge,  except  for 
selected  episodes,  of  their  own  country’s  history.  It  was  felt  that  it  was 
necessary to give those with an eight-year education a more rounded and 
complete historical knowledge; the ensuing debate centred upon how best to 
do this.  
 
According to Schlesinger’s report, one of the main themes to emerge from the 
discussion, and one of relevance to Soviet historiography in general, was the 
extreme unease felt by many historians towards changes to the curriculum. It 
was feared that they could inadvertently revert to the ‘sociological schemas’ 
taught  in  the  past.  This  was  a  reference  to  the  party’s  criticism  of  history 
education  in  1934,  directed  primarily  against  Pokrovskii  and  his  school  for 
their  alleged  schematic  approach  to  the  past.  Schlesinger  wrote:  ‘Not  for 
nothing  did  M.  V.  Nechkina  reproach  the  majority  of  her  colleagues  with 
unwillingly gliding into the treatment of history in terms of abstract sociological 
schemes, condemned a quarter of a century ago, since with the condensed 
course of modern general history no time would be left for anything else’.
82 
Similarly Schlesinger argued that, at a conference convened by the History 
faculty of Moscow University: ‘It was left to [E. M] Chermenski…to bring home 
the obvious truth that the danger of a return to abstract sociological schemes 
was implied in the very burdening of the curriculum with enormous amounts of 
materials  which  simply  could  not  be  dealt  with  in  other  than  schematic 
ways’.
83 Schlesinger clearly shared this unease, since it was both an ‘obvious 
truth’ and a ‘danger’, in his opinion.  
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Another feature of the debate was the apparent alarm of some historians at 
what they perceived as a tendency to fully rehabilitate the Pokrovskii ‘school’ 
of historiography. Schlesinger offered his own opinion in a footnote to the text. 
Schlesinger argued that, as a defamed old Bolshevik, Pokrovskii had been 
rehabilitated by the Twentieth Party Congress. As a philosopher of history, he 
could be no more rehabilitated than any sociologist whose theory was now 
proven obsolete. As an organiser of an education system, it was impossible to 
rehabilitate him. Schlesinger continued:  
 
The  basic  confusion  had  been  produced  by  Stalin,  who 
combined  the  criticism  of  Pokrovski’s  ‘economic  materialism’ 
and  of  his  concept  of  history  as  ‘political  struggle  looking 
backward’ (a criticism in which Stalin was certainly right, though 
he shared in fact at least the second of Pokrovski’s concepts) 
with an, equally necessary, request for a return to a systemic 
teaching of history based upon the facts, and with a barbaric 
calumniation  of  Pokrovski  and  his  pupils  as  alleged  counter-
revolutionary conspirators.
84  
 
Schlesinger  was  once  again  condemning  Stalin,  both  in  terms  of  his 
behaviour towards Pokrovskii as a person and in his guilt for reflecting present 
day politics into the past. He also remained a staunch critic of Pokrovskii’s 
historical work and theory. Schlesinger, alongside many Soviet historians, still 
regarded  ‘overcoming’  Pokrovskii’s  ‘school’  as  a  major  intellectual 
achievement of the Stalin era. He offered a consistent view over time, on this 
issue at least.  
 
In  April  1965  Schlesinger  published  what  was  ostensibly  a  review  of  the 
publication  of  pre-1914  correspondence  between  Lenin  and  Camille 
Huysmans,  the  then  Secretary  of  the  Second  International.
85  As  well  as 
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providing  an  insight  into  Lenin’s  attitude  towards  international  Social 
Democracy  in  the  pre-war  years,  Schlesinger’s  review  also  concerned  the 
incipient debate upon this issue, a debate which Stalin had so firmly crushed 
in  his  letter  to  the  editors  of  Proletarskaia revoliutsiia  in  1931. The article, 
therefore, deals with one of the most crucial incidents in the development of 
Soviet historiography.  
 
It  was  in  this  article  that  Schlesinger  was  the  most  critical  of  Soviet 
historiography and Stalin’s impact upon it in particular. He described how, in 
the  summer  of  1930,  the  leading  Soviet  historical  journal  Proletarskaia 
revoliutsiia published an article by the historian A. Slutskii in which he argued 
that  before  1914  Lenin  may  well  have  underestimated  the  danger  of 
‘Centrism’ amongst international Social Democratic groups.
86 Slutskii felt that 
Lenin’s behaviour was explicable since he required international sympathy for 
the reconstruction of the Russian Social Democratic Party under Bolshevik 
leadership.  However,  he  criticised  Lenin  for  not  having  encouraged  a 
breakaway of the left-wings of European parties. Under the influence of what 
Schlesinger  described  as  ‘apparently  internal’  criticism  by  the  Central 
Committee Secretariat, the journal’s editors admitted on 20 October to having 
committed an error in publishing Slutskii’s article.
87 However, they also added 
that it would be expedient of historians to concentrate upon the relationship of 
the Bolsheviks to the Second International. According to Schlesinger:  
 
  This  provoked  Stalin’s  rage:  in  an  article….he  attacked  the 
editors  -  which  meant  primarily  Pokrovsky  -  for  permitting 
discussions  on  issues  affecting  the  very  essence  of 
Bolshevism;  Slutsky’s  ideas  were  denounced  as  hidden 
Trotskyism;  a  lot  of  not  immediately  connected  observations 
were  added  about  Trotskyism  allegedly  hidden  in  other 
publications  on  party  history;  ‘rotten  liberalism’,  which  had 
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caused the editors to enter into discussion even with enemies 
of the party, and basic weaknesses contained in the work even 
of  historians  as  close  to  Stalin’s  political  standpoint  as  E. 
Yaroslavsky, were condemned.
88 
 
In  damning  terms,  Schlesinger  described  the  impact  of  Stalin’s  letter  on 
subsequent historical work: ‘…. by his solemn proclamation the task of party 
history as searching not for the truth but for constructs fitting the needs of the 
party  leadership  was  firmly  established,  and  has  left  its  traces  up  to  the 
present day’.
89 Schlesinger may have believed that the letter only impacted 
upon party historiography, as opposed to the study of more general historical 
problems. In his earlier writings Schlesinger had frequently conceded that it 
was party history that was the most influenced by the vagaries of party policy. 
Whilst  this  may  be  true,  it  seems  unlikely  that  he  would  believe  all  other 
spheres  of  historical  work  remained  unaffected.  Later  in  the  article, 
Schlesinger actually wrote in terms of general historiography and the changes 
which resulted from Stalin’s letter. 
 
Schlesinger  insisted  that  he,  and  other  communists,  well  understood  the 
implications of the letter:  ‘In the German communist movement, in which I 
worked  at  the  time,  we  could  have  no  doubt  whatever  that  such  a 
reinterpretation of the tasks of historiography rather than the struggle against 
certain  incorrect  statements  had  been  Stalin’s  major  motive  in  writing  this 
article and in drawing the appropriate ‘organizational consequences’ from it’.
90 
Stalin  meant  to  delineate  the  boundaries  of  acceptable  historiographical 
debate; as Schlesinger understood it this was a drive for the establishment of 
theoretical homogeneity. If anyone had been in doubt, the ensuing ‘theoretical 
offensive’ conducted by the leaders of the Comintern national sections would 
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soon have clarified matters. Such an account of Schlesinger’s thinking on the 
issue at the time coincides with his description of events in his unpublished 
memoirs.
91 Both items were written retrospectively and at around the same 
time. The fact that they support each other displays a consistency which helps 
to validate Schlesinger’s statements on his contemporary understanding.  
 
A certain amount of justification appears to have been written by Schlesinger 
concerning his, and others, reaction, or lack of it, to this ‘theoretical offensive’. 
He  was  keen  to  point  out  that  not  all  official  statements,  or  all  aspects  of 
problematic  ones,  were  incorrect;  he  argued,  ‘….  the  occurrence  of  quite 
sensible  and  necessary  statements  in  such  documents  prevented  anyone 
except  those  directly  harmed  from  criticizing  them’.
92  Somewhat 
unconvincingly, Schlesinger argued that these drives could well be used to 
mobilize party workers against theoretical errors advocated by certain factions 
within  the  leadership  of  the  parties,  so  there  may  have  been  a  positive 
element  to  them.  Ultimately  however,  he  wrote:  ‘Faced  with  an  extremely 
critical situation in Germany as well as in the USSR, none of us was eager to 
raise controversial issues’.
93 External factors demanded that party loyalty took 
precedence.  
 
One  could  argue  that  these  justifications  help  to  explain  Schlesinger’s 
attitudes and written emphases up to the 1950s: he did not wish to damage 
the unity of the party in the face of external danger; there were elements of 
truth in the new orthodoxy and mobilisation against theoretical errors could be 
a positive force. Was this why Schlesinger did not publicly denounce what he 
retrospectively denigrated? Schlesinger’s attitude once again evidenced his 
pragmatism and desire to play the role of advocate for the Soviet system. 
 
One interesting feature of Schlesinger’s attitude towards Stalin’s letter to the 
editor’s of Proletarskaia revoliutsiia is that he appears to have seen the attack 
as  directed  principally  towards  Pokrovskii.  He  stated  this  explicitly  in  the 
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introduction to his review, ‘…. he [Stalin] attacked the editors – which meant 
primarily Pokrovsky’.
94 Later, when discussing the impact the availability of the 
Lenin  and  Huysmans  correspondence  would  have  on  research,  he  wrote: 
‘The  publication  of  this  volume  may  offer  an  opportunity  to  resume  the 
discussion which Pokrovsky was prevented from opening in 1930 by Stalin’s 
intervention’.
95  Schlesinger  believed  Stalin  and  Pokrovskii  to  be  the  main 
protagonists in the affair. Perhaps this helps to explain Schlesinger’s relatively 
passive reaction to Stalin’s interference in the historical sphere, both at the 
time and later in the 1930s and 1940s when engaged in writing about Soviet 
historiography. It may have been another justification for his inactivity, despite 
his full awareness of the wider implications for theoretical and academic work. 
Schlesinger consistently made his evaluation of Pokrovskii’s contribution to 
the historical sciences known. He felt Pokrovskii’s theoretical constructs and 
methodology  to  be  fatally  flawed  and  seriously  detrimental  to  both  the 
development of historiography and the teaching of history in the Soviet Union. 
Throughout  his  writings  he  argued  that  the  overcoming  of  the  Pokrovskii 
‘school’ was a major intellectual achievement of the Stalin era. If Schlesinger 
believed  Stalin’s  attack  to  be  fundamentally  directed  against  Pokrovskii’s 
theories,  teachings  and  students,  then  he  might  have  taken  a  pragmatic 
approach to events; believing the outcome of the attack worthwhile despite 
the high costs. Of course, in order to substantiate this argument one would 
have to prove that Schlesinger held this negative interpretation of Pokrovskii 
already in 1931. There are no articles or papers from this time dealing with 
Soviet historiography. Yet it is certain that Schlesinger heavily criticised what 
he perceived as ‘Pokrovskiism’ in his first known writing to cover the subject in 
1938.
96  
 
Schlesinger  was  somewhat  isolated  on  this  issue.  Many  academics  have 
argued  that,  rather  than  the  letter  being  an  attack  directed  specifically  at 
Pokrovskii,  no  historians  emerged  from  the  affair  unscathed.  Barber,  for 
example,  argued  that  very  few  escaped  criticism,  dismissal  from  post  or 
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expulsion from the party. He insisted: ‘M. N. Pokrovsky, was spared, but he in 
any case was a dying man. His closest followers … were all attacked and 
forced to acknowledge mistakes’.
97 It seems that Stalin intended to signal a 
warning  to  the  historical  profession  in  general,  rather  than  to  attack  one 
particular leading school at this time.  
 
Schlesinger’s review contained an interesting and relatively unique evaluation 
of Lenin’s role in international Social Democracy in the years before the First 
World War and immediately after the Revolution. He argued that, were it not 
for Allied intervention leading to civil war on a massive scale, the Bolsheviks 
may well have dealt with the split from the Menshevik-Internationalists in an 
analogous  way  to  the  conflict  with  the  right-wing  communists.  Moreover: 
‘Lenin, if not involved in a desperate war, might indeed, instead of organizing 
the  centralized  Comintern,  have  found  some  means  broader  and  more 
propagandist in character to advocate his views within the international labour 
movement’.
98 Schlesinger argued that Lenin was pushed, unwillingly, towards 
an  authoritarian,  centralized  leadership  style.  Speculating  on  what  Lenin’s 
attitude  to  events,  occurring after  his  death,  might  have  been.  Schlesinger 
wrote:  
 
I  very  much  doubt  whether  he  even  thought,  as  Stalin  later 
asserted,  of  the  possibility  of  socialism  in  one  country,  but 
surely he would not have left, as Trotsky later suggested, the 
Russian revolution in the lurch when the west European part of 
the revolutionary perspective failed to realize. Still, he would not 
have claimed that the outcome of the adaptations was the last 
word of the international socialist movement
99 
 
He  argued  that  both  Trotsky  and  Stalin  were  wrong  in  claiming  Lenin’s 
authority for their actions after his death. Lenin would not have envisaged the 
isolated position of the Soviet Union as desirable and would not have altered 
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theoretical  doctrine  to  match  such  a  state  of  affairs.  However,  equally,  he 
would not have abandoned the Soviet experiment when the west European 
revolution  did  not  immediately  come  to  fruition.  Schlesinger  once  again 
advocated the actions taken by the Soviet Union, insisting that its detractors 
were simply utopian. 
 
This review appears to have been an honest, frank and relatively independent 
analysis  of events  in  the  historical  sphere  in  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  early 
1930s,  as  well  as  a  brief  analysis  of  Lenin’s  international role  immediately 
before and after the Revolution. One of the most striking aspects of the paper 
is how sympathetic Schlesinger was to Lenin. He praised his abilities and the 
role he played in international communism, as well as staunchly defending his 
actions against critics such as Slutskii, and what he clearly perceived as slurs 
upon his reputation by Trotsky and others. Schlesinger had made clear his 
admiration in writings concerning Lenin and Maxism and this was continued in 
his historical works and papers on historiography.   
 
In contrast, another striking feature of this review is Schlesinger’s near total 
condemnation  of  Stalin.  The  only  non-critical  statement  Schlesinger  made 
about Stalin was that he had been correct to disagree with Slutskii; however 
his  reasons  for  this  were  erroneous.
100  Stalin’s  attack  on  the  editors  of 
Proletarskaia revoliutsiia, which aimed at achieving theoretical homogeneity 
as he dictated, led to the search not for truth but for convenient constructs to 
suit the needs of the party. The effects of this offensive were still discernible in 
academic work on party history as late as 1965 when Schlesinger published 
his review.  
 
The  review  conforms  to  the  general  problem  of  Schlesinger’s  writings  on 
Soviet historiography. How is one to marry his apparently differing attitudes to 
the same issues? In this paper Schlesinger is at his most vociferously critical 
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of Stalin and his impact upon the study of history in the Soviet Union. This 
increases the contrast between the negative evaluation of Stalin discernible in 
all of his writings in the post-1953 period and his much more positive portrayal 
of  events  published  before.  In  this  paper,  just  as  in  his  report  on  Soviet 
attitudes  towards  the  treatment  of  historical  sources,  Schlesinger  insisted 
upon the enormous significance of Stalin’s letter for Soviet historiography and 
communist intellectual life in general.
101 Yet he had made no real reference to 
it in his writings before 1953, despite writing a series of articles and a chapter 
in a book specifically on developments within the area. Although his earlier 
work concentrated upon the later evolution of historical research, in the late 
1930s  and  1940s,  the  omission  of  details  on  state  interference  of  such 
seismic proportions seems incredible. The 1931 letter created the intellectual 
terrain  from  which  any  later  developments  would  have  emerged  and 
Schlesinger’s later writings and personal reflections prove he was only too 
aware of this. 
 
Schlesinger  published  a  report  on  recent  developments  in  Soviet  social 
sciences in 1967 in the French periodical Annuaire de L’U.R.S.S.
102 Its scope, 
intention and methodology were very similar to his earlier report for Zeitschrift 
fur Sozialforschung published in 1938; both used contemporary Soviet journal 
publications to attempt a general analysis of developments within the sphere 
of  social  science.  In  general,  Schlesinger  felt  that  after  the  necessarily 
negative process of ‘de-Stalinisation’ the social sciences were now moving in 
a  more  positive  and  progressive  direction.  He  wrote,  ‘….  explicit  ‘de-
Stalinization’, i.e. a condemnation of dogma and attitudes established during 
the two tragical decades, has fairly submerged: in the space thereby opened 
the search for new, scientifically based approaches not only to practical but 
also to basic theoretical problems is in full swing’.
103 In a style typical of his 
post-1953 writings, Schlesinger displayed an intensely critical attitude towards 
the Stalin era; he wrote as if this interpretation was to be taken for granted.  
His  treatment  of  contemporary  developments  and  research  was,  however, 
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undertaken in a much more optimistic and appreciative manner. 
 
The discussion consisted of three separate topics. Schlesinger described the 
progress made within Marxist theory, especially in what he labelled ‘Marxist 
historical sociology’.
104 He also described theoretical work on the problems of 
‘nation’  as  a  concept.  Both  matters  were  widely  debated  in  1966.  The 
remaining section of the article concerned developments within the field of 
Soviet historiography. 
 
Schlesinger began by pointing out the new positive approach to history which 
he was able to discern:  
 
I may, at first, denote the truly ingenious way in which, without 
sacrificing anything of the necessary clarity, they have achieved 
a ‘de-dramatization’ of de-Stalinization so as to get their hands 
free for more urgent tasks. The Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal – 
in my opinion, the best of the group – got the issue settled by 
publishing now, from issue to issue, not just necrologues for the 
victims  of  the  army  purge  which  would  be bound  to  make  a 
sombre impression.... but by reprinting the citations from their 
earlier, and happier years, of the heroic deeds for which they 
got their medals.
105 
 
Evidently Schlesinger felt Soviet historiography could now move on from the 
‘sombre’  task  of  ‘de-Stalinisation’.  He  approved  of  the  more  optimistic  and 
celebratory  approach  of  the  military  history  journal  he  cited.  The  generally 
positive tone of Schlesinger’s report was also visible in his appraisal of works 
on the origin of the Soviet state.
106 
 
The  main  issue  of  ‘de-Stalinisation’  for  Soviet  historians,  according  to 
Schlesinger, had been the need to discover the correct attitude towards the 
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Pokrovskii ‘school’. This was necessary because of the ‘legend’ established 
since 1934 of the, ‘…anti-historical, if not counterrevolutionary’ character of 
Pokrovskii and his students.
107 Schlesinger gave no details as to the origin of 
this ‘legend’ but the use of such a term implied his antipathy towards it. This 
was disingenuous since in his earlier writings, at the time in which the ‘legend’ 
was still the orthodox Soviet interpretation, he appeared to concur with this 
very negative evaluation.  
 
In order to demonstrate the kind of work published on the issue, Schlesinger 
described and analysed an article by O.L. Vainshtein entitled ‘The Formation 
of  Soviet  Historical  Sciences  in  the  1920s’  and  published  in  1966.
108  He 
argued  that,  whilst  Vainshtein did  not  deny  Pokrovskii’s  deviation  from  the 
correct  path  of  historical  materialism,  he  also  showed  his  relationship  to 
earlier  historians.  He  compared  the  Pokrovksii  ‘school’  to  the  liberal 
historiography from whence it had emerged. Historians such as Kliuchevsky 
had placed more importance upon social formations and class interests than 
individuals and ideas. However, they were still far from developing a proper 
Marxist  perspective.  As  Schlesinger  pointed  out,  ‘….  against  this  state  of 
historical science before, and immediately after, the October revolution the 
approach of Pokrovsky, and of the school of Soviet historians trained by it, 
appear in a more proper perspective’.
109 Throughout the 1920s, Pokrovskii 
and his students developed by fighting those bourgeois trends inevitably still 
present  in  Soviet  historiography.  They  also  played  a  vital  role  in  the 
construction  of  Soviet  historical  institutions  such  as  the  Institute  of  Red 
Professors and RANION (the Russian Association of Research Institutions in 
the Social Sciences).
110 This was another achievement for which Pokrovskii 
was now to be recognized by both Vainshtein and Schlesinger. 
 
This positive appreciation of Pokrovskii’s legacy was not accompanied by any 
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minimising of the errors committed by his ‘school’. Schlesinger pointed out 
that  the  article  criticised  Pokrovskii’s  misuse  of  sociological  schemata,  his 
continued  acceptance  of  certain  concepts  of  bourgeois  science  and  his 
tendency to ‘modernise’ the class struggles of the past, amongst other errors. 
In fact, Schlesinger continued: ‘All the essential elements of Stalin’s criticism 
of Pokrovsky are thus upheld’.
111 Yet, it was also accepted that these errors 
were indicative of the general level of historical studies in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s. As Schlesinger argued, ‘…. the Pokrovskeans, in this respect, 
hardly committed mistakes much surpassing Stalin’s elaboration of a ‘slaves 
revolution’ which allegedly overcame ancient society’.
112  
 
Schlesinger argued that Vainshtein did not deal with the overtly nationalist 
elements  to  Stalin’s  anti-Pokrovskii  campaign.  Apart  from  this,  however, 
Schlesinger  appeared  to  be  in  agreement  with  his  interpretation.  This 
approach contrasts remarkably with the continuing attacks on Pokrovskii that 
Schlesinger reported immediately before the Twentieth Congress. However, it 
is typical of the change in historians’ attitudes heralded by the Congress; they 
now proclaimed Pokrovskii’s merits as an historian as well as writing of his 
theoretical and practical errors. Schlesinger appeared to concur with such an 
interpretation.  He  was  keen  to  point  out  that  Pokrovskii  had  advanced 
historiography well beyond the legacy left by his predecessors and insisted 
that his errors were no greater than those of his contemporaries. However, 
Schlesinger  did  retain  some  consistency  with  his  earlier  writings.  He 
maintained that Pokrovskii’s system was deeply flawed or at best obsolete. 
 
It seems clear that there was a change in the tone of Schlesinger’s writings 
before and after Stalin’s death. Up to 1953 Schlesinger wrote a great deal on 
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the  subject  and  some  elements  of  continuity  were  visible.  He  always 
generalised  the  study  of  history  in  the  Soviet  Union  in  a  positive  manner. 
Whilst  never  denying  the  political  and  censorial  impediments  necessarily 
constituting a significant part of a historian’s work, Schlesinger praised the 
kind of publications appearing. He argued that enough intellectual freedom 
and historiographical debate existed to ensure vigorous scholarship. At this 
time,  Schlesinger  also  frequently  criticised  what  he  perceived  as  the 
Pokrovskii  ‘school’  of  history;  he  argued  that  its  defeat  was  a  major 
achievement of the historical field. After 1953 Schlesinger’s general attitude, 
as expressed in his publications, altered radically. He now denigrated Soviet 
historical scholarship of the Stalin era for its poor quality and condemned the 
intellectual atmosphere from whence it originated. He argued that significant 
improvements could now be expected as a result of ‘de-Stalinisation’. This 
later attitude is mirrored in his unpublished memoirs. 
 
 
Schlesinger’s  Change  in  Emphasis  and  Potential 
Explanations 
There can be little doubt that a distinct difference in the tone of Schlesinger’s 
emphases and arguments are visible in his writings on historiography before 
and  after  Stalin’s  death.  As  the  previous  chapters  have  elucidated, 
Schlesinger demonstrated a generally positive attitude towards the quality of 
historical scholarship in the period before 1953. However, in his later writings, 
he  criticised  that  very  same  output.  His  analysis  had  altered  from  one  of 
conditional praise to almost wholesale condemnation. The paradox between 
these  two  positions  is  increased  further  on  consideration  of  Schlesinger’s 
memoir  reflections.  Schlesinger  wrote  a  great  deal  on  his  perception  of 
intellectual  work  in  pre-war  Soviet  Russia.  He  argued  that  his  freedom  to 
produce academic or intellectual work was severely impeded by the state, to 
the point where his own commitment to that freedom was in such contrast to 
the official position, that his expulsion from the party became inevitable. This 
interpretation  would  substantiate  Schlesinger’s  later  writings,  in  which  he   315 
referred  to  the  intellectually  impotent  atmosphere  created  by  Stalin,  yet 
contradicts his earlier work and its more positive tone.  
 
These alterations in interpretation may well affect judgements of Schlesinger 
as a historian and writer on Soviet historiography. They perhaps inevitably 
impact upon the value of his publications to students of the Soviet Union. It is, 
therefore, vital to fully comprehend and attempt to explain this dichotomy. The 
remainder of this chapter will explore the changing nature of Schlesinger’s 
interpretations  and  their  relationship  to  the  dynamics  of  official  Soviet 
orthodoxy; seeking to determine to what extent, if any, Schlesinger’s views on 
historiography  mirrored  the  party  line.  Could  Schlesinger  be  correctly 
identified  as  a  Stalinist  during  his  early  academic  career  on  leaving  the 
USSR?  Did  the  apparent  vacillations  and  contradictions  in  his  analysis 
coincide with similar changes in the Soviet Union and, if so, what effect does 
this  have  on  the  value  of  Schlesinger’s  writings  and  reputation  as  an 
academic?  Schlesinger’s  attitude  towards  three  things  in  particular  will  be 
highlighted:  the  Short  Course  and  its  interpretation  of  Russian  history; 
Shestakov’s textbook, and Pokrovksii’s legacy and ‘school’. The chapter will 
then examine possible motives or explanations for the evident inconsistencies 
in Schlesinger’s work; before, once again, considering how this influences any 
critique  of  that  work.  It  will  be  possible  to  discern  in  what  way  his 
understanding of Marxist thought, his study of Soviet historiography, and the 
inherent contradiction in his analyses over time, impacted upon his writing. 
It seems beyond doubt that Schlesinger advanced a comparatively positive 
portrayal of historical scholarship in the Soviet Union in his papers, articles, 
etc written from the late 1930s up to the death of Stalin in 1953. It is also 
possible  to  recognise  parallels  in  Schlesinger’s  analysis  with  those  of 
orthodox Soviet interpretations. These were elaborated in officially endorsed 
state textbooks which were, according to Markwick, granted ‘biblical status’; 
they, ‘…. established the paradigm within which all other historical writing was 
confined’.
113  The  most  notorious  of  these  texts  was  the  History  of  the 
Communist  Party  of  the  Soviet  Union  (Bolsheviks):  Short  Course,  which 
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established the axioms of party history from its publication in 1938 until its 
denunciation  at  the  Twentieth  Congress.  It  is,  therefore,  essential  to 
determine  Schlesinger’s  attitude  towards  it.  The  textbook  was  edited  by  a 
commission  of  the  CPSU  Central  Committee  and  was  granted  official  CC 
endorsement. However, Stalin was popularly regarded as its principal author. 
As Markwick pointed out: ‘Hailed as  ‘the encyclopaedia of Marxism-Leninism’ 
by  Kaganovich,  the  Short  Course  was  the  codified  culmination  of  the 
merciless ‘auto-da-fé’ against the historians set in train in 1931 by Stalin’s 
letter to the editors of Proletarskaya revolyutsiya’.
114 On 14 November 1938 
the CC passed a resolution declaring the Short Course the only ‘official’ guide 
to  Marxism-Leninism  and  party  history,  thus  ending  any  opportunity  for 
speculation or debate on matters contained therein.
115  
 
Schlesinger did not write a great deal about the Short Course or the period of 
history it covered in his pre-1953 papers. It is, therefore, a little difficult to 
ascertain  his  opinion  of  it.  However,  Schlesinger  did  quote  from  the  text, 
referring to it as an ‘official source’, in Spirit of Post-war Russia.
116 The citation 
was  to  prove  that  Marxist  and  Soviet  theory  did  not  neglect  the  historical 
importance of human thought. Schlesinger felt, at this point, that he could use 
the Short Course as a legitimate and respectable source for the presentation 
of Soviet interpretations. He utilised it as a source to substantiate his own 
argument, an argument that advocated a positive portrayal of Soviet historical 
writing.  
 
There  are  two  elements  of  Schlesinger’s  analysis  of  Russian  history  and 
historiography,  which  coalesce  with  the  official  Soviet  interpretation  as 
represented by the Short Course. Firstly, Schlesinger was in agreement with 
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the text about the nature of pre-twentieth century Russian society. The Short 
Course  argued,  ‘Tsarist  Russia  entered  the  path  of  capitalist  development 
later than other countries. Prior to the sixties of the past century there were 
very few mills and factories in Russia. Manorial estates based on serfdom 
constituted  the  prevailing  from  of  economy.  There  could  be  no  real 
development  of  industry  under  serfdom’.
117  It  seems  that  the  1860s  were 
regarded as the key decade in Russia’s emergence from its feudal economy. 
In  Schlesinger’s  The  Problems  of  Commercial  Capital,  he  wholeheartedly 
agreed with this analysis. Insisting that anything but a capitalist interpretation 
of Russia’s feudalist past could be considered, Schlesinger argued: ‘Russian 
history knows no breaking up of the manor’.
118 This was in direct accord with 
the  Short  Course’s  statement  on  the  ubiquity  and  significance  of  manorial 
estates.  Schlesinger  continued:  ‘It  would  seem  much  more  promising  to 
describe Russia as the classical country of feudalism which, through at least 
four big crises… developed new and again new forms of society until the fifth 
(that  during  the  60ties  of  the  19
th  Century)  forced  upon  it  at  least  some 
compromise  with  capitalism’.
119  Here  again,  Schlesinger  was  in  agreement 
with the official Soviet depiction of the 1860s as the significant decade for 
transition from feudalism to capitalism, although both texts were at pains to 
point  out  that  this  transition  was  not  an  abrupt  change  from  one  type  of 
economy to another, but was a much more prolonged process.  
 
The second issue on which Schlesinger seemed to be in complete accord 
with the Short Course was on the theoretical base from which historical study 
was  undertaken  in  the  Soviet  Union.  In  1947,  Schlesinger  wrote,  with 
approval:  
 
….  the  Marxist  conception  of  history  was  formulated,  and 
achieved  its  main  triumphs,  in  opposition  to  the  traditional 
‘explanation’  of  historical  development  by  the  enumeration  of 
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the  feats  of  ‘great  men’  and  by  the  description  of  the  ideas 
influencing  their  actions.  In  opposition  to  such  an  ‘idealistic’ 
conception, Marxism  stresses  the  importance  of  the  objective 
structure  of  society,  based  on  the  material  conditions  under 
which  men  produced  their  means  of  livelihood.  The  objective 
structure  of  society  influences  the  action  of  men  both  by 
influencing their ideas and by setting limits to the realization of 
their ideas.
120 
 
Similarly  the  Short  Course  argued  that,  in contrast  to the  ‘idealism’ of  the 
Narodniks  and  the  Socialist-Revolutionaries:  ‘The  strength  and  vitality  of 
Marxism-Leninism lies in the fact that it does base its practical activity on the 
needs of the development of the material life of society and never divorces 
itself from the real of society’.
121 The text continued: 
 
It does not follow from Marx’s words, however, that social ideas, 
theories,  political  views  and  political  institutions  are  of  no 
significance in the life of society… We have been speaking so 
far  of  the  origin  of  social  ideas,  theories,  views  and  political 
institutions, of the way they arise, of the fact that the spiritual life 
of society is a reflection of the conditions of its material life. As 
regards  the  significance  of  social  ideas,  theories,  views  and 
political  institutions,  as  regards  their  role  in  history,  historical 
materialism,  far  from  denying  them,  stresses  the  role  and 
importance of these factors in the life of society, in its history.
122 
 
Both texts emphasised the materialist element to the Marxist conception of 
history,  the  primacy  of  the  conditions  of  material  life  in  any  causal 
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relationship. However, both also wished to demonstrate that this did not lead 
to the complete exclusion of social ideas as important factors in history. 
 
Yet, in the third part of Schlesinger’s series of articles on Soviet historiography 
he made an implicit criticism of the Short Course. Schlesinger pointed out the 
difficulties  historians  of  the  German  revolution  of  1918  faced,  since  their 
analysis was only free from criticism if it conformed to the official interpretation 
as  elucidated  in  the  Short  Course.  This  led  to  criticisms  of  ‘a  dogmatic 
character’.
123 Schlesinger was arguing that the necessity of complying to the 
dictates of the Short Course impacted negatively on the research and writing 
of history. In the same paper he explicitly disagreed with the official Soviet 
interpretation  of the German revolution. The  Short  Course  insisted,  ‘…  the 
revolution  in  Germany  was  not  a  Socialist  but  a  bourgeois  revolution’.
124 
However, Schlesinger argued: 
 
 ….  if  a  revolution  is  defined  as  a  certain  form  of  mass-
movement which may be abortive, then it is true to say that a 
working  class  revolution  with  socialist  aims  occurred  in 
Germany  in  1918  and  was  defeated.  In  Germany  of  1918, 
bourgeois society was a firmly established reality although there 
was  still  room  for  bourgeois-democratic  reforms,  and  any 
thorough change would have been socialist.
125 
 
This obviously represented a major distinction between Schlesinger’s writings 
and the interpretation in the Short Course. However, Schlesinger did not state 
this explicitly and elsewhere had suggested that the text was a reasonable 
presentation of official theory.  
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It seems clear that Schlesinger did disagree with some aspects of the Short 
Course.  He  certainly  did  not  echo  any  of  its  most  vulgar  descriptions  or 
interpretations. In fact, he wrote little on any of the subject matter covered by 
the  textbook,  thus  there  is  little  that  is  directly  comparable.  There  are, 
however, similarities in interpretation, and even in description, with some of 
Schlesinger’s  earliest  writings.  So  perhaps  Schlesinger  was  following  the 
party line, on some matters at least. However, this benevolence or lack of 
criticism  is  in  contrast  to  the  attitude  Schlesinger  presented  after  Stalin’s 
death. In the post-1956 era, Schlesinger wrote with praise of Mikoyan’s attack 
on the Short Course arguing that it was the ‘root of the evil’.
126 Schlesinger 
now conformed to the new orthodoxy as represented by the speeches of the 
Twentieth Congress. 
 
Another  textbook  representing  official  Soviet  interpretations  was  Istoriia 
SSSR:  kratkii  kurs,  published  in  1938  under  the  editorship  of  A.  V. 
Shestakov.
127 It was issued as a textbook after receiving second prize in a 
competition for school textbooks, announced by Sovnarkom and the Central 
Committee in 1936, and was intended for use amongst third and fourth grade 
students.
128  K.  Shteppa  has  argued  that  this  text,  ‘….  was  named  the 
standard  textbook  obligatory  for  all  elementary  and  middle  schools  in  the 
Soviet Union and until the late 1930s and early 1940s was the only material 
on Russian history for courses in these and even the higher schools’.
129 Its 
pre-eminent position within the school curriculum demonstrates its importance 
and testifies to the orthodoxy of the interpretations it expounded. Schlesinger 
wrote about it specifically on a number of occasions in the years between his 
leaving the USSR and Stalin’s death.   
 
In  Schlesinger’s  1938  report  for  Zeitschrift  für  Sozialforschung  he  offered 
much praise for the newly published textbook.
130 He pointed to its inclusion of 
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sections on the Scythens and Black Sea Greeks as evidence that the text 
was not entirely based on the history of the Slav peoples. He argued that, 
despite  certain  ‘prettifications’,  Shestakov’s  book  provided  a  balanced  and 
detailed  presentation  of  historical  events.  This  would  certainly  suggest 
general  agreement  with  the  interpretations  it  contained.  Again  in  1947, 
Schlesinger made positive comments upon the textbook. He argued that, in 
comparison to earlier interpretations of Peter:  
 
Present Soviet historians, for example in the official textbook, by 
Shestjakov, acknowledge that Peter the Great, as he is again 
called, ‘did a good deal to shape and strengthen the state ruled 
by  the  big  landlords  and  merchants’….  The  achievement  of 
reform within the existing system is recognized as well as the 
necessity  of  eventually  overthrowing  this  system.  This  result 
seems to be reasonable from the historical as well as from the 
methodological point of view.
131 
 
This,  again,  would  suggest  agreement  with  the  interpretation  of  Peter  I 
contained in Shestakov’s book. 
 
As  late  as  October  1952,  Schlesinger  was  praising  the  book.
132  Whilst 
admitting the politically expedient, patriotic nature of the text, Schlesinger gave 
the impression that this did not necessarily detract from its balanced approach. 
In fact, in a footnote in the same paper, Schlesinger wrote:  
 
The treatment of the conquest of the Tartars in the 10
th Century 
is,  indeed,  much  more  sympathetic  to  the  victims  of  Tsarist 
expansion  than  would  be  conceivable  in  a  Soviet  publication 
today. This also applies to the treatment of the achievements of 
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Peter I; here the sufferings of the masses during the realization 
of these achievements are emphasized.
133 
 
Although criticising more modern textbooks, Schlesinger, once again, offered 
praise of the interpretative line taken in the Shestakov work. This suggests 
that  Schlesinger  approved  of  the  official  Soviet  line  as  represented  by  the 
textbook. 
 
When Schlesinger referred to the text in his writings after 1956 he revealed a 
similar attitude, showing consistency of interpretation in this matter at least. 
He continued to express admiration for the Shestakov work, particularly in 
relation  to  Shamil.  He  argued  that  the  late  Stalin  period  distorted  the 
reasonable  interpretations  expounded  in  the  text.  Schlesinger  followed  the 
orthodoxy of the early Stalin period but explicitly rejected that of later. Whilst 
this  condemnation  was  far  more  forthright  in  his  later  writings  than  in  his 
earlier ones, Schlesinger’s opinion did not change over time. His consistency 
was in contrast to the general tone of his work, which displayed a marked 
alteration in the period after Stalin’s death. 
 
 It  could  be  argued  that  Schlesinger  so  closely  mirrored  official  Soviet 
interpretations over time that this was, in fact, his intended aim. This feature 
of his writing is particularly striking as regards his attitude to Pokrovskii. In 
earlier  publications  Schlesinger  wrote  in  almost  entirely  critical  terms, 
denigrating Pokrovskii for his schematic, abstract and a-historical approach to 
Russian history. He accused Pokrovskii of transforming dialectic materialism 
into  ‘economic  automatism’.
134  The  content  of  his  criticism  and  even  the 
vocabulary utilised were remarkably similar to official decrees concerning the 
teaching  of  history,  such  as  those  of  May  16,  1934.
135  His  interpretation 
corresponded  closely  to  the  official  Soviet  one  as  expressed  in  the  two-
                                                 
133 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Discussions on the Periodization of History’, p.159, footnote 14. 
134 Schlesinger, ‘Neue sowjetrussische Literatur zur Sozialforschung’, p. 189. 
135 Pundeff, History in the USSR, p. 100-103.   323 
volume collection of essays, published in 1939-40.
136 Schlesinger’s writings 
shared  none  of  their  polemical  invective  but  the  actual  content  of  their 
scholarly criticism was similar in character. In contrast, after the Twentieth 
Party Congress the official Soviet stance toward Pokrovskii and his ‘school’ 
mellowed significantly. Enteen wrote: ‘Praise of his energy, his devotion and 
his practical leadership, coupled with warnings against a revival of his ideas 
long  ago  transcended  might  be  considered  the  essence  of  the  official 
interpretation’.
137 This again is remarkably similar to Schlesinger’s attitude in 
his post-Stalin writings. Was Schlesinger being influenced by official Soviet 
interpretations when forming his own? Did Soviet policies affect the tone of 
his  academic  writing?  Whilst  this  may  be  the  case,  it  is  vital  to  note  that 
throughout both periods, and even in his memoirs, Schlesinger argued that 
the  defeat  of  the  Pokrovskii  school  was  a  progressive  development.  The 
Stalinist period of historiography had a positive impact on historical science if 
only because of this step. Schlesinger was consistent in this regard in both 
his writings before Stalin’s death and those after.  
 
Nonetheless, there remains a clear distinction between Schlesinger’s writing 
in the two periods investigated. The tone and content of his work suggests an 
attempt  to  provide  a  distinctly  positive,  optimistic  portrayal  of  Soviet 
historiography,  and  Soviet  life  in  general,  in  the  years  under  Stalin.  In 
contrast, after 1953, and particularly after 1956, Schlesinger retrospectively 
condemned  events  under  Stalin  and  now  expressed  great  optimism  for 
developments in the post-Stalin era. Throughout both periods Schlesinger’s 
interpretation  often  appeared  remarkably  similar  to  Soviet  orthodoxy  as 
expressed through decrees, official textbooks and the Twentieth Congress. 
 
It  is  necessary  to  posit  reasons  for  this  change.  Why  did  Schlesinger’s 
interpretations  and  attitudes  alter  so  starkly?  Why  did  his  later  work 
correspond to his own experiences and memoir reflections when his earlier 
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work did not? Why were his earlier interpretations so different to those of his 
peers and modern commentators?  
 
One possibility is that Schlesinger was deliberately and slavishly following the 
changing Soviet line – acting as Stalin’s man in Glasgow. Whilst there are 
similarities  between  certain  party  orthodoxies  and  Schlesinger’s 
interpretations, this argument does not hold up to scrutiny. Schlesinger was 
certainly  never  uncritical  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  policies.  He  regularly 
disagreed with Soviet orthodoxy and explicitly said so, although this was often 
in footnotes in the pre-1953 period. He had also demonstrated his belief in the 
necessity of academic independence and integrity in his activities as a scholar 
in the UK.
138 One example of this integrity is demonstrated in Schlesinger’s 
attitude  towards  the  publication  of  views  at  odds  with  his  own.  When  the 
economist N. Jasny found that he was unable to publish in the US due to his 
unorthodox views on Soviet statistics, he discovered a forum in Schlesinger’s 
Soviet  Studies.  J.  Wilhelm  has  noted  that  this  was  on  Schlesinger’s 
instigation: ‘When one of the editors, Rudolf Schlesinger, published an article 
favourable  to  Soviet  agriculture, he  sent  a copy  to  Jasny  with  the offer  to 
publish an unedited reply from him because he knew Jasny disagreed with his 
assessments’.
139  This  presents  a  very  different  picture  of  Schlesinger  than 
one of a loyal adherent to Soviet orthodoxy. It must also be remembered that 
it was his ‘liberal’ attitude towards freedom of debate that led to his expulsion 
from the KPD.  
 
Also, there were elements of consistency in Schlesinger’s writings. This often 
put  him  at  odds  with  orthodoxy  and  provides  evidence  of  his  academic 
integrity.  As  much  as  the  emphasis  in  Schlesinger’s  writings on  Pokrovskii 
may  have  altered,  he  consistently  denounced  Pokrovskii’s  concepts  and 
methods  and  argued  that  their  defeat  was  a  major  achievement  in  the 
maturation of Soviet historiography. Schlesinger also always maintained the 
difference between actual, professional historical work within the Soviet Union 
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and those historians who were merely propagandists playing a game.
140 In 
fact, Schlesinger seems to have believed in his own consistency. He made no 
reference to the shift in his interpretation following Stalin’s death. In History of 
the  Communist  Party  of  the  USSR  he  cited  early  work  to  provide  further 
information and verify his proposition. He referred readers to his Zeitschrift 
article of 1938 and his first paper on Soviet historiography, published in July 
1950,  when  discussing  the  positive  impact  the  defeat  of  the  ‘Pokrovskiian’ 
approach had on the historical sphere.
141 This suggests that Schlesinger still 
believed in the legitimacy of these works. The fact that his writings can be 
seen  to  somehow  mirror  those  of  official  Soviet  orthodoxy  on  Pokrovskii 
should not necessarily be seen as an indication of his complicity with, or of the 
undue influence of, that state.  
 
Another explanation for the change in Schlesinger’s interpretation could be 
that the process of ‘de-Stalinisation’ in the Soviet Union threw new light on 
historical scholarship and thus altered his opinion. In this case, information 
offered  to  the  CPSU  at  the  Twentieth  Party  Congress  would  have  been 
revelatory to Schlesinger. It seems clear that before 1956 he did believe in the 
existence of a conspiracy against Stalin, something he felt at the time justified 
the ‘purges’. In his memoirs, he explained that he had no doubts about the 
anti-Stalin conspiracy when writing Spirit of Post-war Russia.
142 Schlesinger 
wrote that this belief changed as a result of the Congress; he now accepted 
that  charges  had  been  ‘trumped  up’,  but  he  continued  to  accept  the 
functionality  of  this  violent  generational  shift.
143  It  seems  clear  that  the 
Congress did alter Schlesinger’s opinion of the USSR and this could explain 
his condemnatory attitude towards previous Soviet scholarship. However, it 
does not particularly elucidate his positive tone in pre-1956 writings since his 
memoirs show that he felt the intellectual environment in Stalin’s Russia to be 
incompatible  with  scholarly  integrity.  It  also  fails  to  explain  why  his  earlier 
attitude was in contrast to the majority of international opinion, which argued 
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that  Soviet  historiography  was  controlled  by  the  party  to  the  detriment  of 
scholarship. 
 
A more convincing explanation is that Schlesinger was reacting to what he 
perceived as the ‘cold war’ mentality of some Western and émigré authors. In 
1961 he had written that British research on the Soviet Union conformed, on 
the whole, to correct academic scrutiny. Yet much that was published on the 
subject in the U.S. was of a wholly reactionary character. Schlesinger referred 
to, ‘…the American method of promoting the study of the ‘potential enemy’’ 
and argued that:  
 
Scholarly insight cannot be achieved when it is based on the 
assumption that Soviet developments are due to some devilish 
disruption  of  the  supposedly  ‘natural’  state  of  society 
(tantamount  to  the  official  mythology  about  American  society 
itself)  or  that  they  are  due  to  the  inherent  dynamics  of  that 
abstraction  called  ‘power’  (the  product  of  American 
disillusionment  with  the  democratic  ideology)  and  that 
consequently  every  action  is  permissible  if  it  will  weaken  a 
supposedly hostile ‘power complex’.
144 
 
In his unpublished book based on the Marxism-Leninism lectures, Schlesinger 
referred disparagingly to ‘cold warriors’, those writers and commentators who 
acted  from  the  perspectives  and  motivations  of  their  particular  cold-war 
hemisphere rather than from academic principles.
145 This attitude was also 
evidenced in History of the Communist Party of the USSR when he wrote of 
‘Western Sovietology’ in the pejorative.
146 He argued that scholars of this type 
began  their  studies  from  ‘absurd  expectations’,  basing  their  criticism  of 
communist states on capitalist criteria. 
 
Schlesinger  often  displayed  an  immensely  sceptical  view  of  observational 
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material published by émigrés, placing much of it firmly within the cold war 
camp. Again, Schlesinger felt that this type of publication was more common 
in the U.S., ‘We [in the UK] are also spared the emphasis that has become 
conventional in the United States on the ‘revelations’ of displaced persons, 
and the diversion of scholarly energies into ‘field studies’ and interviews with 
that  particularly  unrepresentative  sector  of  the  Soviet  population’.
147  His 
negative  opinion  of  the  value  of  émigrés  work  was  also  displayed  in  two 
papers on Soviet law, both published in 1951. In a book review, Schlesinger 
wrote: 
 
The  problem  of  how  to  use  the  evidence  available  in  the 
experiences of Displaced Persons constitutes one of the most 
urgent issues in the methodology of the analysis of any problem 
in Soviet society. The tendency of some Displaced Persons to 
become producers or inspirers of best-sellers, and the hopeless 
entanglement  of  experiences  undergone  in  the  U.S.S.R.  with 
Western ideology and politics in which the analyst of such works 
finds himself caught do not encourage the use of that type of 
material.
148 
 
Similarly, in a paper on the value of court cases as sources of information on 
Soviet society, he argued that, ‘… the refugees’ experiences are subject to a 
process  of  selection  and  editing,  which  are  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent 
conditioned by the state of international relations and of public opinion in the 
country of publication’.
149 If Schlesinger had always believed this to be the 
context  from  which  a  large  amount  of  Western  work  emerged,  it  may  well 
have encouraged him to provide an overly optimistic or positive interpretation 
of Soviet developments in reaction.  
 
That some of the academic output of the West in the 1950s and early 1960s 
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was  heavily  influenced  by  its  ‘cold  war’  context  is  now  increasingly 
recognised. R. Markwick has written: ‘Sovietology, lavishly financed especially 
in the United States and Germany, emerged as an essential part of the West’s 
cold-war  armoury  in  which  the  totalitarian paradigm,  at  least until  the mid-
1960s,  was  a  vital  weapon.  Nowhere  has  this  been  more  evident  than  in 
Western scholarship on Soviet historical writing’.
150 Scholars depicted Soviet 
historians  as  the  handmaidens  of  political  authority,  producing  nothing  of 
academic  merit.  As  Markwick  pointed  out,  whilst  there  was  certainly  some 
truth  to  these  accusations,  ‘…  unsubstantiated  assertions  about  the  myths 
allegedly  woven  by  Soviet  historians  in  their  psychological  prison  were  a 
major  impediment  to  non-Soviet  scholars  taking  the  work  of  their  Soviet 
counterparts  seriously’.
151  Adherents  of  this  totalitarian  model  were  often 
entirely unconscious of the fact that they too may have been involved in their 
own  myth  making.  They  tended  to  hold  firm  to  the  conviction  that  ‘our’ 
research  is  ‘objective’  whilst  ‘theirs’  is  ‘ideological’.  McDermott  and  Agnew 
have commented on the almost total consensus surrounding the ‘totalitarian 
paradigm’  of  the  Soviet  system  that  was  dominant  in  Western  academic 
circles from the 1950s onwards.
152 They pointed out, however, that E.H. Carr 
and others ‘declined to pay homage’ to this ubiquitous theory.
153 Schlesinger 
could admirably be placed in this lofty company, being unwilling to bow to the 
dominant historical and interpretative trend. 
 
S. Fitzpatrick, the renowned historian of culture in the Soviet Union, has also 
commented  on  the  ‘moral  protest’  and  ‘totalitarian’  nature  of  much  memoir 
and academic work about Stalin and the academic world. She argued that a 
great deal of memoir literature on cultural life under Stalin, ‘… expresses the 
viewpoint of the old Russian intelligentsia and tends to be a literature of moral 
protest, either against the Soviet regime as such or against the abuses of the 
Stalinist period’. Equally, she noted a body of Western work that analysed the 
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syndrome of ‘totalitarian control’ of culture:  
 
The  element  of  moral  condemnation  in  the  concept  of 
totalitarianism  –  developed  in  the  postwar  years,  which  were 
also the formative years of American Soviet studies – makes the 
scholarly  literature  strikingly  similar  in  tone  to  the  memoir 
literature of the intelligentsia.
154 
 
Whilst most of this literature did provide a great deal of information upon the 
subject and was not incorrect in many of its theories and assumptions, the 
relationship between party and culture was often far more complex then was 
acknowledged. 
 
The paper by B. Wolfe in the edited conference proceedings, Totalitarianism, 
provides  a  good  example  of  this  kind  of  literature.
155  Published  in  1954  it 
discussed  ‘totalitarianism’  and  intellectual  life,  with  a  particular  focus  on 
history in the Soviet Union. Using the model of totalitarianism, Wolfe argued 
that there was nothing of value in Soviet historical output, it was merely myth-
making  and  there  were  no  scholars  or  academics,  just  propagandists.  He 
wrote: 
 
But to say that history has become a weapon and the historian 
a warrior is scarcely to touch upon what is essentially new in the 
new  history.  Historiography  has  been  absorbed  into  ideology 
and  must  support  and  accord  with  and  be  pervaded  by  the 
ideology that justifies and takes its character from the regime. 
History is part of a myth or mystique, so that its actors, its forces 
and  trends,  its  trajectories  from  past  through  present  to  the 
future, must be in keeping with the style that characterizes the 
whole  system.  Just  as  painting  and  poetry  and  music  must 
conform to that ‘style’ so history, which is once more a form of 
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poetry in its primary sense of myth-making.
156 
 
Explaining the totality of state control over history, Wolfe continued: 
 
  In  the  new  historiography  there  is  a  startling  reversal  in  the 
roles of history-maker and historian. In the pre-totalitarian epoch 
or in the free world, men make their history as best they can, 
and the historians try to determine the relations between what 
they thought they were doing, what they said they were doing, 
and what they have really done. But the new rulers know what 
they  are  doing.  They  possess  in  their  ideology  and  in  their 
charismatic attributes a prophetic insight and an absolute key to 
the  future.  They  are  history-makers  in  a  new  sense,  having 
banished  all uncertainty  and  contingency  from  human  affairs. 
They no longer need critical interpreters and assayers of their 
intentions, their words, their deeds, and the consequences of 
their deeds.
157 
 
Schlesinger may have reacted against this dualist view - of the ‘free world’ 
pitted  against  the  intellectually  stagnant  Soviet  system.  The  impact  of 
Schlesinger’s overtly political bias on the value of his writings lessens when 
his work is compared to undoubtedly polemical peers such as these. Within 
this context, it could well be argued that Schlesinger was being sympathetic to 
Soviet  historians  in  reaction;  he  was  perhaps  attempting  to  redress  the 
balance.  
 
Other scholars took a far more neutral position than Wolfe when investigating 
Soviet  historiography.  However,  many  still  occasionally  betrayed  what 
Schlesinger  may  have  understood  as  their  ‘cold  war  bias’  and  wrote  from 
within the ‘totalitarian’ model. K Shteppa often referred to the monolithic party 
machine  that  dictated  historical  interpretation  from  on  high.
158  He  also 
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occasionally  adopted  a  sarcastic  tone  when  discussing  Soviet 
historiography.
159 C. Black wrote from a ‘totalitarian’ perspective and made 
clear his total rejection of the theory and methodology employed by Soviet 
historians.
160 Schlesinger consistently argued that the West’s insistence on 
evaluation from their, necessarily one-sided, criteria did not allow for a full 
appreciation of events or developments.
161 To entirely reject, from the outset, 
the methodology used by the historians being examined may have blinded the 
author to their achievements. Such a perspective was also clearly at odds 
with Schlesinger, who embraced that methodology. His early positive attitude 
may well have been to counter these very different approaches. 
 
In fact, as noted throughout the chapters, much of Schlesinger’s work seems 
to have been concerned with defending Marxism and the Soviet Union against 
unfair  Western  criticism.  In  his  unpublished  memoirs,  Schlesinger  explicitly 
noted his intention, on leaving Soviet Russia, to counter the prevailing anti-
Soviet campaign in the West by way of his writings.
162 In a paper from 1967 
Schlesinger  noted  the  West’s  preoccupation  with  Stalin  and  his  rule  when 
discussing the Soviet Union. He wrote of the broadness of Marxist teaching, 
encompassing as it did the fields of art and even the natural sciences and 
argued: ‘But most Western argument on Soviet ideology rests precisely upon 
the  record  of  the  twenty-two  years  –  out  of  a  total  Marxist  record  of  123 
years’.
163 He also spoke of the, ‘…short-term distortion of the picture by the 
Stalin  episode’,  continuing,  ‘…on  which,  and  on  the  inflation  of  which  to a 
counter-utopia the advocates of the not-so-open Western society rely to the 
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present  day’.
164  The  concentration  upon  the  Stalin  era  and  its  negative 
aspects  was  made  clear  and  Schlesinger  attempted  to  portray  a  more 
accurate or positive picture in reaction. Such an attitude would have become 
less tenable, or necessary, after the Twentieth Congress, perhaps explaining 
the alteration in his writings at this time. Now, it was possible for Schlesinger 
to denounce Stalin without appearing to validate all cold war criticism of the 
Soviet regime. 
 
In his unpublished book on Marxism-Leninism, Schlesinger again highlighted 
the defensive aspect of his writing. He argued that he wished to treat Marxism 
from  a  more  correct  perspective.  Previous  courses  on  Marxism  had  been 
delivered by opponents who denounced it as a threat to civilisation.
165 The 
Western  intellectual  scene  was  dominated  by  a  number  of  erroneous 
interpretations and Schlesinger wished to take a stand against them.
166 For 
example,  Schlesinger  wrote  that  after  the  Twentieth  Congress  and  the 
Hungarian insurrection of 1956, ‘…there has been a tendency to react to the 
obvious  short-comings  of  Soviet-type  ‘realistic  socialism’’  by  a  revival  of 
Marx’s  pre-Marxist  writings  and  an  emphasis  on  the  humanist  elements 
therein.
167 He disagreed with such a revival and felt that it was a distortion of 
Marxism.   
 
Other historians and scholars have described Schlesinger as ‘anti-cold war’ in 
his  attitude  and  professional  behaviour.  This  substantiates  the  view  that 
Schlesinger’s changing perspectives can be partly explained by his desire to 
counter prevailing cold war tendencies in the West. Notable academic R. W. 
Davies  referred  to  Schlesinger,  Jack  Miller,  Deutscher  and  others  as 
belonging to the ‘anti-Cold War’ camp. Describing this group, Davies wrote:  
 
If the primary characteristic of the members of this camp was 
their  belief  in  the  legitimacy  and  progressiveness  of  the 
Bolshevik  revolution,  one  of  their  secondary  characteristics 
                                                 
164 Ibid. p. 89. 
165 Schlesinger, Marxism-Leninism, p. II. 
166 Ibid. p. 12… 
167 Ibid. 13.   333 
(curious  though  this  may  seem  today)  was  that  they  all 
regarded  the  Soviet  industrialization  drive  and  the  forced 
collectivization of agriculture as in broad outline inevitable, and 
in some ultimate sense progressive.
168  
 
Davies counterpoised this group to those who viewed the Bolshevik revolution 
as  illegitimate  and  wrote  from  that  perspective.  He  referred  to  the  shared 
outlook of the anti-cold war group again in a review published in 2000 which 
spoke of the ‘eccentric and flamboyant’ Schlesinger.
169  
 
This explanation of Schlesinger’s changing interpretation as a reaction to cold 
war scholarship can be understood as part of his role as ‘scholar advocate’. 
Schlesinger was an advocate, a defender, of the Soviet Union and Marxism in 
general in the face of hostile Western reaction. His loyalty and pragmatism 
allowed  Schlesinger  to  retain  a  reasonable  attitude  towards  developments 
whilst  opponents  could  only  view  events  from  a  negative,  polemical, 
perspective.  Equally,  disillusioned  ex-supporters  were  blinded  by  their 
utopianism. They failed to recognise the necessary, if unfortunate, decisions 
that had to be taken if the Soviet Union was to survive and turned, instead, to 
opposition.  
 
There  is  considerable  evidence  of  Schlesinger’s  loyalty.  His  Marxist 
perspective shone consciously from all his work and his sympathy with the 
Soviet Union was always transparent. In his memoirs Schlesinger wrote of his 
awareness  that  KPD  members  expected  him  to  attack  his  former  party 
immediately on arrival in the West.
170 He, thus, determined to prove his loyalty 
to Marxism. This desire to demonstrate his loyalty may have found expression 
in his publications; his favourable attitude to Soviet historiography in the Stalin 
era, his initial recognition of Stalinism as the successor to Leninism, and his 
subsequent agreement with the denunciations of the Twentieth Congress. Yet 
such  a  description  of  events  could  well  be unfair.  As  Schlesinger  wrote:  ‘I 
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think that my further activities have sufficiently elucidated what I understand 
by the obligation of Marxists to contribute, inside or outside the established 
organisational  framework,  to  the  development  of  Marxist  thought’.
171 
Schlesinger was loyal to a particular ideology and methodology, not a state or 
party.  He  conformed  to  what  he  understood  as  the  tenets  of  Marxist 
scholarship rather than the dictates of the Soviet Union. This does, perhaps, 
explain  Schlesinger’s  initial  willingness  to  portray  historical  research 
conducted within a supposedly Marxist framework in a positive light. However, 
his  writings  were  coloured  by  his  sympathies  to  Marxism  and  the  Soviet 
experiment in its entirety, not by vulgar party adherence. 
 
Schlesinger’s pragmatism or utilitarianism in respect to the Soviet Union has 
also  been  widely  demonstrated,  most  notably  in  his  attitude  towards  the 
purges and Stalin’s legacy. This perspective allowed Schlesinger to retain his 
sympathy  when  others  rejected  the  Soviet  Union,  after  the  purges,  the 
Hungarian  events  of  1956  or  the  revelations  of  the  ‘secret  speech’,  for 
example.  Schlesinger  believed  that  hard  decisions  and  actions  were 
sometimes  necessary  for  the  greater  good.  To  imagine  otherwise  was 
utopian.  He  argued  that  Rosa  Luxemburg’s  revulsion  at  the  use  of  terror 
would not have lasted since it was necessary in some situations: ‘This is the 
crux of the matter: the Russian revolution has ceased to be a dream, it has 
become hard reality. If Rosa had survived and become responsible for a real 
revolution  building  a  new  order  she,  too,  would  have  learned  to  do  hard 
things’.
172  This  attitude  helps  explain  why  Schlesinger  was  able  to  discern 
positive  outcomes  from  the  Stalin  era  where  others  could  only  express 
distaste for the atmosphere and methods used. Schlesinger pointed to the 
advantages  of  the  defeat  of  the  Pokrovskii  school  and  the  reasonable 
interpretations within certain textbooks whilst recognising, although perhaps 
diminishing,  the  general  character  of  a  manipulated  and  cowed  historical 
profession. After 1956, events had moved on and the Soviet Union was now 
discussing its errors. Schlesinger no longer needed to redress the balance of 
Western  interpretation  and  could  concentrate  on  the  optimistic  indications 
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emerging from Moscow. 
 
Detailed  analysis  and  recognition  of  the  outlined  changes  in  Schlesinger’s 
writings  on  historiography  inevitably  affect  their  value  to  students  of  the 
subject. Yet a consideration of his possible motives has shown that they were 
unlikely  to  have  been  sinister  in  intent.  It  is  doubtful  that  Schlesinger  had 
deliberately  followed  the  dynamics  of  official  Soviet  orthodoxy  as  anything 
more than a distant sympathiser. His desire to demonstrate his loyalty was 
more about proving that he was not an ‘enemy’ of the Soviet Union and his 
positive  interpretation  of  facts  and  events  may  well  have  been  heavily 
influenced  by  what  he  perceived  as  the  reactionary  character  of  some 
Western scholarship. Schlesinger’s real loyalty was to Marxism, as a theory 
and methodology in its widest sense. As an editor, Schlesinger demanded the 
very  highest  standards  of  academic  integrity.  His  seeming  pursuit  of 
objectivity  in  practice  surely  lessens  the  criticism  that  the  conspicuously 
political character of his early writings must inevitably attract.   
 
It is important to remember that the apparent inconsistency in Schlesinger’s 
description of Soviet historiography is fundamentally a matter of emphasis. 
The difference between his analyses before and after Stalin’s death was in 
their  general  impressions,  the  nuances  of  interpretation.  Schlesinger  never 
denied  those  elements  which  contradicted  his  overall  analysis.  His 
conclusions  were  never  so  strong  that  they  denied  the  possibility  of 
alternatives. His writing on Soviet historiography and Marxism can, therefore, 
provide a wealth of insightful information. 
 
Compared to other authors of his generation Schlesinger appears uniquely 
self-aware.  He  often  began  his  books  and  papers  with  a  statement  of  his 
political convictions and intellectual assumptions.
173 Other writers were less 
forthcoming  and  yet  their  assumptions  would  nevertheless  influence  the 
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contents of their work.
174 Whilst caution must clearly be exercised as regards 
Schlesinger’s  work,  it  still  remains  a  valuable  resource  for  a  better 
understanding  of  Marxist  theory  in  the  twentieth  century,  Soviet 
historiography, the Stalinist state and life as a scholar in the cold war West. 
Schlesinger’s political and ideological outlook coloured his scholarly output. 
However,  an  inclusion  of  the  usual  caveats  necessary  for  any  source 
evaluation  allows  for  a  proper  appreciation  of  his  work  in  terms  of  its 
contribution to the development of Soviet studies. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusions 
 
Rudolf Schlesinger was an important political activist, theorist and journalist. 
Involved in many of the key events of the first half of the twentieth century, he 
recorded  his  experiences  in his  unpublished  memoirs and  wrote  academic 
works on the same subjects. On his departure from the Soviet Union in the 
late 1930s, Schlesinger established a career as a renowned and respected 
scholar  in  the  UK.  However,  his  activities  and  publications  have  remained 
relatively ignored since his death. This may be because his writing style and 
subject matters do not lend themselves to a broad or popular readership or, 
perhaps, the area of study has fallen out of favour with the end of the cold war 
and  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Nevertheless  his  academic  writings 
remain a rich vein of scholarship and are worthy of detailed investigation. 
 
Two aspects of Schlesinger’s work have been examined in detail: his writings 
on  Marxism  and  those  on  Soviet  historiography.  Marxism  was  both  the 
political motivation and intellectual foundation of all of Schlesinger’s activities 
and publications. It was chosen as an area of study because it allows for an 
appreciation  of  all  of  Schlesinger’s  other  work;  Marxism  provided  the 
methodology, theoretical paradigm and often the subject matter of his papers. 
Schlesinger was a reputable and prolific scholar of Marxism, displaying an 
encyclopaedic knowledge of the classics and Marxist developments in Russia. 
He  was  also  a  representative  of  his  generation  of  left-wing,  radical 
intellectuals.  
 
The  second  focus  was  Schlesinger’s  writings  on  Soviet  historiography. 
Although this was not an obvious selection since Schlesinger is not primarily 
known for his work in this field, the study was undertaken for a number of 
reasons.  Not  least  because  Schlesinger  wrote  specifically  about  Soviet 
historical output on a great many occasions, and consistently over time, and 
he  referred  to  the  topic  frequently  when  addressing  other  matters. 
Developments  within  Soviet  historiography  were  of  great  interest  to  him   338 
throughout his publishing career. Also, an in depth critique of Schlesinger’s 
work on this subject demonstrated the change in emphasis discernable in his 
publications, depending upon the date written. In his early works on all topics, 
Schlesinger provided a positive, optimistic, even defensive, interpretation of 
events  within  the  Soviet  Union.  In  the  period  after  Stalin’s  death,  and 
particularly from 1956 onwards, he condemned those same developments but 
expressed an optimistic attitude for the post-Stalin future of the Soviet Union. 
This change is most clearly highlighted in his writings on the subject of Soviet 
history. 
 
A  critique of  Schlesinger’s  writing on Marxism  and  Soviet historiography  is 
illuminating  because  it  allows  for  a  better  appreciation  of  his  value  as  a 
scholar to students of the Soviet Union. The overdeterminist foundation of the 
thesis suggests that it also throws new light on those very topics, the Soviet 
Union in general and the cold war nature of Western scholarship. Historical 
science and Marxist theory were two of the bases of Stalin’s rule. Thus, any 
illumination  of  them  should,  in  addition,  provide  an  insight  into  Stalinist 
Russia.  
 
Schlesinger’s intellectual development began with a devotion to the writings 
and theories of Rosa Luxemburg. She had a decisive influence on the young 
liberal,  converting  him  to  communism  for  the  rest  of  his  life.  Schlesinger 
initially admired Luxemburg’s commitment to spontaneity, her attack on the 
bureaucratism of the trade union movement and her concern with the peoples 
of undeveloped nations. He remained an admirer of her political convictions 
but began to question her theories and methods when the disparities between 
the successful experiences of the Russian party were compared to those of 
the Luxemburgist KPD in Germany. On realising that Luxemburg and Lenin’s 
attitudes  towards  party  organisation  were  incompatible,  and  fully 
understanding  the  difference  in  their  conflicting  economic  theories, 
Schlesinger  decided  Lenin  was  correct.    From  the  mid-1920s  onwards 
Schlesinger became a Leninist. 
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According  to  Schlesinger,  Luxemburg  remained  a  powerful  icon  but  her 
theories were erroneous and contributed to the failure of the KPD in Germany. 
He supported Luxemburg but rejected the doctrine of ‘Luxemburgism’. He felt 
that  she  left  the  party  unable  to  correct  its mistakes  without  wildly  veering 
towards deviations of the opposite extreme. He believed that, had the German 
party been successfully bolshevised, they would have been able to achieve 
power through revolutionary action sometime between 1918 and 1923. For 
Schlesinger, Luxemburg’s errors occurred because she did not recognise the 
new  stage  of  capitalism,  monopoly  capitalism,  unlike  Lenin  or  Hilferding. 
Society had developed from the time of Marx and Engels but Luxemburg was 
unable to evolve from the classical model. Her understanding of Marxism and 
capitalism became obsolete.  
 
Schlesinger criticised those who tried to use Luxemburg in support of their 
own partisan political agenda. He argued that she was no arch-democrat and 
could not be used as a theoretical stick with which to beat the Bolsheviks. In 
his later writings on the subject, written after Stalin’s death, Schlesinger also 
derided Stalin’s distorting influence on Luxemburg’s legacy. He argued that 
the  virulent  anti-Luxemburg  campaign  in  the  KPD  in  the  mid-1920s  was 
merely an attempt by party members to visibly express their pro-Stalin loyalty. 
Schlesinger believed that de-Stalinisation offered an opportunity for Marxists 
to develop a correct perspective towards Luxemburg.  
 
Despite his early adherence to Luxemburg, by his mid-twenties Schlesinger 
transferred his allegiance to Lenin and Leninism. His admiration of Lenin, his 
political  activities  and  Marxist  theories,  were  a  key  feature  of  all  of 
Schlesinger’s writing. This respect shone through his work consistently over 
time. It is also clear that Schlesinger believed Leninism to be the next stage of 
Marxism.  It  was  not  a  distortion,  as  some  critics  argued,  but  the  next 
dialectical development in a dynamic model. In fact, Schlesinger went further, 
arguing that Leninism led to the success of Marxism, created a higher phase. 
It  was  Lenin’s  ability  to  develop  theory,  to  change  it  to  fit  new  material 
circumstances,  that  directly  led  to  the  success  of  the  Russian  revolution. 
Lenin  recognised  the  nature  of  capitalist  development  in  Russia  and  the   340 
significance of the proletarianising process on the peasantry, for example. In 
contrast, Luxemburg’s failure to develop theory directly led to revolutionary 
defeat in Germany.  
 
Schlesinger argued that Lenin’s main contribution to Marxism was his theory 
of  the  party.  Lenin’s  methods  of  party  organisation  were  outlined  in  his 
writings  and  were  strictly  adhered  to  as  the  Bolsheviks  took  power.  Other 
parties  wishing  to  emulate  their  success  should,  therefore,  follow  Lenin’s 
instructions.  According to Schlesinger, Lenin was able to blend a synthesis of 
the Russian revolutionary tradition with Marxist theory to create a new type of 
party, one capable of leading a revolution.  However, material conditions had 
now changed, in part owing to Lenin and his party’s success. The world was 
very different and Lenin’s Marxism now required development to take this into 
account.  
 
Schlesinger  seemed  to  unquestioningly  accept  Lenin’s  tenets  and 
propositions. That Lenin carefully prescribed the necessary actions to bring 
about revolution in Russia appeared obvious, although this version of events 
can  be  easily  disputed.  Schlesinger  also  aped  Lenin’s  facile  philosophical 
depictions  and  argued  that  his  plans  for  the  post-revolutionary  state  were 
correct,  even  if  they  were  unable  to  come  to  fruition  due  to  external 
circumstances.  His writings on Leninism broadly corresponded to the Soviet 
line  of  interpretation.  His  early  works  implied  Stalinism  was  the  natural 
progression  from  Leninism,  they  also  stressed  1912  as  a  key  date  in  the 
history of Marxism – the year Stalin joined the central committee. However, 
his  later  works  emphasised  the  distorting  effect  Stalin  had  introduced  to 
theory. It was necessary to return to Leninism before the next dialectical stage 
could  be  embarked  upon.  Despite  this  nuanced  change  in  analysis 
Schlesinger’s writings on Lenin are insightful and scholarly. They also provide 
a wealth of information on Schlesinger’s personal Marxist development.  
 
Although  Schlesinger  wrote  little  about  Marx  and  Engels,  he  held  them  in 
great  esteem  and  was  very  knowledgeable  on  the  subject  of  the  classics. 
Schlesinger’s interest lay in the contemporary significance of Marxism – its   341 
relevance  for  the  present  day.  His  emphasis  was,  thus,  inevitably  on  later 
developments,  on  Leninism,  Luxemburg  etc.  However,  it  is  still  possible  to 
detect general themes in Schlesinger’s understanding of Marx and Engels.  
 
This  understanding  emerged  from  his  relationship  to  Leninism.  He  used 
Leninist sources to explain Marxism and followed Lenin’s interpretations. In 
addition, Schlesinger made clear that Marxism was more important than Marx. 
Marx and Engels founded a theory and method that developed beyond their 
initial  input.  The  founders  were  wrong  on  some  issues,  and  others  were 
solved  over  time,  but  this  had  no  effect  on  the  veracity  of  Marxism. 
Schlesinger  insisted  the  two  key  elements  of  Marxism  were  dialectics  and 
historical  materialism.  Although  he  varied  his  view  on  the  importance  of 
Hegelian dialectics to Marxism, he consistently argued that these two ideas 
formed the basis of the theory. He also stressed the active nature of Marxism, 
in contrast to contemplative philosophy. Marxism was intended to understand 
and then to change, not merely to observe.  
 
Schlesinger’s motive of myth dispelling was particularly clear in respect to his 
views  on  Marxism  and  Marx.  Many  of  his  writings  on  the  subject  seemed 
geared towards the clarification of misunderstandings and misconceptions in 
the  West.  For  example,  Schlesinger  frequently  emphasised Marx’s  attitude 
towards  Russia,  arguing  that  Marx  did  not  develop  a  universal  model  of 
development; there was more than one path to socialism. Schlesinger also 
hotly  disputed the  notion  that Marxism  denied  the  power  of  ideas  and  the 
human element or that it was overly deterministic.  
 
An examination of Schlesinger’s Marxism suggested similarities between his 
conceptions and those of contemporaries, particularly Georg Lukács. The two 
theoreticians did have much in common; such as their insistence on Marx’s 
debt  to  Hegel,  their  concentration  on  the  active  nature of  Marxism  and  its 
importance as a method. They also both strongly rejected vulgar materialism 
and economic determinism. However, Schlesinger sided with Lenin wherever 
his  views  differed  to  Lukács’.  Schlesinger  argued  that  Marxism  was  a 
scientific method of universal validity and that dialectics were objective and   342 
independent  of  man.  This  was  in  obvious  contrast  to  Lukács.  They  also 
disagreed  as  to  Luxemburg’s  legacy  since  Lukács  insisted  she  alone  had 
advanced  Marxist  theory  after  Marx  and  Engels’  death.  Schlesinger  would 
necessarily have been influenced by Lukács’ concentration upon philosophy 
and his vocabulary since they emerged from the same intellectual and political 
milieu.  However,  their  similarities  are  not  as  great  as  one  might  expect. 
Schlesinger’s  own  references  to  Lukács,  though  few,  are  consistently 
dismissive. 
 
Once  more  in  the  role  of myth  breaker,  or ‘scholar  advocate’,  Schlesinger 
argued that Stalin was a Marxist theoretician. Although no genius, those who 
denied Stalin’s role in the development of Marxist theory did so for partisan or 
political  reasons.  Schlesinger  felt  Stalin  was  the  first  to  recognise  that 
Leninism  was  a  new,  more  advanced,  stage  in  Marxism.  He  was  also 
instrumental  in  dropping  utopian  elements  in  world  revolution.  When 
discussing  Stalin’s  theoretical  input,  Schlesinger  was,  in  general,  more 
positive in his earlier works. He argued throughout his publishing career that 
Stalin had been significant as a ‘populariser’ of Marxism – he made the theory 
accessible to the average worker. However, in his later works, Schlesinger 
consistently pointed to the negative impact Stalin wrought, both in terms of the 
intellectual atmosphere he created and his own contribution. He argued that 
Stalin’s popularising involved vulgarisation. 
 
The investigation into his writings on Stalin revealed Schlesinger’s pragmatic 
attitude and this helps to explain the apparent inconsistency in his views over 
time. Schlesinger argued that Stalin was a brutal leader who carried out tasks 
in an illegal and inhumane manner. However, Stalin took decisions necessary 
for  the  survival  of  the  Soviet  Union,  the  embodiment  of  socialist  hope. 
Schlesinger believed Stalin’s ‘socialism in one country’ was not intellectually 
valid but was necessary to motivate the Soviet people at a time of isolation 
and  doubt;  the  theory’s  utility  was  the  most  important  thing.  He  reacted 
against the horrors of the purges but pointed to their efficacy and insisted that 
Stalin’s leadership fulfilled a historical function, however distasteful that was to 
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Turning to Soviet historiography, Schlesinger’s memoir reflections on his time 
as a scholar and intellectual in the Soviet Union were examined. This was to 
provide a personal context to his academic publications. Schlesinger worked 
in the Soviet Union as an academic researcher and editor in the 1920s and 
1930s and wrote extensively of the experiences in his unpublished memoirs. 
He  seemed  to  believe  the  historical  field  was  very  separate  from  his  own 
intellectual circle and this may diminish any comparisons drawn between the 
two. This division may help to explain why his personal reflections differed so 
sharply to his attitude towards Soviet intellectual freedom expressed in his 
early writings in the West. However, his knowledge of the scholarly climate 
must surely have given him a general insight into the world of the historian. 
There is, thus, a contradiction between his negative personal evaluation of the 
intellectual  atmosphere  of  Stalin’s  Russia  and  his  positive  interpretation 
immediately after his expulsion. 
 
In general, Schlesinger’s memoirs detailed a hostile intellectual environment, 
one without academic freedom and in which party dictates were the final word 
in all discussions, if a discussion was allowed at all. Schlesinger encountered 
often insurmountable difficulties to publication and was soon reluctant to air 
disagreements  in  party  meetings.  He  described  the  effect  of  Stalin’s  1931 
letter to Proletarskaia revolutsiia on the KPD and the ensuing clampdown on 
intellectual freedom; surely realising that its impact on Soviet historians must 
have been even greater. Schlesinger also argued that he rejected the concept 
of Marxism developed under Stalin, Marxism as an authoritarian symbol of 
party  unity.  Instead,  Schlesinger  believed  that  Marxism  was  a  method 
developed  by  dialectical  progression;  it  emerged  through  argument  and 
discussion. To limit freedom of debate, thus, stifled Marxism.  
 
However,  Schlesinger  did  point  to  one  positive  element  of  Stalin’s  rule  on 
intellectual  life.  He  insisted  the  repudiation  of  Pokrovskii’s  schematic, 
economist  interpretation  of  history  represented  a  clear  advance  in  Soviet 
historiography. Schlesinger consistently argued this was the case in all his 
academic writings. He detailed other advances he felt had taken place in the   344 
arts under Stalin, arguing that Stalin overcame the narrow mindedness of the 
earlier period. 
 
Schlesinger’s  works  on  Soviet  historiography  written  and  published  during 
Stalin’s lifetime were, generally, very positive in character. He praised recent 
interpretations  of  Peter  I  and  current  textbooks  and  argued  that  they 
represented  progress  from  previous  analyses  and  were  historically 
reasonable.    He  insisted  the  Marxist  methodology  employed  by  Soviet 
historians  did  not  stifle  debate  but,  instead,  provided  it  with  a  sound 
theoretical  foundation.  There  was,  in  fact,  a  great  deal  of  critical  debate; 
discussions and disagreements were how orthodoxy was established. Whilst 
Schlesinger  never  denied  the  difficult  aspects  of  scholarship  in  the  Soviet 
Union,  in  some  of  his  writing,  particularly  Spirit  of  Post  War  Russia,  he 
provided an entirely glowing characterisation of developments in the historical 
field under Stalin.  
 
Schlesinger’s interpretations and emphases often aligned with official Soviet 
campaigns.  His  depiction  of  Pokrovksii  as  a  schematic,  vulgar  economic 
determinist  was  simplistic  and  distorting.  Yet,  it  mirrored  the  official  anti-
Pokrovskii  campaign  of  the  1930s;  often  utilising  the  same  vocabulary. 
Similarly, Schlesinger’s description of the nature of pre-revolutionary Russia 
altered  subtly  as  official  Soviet  characterisations  did.  In  his  first  works, 
Schlesinger  insisted  the  pre-revolutionary  state  was  substantially  feudal, 
agreeing with the ensuing anti-Pokrovskii movement. Yet later, he conceded 
that  there  were  notable  elements  of  capitalist  development;  appearing  to 
agree with the official post-war anti-cosmopolitanism campaign. 
 
The pre-1953 publications certainly admitted the negative aspects of Soviet 
scholarship. Schlesinger denounced Soviet campaigns, such as those against 
‘bourgeois objectivism’, and argued that they were having a detrimental effect 
on  the  historical  sphere,  the  quality  of  scholarship  and  its  international 
reputation.  However,  critical  comments  were  often  consigned  to  footnotes, 
inevitably lessening their impact. Individual reviews and papers were heavily 
censured, especially those concerning later periods. Yet, Schlesinger did not   345 
appear to draw these negative impressions into his overall conclusions. He 
argued  there  was  a  difference  between  genuine  historians,  who  produced 
scholarship of merit and substance, and mere propagandists. It was this latter 
group  who  tended  to  fall  foul  of  authorities  and  participate  in  the  dubious 
purges  and  denouncements  of  academics  and  interpretations.  Schlesinger 
may have been keen to separate the work of the two groups. He would not 
wish  to  have  Soviet  historiography  judged  on  the  output  of  party 
propagandists. 
 
Initially  after  Stalin’s  death,  the  change  in  Schlesinger’s  attitude  towards 
Soviet historiography was small. He continued to argue that work of value had 
been completed and that freedom of debate had existed. Although, he was 
now more condemnatory of the general academic environment and strongly 
criticised individual works. His analyses in works written after the Twentieth 
Party Congress, however, represent a sea change. Schlesinger outlined the 
events  of  the  congress  and  the  de-Stalinisation  process  and  appeared  in 
complete  accord  with  developments.  He  approved  of  the  condemnation  of 
Stalin’s excesses and cult of personality, and wrote enthusiastically of the call 
for historians to take a more measured approach to their work. 
 
Schlesinger appeared optimistic about the future of historical science in the 
Soviet Union. However, he also portrayed a deeply hostile attitude towards 
earlier  work,  Soviet  historiography  completed  under  Stalin.  He  pointed  to 
historians’ selective approach to facts and sources, taboos on certain themes 
and a general authoritarian degeneration in the intellectual environment. This 
was in stark contrast to his early positive appraisals. Schlesinger noted the 
deleterious impact of Stalin’s exhortations to Soviet patriotism, particularly on 
the study of early periods of Russian history. He also emphasised the terrible 
effect of Stalin’s 1931 letter. His early work barely referred to the event, yet 
was now described in damning terms. 
 
Schlesinger’s change in tone often corresponded to official Soviet orthodoxy. 
In the pre-1953 era, he agreed with interpretations in textbooks and the anti-
Pokrovskii  campaign.  After  1956  he  supported  the  pronouncements  of  the   346 
Twentieth  Congress  and  appeared  in  complete  agreement  with  the  more 
conciliatory  stance  towards  Pokrovksii.  This,  alongside  the  change  in 
emphasis, required  explanation  if  Schlesinger’s  writings  were  to  retain  any 
value as academic work.  
 
Schlesinger  could  have  been  slavishly  following  the  Soviet  party  line. 
However, there is plenty of evidence of his academic integrity. Schlesinger 
was never uncritical of developments within the Soviet Union and his analysis 
often  contradicted  official  orthodoxy.  Also,  there  were  many  elements  of 
consistency  in  Schlesinger’s  analysis.  So  this  explanation  seems  unlikely. 
Perhaps  the  speeches  at  the  Twentieth  Congress  were  revelatory  to 
Schlesinger, fundamentally altering his attitude towards earlier events. Whilst 
this  is  plausible,  and  explains  Schlesinger’s  retrospective  condemnation  it 
does not account for his earlier praise, in opposition, as it was, to the majority 
of international opinion. 
 
The most reasonable explanation for Schlesinger’s early positive perspective 
was that he was reacting against perceived cold war bias of the West. He 
expressly  pointed  to  the  cold  war  hostility  of  many  writers  and  émigrés. 
Modern  scholars  have  substantiated  the  assertion  and  have  criticised  the 
blinkered approach to Soviet historiography and the totalitarian paradigm of 
much Western work of the time. In addition, peers of Schlesinger argued that 
he was an ‘anti cold-war’ scholar. 
 
Alongside this motive, was Schlesinger’s desire to remain loyal to the Soviet 
regime, and, more importantly, to Marxism and communism in general. In his 
role  as  scholar  advocate,  Schlesinger  defended  and  promoted  the  Soviet 
Union.  That  is  not  to  say  that  Schlesinger  was  a  propagandist  or  that  he 
justified all actions of the state. However, his pragmatism and utilitarianism 
allowed him to eschew utopian disillusionment and instead accept the harsh 
realities of revolutionary governance and state building.  Knowledge of this 
aspect of Schlesinger’s scholarship affords a proper perspective on the value 
of his writings.  
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Whilst  the  notion  of  the  ‘scholar  advocate’  is  helpful  in  understanding 
Schlesinger, it is not an absolute explanation of his motivations and writings. 
The concept is used to show the conflicting nature of Schlesinger’s work, his 
dual role as both a scholar and an advocate of Marxism and the Soviet Union. 
However,  there  were  times  when  the  advocate  appeared  to  dominate  the 
scholar and Schlesinger’s intellectual honesty must be called into question. 
His  near  total  acceptance  of  Lenin’s  writing  on  philosophy,  and  empirio-
criticism in particular, is a good example of this aspect of Schlesinger’s work. 
For  the  most  part,  Schlesinger  simply  aped  the  simplistic  and  distorting 
criticisms of his mentor despite his undoubted awareness of the crass nature 
of this abuse. The advocate was stronger than the scholar. 
 
Schlesinger’s  attitude  towards  the  ‘Twenty  One  Conditions’  of  entry  to 
Comintern are also illuminating in this respect. Schlesinger wrote frequently 
that  he  believed  the  conditions  were  mistaken;  they  created  an  overly 
centralised organisation aimed at little more than wholesale ‘Bolshevisation’ of 
the communist movement. The conditions failed to cleanse the parties as they 
were intended to and the principles they were supposed to convey were rarely 
understood by signatories. In fact, according to Schlesinger, the conditions 
made workers less willing to learn from Russian experiences. They needlessly 
alienated  the  very  people  they  were  to  inspire.  As  a  scholar,  Schlesinger 
understood and commented on this. However, in spite of his misgivings, he 
left the Austrian Socialist Party when it refused to meet the conditions. He 
joined the Austrian Communist Party in order to remain loyal to the Soviet 
experiment. The need to remain alongside the victorious Russian communists 
was  paramount  even  if  they  were  mistaken  or  their  actions  harmful.  In 
Schlesinger’s actions the advocate, once again, proved more powerful than 
the scholar.  
 
Schlesinger argued that many people in his generation silenced their personal 
misgivings in order to stay faithful to Soviet Russia. They felt this sacrifice was 
necessary for the greater good of the socialist cause. Like others, his motives 
were  clear  and  he  did  not  deny  them.  This  provides  an  insight  into 
Schlesinger’s work and helps explain the conflict within them. Yet his devotion   348 
to Lenin, his naive belief that were it not for Soviet Russia’s desperate war for 
survival Lenin would have constructed an International along more open lines, 
run counter to his academic analysis of the situation and to many of Lenin’s 
own  writings.  In  this,  and  on  other  occasions,  Schlesinger  appeared  so, 
‘blinkered by his own intellectual idiom’, to use Jack Miller’s phrase, that it can 
be difficult to afford some of his work much credibility.
1 
 
There were other sections of Schlesinger’s writings that can be placed in this 
category;  times  when  advocacy  seemed  a  stronger  motive  force  than 
scholarship. His early failure to condemn the Short Course and Stalin’s letter 
to Proletarskaia revolutsiia or to acknowledge the hugely detrimental effect 
they had had upon the Soviet historical field are particularly striking examples. 
These works deliberately sought to stifle debate and dictate, quite explicitly, 
the boundaries of historical truth. Their facts and interpretations were the only 
ones  that  historians  were  permitted  to  use.  Again,  when  writing  about  the 
‘anti-cosmopolitanism’  campaign,  Schlesinger  failed  to  highlight  its  anti-
Semitic  character.  This  omission  is  remarkable.  It  would  seem  that 
Schlesinger’s desire to illuminate or advocate the positive aspects of Soviet 
historiography outweighed the need to paint a completely accurate picture in 
his  scholarly  work.  Schlesinger  hinted at  his  reasons  for  accepting  Stalin’s 
letter  in  his  memoirs.  He  argued  that  most  understood  the  purpose  of  his 
intervention but were concerned about external threats to the Soviet Union 
and felt their solidarity with it was more important than expressing opposition 
and promoting disunity.  However, whilst there was clearly a conflict between 
Schlesinger as an advocate and as a scholar, it was only on certain occasions 
that  the  advocate  entirely  dominated.  This  should  not  affect  an  overall 
appreciation of his writings. 
 
Besides the body of work on Marxism and historiography discussed in this 
thesis,  Schlesinger  contributed  to  scholarship  in  many  other  ways.  The 
‘scholar’ description can, thus, be further defended. These other aspects of 
Schlesinger’s career deserve further, more detailed study but can be briefly 
                                                 
1 See above, p. 20.   349 
summarised. Working at the Glasgow Institute of Soviet and East European 
Studies, Schlesinger became a leading light within a generation of scholars 
who founded the academic field of soviet studies in the UK. Alongside others, 
such as Maurice Dobb and E. H. Carr, Schlesinger helped to create an open 
British discipline in opposition to the more cold-war minded hostility of much 
US work on the same subject. His personal experiences of the Soviet Union 
and continental social democracy, coupled with his academic background and 
language  skills  were  ideal  preparation  for  this  career.  It  is  clear  that 
Schlesinger’s  colleagues  and  contemporaries  found  his  contribution 
invaluable  and  he  was  described  as  an  authoritative  figure  on  Russian 
matters.  
 
One of Schlesinger’s most significant contributions to the new field was in his 
co-founding  and  co-editing  the  journal  Soviet  Studies,  one  of  the  world’s 
leading academic journals devoted to the Soviet Union. Based in Glasgow, 
the journal has remained an important periodical, changing its title to Europe-
Asia Studies in 1993 following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The journal 
provided  a  forum  for  scholars  with  an  interest  in  the  field  to  publish  and 
interact  and  bestowed  academic  credibility  on  a  still  new  discipline. 
Schlesinger  contributed  prolifically  to  the  journal  throughout  his  career  and 
was  noted  as  an  editor  of  integrity  who  strove  for  academic  objectivity 
whatever his personal political convictions. In 1964 Schlesinger also founded 
and  edited  the  journal  Co-existence.  Testament  to  Schlesinger’s  scholarly 
integrity, this was a modern attempt to promote friendly academic dialogue 
between ideological and developmental divides.  
 
Schlesinger was also well-known for his two documentary readers produced 
for  the  International  Library  of  Sociology  and  Social  Reconstruction.
2  The 
works,  on  the  family  and  the  nationalities  problems  in  the  USSR  are 
significant  for  providing  translated  and annotated  materials and  documents 
unavailable in the west up to then. Schlesinger also spent much of his time at 
                                                 
2  Schlesinger,  (ed.)  Changing  Attitudes  in  Soviet  Russia:  The  Family  in  the  USSR; 
Schlesinger, (ed.) Changing Attitudes in Soviet Russia: The Nationalities Problem and Soviet 
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Glasgow  publishing  translations  and  annotations  of  Soviet  texts  in  Soviet 
Studies. These, again, provided a wealth of information and source material 
for students and helped to lay the foundations of the discipline.  
 
Schlesinger,  the  scholar  advocate,  had  several  key  attributes.  Despite  his 
occasional  scholarly  failures,  when  the  role  of  advocate  seemed  to  take 
precedence in his desire to remain loyal to the Soviet experiment, Schlesinger 
appears intellectually honest. Consistency in approach and motivation can be 
seen in his work on Marxism and Soviet historiography. In both, he fought 
against  what  he  saw  as  vulgar  Marxism,  vulgar  economic  determinism;  a 
misunderstanding of the ideology and method that distorted and blunted it as 
an  instrument  of  social  change  and  intellectual  advancement.  In 
historiography,  Schlesinger  believed  Pokrovskii’s  influence  to  have  been 
hugely detrimental because it could be seen as simple economic determinism. 
This vulgarisation was increased yet further in the hands of his followers and 
popularisers.  Schlesinger  was  supportive  of  developments  under  Stalin 
because  historians  finally  overcame  this  error.  Pokrovskii’s  school  became 
obsolete, an improvement upon pre-Marxist historical analysis but dated and 
vulgar nonetheless.  In Marxism, Schlesinger combated attempts to pit the 
young Marx against his more mature works and argued against vulgarisation 
and overly deterministic interpretations. 
 
Another key feature is Schlesinger’s lifelong desire to counteract the myths 
and  distortions  that  he  saw  surrounding  perceptions  of  Marxism  and  the 
Soviet  Union.  Whether  caused  by  ignorant  misunderstanding,  utopian 
disillusionment or cold-war hostility, Schlesinger attempted to rescue Marxism 
from misinterpretation. He wished to show the West, in particular, the essence 
of true Marxism, the reality of the Soviet Union, rather than the jaundiced, 
one-dimensional  version  commonly  propounded.  His  defence  of  both  may 
have swung too far in opposition, but was done from an honest and stated 
standpoint. 
 
Schlesinger understood Marxism as a transforming ideology and method. It 
was supposed to change the world, for the better. This was also the essence   351 
of  his  scholarship.  Schlesinger,  as  a  Marxist  and  scholar,  was  actively 
engaged  in  that  transformation.  His  writings  must  be  assessed  from  this 
perspective; his intention was to change things: to explain, inspire and lead. 
This would necessarily give his work a political colour but does not make them 
any less honest or credible. 
 
Schlesinger’s Marxism, his understanding of history, his personal motivation 
were all profoundly influenced by the success of the Bolsheviks and the rise of 
the Soviet experiment. Schlesinger viewed everything through the prism of the 
Soviet Union. Originally raised within the German communist movement and 
Marxism  of  Luxemburg,  Schlesinger  shifted  allegiance  to  Lenin  when  the 
success of the Russian revolution became clear. To Schlesinger, this triumph, 
compared to the abject failure of German communism, was proof of Lenin’s 
superiority over Luxemburg. Schlesinger turned his attention east, and there it 
stayed. He was able to forgive almost anything the Soviet Union did, even 
when he was personally injured by those actions, because it was the current 
best hope for humanity. To Schlesinger, the Soviet Union was the pinnacle of 
communist  achievement  thus  far.  It  was  not  perfect,  it  made  mistakes, 
required development, but this was the nature of Marxist dialectical progress. 
To believe otherwise, was naïve utopianism.  
 
Schlesinger was loyal to the Soviet experiment and the Marxist method. This 
fact influenced all of his writings. Yet this loyalty was not to a specific party, to 
the  machinations  of  political  orthodoxy  and  the  dictates  of  changing  party 
personnel.  It  was  to  Soviet  and  Marxist  ideals.  In  fact,  Schlesinger’s 
commitment to these ideals – investigation, criticism, freedom of debate – led 
to his expulsion from the party he had devoted his life to. Schlesinger was a 
consciously  transparent  adherent  of  Marxism,  his  writings  were  politically 
coloured. With this in mind, one can appreciate the wealth of information and 
analysis he provided in the course of his academic career. His work is a rich, 
and largely untapped, source for the better appreciation of many aspects of 
the twentieth century.   352 
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